Kneebone v Greenberger (Evans)
[2018] QCATA 163
•5 November 2018
QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
CITATION:
Kneebone v Greenberger (Evans) [2018] QCATA 163
PARTIES:
BRIAN KNEEBONE
(appellant)v KAREN GREENBERGER (EVANS)
(respondent)
APPLICATION NO:
APL098-18
ORIGINATING APPLICATION NO/S:
MCDT69 of 2018 (Beenleigh)
MATTER TYPE:
Appeals
DELIVERED ON:
5 November 2018
HEARING DATE:
1-2 November 2018
HEARD AT:
Brisbane
DECISION OF:
Dr J R Forbes, Member
ORDERS:
1 The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
2 The application for reduction of filing fees is refused.
CATCHWORDS:
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – nature and limitations of applications for leave to appeal – minor civil dispute (residential tenancy dispute) – bond moneys – whether payable to lessor – whether exit condition of premises shows only fair wear and tear – whether evidence can support decision of primary tribunal – where questions of credit – no appellable error shown – whether filing fees on application for leave may be reduced – where no basis for reduction exists
Queensland Civil and Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act (Qld) ss 32, 35, 123, 142, 143
Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Regulation 2009 (Qld) ss 8, 10
Residential Leases and Rooming Accommodation Act 2008 (Qld) s 419Absolon v NSW Technical and Further Education Commission (1997) 75 IR 47; affirmed [1999] NSWCA 311;
Azzopardi v Tasman UEB Industries Ltd (1985) 4 NSWLR 139
Bisley Investment Corporation Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1982) 59 FCR 132Brunskill v Sovereign Marine & General Insurance Co Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 842
Clyde Bergmann Senior Thermal Pty Ltd v Varley Power Services Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1039 Commissioner of Taxation v Baffsky (2001) 122 A Crim R 568
Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472
Drew v Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd [2009] 2 Qd R 219; [2009] QCA 66
Duryea & Anor v Hiles [2012] QCAT 661
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118
Futurepower Developments Pty Ltd v TJ and RF Fordham Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 232Manonai v Burns [2011] WASCA 165
Mifsud v Campbell (1991) 21 NSWLR 725
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323; 180 ALR 1
Oak Valley (Maralinga) Inc v Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (1999) 98 FCR 1
Snell v Morgan [2011] QCATA 316
Strbak v Newton [1989] NSWCA 202
Thompson & Anor v Jedanhay Pty Ltd [2012] QCATA 246
Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon (2003) 200 ALR 447APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION:
Applicant:
Self-represented
Respondent:
Self-represented
The matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld).
REASONS FOR DECISION
In March 2013 the respondent Karen Ann Evans[1] (`Evans’) leased a house property at Eagleby, owned by Brian Kneebone, the appellant (`Kneebone’). Evans and her family resided there for the best part of five years until November 2017. She lodged a bond of $2,400 with the Residential Tenancy Authority.
[1]Nee Greenberger. The action began before her marriage.
The initial lease was for 6 months with a `possibility of extension’. In fact, with several extensions, she and her family remained there until 29 November 2017.
Relations between the parties were amicable until Evans told Kneebone that she and her family would soon be leaving.[2] Then, according to Evans, Kneebone’s attitude changed. Tensions developed between the parties and, when the Evans’ family left, Kneebone issued an extensive list of complaints about the condition of the property, and refused to release the bond. So Evans began action to recover it.[3]
[2]There is no suggestion that, in so doing, Evans would be in breach of the lease.
[3]Application for minor civil dispute – residential tenancy dispute, filed 18 January 2018.
Kneebone responded with a counterclaim for $13,966.20,[4] subsequently increased to $15,226.20.
[4]Counter-application filed 13 February 2018.
However, before or after issue was joined – the chronology of this dispute is not always clear – Kneebone offered to accept the amount of the bond - $2,400 – in full and final settlement:
Kind offer ... Knowing the stress I would suffer by a Court Appearance, I offered to accept the Bond as full payment ... The kind offer is withdrawn. I have already suffered immense stress seeing the beautiful home I built in such a poor state.[5]
[5]Affidavit of Brian Kneebone sworn 12 February 2018 paragraph 21; affidavit of Karen Ann Evans sworn 17 January 2018 2nd paragraph (“Just sign over [your] bond, this will all go away”.)
There are other references to `my beautiful home’ and `my palatial home’[6], nostalgically known as Gracelands, complete with an `Elvis room’. However, Kneebone has not lived there since `around 2009’, when it became a rental property.[7] It was advertised for sale on 11 December 2017 and sold shortly afterwards.
[6]Affidavit of Brian Kneebone sworn 12 February 2018 paragraph 4.
[7]T page 25 line 30.
The trial was held at Beenleigh on 13 March 2018. The parties appeared in person. The tribunal decided that the bond money be divided, $500 to Kneebone, $1900 to Evans.
Against that ruling Kneebone now seeks leave[8] to appeal.
[8]As required by QCAT Act s 142(3)(a)(i).
Was the leave application lodged in time?
A threshold issue, raised by Evans, is whether the application for leave was filed in time. Subject to an extension of time, which is not in question here, a late application is incompetent. This limitations issue was not raised at the trial, but as a fundamental question of jurisdiction it may be raised at any stage.
An application for leave to appeal must be filed within 28 days after the `relevant day.’[9] For present purposes the expression `relevant day’ means the day when the applicant received written reasons[10] for the subject decision.[11] The records of the tribunal show that Kneebone applied for written reasons on the day of the hearing, namely 13 March 2018. The tribunal posted a CD to him from the Beenleigh registry on 23 March 2018, and on the most jaundiced view of postal efficiency it would have reached him by 30 March. In fact, Kneebone says that he received it on 28 March. The application for leave was filed on 20 April 2018, that is, within time. There is no substance in the limitations point.
[9]QCAT Act s 143(3).
[10]An audio disc is deemed to be `writing’: QCAT Act s 123.
[11]QCAT Act s 143(5)(c).
Orders Sought
Kneebone seeks an order that the existing decision be set aside, and that in lieu thereof judgment be entered in his favour in the amount of $15,193 including costs. More colourfully, and less realistically having regard to jurisdiction limits, he asks that Lusty’s exit report be declared `bogus’, and, punitively, that Evans be blacklisted with the Tenants Information Centre Australia, which trades as a `Default Tenancy Control System’.[12]
[12]Counterclaim, `What I seek’, item 4.
Proposed Grounds of Appeal
The grounds of appeal (and comments) set out in the application for leave may be summarised as follows:
(a)The tribunal failed to compare entry and exit condition reports;
(b)The tribunal failed to consider the affidavits of Strudwick, Jackson (as corrected on 10 April 2018), and the applicant;
(c)Jackson `will testify’ that the premises were extensively renovated not long before Evans and family arrived’
(d)Evans’ offer of $500 `does not match the evidence’;
(e)Timely payment of rent does not justify or excuse damage or failure to clean;
(f)The tribunal erred in finding that the appellant, as landlord, was not entitled to remuneration for his own remedial work;
(g)Animals were kept in the house without the appellant’s approval.
It is not uncommon for self-represented parties to gain a second wind when the time for submissions arrives. Kneebone’s submissions in support of his application raise complaints not mentioned in that document. However, in the interests of a full consideration of his case I shall treat them as additional grounds of appeal. First, he submits:
Just one single point suggests this Leave for Appeal be granted. The Entry and Exit reports were not compared, with the Adjudicator saying `I am not going back to 2014’. The Entry Report was dated 2013.
Finally the appellant contends that, in a hearing of `approximately one hour’, the tribunal did not properly consider his case.
Entry Report
Kneebone complains that the entry report of 21 February 2013 was not duly considered. He cites Duryea & Anor v Hiles[13] in support of a contention that this omission – if it occurred – amounts to a decisive error of law.
[13][2012] QCAT 661.
Duryea was decided on its own facts, including of course the credibility of the competing versions, as assessed by the tribunal in that case. It is not authority for a general principle that an entry report is always a vital piece of evidence, regardless of the length of a tenancy, the number of lawful occupants or the age of the property. Any notion that the entry report in Duryea was an important, let alone decisive factor in that case would be quite misconceived. Apart from a mention in the headnote to that case (which is not part of the judgment) the one brief reference to the entry report concerns a `dressage area’, dismissively described as `of no particular or use to the [tenants]’.[14] For reasons given below, the adjudicator’s passing remark: `I am not going back to matters that occurred in 2014 or before’ is not the clincher that the appellant declares it to be.
[14][2012] QCAT 661 at [24].
In the circumstances of this case, however, it is the accepted exit report that is of much greater importance. I say `accepted’ advisedly, because the tribunal was required to choose between two conflicting reports – that of Helen Lusty (for the respondent) and one produced by Stacey Strudwick (for the appellant). Essentially that question is the fulcrum of this case.
This ground is a subjective expression of dissatisfaction. The appellant is not in a position to say, objectively, what the adjudicator did or did not consider, at the hearing, or in reading the papers beforehand. The entry report was certainly before him, to be given such weight as he saw fit.
No Consideration of Affidavits
Clearly the tribunal rejected the Kneebone-Jackson-Strudwick version of condition in which Gracelands was left, in favour of the Evans-Lusty-Welsh-Campbell version. But rejection, however disappointing for one party, is not a failure to consider the latter’s evidence. Jackson’s post-hearing affidavit of 19 April 2018 and the appellant’s promise that she `will testify’[15] about renovations were not before the adjudicator, although it could have been. It is inadmissible at this stage.[16]
[15]Grounds of appeal paragraph 4.
[16]See directions of the senior member dated 15 May 2018 paragraph 4.
Strudwick, clearly an important witness for the appellant, was not called by him at the hearing. Kneebone was able to cross-examine Lusty; Evans was not able cross-examine Strudwick.
The Respondent’s Offer
The appellant submits that Evans’ offer to pay $500 `does not match the evidence’ and protests: `How could it possibly be fair?’. Earlier in the proceedings he would have been content with $2,400, some $13,000 less than his ultimate demand. The remarkable increase is really not explained. At all events, the question of a proper award is for the tribunal, not for the appellant. The same applies to the appellant’s rejection of `fair wear and tear’, (a tax-deductible depreciation as the adjudicator noted[17]) to explain the condition of a house some 35 years old[18], lawfully occupied[19] by a large family for almost five years.
[17]T page 29 lines 2-4.
[18]`I built it in 1984: T page 25 line 35.
[19]As held at T page 30 lines 5-8.
No Rent Default
It is common ground that Evans did not once fail to pay rent as it fell due. The appellant submits that timely payment does not excuse damage or failure to clean. No doubt this is so, but the tribunal made no finding to the contrary. However, it may reasonably have seen this conduct for nearly five years as some evidence of responsible housekeeping.
Remuneration for Appellant’s Own Work
The rejection of the appellant’s claims under this heading was based on a reasonable perception of a conflict of interest, particularly in view of findings that the quantum evidence was variously `mere estimates’, `speculative’ and `so obviously made as great as [it] could possibly be’.[20] In any event, the fact that the appellant’s claims were wholly rejected – Evans’ concession of $500 aside – renders this question academic.
[20]T page 30.
Painting, Alterations, Animals
Evans admitted that there was some paint splashed on a fence, and that a flyscreen was not removed from a window. For those defects she offered $500 in compensation. Otherwise, she said, the premises were left in as good a condition as when her tenancy began.[21] In that regard, she was supported by the witnesses Lusty, Anne Welsh[22] and by cleaner Annaliese Campbell, who states that the carpet, laid many years earlier was quite worn, but `looked great for the period of tenancy’, Campbell added that the tenants had `done a great job maintaining and caring for it’.[23] She was not summoned[24] for cross-examination.
[21]T page 6 line 39.
[22]Statutory declaration 17 January 2018.
[23]Statement of Campbell 13 January 2013.
[24]See QCAT Act ss 97(1)(a), 97(2).
In good faith, Evans and her husband painted two rooms where minor damage to walls had occurred.[25] She and her husband testified that the relatively minor alterations now complained had Kneebone’s express or tacit permission.[26] She says that Kneebone visited the property `regularly’ and took no exception to the changes until about the time of their leaving, when his previously friendly attitude changed to one of hostility.[27] Lusty and Campbell also complain of `harassment’ about that time – evidence which the appellant did not challenge.
[25]T page 8 lines 1-11.
[26]Affidavit of Karen Evans sworn 17 January 2018; T page 10 lines 17-18 (Mr Evans).
[27]Affidavit of Karen Evans 17 January 2018 Unnumbered first paragraph.
Evans deposes, and in this she is supported by a document in evidence, that Gracelands was advertised as ready for purchase on 11 December 2017.[28] That was less than two weeks after Evans and family left the house, according to the appellant’s repetitive and somewhat hyperbolic complaints, in appalling dirt and disrepair.
[28]Photocopy of `Gumtree’ advertisement.
It is common ground that a pet dog could be kept on the property. The appellant now objects to its presence in the house. Given a tenancy of almost five years, and a family of four children, it is simply unrealistic for the appellant to pretend that he was unaware that the dog would go indoors. The absence of any objection for years, until the landlord-tenant relationship soured, may reasonably have struck the tribunal as acquiescence.
No Reversion to 2014
On one particular point the appellant considers that he has an unarguable case for leave to appeal:
Just one single point suggests this Leave for Appeal should be granted. The Entry and Exit reports were not compared, with the Adjudicator saying: `I am not going back to 2014. The Entry Report was dated 2013.[29]
[29]Submissions on appeal filed 25 July 2018 paragraph 2.6. Cf T page 29 line 10.
But when this statement is read in context, it does not bear the significance that the appellant suggests. It was directed to a complaint about a fence, and is followed immediately by these words: `If there is a problem with the fence, that must be brought up within a period [of] six months as a breach and, if not, it is statute barred.’ As it happens, this statement refers to legislation[30] briefly mentioned in Duryea[31] on which the appellant relies.
[30]Residential Tenancies and Rooming Accommodation Act 2008 (Qld) s 419(3).
[31][2012] QCAT 661 at [12].
There is no substance in this argument.
Fairness of Hearing
The appellant `[does] not believe that the Adjudicator examined each of [his] claims’. `[M]y claims were far from addressed in full’.[32]
[32]Submissions of appellant filed 25 July 2018 paragraphs 2.2, 2.3.
This expression of disappointment reveals no understanding of the working methods of experienced judicial officers in an extremely busy jurisdiction. Whenever possible, they examine the papers before the hearing, identify the real issues – a task in which they often receive little assistance - and sift out repetitious, irrelevant, or peripheral material, abundant in this case. A plethora of indistinct or unrevealing monochrome photographs may be of little assistance. The transcript shows that the adjudicator began by carefully questioning the appellant to distil the quantum and basis of his numerous claims.[33]
[33]See T pages 2 to 7.
An adjudicator dealing with a matter at first instance, in an oral hearing of self-represented parties, does not enjoy the time, leisure for reflection, professional assistance or facilities of a Supreme or High Court judge.[34] There is no rule that voluminous or repetitive evidence or argument must be followed by a long and complex judgment.[35] Not every piece of evidence is important, and not every argument is tenable.[36] Litigants’ expectations should be adjusted to the circumstances.[37] Judicial sympathy is extended to `overloaded’ tribunals.[38] `The realities of pressure of work and limited time in the magistrates’ court must be acknowledged.’[39]
It is plainly unnecessary for a judge to refer to all the evidence ... or to indicate which of it is accepted or rejected. The extent of the duty to record the evidence given and the finding made depends ... upon the circumstances of the individual case.[40]
[34]Bisley Investment Corporation Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1982) 59 FCR 132 at 157.
[35]Clyde Bergmann Senior Thermal Pty Ltd v Varley Power Services Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1039 at [66]; Futurepower Developments Pty Ltd v TJ and RF Fordham Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 232 at [14].
[36]Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323; 180 ALR 1 at 5, 57.
[37]Drew v Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd [2009] 2 Qd R 219; [2009] QCA 66 at [60].
[38]Absolon v NSW Technical and Further Education Commission (1997) 75 IR 47; affirmed [1999] NSWCA 311; Manonai v Burns [2011] WASCA 165 at [66].
[39]Commissioner of Taxation v Baffsky (2001) 122 A Crim R 568 at 578 per Spigelman CJ; Manomai v Burns, above at [56].
[40]Mifsud v Campbell (1991) 21 NSWLR 725 at 728 per Samuels JA.
An adjudicator is not required to mention every fact or argument relied on by an unsuccessful party.[41] `The reasons for the [tribunal’s] decision are not to be construed finely and minutely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error.’[42]
It is going too far to suggest that in every case a judge must submit the material ... to the most meticulous analysis and ... a detailed exposition of every aspect of the evidence and the arguments. ... Trial judges must always endeavour to balance their duty to explain with their duty to be brief.[43]
[It is wrong to go] through the words of the decision maker with a fine appellate tooth comb, against the prospect that a verbal slip will be found warranting the interference of a court of law.[44]
[41]Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon (2003) 200 ALR 447 at [62] (High Court).
[42]Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272; Oak Valley (Maralinga) Inc v Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (1999) 98 FCR 1 at [22].
[43]Strbak v Newton [1989] NSWCA 202 at 7 per Samuels JA.
[44]Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 291-292 per Kirby J; Futurepower Developments Pty Ltd v TJ and RF Fordham Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 232 at [11].
The appellant was given a fair opportunity to state his case, and was treated with courtesy throughout. The adjudicator’s questioning of Evans and her witnesses was at least as searching as his approach to the appellant’s case. I see no error of law, or miscarriage of justice in the conduct of the trial.
The resolution of this case depends heavily upon the tribunal’s assessment of the credit of the competing versions. That judicial exercise, in turn, depends on the decision maker’s impressions of the demeanour, candour, and self-presentation of the witnesses.
As a matter of courtesy and deference to the unrepresented parties before him, the adjudicator did not dwell on matters of credit. However, he did describe the counterclaims, or some of them, as mere estimates or speculations. More critically, he observed that they were `so obviously made as great as they could possibly be. This makes it very, very difficult for me.’[45]
[45]T page 30 line 13.
Other aspects of the case may well have contributed to the adjudicator’s difficulty, but whether or to what extent they went to credit was for him to decide.
Originally the appellant was content to accept as compensation for any excess of wear and tear the respondent’s bond of $2,400. But when `things [went] bad between us’[46] there was a breathtaking escalation to more than $15,000, pursued with zeal, repetitive and minute detail and occasional hyperbole bordering on the obsessive.[47] At first the appellant wanted only their deposit; then his claims became more ambitious – seven times more so, as the adjudicator noted.[48]
[46]Email Kneebone to Evans 27 November 2017, two days before she and family left “Gracelands”.
[47]E.g. T page 27 lines 27-29.
[48]T page 27 lines 41-42.
A punitive attitude was revealed: The appellant sought an order that Lusty’s exit report `be declared a false document’[49], and `an order that I be given permission to list the tenant on Tenants Information Centre Australia for damages done.’[50]
[49]Application for leave to appeal, annexure Part D paragraph 1(l); submissions of appellant filed 25 July 2018 paragraph 2.
[50]Counterclaim, `What I seek’, item 4.
The respondent’s witness Helen Lusty had only a tenuous connection with the respondent. They met some seven years before Lusty cleaned the house in November 2017. Before that they had no dealings with each other for three or four years.[51] When Evans asked the firm of `Mim’s Cleaning’ to do a departing `bond clean’ she did not ask for Lusty personally. Lusty says that Evans would not have known who was coming from Mim’s until she (Lusty) turned up to do the job.[52] That evidence was not contradicted.
[51]T page 13 lines 6-9.
[52]T page 13 lines 11-12.
On the other hand, there were established business relationships between the appellant and his witnesses Jackson and Strudwick. The appellant employed Jackson to clean his rental units on the Gold Coast several times a week.[53] Strudwick of Elders Real Estate is, or was the appellant’s agent.[54] Jackson did grant that `on the surface the house looked tidy’,[55] for whatever that may be worth.
[53]T page 13 lines 29-35.
[54]Exit report signed by Strudwick as agent, 1 December 2017.
[55]Affidavit of Maureen Leone Jackson sworn 12 February 2018 paragraph 4.
In the contest between the rival exit reports[56] the appellant sought to discredit Lusty’s by accusing her of falsely backdating it. An allegation of fraud should not be made without cogent evidence to support it. Here there was none. In cross-examination the appellant put the allegation to Lusty and she firmly rejected it. Of course a cross-examiner’s imputation that is denied is not per se evidence.
[56]Lusty’s and Strudwick’s .
The house that was allegedly left in an appalling state was advertised for sale less than two weeks after the Evans family left, and was sold soon afterwards.
Originally the respondent leased Gracelands for just six months from mid-February 2013, subject to a `possibility of extension’. Subsequent extensions until late 2017 were apparently arranged amicably, and it was only when the respondent gave notice of leaving that tension between the parties arose.
By late 2017 Gracelands was thirty-odd years old. It had not been owner-occupied since 2009. It accommodated a large family for almost five years. The adjudicator, having seen and heard the witnesses (but not Strudwick) and having considered the affidavits, photographs and other documents, found that the exit condition of the property was due to fair wear and tear, and to minor alterations that the appellant expressly or implicitly permitted. Obviously the appellant does not accept that conclusion, but what matters is that there was evidence to support it, and the adjudicator was the constitutional judge of fact and credit.
Nature and Limits of Applications for Leave to Appeal
An application for leave to appeal is not a retrial de novo, as some of the appellant’s submissions assumed. That is an understandable error of unrepresented parties, but it is misconceived. An appeal is not an occasion to repeat or reargue evidence rejected by the trial judge, or to present material that could have been led at first instance, but was not.[57]
[57]Snell v Morgan [2011] QCATA 316 at [10]; Thompson & Anor v Jedanhay Pty Ltd [2012] QCATA 246 at [28].
The legislative policy of the QCAT Act is that primary decisions, particularly in minor civil disputes, should normally be final. An applicant for leave must show that it is reasonably arguable that the decision in question is affected by legal error, or exhibits a finding of fact or credit unsupported by any evidence, or that is `glaringly improbable’.[58] Credit findings are seldom disturbed, particularly when they are substantially based on the demeanour of the parties.[59] Appeal courts recognised that trial judges have the considerable advantage, not enjoyed by a court of appeal, of seeing and hearing the witnesses giving their evidence, presenting their arguments, and conducting themselves in court.
[58]Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472 at 479 per Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ; Brunskill v Sovereign Marine & General Insurance Co Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 842 at 844.
[59]Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 at 127.
It is not legal error to prefer one version of the facts to another, or to give less weight to one party’s case than the latter thinks it deserves. That is a trial court’s prerogative. There is no legal error in merely making a decision with which other reasonable minds may differ.[60] Findings will not be disturbed where, as here, they have rational support in the evidence, even if another reasonable view is available.[61] It cannot be said that the present finding is unreasonable, or unsupported by evidence, or is `glaringly improbable’.
[60] Azzopardi v Tasman UEB Industries Ltd (1985) 4 NSWLR 139 at 151.
[61]Fox v Percy, above, at 125-126.
Resolution
The appellant has not demonstrated any appellable error in the primary decision, nor do I discern any. There was evidence upon which the adjudicator was entitled to act as he did, and it is not for this tribunal to interfere by re-trying the case. The application for leave to appeal must be dismissed.
ORDER
The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
Application for Fee Reduction
The Principal Registrar has referred to the tribunal application by Kneebone for reduction of filing fees upon his application for leave to appeal.[62]
[62]QCAT Act s 35(2)(d).
Filing fees may be waived or reduced on the ground of `undue financial hardship”.[63] No other ground of exemption is recognised.
[63]Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Regulation 2009 (Qld) ss 8(5), 10(2).
The applicant relies upon his statement that he holds a Commonwealth Seniors Health Card, but that is not, in itself, a recognised ground for waiver or reduction of filing fees. There is undisputed evidence that the applicant owns, or has recently disposed of a considerable amount of realty. In those circumstances I cannot be satisfied that payment of the normal filing fees would cause this applicant undue financial hardship.
ORDER
The application for reduction of filing fees is refused.
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