Klewet Pty Limited v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue

[2004] NSWADT 90

CITATION:	Klewet Pty Limited v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2004] NSWADT 90
DIVISION:	Revenue Division
PARTIES:	APPLICANT Klewet Pty Limited RESPONDENT Chief Commissioner of State Revenue
FILE NUMBER:	036033
HEARING DATES:	5/05/2004
SUBMISSIONS CLOSED:	05/05/2004
DATE OF DECISION:	05/12/2004
BEFORE:	Block J - Judicial Member
APPLICATION:	Parking space levy - assessment of
MATTER FOR DECISION:	Principal matter
LEGISLATION CITED:	Parking Space Levy Act 1992 Taxation Administration Act 1996
CASES CITED:
REPRESENTATION:	APPLICANT R Knight, agent RESPONDENT H Roberts, solicitor
ORDERS:	The objection decision under review is set aside.

1 The objection decision which is under review in this matter is the disallowance by notice dated 20 June 2003 of an objection against three notices of assessment issued on 30 June 2003 made under the Parking Space Levy Act 1992 (“the Act”) for the years ended 30 June 2001, 30 June 2002 and 30 June 2003 (collectively the “relevant years”).

2 The Tribunal had before it the documents lodged pursuant to section 58 of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997.

3 In January 2003 the Respondent sent a questionnaire (the “questionnaire”) entitled “Parking Space Levy Questionnaire” to Klewet Pty Limited (referred to as “Klewet” or the “Applicant “). In accordance with clause 1 the questionnaire noted that Klewet is the owner of Lots 46 and 47 in Strata Plan 49696 situate at 221-223 Miller Street North Sydney (referred to in these reasons as “the premises”. The premises consists of a portion of the 13th floor of the building situate at that address; they include the rights to a designated parking space (“the parking space”) in the building. The questionnaire contained a number of questions and including question 6 reading as follows:

“If you have indicated that a property has exempt parking spaces please provide details of the type of exemption(s) claimed”

4 The questionnaire was completed by Robin Edward Knight (“Robin”) as an authorised officer/representative of Klewet; question 6 was answered as follows: “the parking of a motor vehicle by a person who is providing services on a casual basis on the premises where the space is located”.

5 The assessments referred to in clause 1 were issued in January 2003.On 18 March 2003 and in response to the assessments, Mr E.J. Knight (“Knight”) wrote three separate letters (one for each assessment); the third-last and second last paragraphs read as follows:

“On 14 January 2003, we received a notice of assessment dated 30 January 2003 in an amount of $800. It would appear that you have made an error in sending this assessment to us. It is clear that the Parking space in question is exempt of levy in accordance with item 4 under the heading “Exemptions for all areas” in your Departments Fact sheet “Parking Space Levy.

We have today paid in full the amount of $800 to your offices to which we will require a full refund when the matter is cleared up”.

6 On 15 May 2003 the Respondent wrote to Klewet seeking further information; that letter reads as follows:

PARKING SPACE LEVY OBJECTION

Thank you for your letter dated 12 March 2003 objecting to the parking space levy assessments we issued on 30 January 2003.

We note your claim that the subject parking space is exempt for the levy but unfortunately you have not provided any details upon which we can assess your claim. Could you please provide a full account of the circumstances and use of the subject car space and include the following items:

1. Who are the services being provided to?

2. Who is providing the services?

3. What is the relationship between the person providing the services, the person to whom services are provided and the owner of the parking space.

4. Describe the nature of the services—be specific and detailed.

5. What is the business of the person to whom services are provided?

6. What is the frequency of the provision of services?

7. What is the frequency of use of the space?

Should you wish to discuss this letter you may contact Tony Lauricella on [phone].

7 In answer to the letter dated 15 May 2003, Knight replied to the Respondent by letter dated 26 May 2003 and faxed to the Respondent; that letter reads as follows;

“We are in receipt of your letter dated 15th May 2003 requesting certain information please find answers to questions as follows:

1. Companies occupying suites 3 and 4 of the 13th floor of the premises.

2. Mr E. J. Knight.

3. (a) Consultants to and Non Executive Chairman of Klewet Pty Ltd the owners of the parking space

(b) Consultant to Jazz Future Konnection Pty Ltd (Tenant)

(c) Consultants to Fabric Australia Pty Ltd (Tenant)

4. Consultancy on an ad hock basis, attendance for meeting as required.

5. Klewet Pty Ltd - General Trading Company

Jazz Future Konnection Pty Ltd - Music Promotion

Fabric Australia Pty Ltd - (Reward/ Loyalty Program)

6. Average 5/6 times a month. Sometimes part of a day, two or three days in a row, sometimes once a month, sometimes not for one, two or three months. Casual.

7. As at Item 6

Should you require any further information, please do not hesitate to contact me.

8 The objection having been disallowed by notice dated 20 June 2003 review by the Tribunal was sought on 14 July 2003 by Robin. Question 7 (Reasons for Application) was answered by Robin simply by referring to a number of attached letters and including those referred to in preceding clauses of these reasons and also a letter dated 20 June 2003 addressed to Knight by the Respondent; the first sentence of the fourth paragraph of that letter reads as follows:

The term “services on a casual basis” refers to those services provided on an irregular basis for the maintenance or improvement of the premises and its systems.

The letter dated 20 June 2003 accords with a circular dated May 2003 entitled “Parking Space Levy Exemptions” and which sets out the basis upon which, in the view of the Respondent, exemptions are available.

9 It will be noted then that review was sought by Robin and not by Klewet; moreover the section 58 documents were issued on the basis that Robin is the Applicant. A possible problem as to jurisdiction was resolved with the assistance of Miss Roberts who suggested that application be made for the substitution, as Applicant, of Klewet in place of Robin. That application was duly made and, with the consent of Miss Roberts, granted. From this point on all references in these reasons to the “Applicant” refer to Klewet and to the exclusion of Robin. Had that application not been made and granted there would have been a problem as to jurisdiction and in consequence of which Robin could not have proceeded with his review application because he was not the owner of the premises. This would have required Klewet to start afresh and if necessary to seek an extension of time within which to do so. In my view an application for an extension of time would have been granted; the original application for review as made by Robin indicated, through the attached letters, that it related to the premises of which Klewet is the owner.

10 The Respondent’s case is clearly articulated in his Outline Submissions quoted substantially but not in full, as follows:

Relevant legislation

Parking Space Levy Act 1992

1 The object of the Parking Space Levy Act 1992 as set out in section 3 is:

“to discourage car use in business districts by imposing a levy on off-street commercial and office parking spaces (including parking spaces in parking stations), and by using the revenue so raised to finance the development of infrastructure to encourage the use of public transport to and from those districts.”

2 Section 7 sets out the types of parking spaces that are exempt from the levy. The applicant relies on s7 (2) (d):

“7 Parking spaces to which this Act applies

(1) This Act applies to a parking space on premises to which this Act applies, other than an exempt parking space.

(2) A parking space on premises within a Category 1 area or Category 2 area is an exempt parking space if it is set aside or used exclusively for one or more of the following purposes:

(a) the parking of a bicycle or motor bicycle,

(b) the parking of a motor vehicle by a person resident on the same premises as those on which the space is located or on adjoining premises,

(c) the parking of a motor vehicle for the purpose of loading or unloading goods or passengers to or from the vehicle,

(d) the parking of a motor vehicle by a person who is providing services on a casual basis on the premises where the space is located,

(e) the parking of a motor vehicle while a disabled person’s parking authority is displayed on the vehicle in the manner specified in the authority, the conditions specified in the authority are being observed and the authority is in force,

(f) the parking without charge of a motor vehicle on premises owned or occupied by the council of the local government area in which the premises are situated by a person other than an officer or employee of the council,

(g) the parking without charge of a motor vehicle on premises owned or occupied by a religious body or religious organisation, being a religious body or religious organisation in respect of which a proclamation is in force under section 26 of the Marriage Act 1961 of the Commonwealth or a religious body within a denomination in respect of which such a proclamation is in force,

(h) the parking without charge of a motor vehicle on premises owned or occupied by a public charity or public benevolent institution.”

3 Clause 6B of the Parking Space Levy Regulation 1997 provides criteria for assessment of the purpose for which a parking space is set aside:
“6B Assessment of exemptions for parking spaces

(1) In assessing for the purposes of section 7 of the Act whether a parking space is set aside for a purpose, the Chief Commissioner is to have regard to the following principles:

(a) the presence of measures (such as access control measures) or other features to limit the use of a parking space to use for a particular purpose or purposes indicates that the parking space is set aside for that purpose or those purposes,

(b) the absence of measures or other features as described in paragraph (a) indicates that a parking space is not set aside for any particular purpose,

(c) a parking space in a parking area that forms part of a retail shopping centre (being a parking area that is in the same building as the shopping centre and that operates generally only at times when shops in the shopping centre are open for business) should be considered to be set aside for the parking of a motor vehicle by customers of a retail shop, unless the parking space is a non-retail space as provided by subclause (2),

(d) the fact that a parking space is available or permitted to be used for a purpose, or is indicated (by advertising or otherwise) to be available for use for a purpose, does not of itself indicate that the parking space is set aside for that purpose.

(2) A parking space is a non-retail space for the purposes of subclause (1) (c) if it is available for the use of persons who may not be customers of a retail shop in the retail shopping centre concerned.

(3) In assessing for the purposes of section 7 of the Act whether a parking space on premises is used exclusively for a purpose, the Chief Commissioner may make a determination based on such investigation, study or survey as to the use of parking spaces on the premises as the Chief Commissioner thinks fit.

(4) For the purposes of the making of a determination under subclause (3), the Chief Commissioner may require the owner of premises on which there is a parking space to which the Act applies to carry out and report the results of such investigation, study or survey as to the use of parking spaces on the premises as the Chief Commissioner may from time to time direct.”

The Applicant’s Argument

4. The applicant relies on s.7(2)(d) of the Act to qualify for the exemption. It asserts that the parking space in question is set aside for the use of Mr E J Knight who provides “consultancy services on an ad hock (sic) basis” to tenants of the premises. The applicant contends that this meets the requirements of the exemption in that Mr Knight provides services on a casual basis on the premises where the space is located.

The Respondent’s Argument

5. The Respondent contends that Mr E J Knight’s use of the parking space does not meet the requirements of the exemption. In his letter dated 28 July 2003 addressed to the Administrative Decisions Tribunal, the applicant argued that he was entitled to the exemption because the subject parking space is reserved for casual use by a particular person and the space is used on a casual basis. The applicant refers to dictionary definitions of casual including meaning “irregular, unmethodical, undesigned, careless, haphazard, random, unplanned”. The applicant says that Mr Knight uses the space on a varied and irregular basis. Importantly, however, the legislation requires that it is the provision of services which are to be “casual”, rather than the parking itself.

6. Despite being requested to do so by the respondent, the applicant has not provided any evidence of the services that are provided on the subject premises, other than to describe them as “consultancy”. Mr E J Knight, the person for whom the parking space is reserved, is in fact a director of Klewet Pty Ltd, the owner of the parking space. Mr Knight’s son, Robin Edward Knight, is a director of Jazz Future Konnection Pty Ltd, another tenant of the premises.

7. In the absence of any evidence of the services which are provided by Mr Knight on the premises upon which the parking space is located, the respondent cannot possibly be satisfied that the relationship between the owner of the parking space and the person for whom it is reserved is anything other than an ordinary relationship of a director of the company that owns the parking space. Provision of a reserved parking space for a director of a company, whether that director attends the premises daily or irregularly, is not a use which qualifies the parking space for exemption from the levy.

8. The Parking Space Levy Regulation 1997 provides criteria for assessment of the purpose for which a parking space is set aside. The Chief Commissioner is entitled and indeed required to have regard to the principles set out in s.6B of that Regulation. Matters to be taken into account include the following the presence of any features limiting the use of a parking space for a particular purpose or indicating that it is set aside for that purpose and/or the absence of such measures or features. The Chief Commissioner is entitled to carry out an investigation, study or survey in order to assess whether a parking space qualifies for an exemption.

8. The respondent sent a letter to the applicant seeking answers to certain questions on 15 May 2003. Question 4 asked that the Applicant describe the nature of the services in a specific and detailed manner. The Applicant’s response to this question was “consultancy on an ad hock (sic) basis, attendance for meeting as required”. The applicant has not provided any other evidence to demonstrate that the parking space is set aside for the use of Mr Knight, nor how it is in fact used. Further it has provided no evidence as to the services provided by Mr Knight other than describing them as consultancy services.

9. The object of the Act is set out clearly in s.3 as extracted above. The purpose of the levy is to discourage car use in business districts by imposing a levy on off street commercial and office parking spaces. Exemptions are provided for various categories of parking including for example, disabled parking, free parking on premises owned by a religious organisation or a public charity. One should read the relevant exemption in this case consistently with the objects of the Act and the other exemptions provided. Clearly if employees of an organisation were able to use parking spaces and those parking spaces were exempt from the levy, then the objects of the Act would be frustrated.

10. In the second reading speech (Legislative Assembly, 7/5/92) the Minister for Transport, Mr Baird, referred to the need to counter the “bias in favour of parking spaces compared with other possible [employee] benefits” and the need to encourage the use of public transport by commuters:

“I would make the point that it is important to the achievement of the strategic goals of affecting car usage and increasing public transport usage for the journey to work that the levy be imposed in such a way that its cost is ultimately met by those at whom it is targeted ... There are a number of exemptions to the levy. Parking spaces which are necessary for the operations of commercial premises such as delivery and service vehicle spaces and parking spaces used by residents and disabled persons are to be exempt. Non-commercial parking provided by churches and charities are also exempt, as are free limited stay parking provided by councils and parking spaces at community facilities such as libraries and baby health centres”. (Emphasis added)
11. The respondent submits that Mr Knight, as a director of the owner of the parking space, is in an analogous situation to an employee of the company. Based upon the limited evidence which is before the Tribunal, Mr Knight is not providing “services on a casual basis” to the owner of the parking space. He provides ongoing services in his capacity as director, however he parks at the building on a casual basis. This is an important distinction.

11 In the interests of balance the Applicant ‘s submissions are included in these reasons as follows:

Appeal Re; Parking Space Levy Client ID 036033

We submit that the subject parking lot is exempt of a parking space levy,

We submit that the subject parking space is exempt from a parking space levy in that the subject parking space is;

Set aside for the exclusive use of the parking of a motor vehicle by a person who is providing services on a casual basis, on the premises where the space is located.

The aforementioned words accurately and fully described the use to which the subject parking space is put, furthermore, those words are exactly the words used in the Parking Space Levy Act 1992 part one clause 7 (2)(d) which defines one of the uses that qualify a particular parking space as exempt from a parking space levy.

In discussion with the Crown Solicitors Office, they expressed their reliance on Mr. Baird’s (Minister of Transport) second reading of the bill when he said ‘there are a number of reasons for the levy, parking spaces which are necessary for the operation of commercial premises such as delivery and service vehicle spaces and parking spaces used by residents and disabled persons are exempt’. They (The Crown Solicitors Office) then attempted to use the minister’s comments out of context by implying that these uses referred to in the general course of debate are the only uses that are exempt from the levy, they are clearly not, The Parking Space Levy Act 1992 Part I Preliminary 7 (2) sets out a list of exemptions the use of the subject parking space meets the requirements of (d) of that list

Parking Space Levy Act 1992 was introduced to stop or impede the flow of private motor vehicles into densely developed areas (like North Sydney), the use of the subject parking space is put to not only meets the intent of the act it meets the requirement of the Parking Space Levy Act 1992 part one clause 7 (2)(d) in that it is ‘set aside for the exclusive use of the parking of a motor vehicle by a person who is providing services on a casual basis on the premises where the space is located’

The act (Parking Space Levy Act 1992) does not define the word “casual” English dictionaries do there are many and various dictionaries that described the word “casual” as meaning-irregular, unmethodical, unceremonious, haphazard, random, unplanned, unpremeditated and without formality.

This company has taken the word casual to mean what all dictionaries describe as its meaning. It would seem that the O.S.R. have shaped a policy around what they want the word “casual” to mean rather than what it does mean according to dictionary definitions.

At this point, we reserve the right to respond further, if necessary.

12 Oral evidence was given on behalf of the Applicant by Knight. Knight, who is 71 and whose hearing is not good, came to Australia in 1980 after a business career in the United Kingdom. The section 58 documents indicate that the Applicant was incorporated in 1981. Its directors are Knight, Doris Jane Knight who is Knight’s wife, Robin, and Knight’s daughter, Jennifer Ann Phillips (“Jennifer”). The only shareholders are Knight and his wife who hold one share each. Knight however, and perhaps understandably enough, regards the Applicant as his; he said at one point, somewhat heatedly that the Applicant is his “blessed’ company, thus indicating that he effectively aggregates his and his wife’s shareholdings as belonging to him. In his letter dated 26 May 2003 Knight described himself as the Applicant’s non-executive chairman.

13 The Applicant has two investments only; it owns the premises and including the parking space. It also owns land in Karalta Road, Erinor (the “Erinor land”) The Erinor land is one of the central aspects of a residential village scheme which is, so I was told, regulated under the Residential Parks Act. Put in simple terms, the Applicant owns the Erinor land; rent is payable to the Applicant by Pine Needles Village Pty Limited (“Pine Needles”) another Knight family company, in respect of the Erinor land. Pine Needles receives rents from the residents of the homes constructed on the Erinor land. There are 245 of them, described by Knight as moveable and transferable although not without difficulty. The residents own their own homes although they have no interest in the Erinor land; they pay rent to Pine Needles, that rent is a composite of land tax, rates and a profit element for Pine Needles.

14 The Applicant’s business is run on a day to day basis by Robin and Jennifer. Robin works at the premises; Jennifer has offices in the village at Erinor and travels to and from her office directly from and to her home in Terrigal. The parking space is used only by Knight and for whom it is designated and marked as such; access to it gained electronically through the use of a card. Robin does not use the parking space even when his father does not use it, because he has parking in a nearby parking garage. Jennifer parks at the village.

15 There are other companies which are relevant. Robin controls Jazz Future Konnection Pty Limited (“JFK”) which is involved in popular music and the contracting of performers for this purpose. JFK, and Robin on its behalf, use the premises. Fabric Australia Pty Limited (“Fabric”) is controlled by a friend of Robin; (Knight refused to disclose his name and he is thus referred to simply as “the friend”). Fabric is involved in loyalty rewards referable to the fabric industry. Fabric is operated in the main from the friend’s home but it too sometimes uses the premises. Neither of JFK and Fabric pays any rent for the use of the premises and the arrangement with each of them appears to be informal. It will be noted that Knight in his letter dated 26 May 2003 referred to them as tenants; as to whether that is an apt description of companies who pay no rent or other consideration of any kind whatever is perhaps open to some doubt.

16 Knight’s evidence could not be described as forthright. He said that over the relevant years he attended at the premises in order to give advice. He said that to describe him as a consultant would not be altogether apposite although that was the description furnished by him in his letter dated 26 May 2003. It is conceivable that he meant to say that he was not a consultant in the sense that his services were freely available to those prepared to pay his fee. That advice was given in relation to the Applicant and also on occasion to JFK and Fabric. He has no records of any kind as to what advice was given and when it was given or for that matter to whom it was given. He has received no remuneration of any kind from any of these entities. His advice to the Applicant was, so he said, generally given at the premises but it was given on occasion over the telephone and also at his home in the context of family visits.

17 Knight was cross-examined by Miss Roberts as to the manner in which the Respondent’s letter dated 15 May 2003 was answered in his letter dated 26 May 2003. The latter letter was brief in its terms and did not in fact properly or fully address the questions asked; question 4 is a particularly good example. Detailed information was called for and it was not furnished; if anything his answer was evasive. Knight said (and more than once) that if the Respondent wanted further information he should have written a follow-up letter. That contention was quite clearly not tenable.

18 Although Knight’s evidence was open to criticism on the grounds that it was short on detail and on the basis that he was clearly reluctant about giving full answers, it does not follow that it was untruthful. Knight’s evidence can be summed up on the basis that, as he saw it, the Applicant fell within the relevant exemption (7 (2) (d)) in that services were rendered on a casual basis at the premises and he could see no reason why detailed or for that matter any further information was needed. Knight clearly resented some of the questions asked. Given the width of the section his reaction is, to an extent, and to some degree, perhaps understandable. Miss Roberts did not (and indeed could not) dispute his evidence that he attended at the premises now and then on a haphazard basis and that he gave advice of some description. She did not for example cross-examine him as to his answer in his letter dated 26 May 2003 to question 6. Miss Robert’s task was in fact made difficult, and perhaps impossible, by the sheer breadth of the section. The exemption is, in its terms, available if services are rendered on a casual basis at the premises. The Respondent’s interpretation of the section as contained in his letter dated 20 June 2003 is not correct simply because it does not accord with the legislation. There is no basis upon which the relevant services must be furnished to the premises, and either in the form of work on them or in any other manner. The section would appear to apply no matter whether the services were useful or remunerated and it does not matter whether the services were rendered to the Applicant or for that matter anyone else. The exemption applies in its terms so long as some services were performed by the user of the parking space at the premises. Knight said that at his age he went into the premises on an occasional basis when needed. He said that he might go there two days in succession and then not again for a month. The fact that the Applicant is his own company, in realistic terms, renders it more likely than not that he would have performed some service to it even if that service consisted of the checking of or supervision of its accounts and books and records; the Applicant is plainly a company of substance and it is possible (although there was no evidence to this effect) that dividends paid by it are relied upon by Knight. The absence of any definition of the terms ‘service” and “casual” as used in the section have the effect that their plain English meanings, must serve as the guides. Dictionary definitions of these words of wide import are set out later in these reasons.

19 Regulations under the Act have been framed but they do not appear to be of any assistance. Miss Roberts urged me to interpret the Act in accordance with its purpose as contained in section 3; the purpose of the Act is clear enough and that is to discourage parking in certain areas by imposing a levy in certain circumstances but by allowing an exemption, again in certain circumstances. She referred me also the second reading speeches to which, she contended, resort could be had in cases of ambiguity. However I do not think that the section is ambiguous. It allows an exemption where services are performed at the premises on a casual basis. While I did not find Knight’s evidence wholly satisfactory I do not doubt that he did attend at the premises now and then, and thus casually, and that he did, when he went in to the premises, perform some kind of service even if at times that service was (perhaps) perfunctory or nominal or of no particular use or even if there was no pressing need for it. I have some doubts as to his services to JFK and Fabric simply because he professed no knowledge of the nature of either of their businesses. His attitude was quite simple; the Act allows an exemption; the Applicant fits within that exemption and that is an end of the matter. Given the sheer width of the section, to discharge the onus is not at all difficult. I do not know what services were provided or when or to whom; however, and as I have indicated the probabilities favour the proposition that some service of some sort (within the width of meaning of the word “service) was performed and moreover that it was done on anything other than a casual (again a word of wide import) basis.

20 Miss Roberts contended that the services to the Applicant were performed by Knight in his capacity as a director of the Applicant. This may well be so but the section is perfectly wide enough to encompass services of any description performed in any capacity whatever. She emphasised (correctly) that the legislation focuses on service on a casual basis and not parking on a casual basis; it is likely of course that there will be some degree of correlation between the two. Her contention that he furnished service as a director but parked on a different basis cannot be correct; as I have said, the capacity in which services are rendered appears to me to be irrelevant.

21 The Applicant in its submissions referred to dictionary meanings of the word “causal”. The following definition is taken from the Macquarie Dictionary Australia’s National Dictionary Revised Third Edition, Published by the Macquarie Library Pty Limited, 1997:

Casual / adjective 1. happening by chance: a casual meeting . 2 . unpremeditated; offhand; without any definite intention: a casual remark. 3. Careless; tending to leave things to chance; negligent; unconcerned: a casual air . 4 . irregular; occasional: many nurses show are marked preference for the flexibility and degree of freedom that casual employment gives. -Advertiser, 1986. 5. informal: casual clothes. 6 . accidental: a casual fire . 7 . employed only irregularly: because the cashiers are casual workers they could not be trusted – Anne Summers, 1975. 8 . Obsolete relating to persons receiving charity from a district in which they do not permanently live. 9. Obsolete uncertain – noun 10 . a worker employed only irregularly. 11 . ( plural) relaxed, informal clothes, shoes, etc.

22 Similarly the term “service” is one of very wide import; the following definition is taken from the same dictionary:

Service: noun 1. an act of helpful activity. 2. the supplying, supplier of any articles, commodities, activities, etc., required or demanded. 3. the providing or a provider of some accommodátion required by the public, as messengers, telegraphs, telephones, or conveyance. 4. the organised system of apparatus, appliances, employees, etc., for supplying some accommodation required by the public 5. the supplying or a supplier of water, gas, or the like to the public. 6. the performance of duties as a servant; occupation or employment as. a servant. 7. employment in any duties or work for another. a government, etc. 8. a department of public employment, or the body of public servants in it: the diplomatic service. 9. the duty or work of public servants. 10. the serving of a sovereign, state; or government in some official capacity. 11. Military a. (plural) the armed forces the services. b. period or duration of active service. C. a branch of armed forces, as the army or navy. 12. (often plural) the performance of any duties or work for another; helpful activity: medical services 13. the act of servicing a piece of machinery, especially a motor vehicle. 14. public religious worship according to prescribed form and order: divine service. 15. a ritual or form prescribed for public worship or for some particular occasion: the marriage service. 16. the serving of God by obedience, piety, etc. 17. a musical setting of the sung portions of a liturgy. 18. a set of dishes, utensils, etc., for a particular use: a dinner service. 19. Law the serving of a process or writ upon a person. 20. Nautical, etc. a small cord or the like wound about a rope, etc., as for strengthening or protection. 21. Tènnis, etc. a. the act or manner of putting the ball in play. b. the ball as put in play. 22. the insemination of a female animal by the male. adjective 23. of service; useful. 24. of, relating to, or used by, servants, tradespeople, etc service stairs. 25. of or relating to the armed forces. Verb (t) (serviced, servicing ) 26. to make fit for service; restore to condition for service: to service a car. 27. (of a male animal) to inseminate (a fem~ animal). 28. to meet interest and other payments on, as a government debt: to service a debt. 29. to seek to vary an industrial award or conditions in it: to service an award. 30. to meet the needs of (a group of people or organisation) by providing a particular service: the road~safety officer services all the schools in this area. — phrase 31. at some-one’s service, ready to help someone; at someone’s disposal my chauffeur will be at your service during your stay here. 32. be of service, to be helpful or useful: if I can be of service to yu please call me. [ME; OE serfise, from OF servise, from L servitium]

23 There was no issue as to the basis upon which the assessments were paid given that this case relates in fact to a refund claim. Even though the words “under protest” were not used when payment was made, it is clear enough that payment was made on this basis.

24 I have previously indicated that the Respondent’s interpretation of the section as contained in his letter dated 20 June 2003 is incorrect; Miss Roberts did not (and indeed could not) contend otherwise.

25 It follows of course that in all the circumstances, the Applicant did for the relevant years fall within the exemption contained in section 7 (2) (d) of the Act. Accordingly the objection decision is set aside, and the Applicant is entitled to a refund of the amounts paid together with interest in accordance with the Taxation Administration Act 1996.

ORDERS

The objection decision under review is set aside.