QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
CITATION:
Kline Industries International Pty Ltd v Henwood [2024] QCAT 135
PARTIES:
KLINE INDUSTRIES INTERNATIONAL PTY LTD (applicant)
v
KAREN HENWOOD (respondent)
APPLICATION NO/S:
BDL078-23
MATTER TYPE:
Building matters
DELIVERED ON:
25 March 2024
HEARING DATE:
On the papers
HEARD AT:
Brisbane
DECISION OF:
Senior Member Brown
ORDERS:
Proceeding dismissed.
CATCHWORDS:
CONTRACTS – BUILDING, ENGINEERING AND RELATED CONTRACTS – REMUNERATION – RECOVERY – Where applicant performed building work under a contract – Where applicant alleged respondent had failed to pay balance of invoice for variation work – Where applicant says parties agreed to defer payment of the balance of the invoice to a future, unspecified date - Whether agreement unenforceable for lack of certainty
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – LIMITATION OF PARTICULAR ACTIONS – SIMPLE CONTRACTS, QUASI-CONTRACTS AND TORTS – Where applicant performed building work under a contract – Where applicant alleged monies remain due and owing under the contract – Where applicant brought claim for payment of outstanding invoice more than six years after payment of the invoice fell due – Whether applicant’s claim statute barred
CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – ENDING PROCEEDINGS EARLY – SUMMARY DISPOSAL – SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DEFEDANT OR RESPONDENT: STAY OR DISMISSAL OF PROCEEDINGS – where applicant’s claim statute barred – where applicant’s claim without prospects of success
Limitations of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) ss 10,
Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) ss 47
Brice v Chambers [2014] QCA 310
Kruse v Sunland Homes Pty Ltd [2023] QCAT 331
Upper Hunter County District Council v Australia Chilling and Freezing Co Ltd [1968] HCA 8
APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION:
This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld)
REASONS FOR DECISION
What is this proceeding about?
This is a proceeding about a building dispute. Kline Industries International Pty Ltd (Kline) constructed a house for Karen Henwood. Kline says that Ms Henwood owes $4,092.95 being the balance of an agreed variation of the building contract. Ms Henwood says that Kline’s claim is statute barred.
What are the issues for determination?
The following issues are to be determined:
(a)When did Kline’s claim for breach of contract accrue;
(b)Is Kline’s claim statute barred by operation of s 10(1)(a) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) (LAA);
(c)Should the proceeding be dismissed pursuant to s 47 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (QCAT Act).
Section 10(1) of the LAA provides:
10 Actions of contract and tort and certain other actions
(1) The following actions shall not be brought after the expiration of 6 years from the date on which the cause of action arose—
(a)subject to section 10AA, an action founded on simple contract or quasi-contract or on tort where the damages claimed by the plaintiff do not consist of or include damages in respect of personal injury to any person;
(b) an action to enforce a recognisance;
(c)an action to enforce…
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- Case
- [2024] QCAT 135
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Proceeding dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
Proceeding dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In response, Ms Henwood says:(a)she has no recollection of any conversation with Mr Kline regarding the payment of the balance of invoice 244;(b)the first she was aware of the short payment was on 25 January 2023 when Kline forwarded to her an email claiming to have ‘found an outstanding invoice’;(c)On the basis of Kline’s submissions, there was no enforceable contract entered into in relation to the payment of the balance of invoice number 244. Even if there was an agreement, which Ms Henwood denies, there was no certainty of terms and it could not be inferred that payment was deferred until 22 March 2017 (which would mean the proceeding was commenced within the relevant limitation period);(d)The proceeding should be dismissed pursuant to s 47 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) on the basis that the claim by Kline is frivolous and vexatious.Consideration I make the following findings as to jurisdiction:(a)Kline is a building contractor;(b)Ms Henwood is a building owner;(c)The dispute relates to a contract for the performance of domestic building work;(d)The dispute is a domestic building dispute;(e)The Tribunal has jurisdiction to decide the proceeding. The summary dismissal of a proceeding pursuant to s 47 of the QCAT Act should only be ordered in circumstances where the applicant has no reasonable prospects of success. In Kruse v Sunland Homes Pty Ltd[1] I said the following about s 47:[1][2023] QCAT 331.[3] By s 47 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Act 2011 (Qld) (‘QCAT Act'), the Tribunal may dismiss a proceeding, or part of a proceeding, if the Tribunal is satisfied that the proceeding or part thereof is frivolous, vexatious or misconceived; lacking in substance; or otherwise an abuse of process.[4] As the Tribunal has observed on numerous occasions, the power to dismiss a proceeding found in s 47 is akin to a summary judgement power. Judicial Member, the Hon Peter Lyons QC, explained the operation of s 47 in Simons & Ors v Dowd Lawyers Pty Ltd:[33] The focus of s 47 of the QCAT Act is (at least for the most part) the case put forward by a party to a proceeding, whereas the focus of s 48 is the conduct of a party to a proceeding. The respondent particularly relied upon the provisions of s 47, which require the Tribunal to consider whether the applicants’ application is frivolous, vexatious, or misconceived; or lacking in substance. The respondent, in essence, contended that the applicants’ case had too low a prospect of success to warrant its continuance.[34] Section 47 is found in Division 1 of Chapter 2, Part 5 of the QCAT Act. That division is headed “Early End to Proceeding”. Its purpose seems to me to be broadly similar to rr 292 and 293 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (“UCPR”), found in Chapter 9, which is entitled “Ending Proceedings Early”. With respect to those rules, in Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Salcedo McMurdo P said:Nothing in the UCPR ... detracts from the well established principle that issues raised in proceedings will be determined summarily only in the clearest of cases.[35] In that context, her Honour quoted the following passage from the judgment of Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ in Agar v Hyde:Ordinarily, a party is not to be denied the opportunity to place his or her case before the court in the ordinary way, and after taking advantage of the usual interlocutory processes. The test to be applied has been expressed in various ways, but all of the verbal formulae which have been used are intended to describe a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome of the proceeding if it were allowed to go to trial in the ordinary way.[36] The language used in s 47 is not identical to the language used in the UCPR. However, the expressions “frivolous, vexatious or misconceived” suggest a high threshold must be crossed before the Tribunal can exercise its powers under this section. No doubt the expression “lacking in substance” is not to be confined in its operation to cases which are frivolous, vexatious or misconceived. However, it is to be read with the expression “otherwise an abuse of process” found in s 47(1)(c). In my view, the language of s 47 of the QCAT Act indicates that a party who invokes it on the basis that the opponent’s case is weak, faces at least as high a hurdle as a party applying for summary judgment under rr 292 and 293 of the UCPR; and that the principles in the passages quoted above are accordingly relevant. (footnotes omitted)[5] I respectfully adopt the approach of Judicial Member Lyons. I would add the additional observation. It is not appropriate to summarily dismiss a proceeding in circumstances where there is dispute as to the true facts of the case particularly in circumstances where the relevant factual findings will be central to the determination of the dispute between the parties.