Kocer v R

Case [2006] NSWCCA 328


NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL

CITATION:      KOCER v REGINA [2006]  NSWCCA 328

FILE NUMBER(S):
2006/2096; 2006/1965

HEARING DATE(S):               22 September 2006

DECISION DATE:     22/09/2006
EX TEMPORE DATE:          22/09/2006

PARTIES:
A - Ali KOCER
R - Regina

JUDGMENT OF:       McClellan CJ at CL Buddin J Rothman J   

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: District Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):          06/11/0113

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:     Goldring DCJ

COUNSEL:
A - Ertunc Ozen
R - Nicole Noman

SOLICITORS:
A - Nyman Gibson Stewart Solicitors
R - S Kavanagh (Public Prosecutions)

CATCHWORDS:
Criminal Law
Criminal Appeal
competency of appeal
appeal from determination on admissibility of evidence
appeal from an interlocutory order
ruling on evidence not an interlocutory order
competency of stated case

LEGISLATION CITED:
Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW)
Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW)
Crimes Legislation Further Amendment Bill
Supreme Court Act 1970

DECISION:
The appeal and the stated case is dismissed.

JUDGMENT:

- 1 -

IN THE COURT OF
CRIMINAL APPEAL

2006/2096
2006/1965

McCLELLAN CJ at CL
BUDDIN J
ROTHMAN J

22 September 2006

ALI KOCER v REGINA

Judgment

  1. McCLELLAN CJ AT CL:  This is yet another case where an accused person has sought to raise a question in relation to the admissibility of evidence in this Court.  This Court made plain in R v Steffan (1993) 30 NSWLR 633 that questions as to the admissibility of evidence at a trial are not amenable to review on the application of an accused person during the course of the trial. There are obvious and previously stated policy reasons for this position.

  2. A trial judge is entrusted with the conduct of the trial and in only limited circumstances can his or her decision be reviewed in this Court during the course of the trial.  The proper administration of the criminal justice system requires both the trial judge and this Court to be alert to ensure that the trial process is not fragmented by applications during the trial when ultimately, if an injustice occurs, it can be corrected on appeal to this Court.

  1. I agree with Rothman J and the orders which his Honour proposes.

  2. BUDDIN J:  I agree with Rothman J and the orders which his Honour proposes.  I also agree with the additional observations made by McClellan CJ at CL.

  3. ROTHMAN J: Ali Kocer purports to appeal pursuant to the terms of s.5F of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (the Act) against the determination of his Honour Judge Goldring of the District Court of New South Wales made on 18 July 2006. An issue arises as to the competency of the appeal, which involves the construction of s.5F. Before dealing with that issue it is necessary to recite very briefly the nature of the matter which is sought to be appealed.

  4. On 18 July 2006, Goldring DCJ determined that Constable Lehmann was acting on a reasonable suspicion when he chose to stop and search the vehicle registered NXA 21A at 11.05 pm on 12 September 2005.  The accused has been charged with supply…

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AGLC
Kocer v R [2006] NSWCCA 328
Case
[2006] NSWCCA 328
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant in this matter, Kocer, was appealing against the ruling of the Court of Criminal Appeal in relation to the admissibility of certain evidence. The respondent, the Crown, objected to the competency of the appeal. The issue before the court was whether the appeal was within the legislative exceptions that permit an appeal from an interlocutory order. Additionally, the court had to determine if the stated case was competent.

The court held that the appeal was not within the exceptions provided by the legislation, as the ruling on evidence was not an interlocutory order. The court emphasised that the legislative intention is to limit the interference by interlocutory appellate procedures in criminal trials. The trial judge had issued a certificate under ss.5F(3)(i)(b), but the court found that the judge should not have done so as there was no substantial doubt about the correctness of the order made. The court also found that the stated case was incompetent. The appeal was dismissed, and the stated case was also dismissed.

The court concluded that the appeal was not within the legislative exceptions that permit an appeal from an interlocutory order. The ruling on evidence was not an interlocutory order and therefore the appeal was not within the exceptions. The court also found that the stated case was incompetent. The appeal and the stated case were dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

CLELLAN CJ
As I understand it, the appeal under s.5F of the Act was filed in circumstances where the Crown objected to the competence of the stated case and was intended by the applicant to subsume the stated case. In any event, no case can be stated under s.5B of the Act and the case stated is also incompetent. Conclusion It is important to understand that the legislative intention is that criminal trials will be dealt with by the trial judge without undue interference by interlocutory appellate procedures. There are a limited number of exceptions in which the legislature has determined that there may be an appeal, because of the effect of the order on the trial as a whole and, usually, the absence of appeal rights if the trial proceeds to its conclusion. The trial judge issued a certificate under ss.5F(3)(i)(b). It cannot be stressed too highly that trials should proceed without interruption by interlocutory appeals, except where to do otherwise may permanently affect the rights of a party or so inconvenience the trial that an interruption is necessary, in the interests of justice. It will rarely be appropriate for a trial judge to issue a certificate and it will be done only when, in addition to the foregoing considerations, the judge has substantial doubt about the correctness of the order made. As this Court said in Lethlean v R (1995) 83 A Crim R 197 at 206:“I would add that although, in the present case, the trial judge granted a certificate, in my opinion and with due respect, he clearly should not have done so. His Honour apparently had no doubt that he had ruled correctly and said he was prepared to grant the certificate with considerable reluctance. A certificate should be granted only if the trial judge considers there is substantial doubt about the interlocutory judgment given or order made and that it is convenient that the Court of Criminal Appeal resolve that doubt before the trial proceeds further. The trial judge should bear in mind the general disadvantages of appeals on interlocutory matters. These include that the appeal may ultimately prove to have been either unnecessary or an unnecessary duplication of the appeal process.”An interlocutory appeal should be a last resort and not a tactic to delay the trial or undermine the finality of the trial process. This purported appeal under s.5F does not fit within one of the legislative exceptions and is incompetent. As discussed, the stated case is also incompetent. I propose that each of the appeal and the stated case be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: CLELLAN CJ

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