Kneipp v Jonsson
[2012] FMCA 828
•12 September 2012
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| KNEIPP v JONSSON | [2012] FMCA 828 |
| BANKRUPTCY – Objection to statutory discharge from bankruptcy – application to Inspector-General for review – partial success – application in respect of continuing objections – interim application to add to final orders – objection to amendments being allowed – leave granted – costs reserved. |
| Bankruptcy Act 1966, s.149(4) Succession Act1981, s.41(1) |
| Applicant: | HENRY HARVEY KNEIPP |
| Respondent: | ANTHONY JAMES JONSSON |
| File Number: | BRG 127 of 2012 |
| Judgment of: | Coker FM |
| Hearing date: | 6 September 2012 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 6 September 2012 |
| Delivered at: | Townsville |
| Delivered on: | 12 September 2012 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Land |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Lee & Co |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | MacDonnells Law |
ORDERS
That the Application filed on 20 February 2012 be amended by adding to the Final Orders sought the following orders:-
3A.A declaration that Henry Harvey Kneipp’s right under s.41(1) of the Succession Act 1981 to apply to the court for further and better provision out of the Estate of Mary Ann Azzopardi (deceased) did not vest in nor pass to Anthony James Jonsson as Trustee in Bankruptcy of the Estate of Henry Harvey Kneipp under s.58(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966;
3B.A declaration that the “Settlement” reached with the Public Trustee of Queensland as Executor of the Estate of Mary Ann Azzopardi (deceased) on or about 5 September 2011 and referred to in paragraph 26 of the Affidavit of Anthony James Jonsson sworn on 4 April 2012 is void and of no effect;
3C.An order that the proceeds of the “Settlement” referred to in paragraph 3B hereof be forthwith paid to the Public Trustee of Queensland as Executor of the Estate of Mary Ann Azzopardi (deceased) together with interest and that any costs incurred by the Public Trustee of Queensland as Executor of the Estate of Mary Ann Azzopardi (deceased) in negotiating with and arriving at the “Settlement” be paid by Anthony James Jonsson as Trustee in Bankruptcy of the Estate of Henry Harvey Kneipp and that such costs be paid forthwith.
3D.Such further or other order as to this Honourable Court seems meet.
15A.That the Respondent’s Notice of Objection to Discharge (Objection No. 6) dated 19 August 2010 be set aside. (s.178 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966).
15B.In the alternative, that the court makes such order as it thinks just and equitable in relation to Objection No. 6. (s.178 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966).
15C. In the further alternative:
(a)That the court inquire into the conduct of the Respondent in relation to Notice of Objection to Discharge (Objection No. 6);
(b)That the court set aside the Notice of Objection to Discharge (Objection No. 6); or
(c)That it makes such order or orders as it thinks proper (s.179 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966).
That the Applicant, HENRY HARVEY KNEIPP have leave to rely on an Affidavit filed on the 19th July 2012 relating to Notice of Objection to Discharge (Objection No. 6).
The Applicant HENRY HARVEY KNEIPP have leave to rely on the following Affidavits;-
(a)An Affidavit of Wendy Ann Mackay filed on the 19th day of July 2012.
(b)An Affidavit of Henry Harvey Kneipp filed on the 19th day of July 2012.
(c)An Affidavit of Anthony Trevor Lee sworn on the 24th day of July 2012.
That the Respondent file and serve a List of Documents within 28 days from today, such List of Documents to include, inter alia, any and all correspondence between the Respondent and the Public Trustee of Queensland as executor of the Estate of Mary Ann Azzopardi (deceased) relating to a “Settlement” of the exercise by the Respondent of a right to further and better provision out of the Estate of Mary Ann Azzopardi (deceased).
That the Respondent have leave to file any affidavit in reply in respect to such matters as arise within the affidavits of Wendy Ann Mackay filed 19 July 2012, Henry Harvey Kneipp filed 19 July 2012 and Anthony Trevor Lee filed 24 July 2012, with such affidavit to be filed and served by 4.00pm on 12 October 2012.
That the matter be listed for trial in Cairns for 4 days hearing on dates to be fixed.
That the costs of both parties be reserved to the final determination.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT TOWNSVILLE |
BRG 127 of 2012
| HENRY HARVEY KNEIPP |
Applicant
And
| ANTHONY JAMES JONSSON |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
At the present time, I am asked to rule in relation to an interim application filed on 24 July 2012. In that application, the applicant, Henry Harvey Kneipp, seeks orders in the following terms:
1. That the Application filed in this proceeding on 20 February 2012 be amended by adding to the Final Orders sought the following orders:-
3A.A declaration that Henry Harvey Kneipp’s right under s.41(1) of the Succession Act 1981 to apply to the court for further and better provision out of the Estate of Mary Ann Azzopardi (deceased) did not vest in nor pass to Anthony James Jonsson as Trustee in Bankruptcy of the Estate of Henry Harvey Kneipp under s.58(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966;
3B.A declaration that the “Settlement” reached with the Public Trustee of Queensland as Executor of the Estate of Mary Ann Azzopardi (deceased) on or about 5 September 2011 and referred to in paragraph 26 of the Affidavit of Anthony James Jonsson sworn on 4 April 2012 is void and of no effect;
3C.An order that the proceeds of the “Settlement” referred to in paragraph 3B hereof be forthwith paid to the Public Trustee of Queensland as Executor of the Estate of Mary Ann Azzopardi (deceased) together with interest and that any costs incurred by the Public Trustee of Queensland as Executor of the Estate of Mary Ann Azzopardi (deceased) in negotiating with and arriving at the “Settlement” be paid by Anthony James Jonsson as Trustee in Bankruptcy of the Estate of Henry Harvey Kneipp and that such costs be paid forthwith.
3D.Such further or other order as to this Honourable Court seems meet.
15A.That the Respondent’s Notice of Objection to Discharge (Objection No. 6) dated 19 August 2010 be set aside. (s.178 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966).
15B.In the alternative, that the court makes such order as it thinks just and equitable in relation to Objection No. 6. (s.178 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966).
15C. In the further alternative:
a. That the court inquire into the conduct of the Respondent in relation to Notice of Objection to Discharge (Objection No. 6);
b. That the court set aside the Notice of Objection to Discharge (Objection No. 6); or
c. That it makes such order or orders as it thinks proper (s.179 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966).
2. That the Applicant, HENRY HARVEY KNEIPP have leave to rely on an Affidavit filed on the 19th July 2012 relating to Notice of Objection to Discharge (Objection No. 6).
3. The Applicant HENRY HARVEY KNEIPP have leave to rely on the following Affidavits;-
a. An Affidavit of Wendy Ann Mackay filed on the 19th day of July 2012.
b. An Affidavit of Henry Harvey Kneipp filed on the 19th day of July 2012.
c. An Affidavit of Anthony Trevor Lee sworn on the 24th day of July 2012.
4. An order that the Respondent do file and serve a List of Documents within 28 days from today, such List of Documents to include, inter alia, any and all correspondence between the Respondent and the Public Trustee of Queensland as executor of the Estate of Mary Ann Azzopardi (deceased) relating to a “Settlement” of the exercise by the Respondent of a right to further and better provision out of the Estate of Mary Ann Azzopardi (deceased).
5. Such further or other Orders as to this Honourable Court seems meet.
6. An order that the costs of and incidental to this Interim Application be reserved.
The matter has been the subject of heated debate between the applicant and the respondent, Anthony James Jonsson, who is the trustee in bankruptcy for the applicant. It is important that there be some background information understood in relation to this matter before it can be fully appreciated why the interim application is before the court.
BACKGROUND
The applicant was declared bankrupt on 17 August 2007. The respondent was appointed trustee in bankruptcy. The applicant’s statement of affairs was filed on 20 September 2007. It is contended and, I think, accepted, that ordinarily the applicant would be discharged from his bankruptcy, pursuant to the provisions of section 149(4) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966, on 20 September 2010. The respondent, however, has lodged an objection to the applicant’s discharge from bankruptcy, and that is the subject of the proceedings that are currently before this court and to which the interim application, in fact, relates.
One of the significant issues of concern that gives rise to the objections that were filed by the respondent arose from the fact that the applicant was, until his partner’s death, in a de facto relationship with Maryanne Azzopardi. Ms Azzopardi died on 15 August 2009 and left a will dated 17 January 2009. The will provided, in particular, for the applicant to have a right to reside permanently, free from rent for life in the home previously owned by Ms Azzopardi. It was further provided, pursuant to the will, that as long as the estate had funds with which to maintain the property, including to be utilised towards the payment of rates and insurance, they were to be utilised without any call for payment by or on behalf of the applicant.
It was noted within the will, however, that when such funds of the estate had been depleted, the applicant would continue to have the opportunity to live in the home for the remainder of his life, but upon a condition that he then paid a rental at a commercial rate, so as to ensure that those expenses, including rates, insurances and the like, were able to be met.
On 16 August 2010, the respondent lodged eight objections to the applicant’s discharge from bankruptcy, and, in fact, a month later, on 17 September 2010, lodged an additional objection to the discharge. The objections were said to relate to breaches of the Bankruptcy Act by the applicant, in relation to a failure to disclose information relating to his entitlements arising as a result of the will of the late Ms Azzopardi.
Following the lodgement of the objections, the applicant applied to the Inspector-General for review of the objections, and three of the objections were discharged. The other six objections to discharge at least in part were upheld by the Inspector-General and remain effective.
As contended by the applicant, the effect of those objections to discharge remaining effective is that he is not able to be discharged from bankruptcy for a further period of five years from the date of normal discharge. Accordingly, he would not be able, unless a court of competent jurisdiction cancelled the objections, to be discharged from bankruptcy until 20 September 2015.
The applicant filed an application on 3 February 2012. The orders that were sought by the applicant were in these terms:
1. That the Respondent’s Notice of Objection to Discharge (Objection No. 3) dated 16 August 2010 be set aside.
2. In the alternative, that the court makes such other order as it thinks just and equitable.
3. In the further alternative:-
a. That the court inquire into the conduct of the Respondent in relation to Notice of Objection to Discharge (Objection No. 3);
b. That the court set aside the Notice of Object to Discharge (Objection No. 3); or
c. That it makes such order or orders as it thinks proper.
4. That the Respondent’s Notice of Objection to Discharge (Objection No. 5) dated 16 August 2010 be set aside.
5. In the alternative, that the court makes such other order as it thinks just and equitable.
6. In the further alternative:-
a. That the court inquire into the conduct of the Respondent in relation to Notice of Objection to Discharge (Objection No. 5);
b. That the court set aside the Notice of Objection to Discharge (Objection No. 5); or
c. That it makes such order or orders as it things proper.
7. That the Respondent’s Notice of Objection to Discharge (Objection No. 5A) dated 16 August 2010 be set aside.
8. In the alternative, that the court makes such other order as it thinks just and equitable.
9. In the further alternative:-
a. That the court inquire into the conduct of the Respondent in relation to Notice of Objection to Discharge (Objection No. 5A);
b. That the court set aside the Notice of Objection to Discharge (Objection No. 5A); or
c. That it makes such order or orders as it thinks proper.-
10. That the Respondent’s Notice of Objection to Discharge (Objection No. 7) dated 16 August 2010 be set aside.
11.In the alternative, that the court makes such other order as it thinks just and equitable.
12. In the further alternative:-
a. That the court inquire into the conduct of the Respondent in relation to Notice of Objection to Discharge (Objection No. 7);
b. That the court set aside the Notice of Objection to Discharge (Objection No. 7); or
c. That it makes such order or orders as it thinks proper.
13.That the Respondent’s Notice of Objection to Discharge (Objection No. 8) dated 16 August 2010 be set aside.
14.In the alternative, that the court makes such other order as it thinks just and equitable.
15. In the further alternative:-
a. That the court inquire into the conduct of the Respondent in relation to Notice of Objection to Discharge (Objection No. 8);
b. That the court set aside the Notice of Objection to Discharge (Objection No. 8); or
c. That it makes such order or orders as it thinks proper.
16. That the Applicant be discharged from bankruptcy.
17.An order that the Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs of and incidental to this Application to be agreed and if not agreed to be taxed but without recourse to the funds of the estate.
The matter then came before the court on 7 March 2012, where argument ensued in relation to directions to be made, in relation to the proceedings. I noted in the brief reasons that I gave in relation to that argument on 7 March 2012 that the “application before me at the moment is one in its infancy, though, as I understand the submissions that have been made, it has had a lengthy history”.
A truer word could not be spoken. There seems, clearly, to have been a difficult relationship between the applicant and the trustee since the time of the appointment, and at the very least, there appears to be a significant degree of distrust as between the applicant and the respondent.
The applicant, for his part, suggests that the actions of the trustee have been contrary to the obligations, responsibilities and requirements of a trustee, and the trustee’s position is simply to suggest that the applicant has failed to meet the obligations of full and frank disclosure that are required to be made by the applicant to the trustee, during the period of any bankruptcy.
Following argument in relation to the matter, orders or directions were made by me in relation to preparing the matter to proceed to hearing. Those orders, of 7 March 2012, were in these terms:
1. That on or before 4 April 2012 the Respondent shall file and serve any Affidavits by or on behalf of the Respondent.
2. That on or before 2 May 2012 each party file and serve upon the other a List of Documents upon which they intend to rely.
3. That on or before 6 June 2012 the Applicant file any material in answer to the Respondent’s material.
4. That the parties shall undertake the following Dispute Resolution Plan:
(a)the following steps will be undertaken to bring about a consensual resolution:
(i) Exchange of correspondence;
(ii) Correspondence and telephone communications.
(b)the following further steps will be undertaken to bring about a consensual resolution:
(i) On or before 4 July 2012, the parties and their legal representatives shall meet together at a venue to be agreed or by telephone conference and by that means conduct a without prejudice conference to:
A. define the issues in the proceedings;
B.attempt to negotiate a compromise of the proceedings.
5. That upon compliance with these directions, the matter be mentioned at 9.30am on 7 August 2012 in Cairns.
6. That there be liberty to apply to have the matter relisted.
In particular, it should be noted that there were directions for the respondent to file any affidavits to be relied upon by 4 April, and thereafter for the parties to serve upon the other a list of documents upon which they intend to rely. Response opportunities were available to the applicant to file material on or before 6 June 2012, and there were then to be steps taken to establish a dispute resolution plan and appropriate meetings to attempt to resolve the matter or, at the least, define the issues outstanding in the proceedings.
Those steps have, as I understand it, been taken but it was as a result, the applicant says, of information which only came to he and his legal representative’s knowledge following the filing of affidavits by the respondent, that it became necessary for there to be the interim application made in relation to this matter.
In respect of the orders that are sought on an interim basis, there is, at least in part, some agreement. The first of those agreements arises from the fact that it is necessary to include in the original application, orders 15A-15C, which relate specifically to objection 6, which was taken by the respondent in relation to the applicant’s discharge from bankruptcy.
It was conceded that notice was, in fact, provided by the respondent to the applicant to indicate that they had apparently omitted reference to objection 6 in the application filed on 3 February 2012. There is no objection taken to the inclusion of orders 15A, 15B and 15C, though costs are sought in that regard.
Additionally, it was conceded that order 2 of the interim application, seeking the opportunity to have leave to rely upon an affidavit filed by the applicant on 19 July 2012, relating to objection 6 should properly be allowed. That, also, is consented to in relation to this particular matter though costs again remain live.
The interim application also sought an opportunity to rely upon an affidavit of Wendy Ann Mackay that was filed on 19 July 2012. That particular aspect of the application again is not contested by the respondent, though it is certainly the subject of an application for costs unnecessarily incurred, as a result of the need to address such matters as might arise.
What remains hotly disputed, however, are the issues that arise in the interim application relating to the addition of the proposed orders 3A-3D. As well there is objection to reliance upon affidavit of the applicant filed 19 July 2012 in relation to issues other than those arising in respect of objection 6, and any reliance upon an affidavit of the applicant’s solicitor, Tony Lee, which was filed on 24 July 2012.
Also the subject of contention in relation to the matter is the proposed interim order 4, which relates to the provision of a list of documents and, of course, subsequently, disclosure of such documents, though it would seem that if the application relating to the inclusion of additional orders 3A-3D are included, then, of course, further provision of a list of documents and discovery would be the required course to follow, in relation to the matter.
I intend, therefore, to address those contested issues in relation to these proceedings in order.
Insofar as the applicant’s position is concerned, the issue of a “settlement”, effected between the respondent here as trustee in bankruptcy and the Public Trustee as executor of the estate of the late Mrs Azzopardi only came to the knowledge of the applicant when the affidavit of the respondent was filed in accordance with the directions of 7 March 2012.
It was acknowledged in the respondent’s affidavit, however, that the “settlement” was reached on 5 September 2011 and that it afforded some payment, though it is not known the extent of any such payment to the bankrupt’s estate, from the estate of Ms Azzopardi. What is contended on the part of the applicant, however, is that there was a right pursuant to the provisions of section 41(1) of the Succession Act for further and better provision, out of the estate of Ms Azzopardi.
The benefit that would be received, no doubt, from the residuary which was to be utilised toward payment of expenses in relation to a property occupied by him was not, the applicant says, “property”, as defined pursuant to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act and that, therefore, it did not and could not vest in the respondent, as trustee in bankruptcy.
The applicant says, therefore, that the settlement is void and that any moneys that passed to the respondent as trustee in bankruptcy should be refunded to the Public Trustee as executor of the estate of Ms Azzopardi, to enable it to be utilised in accordance with the terms of the will. The respondent’s position in relation to the matter is to say that the addition of the further clauses 3A-3D seeks to add additional causes of action over and above those which were already outlined in the application filed in February 2012. The respondent contends that there is no clear evidence as to whether the applicant’s right for further and better provision from the estate of Ms Azzopardi has vested, and, if there is no evidence of that, then it cannot be presumed that that has occurred and, therefore, the appropriate course of action is for the applicant to proceed with any claim that might properly be brought against the Public Trustee.
It is also contended that the Public Trustee, as party to the agreement reached between the respondent as trustee in bankruptcy and the Public Trustee as executor of the estate of Ms Azzopardi, should be a party to any litigation, and, as there is no evidence that the Public Trustee is aware of any application, it should not be allowed to proceed.
Most significantly, however, the respondent suggests that the argument brought on behalf of the applicant, if it were to succeed, would cause delay to the hearing of the matter currently before the court and would, as submitted, “add significantly to the respondent’s case”.
In that regard, however, it is clear that there is, at least on the face of it, a strong argument to say that there is a fundamental flaw that arises in relation to the action of the Public Trustee and the trustee in bankruptcy in including any amount from the estate of Ms Azzopardi, as part of the bankrupt’s estate, for the purposes of distribution.
It was noted, though not elaborated upon at the time of submissions, that there was, in fact, “a long line of cases” relating to a right to seek further and better provision from an estate, being determined to not be property and, therefore, was not something that could properly vest in or be held by the trustee in bankruptcy.
It may be, of course, that there is just as strongly a line of cases which clearly gives rise to an ability to argue that the “settlement” received in relation to the matter by the respondent, was property for the purposes of the administration of the applicant’s bankrupt estate, but that seems clearly to me to be a proper matter for determination at the trial.
It is clear that it is an issue for dispute. The argument that was put on the part of the respondent, that the bankrupt would not be estopped from pursuing his alleged causes of actions in another proceedings seems to me to fly directly in the face of the need to attempt to resolve all issues and questions between the parties in one hearing and to reduce the costs that might be incurred, in relation to the proceedings. To suggest that there would be a preclusion on the consideration of this issue at this time, but an opportunity for another action to be brought in relation to exactly these points and then to have a dispute and debate in relation to such issues, seems to be folly in the extreme.
It may be that the applicant will not be able to convince the court at a final hearing of an entitlement in relation to the “settlement”, that has been paid by the Public Trustee to the trustee in bankruptcy, but in my assessment it is a real question to be determined, and one which can properly be the subject of litigation within the proceedings before this court. I am satisfied, therefore, that it is appropriate that leave should be granted to add the further final orders sought in terms of orders 3A, 3B, 3C and 3D.
What flows from that, as I indicated earlier, is the question of disclosure in relation to this matter, and, again, I am satisfied that if, as I have indicated I intended to do, which is grant leave to rely upon those further orders sought in relation to the proceedings, then quite properly there should be an order made in terms of order 4 of the interim application filed on 24 July 2012.
The documents relating to the settlement are relevant. They are relevant for the purposes of argument on behalf of both the applicant and the respondent. They cannot, as was suggested, lead to significant delay in either the discovery process or the conduct of the proceedings because it would seem that the documents would, no doubt, speak for themselves, and it would be nothing other than legal argument in relation to the effect of the “settlement”, effected between the respondent and the Public Trustee.
I am satisfied that it is appropriate, therefore, that such an order with regard to disclosure of documents, including the filing and serving of a list of documents, should appropriately be ordered in relation to this matter.
In that regard, I would also note that the argument which was raised in relation to the opportunity being given to the Public Trustee to be heard is, in my view at least at this stage, premature, as was noted in addresses. The relief that is sought in relation to this matter is relief against the trustee in bankruptcy and there is no specific relief sought against the Public Trustee. The Public Trustee is not at risk. What would occur if the applicant were successful in relation to the orders sought in orders 3A through 3D would be for a refund of moneys to be made to the Public Trustee by the trustee in bankruptcy, along with, perhaps, payment of any interest.
There would not be a claim arising in relation to the Public Trustee and I fail to see, therefore, any need or basis upon which the Public Trustee could or would seek involvement in these proceedings. I intend to make the orders sought in order 4 of the interim application.
Finally, there was dispute in relation to whether reliance could be placed upon the second affidavit of the applicant filed 19 July 2012 and the affidavit of the applicant’s solicitor filed 24 July 2012.
The applicant says that the evidence contained within those two affidavits relates specifically to matters that arose from the affidavit of the respondent filed in accordance with the directions of 7 March 2012. It may certainly have been the case and, in fact, I would think was the case, that those affidavits would have been able to be relied upon if they had been filed in accordance with the directions of 7 March 2012. What arises here, however, is a situation where the legal representatives for the applicant have, in further consideration of the proceedings before the court, determined that there should be some specific response to those matters that were raised by the respondent in relation to issues of full and frank disclosure and, flowing from that, evidence that might have been made available by the Australian Federal Police or other inquiry agency.
The respondent says that no such information has been received. The applicant and his legal representative speculate that they have been the subject of covert surveillance and telephone tapping, and that they presume that it might be actions taken by the Australian Federal Police, and that information is being provided to the trustee in bankruptcy for the purposes of these proceedings. It is, of course, entirely speculative, but it does, in my assessment, arise directly from the statements made by the trustee in relation to this matter, which were to the effect that no assistance had been provided by the Australian Federal Police.
The applicant and his solicitors speculate that that is not the case. It may be that they can go no further than that, in which case if both the applicant and his legal representative is subject to cross‑examination it will be found that there is little, if any, weight that can be given to that speculation or assumption. But it is a matter which can be, in my assessment, properly the subject of consideration in relation to this matter.
It was acknowledged that it would be late in time and the respondent to these proceedings should be properly given an opportunity to reply to the matters raised in the affidavits of the applicant and his legal representative, Mr Lee.
It is appropriate that that should occur in relation to this matter, but I am certainly of the view that it is proper also that leave should be granted to rely upon those two further affidavits. I intend to grant leave in relation to the matter and, accordingly, consider that it is appropriate that orders be made in terms of orders 1 through 4 of the interim application filed in relation to this matter on 24 July 2012.
There also, of course, remains the opportunity to be given to the respondent to reply if he were to choose to do so in relation to those additional matters contained within the affidavits of the applicant and Mr Lee, as well as, of course, to the affidavit of Ms Mackay which is not contested, and I intend to make an additional order with regard to the respondent having leave to file any affidavit in reply in respect to such matters as arise within the affidavits of Wendy Ann Mackay filed 19 July 2012, Henry Harvey Kneipp filed 19 July 2012 and Anthony Trevor Lee filed 24 July 2012, with such affidavit to be filed and served by 4 pm on 12 October 2012.
Finally, there also arises issues in relation to costs. In that regard, it was submitted to me that there are contested or divergent positions in relation to costs arising from the fact that the respondent would clearly have an entitlement to costs for parts of the application that have been consented to, but that it may be, as is now the case, that there would be an obligation to pay costs by the respondent in relation to other aspects of the interim application. That certainly is the case in relation to this matter and I am again of the view that it is appropriate that the costs of both parties in relation to this application be reserved to the final determination of the hearing and intend to so order.
I certify that the preceding forty-six (46) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Coker FM
Date: 12 September 2012
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