KMP Coastal Oil Pte Ltd v The owners of Motor Vessel "Iran Amanat" and the 84 other vessels set out in the application
[1997] FCA 483
•5 Jun 1997
CATCHWORDS
SHIPPING AND NAVIGATION - Admiralty jurisdiction, law and practice - In respect of what matters action will lie - Action in rem - Whether jurisdiction should be determined before liability - Did the owner have the relevant nexus as required by section 19(a) of the Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth) to entertain jurisdiction - Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth) ss 3, 4, 5, 10, 17, 19
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION - Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth) ss 3, 17, 19
WORDS AND PHRASES - “Person who would be liable” - Sufficient connection with the ship as to render person and ship liable
WORDS AND PHRASES - “relevant person” - Relevant nexus which must exist between a general maritime claim and the ship
Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth) ss 3, 4, 5, 10, 14, 17, 19
Admiralty Rules rr 39, 52
Australian Law Reform Commission, Report on Civil Admiralty Jurisdiction
Marine Trade Consulting GmbH v Globus (Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia, 9 December 1996, unreported)
Ocean Industries Pty Ltd v The Owners of the Ship M.V. “Steven C” [1994] 1 QdR 69
Shell Oil Company v The Ship “Lastrigoni” (1974) 131 CLR 1
The Aventicum [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 184
The I Congreso del Partido [1978] QB 500
The Owners of the Ship“Shin Kobe Maru” v Empire Shipping Co (1994) 181 CLR 404
The St. Elefterio [1957] P 179
The St. Merriel [1963] P 247
KMP COASTAL OIL PTE LTD v. THE OWNERS OF MOTOR VESSEL "IRAN AMANAT" and the 84 other vessels set out in the Application
No. NG 130 of 1997
WILCOX, BURCHETT AND EMMETT JJ
SYDNEY
5 JUNE 1997
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ) ) NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No. NG 130 of 1997 ) GENERAL DIVISION )
IN ADMIRALTY
On Appeal from a judge of the Federal Court of Australia
BETWEEN: KMP COASTAL OIL PTE LTD
AppellantAND: THE OWNERS OF MOTOR VESSEL "IRAN AMANAT" and the 84 other vessels set out in the Application
RespondentCORAM: WILCOX, BURCHETT AND EMMETT JJ PLACE: SYDNEY DATED: 5 JUNE 1997
MINUTES OF ORDER
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The appeal be allowed with costs.
The proceedings be remitted to Tamberlin J for directions concerning the determination of the appellant’s claim.
The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the respondent’s motion for release of the ship from arrest.
The parties have liberty to apply.
NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ) ) NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No. NG 130 of 1997 ) GENERAL DIVISION )
IN ADMIRALTY
On Appeal from a judge of the Federal Court of Australia
BETWEEN: KMP COASTAL OIL PTE LTD
AppellantAND: THE OWNERS OF MOTOR VESSEL "IRAN AMANAT" and the 84 other vessels set out in the Application
RespondentCORAM: WILCOX, BURCHETT AND EMMETT JJ PLACE: SYDNEY DATED: 5 JUNE 1997
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
By writ filed on 15 October 1996 the appellant (“KMP”) commenced an action in rem under the Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth) (“the Act”) against the owners of eighty five vessels including the “Iran Amanat” (“the Ship”). By the writ, KMP claimed arrest of the Ship, judgment for a specified sum, security for the claim, damages, interest and costs. KMP also applied immediately for arrest of the Ship which was arrested at the Port of Geelong on 16 October 1996.
On 18 October 1996, the owner of the Ship, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (“the Owner”) applied for release of the Ship. That application came before Tamberlin J on 18 October 1996 and was adjourned part heard to Monday 21 October 1996. On Tuesday 22 October 1996, Tamberlin J ordered release of the Ship. On the same day, his Honour granted leave to appeal from that order. This appeal was brought pursuant to that leave.
The Issues in the Appeal
KMP’s claim in the writ was for the sum of $US150,399.49, being the price said to be payable for bunker fuel supplied to the Owner’s ships “Iran Chamran” and “Iran Adl” (“the Sister Ships”) for their operation or maintenance at the Port of Singapore during the months of April and May 1996. At the time of the supply, each of the Sister Ships was subject to a time charter. Nevertheless, KMP claims that the Owner, through its agents, is liable to it for the bunker fuel supplied to them. The Owner contends, on the other hand, that the charterer is liable and that it is not liable.
KMP’s application for arrest of the Ship was made under Rule 39 of the Admiralty Rules which provides as follows:
“(1) A party to a proceeding commenced as an action in rem may apply .... for an arrest warrant in respect of the ship or other property against which the proceeding was commenced.
(2) The application shall be supported by an affidavit of the applicant or of the solicitor or agent of the applicant in accordance with Form 13.”
Form 13 requires, inter alia, particulars of the claim in respect of which the arrest is sought and a statement that the aid of the court is necessary to enable the claim to be satisfied. Those requirements were satisfied.
The Owner’s application for release of the Ship was made under Rule 52 of the Admiralty Rules which provides that a party to a proceeding may apply to the Court in accordance with Form 19 for the release of a ship that is under arrest in the proceeding. Form 19 requires the applicant to state the grounds on which release is sought. The application lodged by the Owner stated the following grounds:
“Want of Jurisdiction not being a relevant person under section 17 and/or section 19 of the Admiralty Act 1988.”
Tamberlin J upheld that contention and concluded that the Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the claim.
KMP’s claim is based on section 19 of the Act which relevantly provides as follows:
“A proceeding on a general maritime claim concerning a ship may be commenced as an action in rem against some other ship if:
(a)a relevant person in relation to the claim was, when the cause of action arose, the owner......of.......the first mentioned ship; and
(b)that person is, when the proceedings commenced, the owner of the second-mentioned ship”.
It is common ground that the Owner was the owner of the Sister Ships at the time when the cause of action relied on by KMP arose and was the owner of the Ship when these proceedings were commenced. It is also common ground that the claim made by KMP is a general maritime claim within section 4(3)(m) of the Act, being a claim in respect of goods, materials or services supplied to the Sister Ships for their operation or maintenance. Thus, these proceedings constitute a proceeding on a general maritime claim within the meaning of section 19.
The question, however, is whether the prerequisite contained in section 19(a) was satisfied, namely, whether “a relevant person in relation to the claim” was the owner of the Sister Ships at the time when the cause of action relied on by KMP arose. Under section 3 of the Act, the expression “relevant person” means, in relation to a maritime claim:
“a person who would be liable on the claim in a proceeding commenced as an action in personam;” (emphasis added)
The critical issue concerns the effect to be given to the words “who would be liable” in that definition.
The Owner contends that the prerequisite contained in section 19(a) was not satisfied because the Owner is not liable to KMP and therefore is not a relevant person in relation to the claim made by KMP. KMP, on the other hand, puts a number of arguments in favour of the proposition that the Owner is liable to it for the price of the bunker fuel and, accordingly, asserts that the Owner is a relevant person within section 19(a).
Tamberlin J formulated the question which he had to decide on the hearing of the application for release of the Ship from arrest as follows:
“whether the debts incurred in respect of the bunker fuel supplied by [KMP] ... were incurred by the [Owner]....[KMP] must establish that the [Owner] is a “relevant person” within the meaning of ss3 and 19 of the Act”.
The hearing of the application for release of the Ship from arrest proceeded on the basis that it was an interlocutory proceeding. Thus, Tamberlin J permitted hearsay evidence to be adduced which may not have been admissible on a final hearing of the question of the Owner’s liability to KMP for the bunker fuel supplied to the Sister Ships. His Honour analysed and construed a number of documents evidencing arrangements concerning the supply of the bunker fuel.
His Honour concluded that the evidence did not persuade him, either on the “balance of probabilities” or the “strongly arguable case” basis, that KMP had established that the Owner had incurred any in personam liability to KMP for the supply of the bunker fuel. His Honour therefore released the Ship from arrest on the ground of lack of jurisdiction under the Act.
Three grounds of appeal were relied on by KMP which can be summarised briefly as follows:
The trial Judge adopted an incorrect approach in determining whether or not the Owner was a relevant person for the purposes of section 3 and 19 of the Act.
Even if the trial Judge adopted the correct approach, he reached the wrong conclusion as to the liability of the Owner to KMP in respect of the bunker fuel.
In any event, the Owner, by filing an unconditional appearance, on the hearing of the application for release of the Ship from arrest, had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court.
The First Ground of Appeal
The Act, by virtue of section 5, applies in relation to all ships, irrespective of the place of residence or domicile of their owners, and to all maritime claims, wherever arising. Section 9 confers jurisdiction on the Court in respect of proceedings commenced as actions in personam on a maritime claim. Jurisdiction is conferred by section 10 in respect of proceedings that may, under the Act, be commenced as actions in rem. Under section 14, a proceeding may not be commenced as an action in rem against a ship except as provided by the Act.
The jurisdiction in respect of proceedings commenced as actions in rem which is conferred by section 10 of the Act is an expansive one. It relevantly enables proceedings on, or in relation to, a general maritime claim to be commenced against a ship within the jurisdiction on the basis that judgment in respect of the general maritime claim may be enforced against the ship. That is to say, a ship, once arrested, may be sold, either before or after judgment, and the proceeds of sale applied in satisfaction of any judgment obtained after the hearing on its merits of the general maritime claim. That consequence flows irrespective of whether, in the proceedings, any person is held liable, in personam, in relation to the general maritime claim.
The effect of section 19 is that a ship (which, under section 3(6) of the Act, is referred to as a “surrogate ship”) may be subjected to that process in aid of satisfaction of a judgment arising out of a general maritime claim which has no connection with the surrogate ship, so long as the owner of the surrogate ship is the owner of the ship to which the general maritime claim relates. The question which arises under the first ground of appeal is whether the jurisdiction conferred by sections 10 and 19 of the Act depends upon it being shown that the owner of the relevant surrogate ship is liable on the general maritime claim or whether it is sufficient that the owner of the relevant surrogate ship is the person who will be held liable if the claim succeeds.
The case appears to have been argued before Tamberlin J on the basis that, once a challenge to jurisdiction has been raised, the court has to be satisfied, either on the balance of probabilities or on some other basis, that the owner of the relevant surrogate ship is, as a matter of fact and law, liable on the general maritime claim; unless the court was so satisfied, there was no jurisdiction. In that regard, the Owner relied on the following observation made by the High Court in The Owners of the Ship“Shin Kobe Maru” v Empire Shipping Co (1994) 181 CLR 404 at 426:
“Where jurisdiction depends on particular facts or a particular state of affairs, a challenge to jurisdiction can only be resisted by establishing the facts on which it depends. And, of course, they must be established on the balance of probabilities in the light of all the evidence advanced in the proceedings held to determine whether there is jurisdiction.”
The Shin Kobe Maru involved proprietary maritime claims as defined in section 4(2)(a) and section 4(2)(b) of the Act. Section 16 confers the right to proceed in rem on such claims. The High Court held that jurisdiction to determine a claim under section 4(2)(a) does not depend upon any factual precondition but, rather, upon its having the legal character required by that paragraph. The situation in relation to section 4(2)(b) is different since ownership is a question of mixed law and fact. However, it was not necessary to determine whether co-ownership was established in that case because the section 4(2)(a) claim meant the court possessed the necessary jurisdiction to determine the whole case.
Although the High Court’s observations in The Shin Kobe Maru on standard of proof were, in the circumstances, obiter dicta, they provide assistance regarding that issue, where jurisdiction depends upon findings of fact. However, they provide no assistance as to the application of section 19(a) or the definition of “relevant person”, matters with which the High Court was not concerned.
Senior counsel for the Owner also referred to Marine Trade Consulting GmbH v Globus (Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia, 9 December 1996, unreported). That case, however, does not advance the matter any further. The question in issue was the ownership of a ship at the relevant times. The case does not bear on the question whether jurisdiction depends on establishing liability in respect of the maritime claim on which proceedings in rem are brought.
Reference was also made to Shell Oil Company v The Ship “Lastrigoni” (1974) 131 CLR 1. The plaintiff had supplied bunker fuel for the ship “Lastrigoni”. An action was commenced in the admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court against the “Lastrigoni”, which was arrested in Melbourne. The owner moved to set aside the proceedings on the ground that the matter was not within the admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court.
The High Court set aside the writ and all proceedings thereunder, including the arrest of the ship. However, in that case, it was conceded that the owner of the “Lastrigoni” was not liable to pay for the bunkers supplied. That, of course, is the very question in issue in the present proceedings. Accordingly, The Lastrigoni gives no assistance in resolving the question presently before the Court.
In the course of its judgment in The Shin Kobe Maru, the High Court referred to The I Congreso del Partido [1978] QB 500 at 535-537 in which Goff J referred to the judgment of Willmer J in The St. Elefterio [1957] P 179 at 186. Willmer J there said:
“In my judgment the purpose of the words ... ‘the person who would be liable on the claim in an action in personam,’ is to identify the person or persons whose ship or ships may be arrested in relation to this new right (if I may so express it) of arresting a sister ship. The words used, it will be observed, are ‘the person who would be liable’ not ‘the person who is liable,’ and it seems to me, bearing in mind the purpose of the Act, that the natural construction of those quite simple words is that they mean the person who would be liable on the assumption that the action succeeds. This action might or might not succeed if it were brought in personam; that would depend upon the view which the court ultimately took of the various contentions raised by Mr. Roskill. But clearly, if the action did succeed, the person or persons who would be liable would be the owner or owners of the steamship St. Elefterio. In such circumstances, in the absence of any suggestion that the action is a frivolous or vexatious action, I am satisfied that the plaintiffs are entitled to bring it and to have it tried, and that, whether or not their claim turns out to be a good one, they are entitled to assert that claim by proceeding in rem.”
The issue in The St. Elefterio was stated by Goff J in The I Congreso del Partido as being whether, on a motion to set aside a writ in an action in rem, the plaintiff was required to prove at the outset that he had a good cause of action in personam. Goff J accepted the view of Willmer J that the use, in the equivalent United Kingdom legislation, of the expression “the person who would be liable” rather than “the person who is liable” was significant; it indicated an intention to refer to the person who would be liable, on the assumption that the action succeeded. It did not indicate an intention to refer to a person who is liable - that is, presently shown to be liable - in personam. (see at page 536).
In The Shin Kobe Maru, the High Court also referred to the decision of Slynn J in The “Aventicum” [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 184. That case also involved a motion that the writ in proceedings commenced in rem against a ship be set aside on the grounds that the court had no jurisdiction over the ship or its owners. The relevant question which his Lordship considered was stated as follows(at page 190):
“Have the plaintiffs satisfied me on the balance of probabilities by their evidence that here the person who was the owner of the vessel at the time the cause of action arose is the person now at the time the proceedings are launched who beneficially owns all shares in the vessel?”
Thus, the issue related to the ownership of the ship in question at two relevant times, being the time when the alleged cause of action arose and the time when the proceedings in rem were commenced. Slynn J was not concerned with the question of whether the owner of the vessel was liable in personam in respect of the claim which was being made against the ship. His Lordship considered that it was necessary to determine the question of ownership on the material available to him, notwithstanding that that material was available only by affidavit evidence. However, his Lordship did not consider whether the putative liability of the owner was relevant to the question of jurisdiction.
While The Aventicum and The I Congreso del Partido both support the proposition that it is necessary to determine the question of jurisdiction at the outset and that that question may be determined on the balance of probabilities in interlocutory proceedings consisting of a motion for the setting aside of the writ and subsequent proceedings on the writ, including the arrest, neither decision is authority for the proposition that it is necessary to determine the question of liability on the claim made in the proceedings in rem in order to determine the question of jurisdiction.
It may be necessary, when jurisdiction is challenged, to make a determination, on the balance of probabilities, of facts upon which jurisdiction depends. However, the question is whether the only facts upon which jurisdiction depends are ownership of the ship to which the maritime claim relates and of the surrogate ship at the relevant times, or whether it is also necessary to determine the liability of the owner of those ships.
The analysis of Willmer J indicates that it is not necessary, when there is a challenge to jurisdiction in proceedings brought on a general maritime claim against a ship in rem, to determine whether the owner is, as a matter of fact and law, liable on the claim. The enquiry is not whether the owner of the ship is liable but whether, if the general maritime claim succeeds against some entity, that entity has the relevant nexus with the ship against which the proceedings in rem are brought, namely, is its owner.
In Ocean Industries Pty Ltd v The Owners of the Ship M.V. “Steven C” [1994] 1 QdR 69, the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland considered the expression “would be liable” in the definition of “relevant person” for the purposes of section 17 of the Act. McPherson ACJ, with whom Thomas and Byrne JJ agreed, referred to the observations made by Willmer J in The St. Elefterio set out above and commented on the fact that those observations were also referred to with approval in The St. Merriel [1963] P 247 at 257-258.
McPherson ACJ observed that the decisions in The St. Elefterio and The St. Merriel show that the function of the expression “person who would be liable” in a context such as this is to identify someone having a sufficient connection with the ship as to render him or her personally, and consequently the ship herself, responsible for goods, materials or supplies for its operation or maintenance. His Honour observed that the contrast between sections 3 and 17 makes apparent that the definition of relevant person is concerned with a hypothetical liability rather than actual liability.
The drafter of section 17 was careful to specify the points of time at which a relevant person must be shown to have had, and to have, a specified connection with a ship for the purpose of a proceeding in rem. It must be shown that the person was the owner or charterer of, or in possession or control of, the ship when the cause of action arose, and the owner when the proceeding in rem is commenced. A similar nexus is required by section 19, although different ships are involved at the two different times.
McPherson ACJ went on to observe (at pages 74-75) that the second requirement is intended to accommodate a case in which ownership of the ship has been transferred between the time when the necessaries were supplied and the time when the action is brought, in which event proceedings against the ship would not be justified if the new owner bore no personal responsibility for the liability sought to be enforced against the ship. By contrast, the definition of relevant person speaks simply of a claim in relation to which a person would be liable in a proceeding commenced as an action in personam. It does not refer to the timing of that proceeding. That is not relevant to the identification of the person, because it is covered by section 17 itself.
There is no material difference between sections 17 and 19 in relation to the observations of McPherson ACJ. His Honour’s comments apply equally to the relationship between sections 3 and 19. Thus the object of the definition of “relevant person” in section 3 of the Act is to describe the nexus which must exist between a general maritime claim and the ship against which a proceeding on that claim may be commenced under section 19 as an action in rem. It is a limitation of jurisdiction in that sense. However, so long as the proceeding can be characterised as being a proceeding on a maritime claim which has the relevant nexus with the ship proceeded against, it is within the court’s jurisdiction to determine that claim. For the court to have jurisdiction over the ship, it is not necessary for it first to determine the relevant person’s liability on that claim.
The admiralty jurisdiction contemplates that a ship may be arrested summarily and without notice. The only matter which Rule 52 expressly requires the court to consider on the hearing of an application for release from arrest are the “terms” on which the ship may be released. Those terms might, of course, include the giving of security in respect of the maritime claim on which the proceedings are brought.
The Rules also provide, in Part II, for caveats against arrest and, under Part VII, for the giving of bail in respect of a ship. Both are procedures whereby the owner of a ship may avoid the consequences of arrest. Nevertheless, those procedures, and in particular the procedure for arrest itself, are predicated on the assumption that it is for the owner of a ship to satisfy the court that it should not be arrested, or that it should be released from arrest, rather than for the plaintiff in a proceeding to satisfy the court that a ship should be arrested.
The arrest procedure provides a statutory method for maintaining the presence of a ship within the jurisdiction until the court has determined a maritime claim made against it. Whereas a plaintiff seeking an order in the nature of a Mareva injunction will be required to satisfy a court that there is a risk that assets which would satisfy a judgment are being removed from the jurisdiction before judgment, in admiralty proceedings, no such onus is imposed upon the plaintiff. Rather, the plaintiff is given a statutory right and the onus is cast on to the owner of the ship to show why the ship should not be detained within the jurisdiction in order to satisfy a prospective judgment. [see generally paragraph 245 of the Australian Law Reform Commission’s Report on Civil Admiralty Jurisdiction, (AGPS, Canberra, 1986)].
The owner of a ship under arrest would be entitled to move for summary dismissal of proceedings on the ground that they were vexatious or frivolous or disclosed no reasonable cause of action. Further, when hearing an application for release of a ship from arrest, the court may be entitled to consider the strength of the plaintiff’s claim. If the court were satisfied that there was no serious question to be tried as to the plaintiff’s claim, the court may be loath to maintain the arrest or to require security for the claim.
For instance, in the present case, the Owner might have sought to persuade Tamberlin J that KMP’s general maritime claim should be dismissed summarily. Alternatively, it might have argued that, while the proceedings should not be dismissed summarily, KMP’s claim involved so many difficulties that it would be inappropriate to maintain the arrest or to require security for the release. However, arguments such as those have nothing to do with the question of the jurisdiction of the Court. Tamberlin J was not asked to consider any such question.
It would be curious if the question whether the Owner is liable to KMP for the price of the bunker fuel had to be considered on an interlocutory and urgent basis, in circumstances where there was no opportunity for the parties to avail themselves of procedures such as discovery and interrogatories which might assist in determining the facts. That issue will not need to be determined until the final hearing, undertaken after completion of the usual preparation. It is not necessary to determine it in order to establish jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the jurisdiction issue does not raise a question whether the Owner is, in fact and law, liable to KMP in respect of the supply of the bunker fuel. The only question is whether the Owner, on the assumption that it is liable to KMP, had the relevant nexus with the Sister Ships, namely, was the owner of them as required by section 19(a). There is no issue as to that question because it is common ground that the Owner was the owner of both the Ship and the Sister Ships at the relevant times.
It appears to us, with respect, that Tamberlin J erred in embarking on a consideration of the evidence in support of the claim by KMP in order to determine whether the Court had jurisdiction. Having regard to the concessions as to ownership, his Honour should have concluded that the Court had jurisdiction to entertain the claim which was formulated in the writ. Whether or not that claim is made out is, of course, a different matter. That will depend upon several questions of fact and law mentioned by counsel and which, undoubtedly, will be raised in the course of the proceedings. However, they are not pertinent to jurisdiction.
We should record that the argument which we have upheld does not appear to have been put squarely to Tamberlin J, if it was raised at all. He was not referred to any of the authorities mentioned above, other than The Shin Kobe Maru and The Lastrigoni. Importantly, he did not have the benefit of the observations of Willmer J in The St. Elefterio or McPherson ACJ in The M.V. Steven C.
The Ship was arrested at the Port of Geelong and there is no dispute that the Owner was, at the relevant times, the owner of both the Ship and the Sister Ships. Accordingly, the Court had jurisdiction to order the arrest and to hear the claim. While the Ship has now been released from arrest, that release occurred on terms which, the Court has been informed, will ensure that continuation of the proceeding would not be futile. It follows that the appeal should be upheld on the first ground.
Other Grounds of Appeal
In the light of the conclusions reached in relation to the first ground of appeal, it is unnecessary to examine the merits of the second ground of appeal. The question whether or not the Owner is liable to KMP will be the principal question in the proceedings. That will depend upon a consideration and analysis not only of the documents which were considered by Tamberlin J but, quite likely, also of other documents and other evidence as well. In those circumstances, it is preferable that those questions not be the subject of any observations by this court on the basis of the evidence before Tamberlin J.
It is also unnecessary to consider the third ground of appeal, namely, the question whether or not the Owner submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court by the filing of an unconditional appearance.
Conclusion
The orders of the court will be that the appeal be upheld and the proceeding be remitted for directions concerning the determination of KMP’s claim. The Owner should pay KMP’s costs of the appeal and of the application for release of the Ship from arrest.
I certify that this and the preceding fifteen pages
are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the CourtAssociate:
Dated: 5 June 1997
Counsel for the Appellant: R.B.S. Macfarlan QC P.E. King
Solicitor for the Appellant: Phillips Fox Counsel for the Respondent: A.W. Street SC G.J. Nell
Solicitor for the Respondent: Norton Smith & Co Date of Hearing: 19 May 1997
Place of Hearing: Sydney
Date of Judgment: 5 June 1997
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