Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia
(DIVISION 1)
Konicka & Winski [2022] FedCFamC1F 705
File number(s): SYC 2007 of 2018 Judgment of: CHRISTIE J Date of judgment: 16 September 2022 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – FINAL PARENTING – where the single expert was cross-examined and the parties settled by consent.
FAMILY LAW – FINAL PROPERTY – where the husband made substantial financial contributions – where the inclusion of notional property was controversial.
Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 75, 79, Part VIII
Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) ss 88, 88C
Cases cited: Bonnici & Bonnici [1991] FamCA 86
Chorn and Hopkins (2004) FLC 93-204
In the Marriage ofPellegrino (1997) FLC 92-789
Jacombe v Jacombe (1961) 105 CLR 355
Kowaliw & Kowaliw (1981) FLC 91-092
Lin and Nicholl [2016] FamCA 401
Pierce & Pierce (1999) FLC 92-844
Trevi & Trevi (2018) FLC 93-858
Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 88 Date of hearing: 29 August – 2 September 2022 Place: Sydney Counsel for the Applicant: Ms Seric Solicitor for the Applicant: De Saxe O’Neill Family Lawyers Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Fermanis Solicitor for the Respondent: Drayton Sher Lawyers Counsel for the Independent Children's Lawyer: Ms Messner on 29 and 30 September 2022 Solicitor for the Independent Children's Lawyer: Legal Aid NSW ORDERS
SYC 2007 of 2018 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MS KONICKA
Applicant
AND: MR WINSKI
Respondent
order made by:
CHRISTIE J
DATE OF ORDER:
16 September 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Within 60 days of the date of this order Mr Winski (“the husband”) pay to Ms Konicka (“the wife”) or as she may direct the sum of $522,038.
2.Simultaneously with the husband’s compliance with Order 1, the wife provide to the husband a properly executed Withdrawal of Caveat Registered Number … and the requisite lodgement fee in relation to the Caveat registered over the title of B Street, Suburb C (“the Suburb C property”).
3.Within 14 days of the husband’s compliance with Order 1 the wife vacate the Suburb C property.
4.In the event that the husband fails to comply with Order 1, then within seven days of the husband’s non-compliance, the husband and wife (“the parties”) shall list for sale the Suburb C property on the following terms:
(a)The parties shall instruct such lawyer as the parties agree upon to have the conduct of the sale, or in the absence of agreement reached within seven days, the wife shall propose three names and the husband shall select one within 48 hours;
(b)The parties shall appoint such agent as the parties agree upon to have the conduct of the sale and in default of agreement as to agent, within seven days the wife shall propose three names and the husband shall select one within 48 hours (“the agent”);
(c)The property will be sold in a manner as agreed between the parties, and failing agreement, as recommended by the agent;
(d)Should the parties agree for the property to be sold…
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- AGLC
- Konicka & Winski [2022] FedCFamC1F 705
- Case
- [2022] FedCFamC1F 705
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the marriage was valid based on the evidence of the ceremony, including the exchange of rings and vows and the husband's subsequent description of himself as married. The court did not find the husband's equivocal evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of a valid marriage. The court also declined to determine the exact commencement date of their cohabitation, as it was not material to the assessment of matters under the Act. The court agreed on the assets, liabilities, and superannuation available for adjustment between the parties, as well as the wife's submission to include certain funds as notional property of the husband.
The court's reasoning was based on the principles set out in Jacombe v Jacombe and Lin and Nicholl. The court considered the source of funds and the wide discretion available in making property adjustment orders. The court found that the husband's inheritance during the marriage would ordinarily be considered a contribution on his behalf. The court also considered the transfer of funds from the husband to his brother and the sale of the Suburb G property.
The court ordered that the parties' marriage was valid and that there should be an adjustment to the contribution-based entitlements of the parties. The court made orders for the distribution of the assets, liabilities, superannuation, and financial resources between the parties, taking into account the wife's submission to include certain funds as notional property of the husband. The court also made orders for the payment of legal costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In a similar vein the husband in this case received an inheritance in the course of the parties’ marriage and as a matter of general principle this would ordinarily be considered a contribution on his behalf: Bonnici & Bonnici [1991] FamCA 86. Consideration The issues which arose for determination were:(a)Were the parties validly married?(b)When did the parties commence to reside together?(c)What assets, liabilities, superannuation and financial resources did the parties have at the beginning of their relationship?(d)How should the transfer of funds from the husband to his brother during the relationship be characterised?(e)Were there surplus funds from the sale of the Suburb G property and if so what happened to them?(f)Is the wife cohabiting with another person?(g)Should there be an adjustment to the contribution based entitlements of the parties? I find that the parties had a wedding ceremony conducted by a priest. The ceremony took place in a church and the parties exchanged rings and vows. The husband thereafter described himself as married. The presumption in favour of the parties being validly married being demonstrated on the basis of cogent evidence, I do not find that there was anything in the husband’s evidence which was capable of rebutting that presumption. Accordingly, I will treat the application for property adjustment as an application invoking the provisions of Part VIII of the Act. The parties were at issue about the commencement of their cohabitation. The husband said that the parties started living together around late 2012. The wife said they started to live together on a full-time basis in early 2012. Accordingly the parties are only at issue about a period of approximately nine months. During that nine months, the parties were married in Country E in 2012. I decline to make a finding about the dispute in circumstances where it is not material to the assessment of matters under the Act. The husband’s net asset position was similar at all relevant points in 2012. Before I turn to consider the parties’ respective contributions it is appropriate to make a determination about the assets, liabilities, financial resources and superannuation available for adjustment as between the parties at the time of trial. The parties reached agreement about the identity and value of the assets, liabilities and superannuation available for adjustment between them (as set out in exhibit D): In addition, the wife submitted that the Court would either include as notional property of the husband (or otherwise make an adjustment to take into account): (a)K Company shares sold and applied to the husband’s legal fees - $10,799;(b)Proceeds from the sale of the Suburb G property not accounted for on settlement - $194,726; and(c)Monies paid by the husband to his brother (other than to acquire interest in the Suburb C & Country E properties) - $196,714. The husband sold the K Company (by then L Company) shares he had acquired from his father’s estate in mid-2018 and received net $10,680.04. He applied those funds to payment of his lawyers. The husband’s counsel said, and I accept, that having regard to the source of those funds – inherited from the estate of the husband’s father - it was open to the Court not to include them as notional property having regard to the wide discretion and the principles which emerge from decisions such as Chorn and Trevi.