Klewer v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (No 2) [2008] FCA 1788
BANKRUPTCY – appeal – whether appellants’ residence is divisible amongst first appellant’s creditors under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) – appellants allege that trust exists over property in favour of second appellant – appellants allege that “protected money” used in purchase of property – no evidence to support existence of trust for the purposes of s 116(2)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act – no writing evidencing a trust as required by s 23C(1) of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) – protected money not used to pay for the whole or substantially the whole of the property for the purposes of s 116(3) of the Bankruptcy Act – s 116(4) of the Bankruptcy Act may operate to allow the first appellant to make a claim for so much of the proceeds of sale of the property as can be attributed to protected money and which constituted an outlay within s 116(2D)
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 5, 58(1)(a), 116(1), 116(2), 116(2D), 116(3), 116(4) Conveyaning Act 1919 (NSW) s 23C
R Meagher, J Heydon and M Leeming, Meagher, Gummow & Lehane’s Equity: Doctrines & Remedies (4th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2002) J Heydon and M Leeming, Jacobs’ Law of Trusts in Australia (7th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2006)
LUCY KLEWER and ROBERT KLEWER v OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY
NSD 339 OF 2008
BENNETT J 1 DECEMBER 2008 SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NSD 339 OF 2008
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
LUCY KLEWER First Appellant
ROBERT KLEWER Second Appellant
AND:
OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY Respondent
JUDGE:
BENNETT J
DATE OF ORDER:
1 DECEMBER 2008
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellants pay the respondent’s costs.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NSD 339 OF 2008
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
LUCY KLEWER First Appellant
ROBERT KLEWER Second Appellant
AND:
OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY Respondent
JUDGE:
BENNETT J
DATE:
1 DECEMBER 2008
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The first appellant (Ms Klewer) was declared bankrupt on 20 September 2005. The second appellant (Robert Klewer or Robert) is Ms Klewer’s son. At the time the sequestration order was made, Ms Klewer resided in and was the registered proprietor of 30 Coachmans Close, Korora, New South Wales (‘the Korora property’). The respondent, the Official Trustee, is the trustee of Ms Klewer’s estate and currently the registered proprietor of the Korora property by virtue of the operation of s 58(1)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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The case of Klewer v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (No 2) involves Ms Klewer and the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy, with the dispute centering around the ownership and disposition of a property known as the Korora property. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The central legal issue before the court was whether Ms Klewer held the Korora property on trust for her son, Robert Klewer, as she had claimed. The court was required to determine if such a trust existed and, if so, whether it was properly established under the relevant legal principles.
The court meticulously reviewed the evidence presented, including affidavits, statements, and other documentation. Ms Klewer asserted that she had declared a trust over the Korora property in favor of Robert Klewer, citing various communications and intentions. However, the court found that there was no written evidence to support the existence of such a trust, and the only testimony came from Ms Klewer herself, which was not corroborated by other witnesses or documentation. The court noted that Ms Klewer had ample opportunity to provide additional evidence or clarify her claims but did not do so effectively.
In its reasoning, the court emphasized the importance of clear and convincing evidence in establishing trusts, particularly in the context of property dispositions. The Federal Magistrate's findings were that Ms Klewer's claims regarding the trust were not supported by the evidence. The court concluded that the trust, if it existed, was not validly established due to the lack of written documentation and corroborative evidence. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellants were ordered to pay the respondent’s costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellants pay the respondent’s costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Ms Klewer has had every opportunity to present submissions, including numerous written submissions, in support of the appeal. Other than to reassert the fact that she holds the Korora property on trust for Robert Klewer which his Honour did not accept, she has not suggested any error on the part of the Federal Magistrate in respect of his Honour’s finding that there was no trust. Ms Klewer has not suggested that his Honour’s findings of fact in relation to the alleged trust were ‘glaringly improbable’ or that his Honour had in some way ‘failed to use or … palpably misused his advantage’ as the trial judge (Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118).The additional evidence and Ms Klewer’s submissions In her oral submissions on 8 October 2008, Ms Klewer asserts the existence of a trust, express, implied or constructive. She also asserts that there is a written will, which accords with a testamentary disposition of the Korora property. Ms Klewer maintains that she made a ‘living will’ and intended to and did transfer the Korora property to Robert Klewer, so that she held the property in trust for him. However, apart from an assertion that a written version must exist somewhere on a computer disk which she has not been able to locate, there is nothing in writing evidencing such a trust. In further evidence adduced in the appeal, to which the respondent did not object, two of Ms Klewer’s children address the statements that were before Raphael FM regarding the issue of the trust. They state that they each understood that, from 2000, Ms Klewer declared a trust over the Korora property in favour of Robert Klewer. An affidavit sworn by Robert Klewer and filed in Court on 8 October 2008 states that, from 2000, Robert understood that the Korora property was his. However, this does not avoid the problem that there was no writing evidencing such a trust. The respondent points to the following evidence before Raphael FM:·In [13] of Ms Klewer’s affidavit sworn 18 February 2008: By mid 2000 the family moved into the current Korora residence. It was at such time that I informed the older children that the home was Robert’s by way of trust due to his condition and his bleak future. I made eldest son Andrew the executor of the estate to ensure that those were my wishes.·At [22] of Ms Klewer’s affidavit sworn 18 February 2008:… When I created such trust it was akin to a living will. ... I created such trust at such time because I have been a suicide risk since 1994 after a truamatic [sic] event ... Their [sic] ought to be no doubt about such trust especially when one takes into account the life long incapacity regarding Robert, the sibling rivalry with regards to their liklyhood [sic] of contesting a will. I was prevented from creating a documented trust on the basis that the Commonwealth Bank held title, refused to transfer title to Robert, albeit that the Bank was maybe in error in that regard, the family accepted from the onset [sic] that a trust by way of an understanding that the Korora home was in safe keeping for Robert and even though they were not happy about it they honoured my wishes.·In a statement dated 18 February 2008, Ms Klewer’s daughter stated that:I am aware that my brother Andrew is the executor of my mother's estate. ... It's highly probable that other reasons why she [the first appellant] wanted to ensure the Korora home was in trust for Robert was because she [the first appellant] may have felt that she could die from an overdose and wanted Robert to live in his own home ... .
Decision
Reasons for decision
BENNETT J
Section 23C(2) of the Conveyancing Act provides that s 23C does not affect the creation or operation of resulting, implied or constructive trusts.THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE’S DECISION Federal Magistrate Raphael had before him two affidavits sworn by Ms Klewer and one by Robert Klewer, together with documents tendered by Ms Klewer. Ms Klewer gave oral evidence. The respondent relied on two affidavits of a Deputy Official Receiver. From that evidence, his Honour compiled a history. His Honour expressed the view that the history itself was not controversial. In summary, the facts as found by Raphael FM at [6]–[14] are:Moneys paid by Ms Klewer in respect of the Korora property·In June 1998, Justice Chisholm of the Family Court of Australia (‘the Family Court’) ordered Ms Klewer’s former husband, Mr Klewer, to transfer the first matrimonial home (‘the Boambee Gardens property’) to Ms Klewer free from encumbrances. Mr Klewer was subsequently ordered to apply to the Insurance and Superannuation Commission to release funds to discharge the mortgage over the Boambee Gardens property. These orders were not “splitting orders” under Part VIIIB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (‘the Family Law Act’) for the purposes of s 116(2)(d)(iva) or s 116(2)(d)(vii) of the Act, as at that time, no such orders existed. The Boambee Gardens property was transferred to Ms Klewer on 26 June 1999.·Ms Klewer entered into an agreement to purchase the land at Korora for $90,000 and to build a house on the land at the cost of approximately $171,000. This was funded by two mortgages with Poinciania Housing Co-operative Society Ltd (‘the Society’) for $150,000, secured over both the Korora property and the Boambee Gardens property. At the time, the house on the Korora property had not been built.·On 26 June 2000, the mortgage over the Boambee Gardens property in favour of the Society was discharged and the property was re-mortgaged to the CBA for the same amount, $150,000.·On the same day, the mortgage over the Korora property in favour of the Society was discharged and the property became the subject of a mortgage to the CBA to secure $231,000.·The house on the Korora land was built and the builder was paid. Apart from CBA funds, two monetary payments were made: the first payment of $50,000 was described as “client funds (Lucy Klewer)” and the second payment of $44,202 as “solicitor payments”.·His Honour seemed to accept that at least one of these payments was from moneys due to Ms Klewer following a personal injury claim that she had made. As his Honour noted, whether the first or second of these payments represented the personal injury payment to Ms Klewer is not relevant for present purposes, although it may be relevant for the purposes of a claim for payment by Ms Klewer on realisation of the Korora property under s 116(4) of the Act.·The Boambee Gardens property was sold in November 2002 for the sum of $146,000.·Ms Klewer arranged for a number of improvements to be made to the Korora property. To the extent that this work was carried out in 2003, it seems to have been paid for by the sale of the Boambee Gardens property.·On 11 October 2004, the orders made by Justice Chisholm of the Family Court in 1998 were varied to include a splitting order under s 90MT (in Part VIIIB) of the Family Law Act. ·Ms Klewer stated that she has used moneys released to her from Mr Klewer’s superannuation funds pursuant to the 2004 orders of the Family Court either to pay the mortgage or to effect improvements on the Korora property.·Ms Klewer also says that she utilised the proceeds of a workers compensation commutation in the sum of $20,000 and another payment of $6,000 for injury to her ankle by a dog to pay the mortgage or to effect improvements on the Korora property.·Further, Ms Klewer says that she applied a payment from a property damages claim, in the sum of $7,410 plus $654 interest, in the same way.·Moneys are owed to the CBA under the mortgage over the Korora property. As at the date of judgment of Raphael FM, the amount outstanding on that mortgage was approximately $211,000.The trust in favour of Robert Klewer·Ms Klewer’s evidence was that, shortly after the Korora property was purchased, she told all her children that she proposed to leave the property to Robert Klewer and that they would not get any benefit from it. This was because of Robert’s disabilities. She told her eldest son that he would be the executor of her estate and that the estate would be left to Robert.·Ms Klewer maintained that it was her intention to declare a trust over the property immediately and not upon death.·There was no written evidence of the declaration of the trust.·There was no admissible evidence of the conversations between Ms Klewer and her children, other than from Ms Klewer.·In her statement of affairs, Ms Klewer said that she was buying the Korora property.·In response to the question: ‘Do you own or are you buying any land or buildings in Australia or overseas?’, Ms Klewer answered ‘Yes’.·In response to the question: ‘Are there any other owners?’, Ms Klewer answered ‘No’.·In correspondence with solicitors in October 2005, under the heading: “Re: Whether my residential property is divisible under s 116 of the Bankrupcty Act 1966”, Ms Klewer made no mention of a trust and referred only to payments made out of what she claimed to be non-divisible funds. His Honour concluded that the letter indicated a sophisticated knowledge of the workings and effect of s 116 of the Act. In other correspondence in October 2005, with the Deputy Official Receiver, Ms Klewer debated legal distinctions and again made reference to s 116 of the Act but made no reference whatsoever to a trust.·In Walton v Klewer [2005] FMCA 878, Ms Klewer had refused to pay a debt to Mr Walton. She said that she was a solvent but recalcitrant debtor. Federal Magistrate Driver made reference to unchallenged evidence presented by Ms Klewer that she owns a house and land in which she has equity and that she was taking steps to refinance the property to pay her debts, if she were willing to pay them. She planned to rent out the property to increase her income. There was reference to Robert Klewer and the fact that he would be ‘disadvantaged by the loss of his home’ but there was no suggestion that he had an interest in that home, being the Korora property.The Federal Magistrate’s findings in relation to the alleged trust