IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Adelaide No A20 of 2019
B e t w e e n -
KMC
Applicant
and
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (SA)
Respondent
KIEFEL CJ
BELL J
GAGELER J
KEANE J
NETTLE J
GORDON J
EDELMAN J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 6 FEBRUARY 2020, AT 10.00 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR S.A. McDONALD: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR B.J. DOYLE, for the applicant. (instructed by Legal Services Commission of South Australia)
MR C.D. BLEBY, SC, (Solicitor‑General for the State of South Australia): May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friends, MR M.E. BOISSEAU and MS F.J. McDONALD, for the respondent and for the Attorney‑General for the State of South Australia intervening. (instructed by Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (SA) and Crown Solicitor for the State of South Australia)
MR M.G. SEXTON, SC, Solicitor‑General for the State of New South Wales: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MS J.S. CALDWELL, for the Attorney‑General for the State of New South Wales who intervenes in the proceedings. (instructed by Crown Solicitor’s Office (NSW))
MR M.E. O’FARRELL, SC, (Solicitor‑General for the State of Tasmania): May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MS J.L. RUDOLF, for the Attorney‑General for the State of Tasmania intervening. (instructed by Office of the Solicitor‑General for the State of Tasmania)
MS K.L. WALKER, QC, (Solicitor‑General for the State of Victoria): If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MS K.A. O’GORMAN, for the Attorney‑General for the State of Victoria intervening. (instructed by Victorian Government Solicitor)
MR G.A. THOMPSON, QC, (Solicitor‑General of the State of Queensland): May it please the Court, I appear on behalf of the Attorney‑General of the State of Queensland intervening, with MS F.J. NAGORCKA. (instructed by Crown Solicitor (Qld))
KIEFEL CJ: Mr McDonald.
MR McDONALD: Thank you, your Honour.
KIEFEL CJ: The parties received a letter, I think, from the Senior Registrar advising that the Court would be assisted by submissions on what is effectively a preliminary question.
MR McDONALD: Yes, your Honour. If it is convenient, I might go straight to addressing that issue.
KIEFEL CJ: Thank you.
MR McDONALD: The question that the Court has raised is whether the sentencing judge did make a finding as to which of the alleged underlying acts of sexual exploitation were proved beyond reasonable doubt within the meaning of section 9(1)(b). In our submission, the better view is that the sentencing judge did not make such a finding. The sentencing remarks do not reveal or indicate in terms that he did.
The Crown in this appeal relies by way of a response on section 9(1) and so we would submit bears the burden of demonstrating its application to the case. So…
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- Case
- [2020] HCATrans 6
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the prosecution bore the onus of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the accused knew the victim was a police officer at the time of the alleged aggravated assault. This question arose in the context of an alleged assault on a police officer, where the prosecution sought to rely on the victim's status as a police officer to elevate the seriousness of the offence.
The High Court unanimously held that the prosecution was not required to prove the accused's knowledge of the victim's status as a police officer. The Court reasoned that the relevant statutory provisions did not create a subjective element requiring the prosecution to prove the accused's awareness of the victim's official capacity. Instead, the status of the victim as a police officer was an objective element of the offence, the proof of which was sufficient for the charge to be made out. The Court affirmed that the legislative intent was to provide enhanced protection to police officers acting in the course of their duty, and this protection did not depend on the subjective awareness of the offender.
The appeal was dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi