Knight v The Queen
[1992] HCATrans 160
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No Sl0l of 1991
B e t w e e n -
PAUL ANTHONY KNIGHT
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Application for special leave
to appeal
MASON CJ
DEANE JDAWSON J
Knight.PA 1 29/5/92 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON FRIDAY, 29 MAY 1992, AT 10.22 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR T.A. GAME: If the Court pleases, I appear for the
applicant with my learned friend,
MR P.A.J, BRAZIER. (instructed by Paul K. Bell &
Co)
MR K. MASON, QC, Solicitor-General for New South Wales: I appear for the respondent with my learned friend,
MR W.G. ROSER. (instructed by S.E. O'Connor,
Solicitor for Public Prosecutions)
MASON CJ: Yes, Mr Game?
MR GAME: If the Court pleases, this is an application for special leave to appeal and an application for
extension of time from a judgment of the New South
Wales Court of Criminal Appeal of 28 March 1991, in
which it dismissed an appeal against convictionfrom a conviction of 2 December 1988, arising out
of the Bathurst riots of April 1985, which makes
this case rather long in the tooth, to say the
least.
There is only one ground from the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal which is raised in the
application for special leave, and that is the
ground which concerns the admission into evidence
of confessional material, a short confessional
statement to an Inspector Schmidt at Bathurst
police station at about 5.30 pm on 7 April.
Very shortly, the factual background is this:
the applicant was arrested at 4.00 pm at the
Mount Panorama race track by certain police
officers. The allegation was made in the evidence
to those officers in cross-examination that they
had assaulted the applicant. That was some time
after 4.00 pm. The names of those officers in particular were Spooner and Smith.
Now, some time later in the trial
Inspector Schmidt gave evidence. The admissions made to Inspector Schmidt were admissions made, as
I said, at about 5.30 pm at the Bathurst police
station which is some five kilometres or more from
the Mount Panorama race track. It was put to
Schmidt that the admissions were not made. Certain
allegations were put to Schmidt, including an
allegation that a threat was made that the
applicant would be charged with attempted murder,
but nothing was put to Schmidt concerning the
physical state of the applicant. No objection was taken to the admission of the confessional
material.
In his unsworn statement the applicant made
allegations that he was assaulted by a number of
Knight.PA 2 29/5/92 officers, and those allegations, if accepted,
amounted to a pretty severe beating. He then said in his unsworn statement that he was taken to the
police station and a considerable time later he was
spoken to by Inspector Schmidt, and he denied the
allegations made by Inspector Schmidt.
Now, immediately after the giving of his
unsworn statement, tendered into evidence over
objection was some medical notes from the Bathurst
gaol. Those medical notes showed - - -
DAWSON J: Who tendered them? MR GAME: The applicant's counsel tendered them, and he tendered them over objection. That appears at
page 693. Sorry, it says:
Yes, I have no objection -
then objection to tender, 693, marked exhibit "2".
MASON CJ: For what purpose were they tendered?
MR GAME: It appears from the observations made in the summing up that the trial judge and counsel thought
that they were tendered for the purpose of
discrediting the detectives who had arrested the
applicant. Now, that appears in the summing up at page 94, from line 15 and then at line 23:
But it's got nothing to do with what he did
beforehand -
this is a reference to the evidence concerning the
assaults. Then at line 29: Your duty is to discover what happened before
he was arrested, form your views about that.
Then it is suggested in the next line that the
material concerning the injuries sustained was relevant to the credit of the police officers about that subject, that subject either being the assaults or what they had to say about the observations of the applicant's involvement in the riot. And then at the top of page 95:
As I said that does not constitute a ground
upon which you should take any course other
than your appropriate duty to decide whether the case has been made out or not. If proof can be given of who did than then appropriate
proceedings can be, would've been brought
about it. Evidently no such thing has
Knight.PA 29/5/92 occurred as we haven't heard anything about
it.
Now that direction is, in my submission, plainly
erroneous. But that direction explains the basis
upon which the parties thought that the material
was going in. Now the material was admissible, in my submission, but it was admissible for a
different purpose. It was admissible, first of
all, because it touched upon the voluntariness of
the confession, but secondly, it was admissible
because it threw doubt on the weight to be given to
the confessional material and it is established
from a long line of cases referred to in
Your Honour the Chief Justice's judgement in
Macpherson's case, that that is a proper use of
such material.
DAWSON J: Well, once of course the confession had gone in,
the question of voluntariness disappeared, did it
not?
MR GAME: Yes, Your Honour, but it still remained for the trial judge to give -
DAWSON J: The question of the weight to be given it, whether it was made or not at all, that was still
open, yes, it would go to that.
MR GAME: Yes, it still remained for the trial judge· to give appropriate directions on all of the material
touching the confession including those medical
notes. But if one considers this case at the
moment those medical notes had gone in, then what
had happened was: early in the trial police
officers in the witness box; allegations put to
them; later in the trial and towards the end of the
Crown case confessional material, no objection;
accused makes dock statement; then medical material
tendered, and we know, with the benefit of
hindsight, that the trial judge was satisfied that the accused had in fact been assaulted violently by
the police officers who arrested him.
Now, my submission is that at that time, at
the very latest, the trial judge had a duty to
raise the question of voluntariness. The material
abundantly gave rise to such a question. Here was
a man with - we know from the material that he had
had no prior convictions and can infer that he had
not been in custody before; he had been in custody
this time for under an hour and a half; he had been
very violently assaulted; he had one arm; he was
five foot three inches, eight and a half stone; on his evidence, a substantial number of officers had
assaulted him. Now, regardless of what the accused had to say about that in his dock statement, there
Knight.PA 4 29/5/92 would be a very high likelihood that he would still
be a person in a very high level of fear at the
time he was spoken to by Inspector Schmidt.
MASON CJ: When you say that the trial judge had a duty in those circumstances to raise the question of
voluntariness, what do you say that the trial judge
should have done?
MR GAME: Your Honour, I take as my starting point a passage from Your Honour's judgment in Macpherson's case,
where Your Honour said that in circumstances which
require clarification - and this is at page 533,
that:
it is for the trial judge to resolve -
the issue, raise it with the parties and clarify
the position.
MASON CJ: But that was a case of an accused in person, was
it not?
MR GAME: Yes, Your Honour said at about point 4: especially cases in which the accused is
unrepresented.
Now, in this case - and it is raised in the
Court of Criminal Appeal judgment - it is suggested
that there may have been tactical reasons for not
objecting to the material but, really, there could
not have been any tactical reasons for notobjecting, given the mistaken view that the parties
had as to the basis upon which the medical material
went in.
DEANE J: What were the maximum penalties for the four
offences with which your client was charged?
MR GAME: I am not absolutely certain, but count 2, which
was by far the most serious, carried, I think, 25 years or life. I am sorry, Your Honour, I am not certain, but I think that count 2 on which he
was acquitted, the Solicitor-General tells me life,
but if it is not life, it is 25 years.
DEANE J: If that is so, that really hits you in the eye as a tactical reason for not fighting too much about
the alleged confession, does it not? Was it used
that way at the trial, that on the basis of what he
is alleged to have said immediately afterwards, he
was not guilty on 2?
MR GAME: No, Your Honour. It was put to the jury that it was a straight verbal and that none of these
Knight.PA 29/5/92
statements were made. So it was never suggested that - - -
DEANE J: It was not put, "Even if you accept - - -
MR GAME: No, Your Honour. DEANE J: Counsel must have had a rather strange approach to
final submissions if he did not make that point,
because on one approach it suggested that that was
why the jury acquitted on that charge.
MR GAME: Your Honour, to put that in its inverse, there was a very substantial dispute in relation to the
identification evidence, and it all centred around
a video which turned up at the committal
proceedings which showed the applicant wearing a
leather coat some time in the middle of these
events. As I said, to put that in the inverse, the jury may have been satisfied, but not beyond a
reasonable doubt on the identification evidence,
and then turned to this evidence to satisfy them
beyond a reasonable doubt on counts 1, 3 and 4, andthat would be the most logical explanation for
their verdicts.
DAWSON J: What do you say the trial judge ought to have
done which he did not do?
MR GAME: Your Honour, in my submission - and I am now taking this submission from Ajodha's case - the
trial judge -
DAWSON J: What is the citation for Ajodha?
MR GAME·: It is ( 1982) AC 204 at 223. I take the Court to that passage. In Ajodha's case, there is a long
passage commencing at about part-way through D:
Though the case for the defence raises an
issue as to the voluntariness ..... defending
counsel may for tactical reasons prefer that the evidence ..... be heard before the jury -
Then a little bit further down:
If the defence adopts this tactic -
of not objecting -
it will be open to defending counsel to submit
at the close of the evidence that, if the
judge doubts the voluntariness of the
statement ..... Even in the absence of such a
submission, if the judge himself forms the
view that the voluntariness of the statement
is in doubt, he should take the like action
Knight.PA 6 29/5/92 proprio motu. It may sometimes happen that
the accused himself will raise for the first
time when giving evidence an issue as to thevoluntariness of a statement already put in
evidence by the prosecution. Here it will be
a matter in the discretion of the trial judge
whether to require relevant prosecution
witnesses to be recalled for further
cross-examination.
Your Honour, in this case, what was missing was
evidence as to the state of mind of the accused
person, but the problem ultimately is - - -
DAWSON J: But really that is not the only thing. There was
no issue about the voluntariness of the statement.
It was never made the way your client - - -
MR GAME: There was no issue as to the voluntariness of the statement on the accused's case because he denied
the making of the statement. But that does notanswer the question from the trial judge's point of
view which is - - -
DAWSON J: But the question so far as he is concerned really
arises at an earlier stage, does it not? Once it
is in it is in.
MR GAME: Well no, Your Honour, once it is in circumstances
may change just as they changed in -
DAWSON J: The issue of its voluntariness may be raised not on the voir dire, but in the course of the case.
MR GAME: Yes, Your Honour. DAWSON J: But it has to be raised, does it not, and it was
not here?
MR GAME: My submission is that it is squarely raised DAWSON J: The evidence itself raises it; whether or not - yes, I see.
MR GAME: Your Honour, if the language of section 410 can be stretched to include assaults as a threat, then it
would be deemed to be involuntary. But in any
event, in my submission, that evidence having been
raised, the question of voluntariness was squarely
an issue that the trial judge had to resolve andcould not resile from it.
MASON CJ: Before you leave Ajodha, there is only one
sentence that gives you any assistance in Ajodha,
is there not, and that is the sentence that
commences immediately above the letter F:
Knight.PA 7 29/5/92 Even in the absence of such a submission, if
the judge himself forms the view that the
voluntariness of the statement is in doubt, heshould take the like action proprio motu.
MR GAME: Yes, Your Honour. Well, on the facts of this case the judge would have been confronted with the
certain knowledge that there was a young man who
had suffered quite severe injuries at the hands of
police within an hour and a half in an unusual
environment.
In the Court of Criminal Appeal - - -
DAWSON J: What would happen if the judge says, "No suggestion is made by counsel for the defence", and
the judge says, "Well, I think I might now exclude
this statement", and they say, "No, we do not want
you to do that. We say it was not made, but we would still rather have it there in case the jury
decides that it was made", because that may have
been the real situation.
MR GAME: Well that, in my submission, is very doubtful
since the accused's counsel went to such extremes
to establish that those admissions were not made.
He cross-examined the police officer up hill and
down dale about the making of notes; where was
Detective Simms? The usual stock in trade of
cross-examination on this sort of issue. Why was it not recorded for another three hours? Why was
no verification sought, and so on? So that it is
doubtful that defence counsel could have had any good reason for wanting this material before the jury.
DEANE J: We have to speculate, but I can think of many good
reasons. I mean, it surely, in the context of this case, was in the interests of the accused to have
the confession in relation to the most serious
charge, and also to attack the confession not on any suggestion that it was not voluntary, but on a
basis it just showed how unreliable all the police
evidence was, because it was the other police
evidence which was still there. I mean, it is not apparent to me that counsel has made the terrible
mess of conducting a defence that is implicit in
all your submissions, and I am not trying to
embarrass you by saying you should make it
explicit, but from this distance it is not at all
apparent to me that counsel has made a terrible
blunder in the way this has all panned out.
MR GAME: Your Honour, I can only say, though, they were all
serious charges. Count 2 was by - - -
Knight.PA 29/5/92 DEANE J: That is something I have been wondering about.
Looking at count 1, it is very hard to see why
count 2 is more serious than count 1. On the face of it, you would think that count 1 was more
serious than count 2.
MR GAME: Yes. I am sorry, I am just not sure what the penalty is for counts 1 - - -
MASON CJ: Do you know, Mr Solicitor? Do you know what the penalty - - -
MR MASON: I am sorry, I do not, I will have some inquiries MR GAME: In the remarks on sentence, it may appear that - - -
DEANE J: Is count 1, do you know, Mr Game, an offence in
those terms, that is, attempting to burn somebody?
MASON CJ: It sounds like something something out of the
15th century.
DEANE J: I have never seen it before. MR GAME: The riot carried life, so there is not much mileage to get rid of count 2 and hang on to your
conviction for riot.
DEANE J: But, factually, what was encompassed by count 2
was, undoubtedly, the most serious thing alleged
against your client.
MR GAME: Factually, it was the most serious because it
involved an ulterior intent to injure a police
officer.
DEANE J: Who had been set on fire. MR GAME:
Who had, in fact, been set on fire, yes. So that
is true; whether or not counts 1 and 3 also carried life is not a matter of which I am certain, but
they were extremely serious offences in themselves.
In the Court of Criminal Appeal, the Court
effectively - this is at pages 131 to 134 -
disposed of this ground upon the basis which
appears at the top of page 134. Starting at
page 133 line 22:
The late Judge Denton was an experienced
trial judge, who was well aware of the rules
relating to the voluntariness of confessional
material, and of his power to remove such
material from the jury at any time. It is
Knight.PA 9 29/5/92 clear from the terms of his Honour's summing
up, and from his sentencing of the appellant,
that he accepted that the appellant had
probably been subjected to assaults from
police. It must be assumed that he considered
the confessional material in this context and
determined that there was insufficient link
between any assaults on the accused and the
subsequent alleged admissions. There being
nothing to indicate that he failed to do so,
and he having no obligation to raise it
himself, we can find no substance in this
ground of appeal.
Now, in my submission, what the Court of Criminal
Appeal thinks about what the trial judge may or may not have privately thought, is quite irrelevant to the task which the Court of Criminal Appeal must carry out. The Court of Criminal Appeal has got
two questions it must ask itself in these
circumstances. One is: what was the duty of the
trial judge, and did he satisfy it? Two: are we
satisfied that the confession was voluntarily
obtained?
Now, with respect to the first, I have already
made submissions as to what the proper duty of the
trial judge is, and that submission effectively
seeks to counter the conclusion drawn by the Court
of Criminal Appeal at page 133, referring to
Byfield, saying that the trial judge has no duty to raise that matter simply for the purpose of
rejecting it.In my submission, circumstances may arise as I
have already outlined, but with respect to the
second question, the question of whether or not the
confessional material was voluntarily obtained, is
the question which the Court of Criminal Appeal
must consider for itself - cannot resolve that
question by making any assumptions about what the
trial judge may or may not have done, and that can be demonstrated very shortly by saying: well, if
the trial judge had issued a one-line judgementsaying, "I find the confession was voluntary", the
duty of the Court of Criminal Appeal would be
exactly the same, just as it is in relation to
unsafe and unsatisfactory submissions, a la Morris
v Reg, or just as it is to consider all grounds of
appeal in the sense identified by this Court in
Jones v Reg.
It does not fulfill that function or carry out
its duty by making an assumption about what the
trial judge did, and the court simply does not
purport, in this judgement, to carry out that
exercise. If it had purported to do so then it
Knight.PA 10 29/5/92 would have been quite beside the point for it to
make this observation, and it does not address the
critical factual issues which were raised. Those,
in short, are the bases upon which a grant of
special leave is sought.
MASON CJ: Yes, thank you, Mr Game. The Court will take a short adjournment to consider the course it will
take in this matter.
AT 10.51 AM SHORT ADJOURNMENT
UPON RESUMING AT 10.55 AM:
MASON CJ: The Court need not trouble you, Mr Solicitor. In the light of the particular circumstances
of this case and the way in which the case for the
defence was conducted at the trial, this is not an
application in which it would be appropriate to
grant special leave to appeal to deal with the
| ~ | issue of voluntariness. | The application for |
special leave to appeal is therefore refused.
The Court will now adjourn until 10.15 am on
Tuesday next.
AT 10.56 AM THE MATTER WAS ADJOURNED SINE DIE
| • |
Knight.PA 11 29/5/92
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
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Criminal Law
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Evidence
Legal Concepts
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Appeal
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Charge
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Sentencing
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