Korda and Ors v Australian Executor Trustees (SA) Limited

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[2014] HCATrans 175

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Melbourne  No M37 of 2014

B e t w e e n -

MARK KORDA

First Applicant

BRIAN WEBSTER

Second Applicant

S.E.A.S. SAPFOR FORESTS PTY LTD (ACN 007 872 120)

Third Applicant

S.E.A.S. SAPFOR HARVESTING PTY LTD (ACN 007 511 211)

Fourth Applicant

GUNNS LIMITED (ACN 009 478 148)

Fifth Applicant

and

AUSTRALIAN EXECUTOR TRUSTEES (SA) LIMITED (ACN 007 870 644)

Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

HAYNE J
CRENNAN J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT MELBOURNE ON FRIDAY, 15 AUGUST 2014, AT 10.21 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

____________________

MR P.D. CRUTCHFIELD, QC:   If the Court pleases, I appear with MR R.G. CRAIG for the applicants.  (instructed by Ashurst Australia)

MR J.R.J. LOCKHART, SC:   If the Court pleases, I appear with MR M.I. BORSKY, for the respondent.  (instructed by Sparke Helmore)

HAYNE J:   Yes, Mr Crutchfield.

MR CRUTCHFIELD:   Your Honours, the majority decision of the Court of Appeal appears to be the first authoritative statement of what “commercial necessity” means or at least what it might mean in the scope of its potential application.

HAYNE J:   Let us assume that questions of commercial necessity and their application in this case are controversial.

MR CRUTCHFIELD:   Yes.

HAYNE J:   Do we not need to be given the documents?

MR CRUTCHFIELD:   Well, your Honours only need to receive – it is common ground – the prospectus which contains the covenant which the covenant holder applied for and the 1964 trust deed and the tripartite agreement. 

HAYNE J:   Do we not particularly need to be given the tripartite agreement?

MR CRUTCHFIELD:   Yes.

HAYNE J:   What do we find there that is relevant to the issue?

MR CRUTCHFIELD:   One finds at least two things, your Honours.  First, one observes that the Milling Company is not a party to the trust deed.  It is a separate obligation it has to pay the money from the proceeds of the sale of the timber to the Forest Company.  That is in clauses 8 and 10 of that agreement.

HAYNE J:   Clause 9 is also perhaps relevant, is it not, at page ‑ ‑ ‑

MR CRUTCHFIELD:   Yes, I should have said 8 to 10.

HAYNE J:   Yes, page – what is it, 236 of the application book?  We have numbers of numerations on there.

MR CRUTCHFIELD:   Yes, exactly:

All moneys received by the Milling Company from the sale of such logs . . . shall be retained by the Milling Company and applied in manner following –

and it takes its slice, in effect.  It then pays the money to the Forest Company, the Forest Company takes its slice and then the Forest Company pays the money to the trustee for the covenant holders and, as your Honours know, it is a classic administration style trust, an old style 1961 Companies Act trust where the trustee collects the money on behalf of the covenant holders.  Now, if your…

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Details
Case
[2014] HCATrans 175
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by the Korda family (the appellants) against a decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia, which had affirmed a judgment in favour of Australian Executor Trustees (SA) Limited (the respondent). The dispute concerned the respondent's entitlement to recover moneys advanced by it to a company, Korda Industries Pty Ltd, which had been guaranteed by the appellants. The core of the dispute lay in whether the respondent had acted in breach of its duty as a mortgagee in possession of certain shares in Korda Industries Pty Ltd, which were also held as security for the loan.

The High Court was required to determine whether the respondent, in its capacity as mortgagee of the shares, owed a duty to the mortgagors (the appellants) to exercise its powers under the mortgage in good faith and for a proper purpose. Specifically, the Court had to consider whether the respondent's actions in appointing a receiver to Korda Industries Pty Ltd and subsequently selling the shares constituted a breach of any such duty, and if so, whether that breach discharged the appellants from their obligations under the personal guarantees.

The Court held that a mortgagee of shares, in exercising its powers of sale, owes a duty to the mortgagor to act in good faith and not to exercise its powers for a purpose other than that for which they were conferred. This duty is distinct from, and in addition to, any duty to take reasonable care to obtain a proper price. In this instance, the Court found that the respondent had not acted in bad faith or for an improper purpose in its dealings with the shares. The evidence did not support the appellants' contention that the respondent's actions were motivated by a desire to injure them or to gain some collateral advantage. Consequently, the respondent had not breached its duty as a mortgagee of the shares, and the appellants remained liable under their guarantees.

The appeal was dismissed.

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