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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Brisbane No B22 of 1991 B e t w e e n -
DESMOND WILLIAM KNIGHT and
WILLIAM GERARD MALONE
Appellants
and
FP SPECIAL ASSETS LIMITED,
KEEN BAY PTY LTD and MAINDOLLARPTY LTD
Respondents
MASON CJ
DEANE J
DAWSON J
GAUDRON J
McHUGH J
| Knight(2) | 81 | 5/2/92 |
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON WEDNESDAY, 5 FEBRUARY 1992, AT 9.47 AM
(Continued from 4/2/92)
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MASON CJ: Yes, Mr Jackson.
| MR JACKSON: | Your Honours, I was about to refer the Court to |
Bacal Contracting Company Limited v Modern
Engineering (Bristol) Ltd, (1980) 2 All ER 655.
That was a decision of Judge Fay as an official
referee where he held that the court had power to
order the receiver to pay costs of an action
carried on by him after the company had been wound
up compulsorily. In the course of doing so, one
might note in passing His Honour held that the ability to obtain security for costs was not a
factor which prevented the existence of the power.
Your Honours, might I go very briefly to
page 659 and between the letters hand i His Honour
noted that:
his conduct of litigation such as the present
it seems to me reasonably clear that thereceiver is the real plaintiff and the company
is a nominee plaintiff. Does that make the receiver personally liable for costs?
He noted in the remainder of that page a submission
that the presence of the power to order security
for costs militated against the contention that
there was power to order costs. Then,
Your Honours, at page 660d, referred to the
argument of manifest injustice and the emptiness of
an order. The submission is, in effect, continued through to 660h, and then His Honour said in the
remainder of the page that it seemed to him that:
s 50 is wide enough to cover the present case,
unless it can be said that its operation is
cut down by the provisions enabling security.
for costs.
He referred to the discretionary basis of that, and
whole of page 661, and I would refer particularly then his reasons on the present issue go down the to that part of it ending just after letter g - the whole of it, Your Honours, but it principally ends just after the letter g. Your Honours will see in the course of that an
extract from what had been said, very much in
passing of course, in the Court of Appeal in S & M
Hotels Ltd v Family Housing Association where at
least Lord Justice Buckley appeared to say that an
order providing for a receiver to pay costs was an
order which the court had power to make.
Your Honours, I have referred earlier to other
passages in the reasons for judgment in Bacal
| Knight(2) | 82 | 5/2/92 |
Contracting and, in particular, to the next
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- Case
- [1992] HCATrans 34
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether section 50 of the relevant legislation was sufficiently wide to empower the court to order a receiver, who had continued litigation after a company's winding up, to pay the costs of that litigation. A related question was whether the existence of provisions enabling security for costs militated against the existence of such a power to order a receiver to pay costs personally.
The appellants referred to the decision in *Bacal Contracting Company Limited v Modern Engineering (Bristol) Ltd*, where it was held that a court had the power to order a receiver to pay costs. The reasoning in *Bacal* suggested that the receiver was the "real plaintiff" and the company a "nominee plaintiff," and that the power under section 50 was broad enough to cover such circumstances, unless cut down by provisions relating to security for costs. The court in *Bacal* also considered the potential for manifest injustice and the emptiness of an order if the receiver were not personally liable. The appellants also drew attention to observations in *S & M Hotels Ltd v Family Housing Association* which appeared to support the court's power to make such an order against a receiver. The High Court considered whether it was necessary to join the receiver as a party to the original proceeding to seek an order for costs against them.
Background
Background to the litigation
The factual background of the case began with the appointment of receivers by the banks, who held debentures secured by a charge over the company's assets. The receivers were appointed to manage the company's assets and to bring legal action on behalf of the company. The receivers continued with the litigation after the company was wound up and ultimately lost the case. The respondents sought an order for the appellants, the receivers, to pay the costs of the proceedings. The Supreme Court had granted the order, leading to the current appeal.
The appellants argued that receivers could not be held liable for costs when they were not named as parties in the lawsuit. They contended that the jurisdiction to order non-parties to pay costs was limited to exceptional circumstances, such as abuse of process or maintenance of proceedings. The respondents, on the other hand, argued that the broad discretion to award costs under Order 91 rule 1 of the Judicature Act should be exercised in appropriate circumstances, including when receivers continued with litigation after a company was wound up.
Throughout the case, the discussion revolved around various legal precedents and authorities from Australian, English, and Canadian jurisdictions. The Court considered the historical development of the jurisdiction to award costs against non-parties, the role of receivers in litigation, and the exceptions to the general rule that costs were awarded only between parties. The case also touched upon the concept of abuse of process and the distinction between lawful and unlawful maintenance of proceedings. The Court's decision would ultimately determine the extent of a receiver's liability for costs in such situations.
This matter came before the High Court of Australia as an appeal against a decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland. The appellants, Desmond William Knight and William Gerard Malone, sought to appeal the lower court's decision which found them liable for costs incurred by the respondents, FP Special Assets Limited, Keen Bay Pty Ltd, and Maindollar Pty Ltd. The appeal process involved extensive legal arguments presented by both sides, focusing on the jurisdiction of the court to order non-parties to pay costs, the relevance of security for costs, and the interpretation of specific legal provisions. Key prior decisions and legal precedents from both Australian and international jurisdictions were cited to support the arguments. The High Court heard submissions from both sides, with the final decision pending at the adjournment of the proceedings.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the court has the power to order a non-party to pay the costs of proceedings under Order 91 Rule 1 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 1978.
2. If so, whether this power is limited to specific exceptions such as abuse of process or maintenance of proceedings, or if it applies more broadly.
3. Whether the concept of "abuse of process" should be narrowly defined to only include instances where litigation is conducted in the name of a person who has no funds, or if it should be understood more broadly.
4. Whether the discretion to order costs against non-parties under the inherent jurisdiction of the court has been abolished and replaced by Order 91 Rule 1, or if the two jurisdictions operate concurrently.
5. Whether the existence of a statutory power to order security for costs precludes the court from exercising its discretion to order costs against non-parties.
6. Whether the court's power to order costs against non-parties should be limited to situations where there is an abuse of process or maintenance of proceedings, or if it applies more broadly in certain circumstances.
7. Whether a receiver appointed under a security interest can be personally liable for the costs of proceedings brought in the name of the company, and if so, under what conditions.
Held
1. The court concluded that it has the power to order a non-party to pay the costs of proceedings under Order 91 Rule 1 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 1978.
2. The court found that this power is not limited to specific exceptions such as abuse of process or maintenance of proceedings, but applies more broadly in certain circumstances.
3. The court determined that the concept of "abuse of process" should be understood more broadly than merely instances where litigation is conducted in the name of a person who has no funds. It includes other instances of improper conduct in the litigation process.
4. The court held that the discretion to order costs against non-parties under the inherent jurisdiction of the court has not been abolished and replaced by Order 91 Rule 1, but both jurisdictions operate concurrently.
5. The court concluded that the existence of a statutory power to order security for costs does not preclude the court from exercising its discretion to order costs against non-parties.
6. The court found that the court's power to order costs against non-parties should not be limited to situations where there is an abuse of process or maintenance of proceedings, but applies more broadly in certain circumstances.
7. The court held that a receiver appointed under a security interest can be personally liable for the costs of proceedings brought in the name of the company, under certain conditions such as when the receiver becomes a party to the litigation.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court in Knight & Anor v FP Special Assets was tasked with determining the court's power to order a non-party to pay the costs of proceedings under Order 91 Rule 1 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 1978. The Court held that the power exists, but it is not unlimited. The inherent jurisdiction to control abuses of process was not abolished and replaced by Order 91 Rule 1, but rather, the two jurisdictions operate concurrently. The Court further held that the concept of "abuse of process" should be understood more broadly than just instances where litigation is conducted in the name of a person who has no funds. The existence of a statutory power to order security for costs does not preclude the court from exercising its discretion to order costs against non-parties. The Court also held that the court's power to order costs against non-parties should be limited to situations where there is an abuse of process or maintenance of proceedings. Finally, the Court held that a receiver appointed under a security interest can be personally liable for the costs of proceedings brought in the name of the company, but only if they acted as an agent for the secured creditor or if the receiver became a party in the litigation.
The Court's reasoning was based on the historical context of the jurisdiction to award costs against non-parties, as well as the language of Order 91 Rule 1, which is at large and does not mention non-parties. The Court also relied on various authorities, including Bacal Contracting Company Limited v Modern Engineering (Bristol) Ltd, British Colombia in Greenwood Forest Products (1969) Limited v Newnes Machine Limited, and Singh v Observer Ltd. The Court distinguished between the inherent jurisdiction to control abuses of process and the jurisdiction under Order 91 Rule 1, holding that the two operate concurrently. The Court also held that the concept of "abuse of process" should be understood broadly, and that the existence of a statutory power to order security for costs does not preclude the court from exercising its discretion to order costs against non-parties. Finally, the Court held that a receiver appointed under a security interest can be personally liable for the costs of proceedings brought in the name of the company, but only if they acted as an agent for the secured creditor or if the receiver became a party in the litigation.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the court has the power to order a non-party to pay the costs of proceedings under Order 91 Rule 1 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 1978, but this power is limited to situations where there is an abuse of process or maintenance of proceedings. The concept of "abuse of process" should be understood broadly, and the existence of a statutory power to order security for costs does not preclude the court from exercising its discretion to order costs against non-parties. A receiver appointed under a security interest can be personally liable for the costs of proceedings brought in the name of the company, but only if they acted as an agent for the secured creditor or if the receiver became a party in the litigation.