Klug v Motor Accidents Insurance Board

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Serial No 59/1991
List "A"

COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA

CITATION:              Klug v Motor Accidents Insurance Board [1991] TASSC 76; A59/1991

PARTIES:  KLUG, Geoffrey
  v
  MOTOR ACCIDENTS INSURANCE BOARD

FILE NO/S:  2411/1984
DELIVERED ON:  15 August 1991
JUDGMENT OF:  Zeeman J

Judgment Number:  A59/1991
Number of paragraphs:  28

Serial No 59/1991
List "A"
File No 2411/1984

GEOFFREY KLUG v MOTOR ACCIDENTS INSURANCE BOARD

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT  ZEEMAN J

15 August 1991

  1. The plaintiff claims damages for personal injury suffered by him as the result of the negligent driving of a motor vehicle, in which the plaintiff was a passenger, by one Lisa Frances Clifford ("the deceased"), on 6 December 1981. The vehicle was being driven by the deceased on Tea Tree Road at Brighton when she lost control and the vehicle left the road. It appears that the deceased was thrown from the vehicle. She suffered fatal injuries. The defendant is sued pursuant to the provisions of s16(1) of the Motor Accidents (Liabilities and Compensation) Act 1973. The defendant has admitted liability. Nevertheless, the defendant has pleaded, by way of defence, that the plaintiff contributed to his own injuries by his failure to wear a seat belt fitted to the motor vehicle. I can deal with that aspect of the matter briefly. I find that at the relevant time the plaintiff was seated in the front passenger seat of the vehicle being driven by the deceased and that that seat was fitted with a seat belt. The defendant carries the burden of proving on the balance of probabilities that the plaintiff was not wearing that seat belt. It has not discharged that burden. The evidence of the plaintiff as to his normal practice of wearing a seat belt and other evidence that the plaintiff remained in the front seat of the vehicle after the accident (all of which I accept) point to the plaintiff having worn the seat belt at the relevant time. Whilst the plaintiff did not claim to specifically recall wearing his seat belt at the relevant time, that is of little assistance to the defendant in the circumstances. The only piece of evidence which might be capable of supporting a finding that the plaintiff was not wearing a seat belt at the relevant time was in the course of one rather confused answer given by the plaintiff during cross–examination, as follows:

"QAgain, do you recollect fastening your seat belt at Richmond?

AWe're back only to Richmond instead of Tolosa Street. I don't know. I mean, that's just the thing, as I said, I know I drove my van, whatever I was in, I mean I did. I mean my son was in the car driving, he did. I can't recall why I didn't – if I didn't why didn't I?"

  1. Having heard the plaintiff give that answer and having regard to the context in which it was given and to other answers which he gave on the same subject matter, I conclude that the statement "I can't…

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Details
Case
[1991] TASSC 76
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Supreme Court of Tasmania, Geoffrey Klug, the plaintiff, sought damages for personal injury sustained as a passenger in a motor vehicle driven negligently by Lisa Frances Clifford, who died as a result of the accident. The Motor Accidents Insurance Board, the defendant, admitted liability but contested the plaintiff's claim for damages by alleging that the plaintiff contributed to his injuries by not wearing a seatbelt. The court found that the plaintiff had worn the seatbelt, rejecting the defendant's allegation of contributory negligence. The court assessed the plaintiff's damages, taking into account his physical injuries, the impact of his psychiatric condition, and the effect of his physical injuries on his ability to work. The court awarded the plaintiff damages for his physical injuries, rejecting his claim for damages for his psychiatric condition on the basis of policy considerations. The court awarded the plaintiff general damages of $45,000.00 and special damages of $3,331.50, less sums already paid by the defendant, for a total judgment of $47,273.00 in favour of the plaintiff.

Background

Background to the litigation

Geoffrey Klug was involved in a car accident on 6 December 1981 as a passenger in a vehicle driven by Lisa Frances Clifford, who lost control of the vehicle on Tea Tree Road at Brighton. Lisa Clifford was fatally injured in the accident. Klug suffered physical injuries including a fractured left clavicle and lacerations to his left cheek, left forearm, and back. He was admitted to the Royal Hobart Hospital but his admission was primarily due to his expressed suicidal intentions following the accident. Following the accident, Klug experienced severe pain and grief, significantly affecting his daily life. He rarely left his home, had few visitors, and struggled to maintain employment, briefly working in hop picking and as a service station attendant before resuming his business in cars. In late 1982, he met his present wife, and they married in 1984. He then moved to Devonport and commenced a lawnmower and small engine business, which he described as successful. Klug's physical condition has remained relatively unchanged since he returned to the workforce. He experiences ongoing pain in his injured shoulder, neck, and back, with frequent severe pain and headaches. His physical limitations affect his ability to conduct his business and engage in daily activities. Klug's psychological condition is marked by a pathological grief reaction stemming from the loss of Lisa Clifford, which has rendered him a sad, withdrawn, and unsociable person. This condition exacerbates his physical pain and diminishes his quality of life. Despite his condition, Klug's business remains profitable, and he has the capacity to employ assistance if needed. The court assessed Klug's damages based on his physical injuries, acknowledging the impact of his psychiatric condition on the severity of his perceived pain and loss of amenity of life.

The matter came before the Supreme Court of Tasmania as a first-instance hearing in a proceeding brought pursuant to the Motor Accidents (Liabilities and Compensation) Act 1973. The plaintiff, Geoffrey Klug, claims damages for personal injuries suffered as a result of a motor vehicle accident caused by the negligent driving of Lisa Frances Clifford, who died in the accident. The Motor Accidents Insurance Board, defendant in the proceeding, admitted liability for the plaintiff's injuries but argued contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff for failing to wear a seatbelt. The plaintiff denied this allegation, and the court found in his favour. The case proceeded to a hearing on the assessment of damages, where the court determined the amount of compensation to be awarded to the plaintiff.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Was the plaintiff contributory negligent by failing to wear a seat belt?
2. Is the plaintiff entitled to be compensated for his psychiatric injury or psychological condition?
3. If the plaintiff is entitled to be compensated, what is the extent of his damages?

Held
1. The court concluded that the plaintiff was not contributory negligent by failing to wear a seat belt; the allegation of contributory negligence was not made out.
2. The court held that the plaintiff is not entitled to be compensated for his psychiatric injury or psychological condition because it resulted from the death of the deceased whose carelessness caused the injury.
3. The court assessed the plaintiff's damages solely by reference to his physical injuries. The plaintiff was awarded $47,273.00 in damages, comprising $45,000.00 in general damages and $3,331.50 in special damages, less $1,058.50 paid by the Motor Accidents Insurance Board.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Klug v Motor Accidents Insurance Board, the Supreme Court of Tasmania addressed three major issues in determining the plaintiff's entitlement to compensation for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The first issue was whether the plaintiff was contributory negligent by failing to wear a seat belt. The court found that the plaintiff was not contributory negligent as the defendant failed to prove on the balance of probabilities that the plaintiff was not wearing the seat belt. The court relied on the plaintiff's testimony and other evidence to conclude that the plaintiff had worn the seat belt at the relevant time.

The second issue was whether the plaintiff was entitled to be compensated for his psychiatric injury or psychological condition. The court determined that the plaintiff's psychiatric injury was largely the result of his continuing grief resulting from a very deep sense of loss. The court distinguished between normal grieving and pathological grief, and found that the plaintiff's grief reaction could be described as pathological grief, which constituted a recognisable psychiatric illness or psychological disorder. However, the court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to be compensated for his psychiatric injury because it was largely the result of the death of the tortfeasor, which was not compensable by reason of policy considerations.

The third issue was the extent of the plaintiff's damages. The court assessed the plaintiff's damages solely by reference to his physical injuries, taking into account the effect of his psychiatric injury on the consequences of those injuries. The court awarded the plaintiff damages for past and future loss of earning capacity, pain, suffering and loss of amenity of life, and future medical and pharmaceutical expenses. The court also awarded the plaintiff special damages for medical and hospital expenses, pharmaceutical expenses, and travel expenses incurred in travelling to and from treatment.

In summary, the ratio decidendi of this case is that a plaintiff is not entitled to be compensated for his psychiatric injury or psychological condition if it is largely the result of the death of the tortfeasor, which is not compensable by reason of policy considerations. The court also found that the plaintiff was not contributory negligent by failing to wear a seat belt, and awarded the plaintiff damages for his physical injuries and the effect of his psychiatric injury on those injuries.