Knowles v McGrory

Case [2025] ACTMC 11


MAGISTRATES COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

Case Title:

Knowles v McGrory

Citation:

[2025] ACTMC 11

Hearing Dates:

27 February 2025 and 21 May 2025

DecisionDate:

21 May 2025

Before:

Magistrate Theakston

Decision:

See [24]

Catchwords:

CRIMINAL LAW – Road Transport Legislation – Drive whilst suspended – Whether s 72 evidentiary certificate admissible – Whether breach of legislative conditions invalidates driver licence suspension – no evidence to answer submission

Legislation Cited:

Road Transport (General) Act 1999 s 3, 17, 44A, 47, 47A and 72

Road Transport (Offences) Regulation 2005 s 16J

Road Transport (Safety and Traffic Management) Act 1999 s 25

Public Sector Management Act 1994 s 18 and 20

Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act 1988 s 70

Legislation Act 2001 s 40, 41, 139 and 140

Administrative Arrangements 2017 (No 1) article 5

Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1999 s 32(2)(a)

Human Rights Act 2004 s 21 and 22

Cases Cited:

Police v Candy [2025] ACTMC 5

Stone v French [2013] ACTMC 4

O’Reilly v State Bank of VictoriaCommissioners [1983] HCA 47

Cassell v R [2000] HCA 8

Hijazi v Orr (1997) 26 MVR 266

R v Morris (1997) 98 A Crim R 408

SAS Trustee Corporation v Miles [2018] HCA 55

Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28

Texts: 

Mirko Bagaric, Ross on Crime (Thomson Reuters, 9th ed, 2022)

Parties:

Ashley Knowles (Informant)

Rodney McGrory (Defendant)

Representation:

Solicitors

R Mackenzie – ACT Director of Public Prosecutions (Informant)

E Wilson – Legal Aid ACT (Defendant)

Charge Number:

CC2024/1484

MAGISTRATE THEAKSTON

Introduction

  1. Earlier today I found the defendant had no case to answer in relation to a charge and dismissed the same.  These are my reasons.

Background

  1. The defendant was before the Court for the hearing of several charges. Relevantly, he was charged with the offence of driving while his driver licence was suspended, contrary to s 32(2)(a) of the Road Transport (Driver Licencing) Act 1999.  He pleaded not guilty to that charge.

  2. The prosecution case was that in 2023 he was pulled over by police and observed to have been driving while his driver licence had been suspended.  There was no issue that he was driving a registrable vehicle on a road at the relevant time.  The defendant took issue with the certificate tendered to prove the suspension, submitting that:

    (a)the certificate was invalid and therefore should not be admitted into evidence, and

    (b)in any event, the purported suspension was invalid and of no effect.

General Principles

  1. In these proceedings, as in all criminal proceedings, the onus of proof is on the prosecution, and they are required to prove each element of an offence beyond reasonable doubt.  Proof is based on the evidence before the court.

  2. At the end of the prosecution case and before a defendant decides whether to present their own case, the defendant may make a no case to answer submission.  The test to be considered in those circumstances is whether, based on the evidence before the court,…

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AGLC
Knowles v McGrory [2025] ACTMC 11
Case
[2025] ACTMC 11
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Knowles v McGrory, the defendant was charged with driving while his licence was suspended, an offence under the Road Transport (General) Act 1999. The defendant argued that the certificate presented by the prosecution, which was used to prove that his licence was suspended, did not meet the requirements of section 72 of the Act and thus was inadmissible. The court was tasked with determining whether the certificate could be considered admissible evidence and if the breach of legislative conditions invalidated the driver’s licence suspension.

The court examined the requirements of section 72 of the Road Transport (General) Act 1999, which provides that a certificate signed by or on behalf of the Road Transport Authority is prima facie evidence of certain matters, including those related to the demerit points register or driver licence register. The court found that the section does not require the certificate to be valid but only that it appears to be signed by the Road Transport Authority. The court also noted that the purpose of the provision is to streamline the proof of technical facts in minor offences and that the defendant still had the opportunity to challenge the contents of the certificate. Based on this analysis, the court determined that the certificate was admissible as evidence, and the defendant's argument regarding the validity of the certificate was rejected.

Given the court's findings, the defendant's argument that the breach of legislative conditions invalidated the driver’s licence suspension was also dismissed. The court found that there was no evidence presented to support this claim, and thus, the suspension remained valid. The defendant's challenge to the admissibility of the certificate was unsuccessful, and the court upheld the conviction.

The court ordered that the conviction for driving whilst suspended be upheld, and the defendant was required to pay a fine.

Orders

Orders of the court

See [24]

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Section 72 of the Road Transport (General) Act 1999 states relevantly:72Certificate evidence and other evidentiary provisions(1)A certificate that appears to be signed by or on behalf of the road transport authority … and states any of the following matters, is evidence of:(a) a matter that appears in or can be worked out from the demerit points register or driver licence register kept under the Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1999; …(7)A court must accept a certificate or other document mentioned in this section as proof of the matters stated in it if there is no evidence to the contrary. Certificates, such as this, have been described as providing prima facie evidence of the facts stated, that such evidence has no inherent weight, and it remains necessary for the court to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the offence has been proved: Hijazi v Orr (1997) 26 MVR 266 at 271. Accordingly, it is open to the defendant to present and or point to other evidence that supports an alternative finding or at the very least creates a reasonable doubt about the facts described in a certificate. That opportunity to challenge the matters described within a certificate should not be confused with any challenge to the provenance or validity of the certificate. The latter does not appear available when the certificate, on its face, satisfies the requirements of the provision. The High Court, in in SAS Trustee Corporation v Miles [2018] HCA 55 at 20 (the judgment of Kiefel CJ, Bell and Nettle JJ) observed that ‘the starting point for ascertainment the meaning of a statutory provision is, of course, the text of the provision considered in light of its context and purpose.’ That principle is echoed in ss 139 and 140 of the Legislation Act 2001. Earlier, the High Court observed in Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28 at [71] that ‘a court construing a statutory provision must strive to give meaning to every word of the provision.’ Additionally, Territory legislation must also be interpreted, so far as is possible, in a way that is compatible with the rights described in the Human Rights Act 2004. Section 72 does not expressly require a certificate to be valid. Instead, the ordinary meaning of the text requires that the certificate only appears to be signed by or on behalf of the Road Transport Authority and state relevant matters. The natural and ordinary meaning of that language is not ambiguous. The word ‘appears’ would do no work and have no meaning if the provision was construed to require the certificate to have been, as a matter of fact, signed by the Road Transport Authority or someone authorised to do so on the authority’s behalf. The above construction is consistent with the obvious purpose and context of the provision and Act. In particular, the provision’s purpose is obviously to streamline the proof of technical and ordinarily non-controversial facts; and more generally, the purpose of the Act is the administration and enforcement of the Road Transport Legislation: s 3 of the Road Transport (General) Act 1999. The provision exists along with a range of other provisions, described above, that provide flexibility for the devolution of statutory authority. Further, the defendant retained the opportunity to challenge the actual contents of the certificate. The convenience provided by these certificates is in the context of the court hearing very minor offences where any engagement with the question about whether the certificate was validly signed may trigger an inquiry unacceptably disproportionate in scale. Accordingly, I see no ambiguity in the ordinary meaning of the provision or any inconsistency between that construction and the purpose and of the Act or the legislative context.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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