Koonara Management Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) v Fabriano Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil)

KOONARA MANAGEMENT PTY LTD (RECEIVERS AND MANAGERS APPOINTED) v FABRIANO PTY LTD

[2019] SASC 99

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Blue

17 June 2019

PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - COSTS - GENERAL RULE: COSTS FOLLOW EVENT - GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND EXERCISE OF DISCRETION

PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - COSTS - DISCONTINUANCE OF OR WITHDRAWAL FROM PROCEEDING

Applications for costs.

Two separate claims were brought by the first and second plaintiffs against the defendant. The plaintiffs had common solicitors and counsel.

The second plaintiff obtained judgment against the defendant by consent for the delivery up of a large quantity of wine. It seeks an order that the defendant pay its costs of action. Conversely, the defendant seeks an order that the second plaintiff pay its costs of action.

The first plaintiff discontinued its action against the defendant. The defendant seeks an order that the first plaintiff pay its costs of action. The first plaintiff seeks an order that each party bear its own costs of action.

Held:

1. As between the second plaintiff and the defendant, costs should follow the event. The defendant should pay the second plaintiff’s costs of the second plaintiff’s action (at [75]).

2.As between the first plaintiff and the defendant, costs should follow the event. The first plaintiff should pay the defendant’s costs of defending the first plaintiff’s claim insofar as those costs were incurred over and above costs incurred in relation to the second plaintiff’s claim (at [83], [88]).

Landlord and Tenant Act 1936 (SA) ss 22, 23, 24, 28, 29; Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth) ss 73, 73(1); Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 420A, referred to.
Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72, discussed.

KOONARA MANAGEMENT PTY LTD (RECEIVERS AND MANAGERS APPOINTED) v FABRIANO PTY LTD
[2019] SASC 99

BLUE J:  

  1. These are applications for costs.

  2. The second plaintiff Reschke Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) (Receivers and Managers Appointed) (Reschke) seeks an order that the defendant Fabriano Pty Ltd (Fabriano) pay its costs following judgment by consent in favour of Reschke. Fabriano seeks an order that Reschke pay its costs or alternatively each party bear its own costs up to 22 October 2018 and thereafter that Reschke pay its costs.

  3. Fabriano seeks an order that the first plaintiff Koonara Management Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) (Koonara) pay its costs following Koonara’s discontinuance of its action. Koonara seeks an order that each party bear its own costs.

    Background

  4. Reschke, Koonara and Reschke Vineyards Pty Ltd (Reschke Vineyards) formed a group of companies controlled by Burke Reschke. Reschke Vineyards carried on a vineyard business on land owned by it in the Coonawarra. Reschke carried on a winemaking business. Koonara provided management services to Reschke Vineyards and Reschke (for which purpose it owned and used agricultural machinery). Koonara allowed Reschke to store its wine (in barrels and bottles) in sheds…

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Details
Case
[2019] SASC 99
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case involves Fabriano Pty Ltd, seeking an order that Koonara Management Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) pay its costs following the discontinuance of Koonara’s action. Koonara, on the other hand, sought an order for each party to bear its own costs. The underlying dispute revolves around an alleged oral lease between Fabriano and Koonara, the purported termination of this lease by Fabriano, and the subsequent distraint of goods by Fabriano, including wine barrels and machinery belonging to Koonara and Reschke. The legality and existence of the lease, as well as the validity of the distraint, remain contested. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court.

The primary legal issues the court had to address were whether the general principle that costs follow the event applied, and whether there were any circumstances that would justify a departure from this principle. Specifically, the court needed to determine whether Koonara should pay Fabriano’s costs following the discontinuance of the action or if each party should bear their own costs. This involved considering the circumstances surrounding the discontinuance of the action and whether any factors warranted a deviation from the general rule.

The court found that the general rule that costs follow the event should apply, meaning that Koonara should pay Fabriano’s costs of action. The court rejected Koonara’s argument that the case should be treated as a compromise where each party bears its own costs. This principle only applies where the parties have entered into a compromise agreement, not in cases of unilateral abandonment of the case by the plaintiff. The court highlighted that Koonara did not engage in any meaningful dialogue with Fabriano before initiating the action, which could have potentially led to an agreement. Furthermore, the court noted that the issues of selling costs and allocation of purchase price were only addressed during the hearing, without any clear mechanism proposed by Koonara. The court concluded that there was no sufficient reason to depart from the general rule, and thus, the plaintiff should bear the defendant’s costs.

The court ordered that Fabriano be entitled to recover its costs of the proceeding from Koonara. The reasoning was grounded in the established principle that unless there is good reason to order otherwise, the party against whom an action is discontinued is entitled to costs arising from the action up to the time of receiving notice of the discontinuance.

Background

Background to the litigation

Fabriano seeks an order that the first plaintiff Koonara Management Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) (Koonara) pay its costs following Koonara’s discontinuance of its action. Koonara seeks an order that each party bear its own costs.Background Reschke, Koonara and Reschke Vineyards Pty Ltd (Reschke Vineyards) formed a group of companies controlled by Burke Reschke. Reschke Vineyards carried on a vineyard business on land owned by it in the Coonawarra. Reschke carried on a winemaking business. Koonara provided management services to Reschke Vineyards and Reschke (for which purpose it owned and used agricultural machinery). Koonara allowed Reschke to store its wine (in barrels and bottles) in sheds on land owned by Fabriano. The Reschke group borrowed money from the National Australia Bank and gave security over their assets to the Bank including fixed and floating charges. Fabriano is a company controlled by Vivian Reschke, who is Burke Reschke’s mother. It owns approximately 480 acres of land at 305 Rocky Castle Road Coonawarra. Fabriano claims that it leased approximately 20 acres of that land (the Land) to Koonara pursuant to an oral lease (the Lease).[1][1] The existence or validity of the Lease was and is disputed. For ease of reference, I refer to the lease asserted by Fabriano as “the Lease” in neutral terms without connoting that it does exist. On 9 May 2018 Fabriano purportedly terminated the Lease on the ground of non-payment of rent totalling $121,669, re-entered the Land and exercised distraint over goods (the Goods) situated on the Land (the Distraint).[2] Those goods included agricultural machinery and plant owned by Koonara (the Koonara Equipment). It also included 1,557 barrels containing 450,975 litres of wine (the Barrelled Wine) and 430 cartons of bottled wine (the Bottled Wine) owned by Reschke.[2] The legality of the Distraint was and is disputed. For ease of reference, I refer to the purported distraint as “the Distraint” in neutral terms without connoting that it was lawful. On 10 May 2018 solicitors for the National Australia Bank sent an email to Fabriano’s solicitors saying that the Bank was the secured creditor of the Reschke group and requesting a copy of the warrant of distraint and inventory. On 11 May Fabriano’s solicitors sent an email to the Bank’s solicitor attaching a copy of the warrant and inventory. On 11 May 2018 the Bank’s solicitors sent an email to Fabriano’s solicitors saying that the Bank held a security interest over all property of Koonara, which had priority over any rights asserted by the landlord. As at the date of the Distraint, action number 976 of 2017 was on foot in this Court being an action by Burke Reschke and Reschke Vineyards against Vivian Reschke, Fabriano and others (action 976). On 17 May 2018, Burke Reschke applied for an interlocutory injunction in action 976 restoring possession of the Land and Goods to Koonara. On 18 May 2018 I heard Burke Reschke’s application. In the course of the hearing, Mr Reschke asserted that the value of the Barrelled Wine was approximately $3.9 million and the value of the distrained machinery and plant was approximately $300,000. He asserted that most of the machinery was owned by Koonara but all of the wine was owned by Reschke. He asserted that the Barrelled Wine was at risk if it remained in the possession of Fabriano. The application was adjourned part heard to 23 May 2018. Fabriano gave an undertaking not to deal with the Goods before the next hearing. Vivian Reschke was present at the hearing.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In any event, the making of the belated offer two days before the scheduled hearing would not be sufficient reason to make a differential costs order. Conclusion Fabriano should pay Reschke’s costs of the Reschke action.Koonara action At the hearing on 11 December 2018 Koonara announced that it did not intend to pursue its interlocutory application and intended to discontinue the action. In due course permission was granted to its discontinuing the action and it has now done so. Rule 107(4) of the Rules provides:Unless the parties agree or the Court orders to the contrary, the party against whom the action, or a claim or defence in the action, is discontinued is entitled to costs arising from the action, or the claim or defence (as the case may require) up to the time of receiving notice of the discontinuance. The starting point is that, unless there is good reason to order to the contrary, Koonara should pay Fabriano’s costs of action. Koonara refers to authorities in which it has been held that, when parties agree to a compromise of an action without agreeing in relation to the costs, ordinarily the court will not proceed to determine the merits of the action and ordinarily will order that each party bear its own costs.[9] Koonara cites a passage from Dal Pont’s Law of Costs which includes the following:Where a suit is compromised before hearing, and the parties have reached no agreement as to costs, the issue may arise as to whether, and if so how, a court can exercise its costs discretion in the absence of a full hearing on the merits. The lack of such a hearing deprives the court of the main factor that determines whether or how it will make a costs order: the ultimate outcome of the case. It is tempting as a starting point to simply say the appropriate course is that each party bear its own costs.… It follows that, at least in cases where the conduct of each party in the litigation has been reasonable, and there is no satisfactory basis upon which the court can make an assessment of the merits, each party will ordinarily be ordered to bear his or her own costs.[10][9] Koonara cites Australian Securities Commission v Aust-Home Investments (1993) 44 FCR 194 at 201 per Hill J; Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs; ex parte Lai Qin (1997) 186 CLR 622 at 624 per McHugh J; Gribbles Pathology Pty Ltd v Health Insurance Commission (1997) 80 FCR 823 at 827 per Finkelstein J.[10] GE Dal Pont, Law of Costs (LexisNexis, 3rd ed, 2013) at [14.66]. The principle relied upon by Koonara only applies when the parties have entered into a compromise agreement: it has no application to a unilateral abandonment of the case by the plaintiff. In the latter case, the general rule is that the plaintiff pays the defendant’s costs of action. There is no reason to depart from the general rule. Before they instituted the action on 12 October 2018, the receivers did not engage in any communications with Fabriano with a view to seeking its agreement to their selling the Koonara equipment as part of a larger sale of the vineyards. If the receivers had engaged in dialogue with Fabriano, an agreement may have been reached. In addition, Mr Hart in his affidavit did not articulate any mechanism for allocating an indivisible purchase price for the vineyards and equipment as between the vineyards and the equipment. This was critical to the protection of the rights of Fabriano pursuant to its distraint of the Koonara equipment. Nor did Mr Hart quantify the selling costs that would be deducted from the sale proceeds before payment into Court. In reality, these matters were only addressed on the run during the hearing on 25 October 2018. When a proposal emerged as a result of discussion during the hearing, Fabriano did not oppose the proposal outright but expressed concern about the costs that would be deducted before payment into court of the proceeds of sale.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court began by acknowledging the general rule that costs follow the event, meaning the party who loses the case usually pays the other party's costs. However, the court noted that this rule is not absolute and can be departed from if there are compelling reasons to do so. The case of Koonara Management Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) v Fabriano Pty Ltd presented a situation where the plaintiff, Koonara, unilaterally discontinued its action without reaching a compromise agreement with the defendant, Fabriano. This situation called for an examination of whether the general rule should apply.

Koonara argued that since the parties had not agreed on the costs and the action was discontinued before a final determination, each party should bear its own costs. The court considered the cited authorities, which indeed suggest that where parties compromise without agreeing on costs, the court typically orders that each party bear its own costs. However, the court distinguished these cases on the basis that they involved a mutual agreement to discontinue the proceedings, whereas the current case involved a unilateral decision by Koonara to discontinue the action.

The court also examined whether Koonara's conduct in the litigation was reasonable, which could warrant a departure from the general rule. Koonara had not engaged with Fabriano prior to initiating the action, and the court found that such lack of engagement did not reflect reasonable conduct. Furthermore, the court highlighted that Koonara's unilateral discontinuance without reaching a compromise constituted good reason to order that Fabriano should not be awarded costs. The court underscored that the lack of pre-litigation engagement and the unilateral discontinuance of the action justified a deviation from the standard costs rule.

The court further deliberated on whether the plaintiff's unilateral discontinuance constituted sufficient grounds for ordering that each party bear its own costs. It was noted that the authorities relied upon by Koonara applied to cases where parties mutually agree to discontinue proceedings, which was not the case here. Given that Koonara had not made any reasonable effort to reach a compromise with Fabriano and had unilaterally discontinued the action, the court found no basis to order that each party bear its own costs.

Lastly, the court considered whether the plaintiff's lack of engagement with the defendant prior to the institution of the action influenced the court's discretion in awarding costs. The court concluded that this factor supported the imposition of costs on Koonara, reinforcing the decision that Koonara should bear Fabriano's costs. The court emphasized that had Koonara engaged with Fabriano, an agreement might have been reached, and the costs outcome could have been different.

In summary, the court held that the general rule that costs follow the event applied in this case, and Koonara should pay Fabriano's costs of the action. The court's reasoning hinged on the absence of a compromise agreement, the unreasonable conduct of Koonara in not engaging with Fabriano prior to litigation, the unilateral discontinuance of the action, and the lack of pre-litigation engagement. The binding legal principle, or ratio decidendi, established by this decision is that a unilateral discontinuance of an action by a plaintiff without reaching a compromise agreement justifies the imposition of costs on the plaintiff, even in the absence of a full hearing on the merits.