Kleid & Schnur
[2024] FedCFamC1A 236
•13 December 2024
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1) APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Kleid & Schnur [2024] FedCFamC1A 236
Appeal from: Schnur & Urbina (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC1F 477 Appeal number: NAA 208 of 2024 File number: MLC 13501 of 2020 Judgment of: ALDRIDGE, GILL & STRUM JJ Date of judgment: 13 December 2024 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – Appeal from a costs order against counsel who appeared in a parenting hearing – Findings that the appellant failed to adequately prepare for the hearing, had accepted a brief in another court on the same date, and did not have standing to appear in a federal court – Where the grounds of appeal are misconceived – Where the primary judge provided reasons for her findings – Where the primary judge considered the material identified by the appellant – No error established – Appeal dismissed – Where the appellant failed to adequately prepare for the appeal – Where the Court holds concerns about the frankness of some of the appellant’s statements – Referral to the Legal Services Commissioner. Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 102NA, 117
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) s 57
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 55B
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) r 12.15
Cases cited: Cassidy v Murray (1995) FLC 92-633; [1995] FamCA 91
Schnur & Urbina [2024] FedCFamC1F 374
Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568; [1989] HCA 44
Number of paragraphs: 56 Date of hearing: 19 November 2024 Place: Heard in Melbourne, delivered in Sydney The Appellant: Litigant in person Solicitor for the First Respondent: Aboriginal Family Violence Legal Service (Djirra) (submitting notice filed) The Second Respondent: Litigant in person (submitting notice filed) Solicitor for the Independent Children’s Lawyer: Perisic Lawyers (submitting notice filed) ORDERS
NAA 208 of 2024
MLC 13501 of 2020FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DIVISION 1 APPELLATE JURISDICTIONBETWEEN: MR KLEID
Appellant
AND: MR SCHNUR
First Respondent
MS URBINA
Second Respondent
INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER
ORDER MADE BY:
ALDRIDGE, GILL & STRUM JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
13 DECEMBER 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is dismissed.
2.The Principal Registrar is directed to forward a copy of these reasons and the transcript of the appeal hearing to the Legal Services Commissioner of Victoria.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Kleid & Schnur has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ALDRIDGE, GILL & STRUM JJ:
This is an appeal from a costs order against counsel who appeared in a parenting hearing before a judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1) made on 18 July 2024.
The respondents and the Independent Children’s Lawyer each filed a submitting notice.
The costs order was made because counsel:
·Had failed to appropriately prepare the case for the mother, having not read all the affidavit evidence (including not having completed reading the father’s affidavit) and having read only one of the single expert’s three reports;
·Had accepted a brief to appear in another court at 2.00 pm on the first day of hearing; and
·Did not have standing to appear as he had not signed the Register of Practitioners maintained by the High Court of Australia.
The matter was listed before the primary judge for a final parenting hearing with an estimated duration of eight days. The appellant was briefed to appear for the mother pursuant to a grant of legal aid under the Victorian scheme for the provision of aid in matters where orders have been made under s 102NA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) preventing a party from personally cross-examining the other.
At the outset of the hearing the appellant announced his appearance adding “I’m only briefed for the cross-examination of the father” (Transcript 29 April 2024, p.2 line 7). This triggered some consternation on the part of the primary judge who sought to test that proposition as her understanding, later confirmed by documents evidencing the position of Legal Aid Victoria, was that funding was provided for the entirety of the hearing. Her Honour asked the appellant to produce the documents that established that he had only been retained on the limited basis asserted by him and suggested that the matter might need to be stood over to the following day if there were issues with the brief to be sorted out.
Her Honour then said “How much more time? I mean, obviously, you’ve read the materials because you’ve had to prepare cross-examination” (Transcript 29 April 2024, p.3 lines 14–15). The answer was “No. I’ve only – your Honour, because I was briefed only for cross-examination…” (Transcript 29 April 2024, p.3 lines 17–18).
After some lengthy further discussion, the matter was stood over to the following day, on which the hearing was then vacated.
It must be said that the appeal also did not get off to a good start. When asked to address [29]–[39] of her Honour’s reasons the appellant responded that the judgment only had 28 paragraphs. It emerged that the appellant was looking at her Honour’s reasons of 31 May 2024 wherein the conduct of the appellant was referred to the Legal Services Commissioner.
When taken to the reasons the subject of the appeal, the appellant said “I’m not entirely sure I’ve seen this document” (Transcript 19 November 2024, p.3 line 28) and in reference to his Summary of Argument, “It would appear that at the time I prepared those submissions, that I had not had the benefit of reading those particular paragraphs” (Transcript 19 November 2024, p.4 lines 19–21).
This cannot have been correct because both the grounds of appeal and Summary of Argument indicate some familiarity with the reasons.
It later emerged that the appellant was completely unaware of the contents of the Appeal Book and had not read the transcript of the hearing (he said he did not have the temerity to do so having regard to his autism spectrum disorder). This woeful level of preparation would be unacceptable for a lay litigant, let alone a practising barrister challenging an order which was based on him not being prepared and ready to run a hearing.
The appellant was given some time to read the relevant reasons and consider his position. He then confirmed his intention to proceed with all grounds of appeal.
THE APPEAL
None of the grounds of appeal challenged the finding at [30] or [38] that found that the appellant did not have standing to appear in a federal court because his name did not appear on the Register of Practitioners maintained by the High Court of Australia (see s 55B(3) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and s 57 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth)).
At the hearing of the appeal the appellant conceded that he had not signed the Register and accepted that in announcing his appearance he had misled the primary judge by holding himself out as entitled to appear. The fact that this might have been inadvertent (the appellant said he was not aware of the requirement) does not alter the reality that the appellant was not entitled to appear. Nor does the appellant’s submission that the issue arose later and her Honour was not aware at the time of the first day of hearing. Nonetheless, the appellant did not accept that this matter alone fully justified the costs order and maintained that the primary judge erred in the application of r 12.15 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (“the Rules”).
As will become obvious, none of the grounds challenged the finding that the appellant was not ready to run the case for the mother.
Accordingly, the appeal was doomed to fail from the outset.
Ground 1 – “Stating conclusions without providing objective criteria including facts in support of the conclusions”
Notwithstanding that the appellant conceded that Ground 1 was “incorrect” (Transcript 19 November 2024, p.7 line 20), he continued to press it.
The complaint is that at [1] of the reasons, her Honour stated that the proceedings were adjourned as a result of the conduct of the appellant. The appellant contends that “no detail is given as to the nature of that conduct and why that conduct was the reason for that adjournment” (appellant’s Summary of Argument filed 14 October 2024, p.1).
The primary judge provided that detail at [29]–[39], the paragraphs apparently not read by the appellant.
This ground fails.
Ground 2 – “Failure to take into account the contents of the affidavit of the appellant which were relevant to the conclusions in ground 1, including directions from the instructing solicitor for the appellant in particular with regard to his role”
At [37] her Honour said:
In addition to the submissions filed on his behalf, Mr [Kleid] also relied upon an affidavit sworn 31 May 2024. In that affidavit, he deposes that he was briefed to appear in the matter on 26 March 2024. He deposes that following receipt of that booking he had a further discussion with his clerk on 29 April 2024 regarding the terms of his engagement. Nowhere in his affidavit does Mr [Kleid] refer to the appearance before me on 16 April 2024 where I went to some length to ensure that he understood the nature of the proceedings, the seriousness of the matters in issue and the expectation of the Court as to the necessity for him to be appropriately prepared to conduct the proceeding on behalf of his client. At that case management hearing, Mr [Kleid] confirmed that he had adequate time to prepare for the hearing.
Plainly, the primary judge took the affidavit and its contents into account.
Ground 3 – “Improper reference to s.117 of the Family Law Act”
It was submitted that this section is irrelevant as it only applies as to costs between parties (appellant’s Summary of Argument filed 14 October 2024, p.2).
We do not agree. Section 117(1) of the Act makes it plain that the prima facie position is that a party shall bear his or her own costs. However, as s 117(2) provides, the Court may make such costs orders it thinks just and where the circumstances justify such a course. Such other orders may include an order that a non-party, such as a lawyer, pay the costs (Cassidy v Murray (1995) FLC 92-633 at 82,365).
This ground is quite misconceived and fails.
Ground 4 – “Incorrect characterisation of the submissions of the appellant about Rule 12.15”
Rule 12.15 of the Rules deals with costs orders against lawyers.
The appellant submitted that the primary judge mistakenly took his submission to be that the rule only applied to solicitors and not barristers when he actually submitted that as the provisions generally relate to work done by solicitors it is more difficult to apply to a barrister.
The introduction to the relevant paragraph of the appellant’s submissions to the primary judge commenced with “It is submitted that Rule 12.15 clearly contemplates the work done by a solicitor…” (appellant’s written submissions as to costs filed 31 May 2024, paragraph 4). Any misunderstanding by the primary judge is therefore understandable.
Before us the appellant accepted that r 12.15 applied to him. Therefore, there can be no difficulty in the application of it by her Honour to the appellant.
The appellant did attempt to make other submissions about the rule which, frankly, we did not understand.
Ground 5 – “Failure to provide proper reference to the legislative provisions relied on in support of the decision supported by reference to relevant facts”
The appellant wrongly suggested that the primary judge did not refer to r 12.15, a challenge impossible to reconcile with the previous ground and with the primary judge setting out the rule in full and making reference to it twice (at [13], [18] and [19]).
Grounds 6 and 7 – “Failure to provide adequate factual basis for the decision, in particular the undisputed fact that Victoria Legal Aid had provided funding for the appellant for only day 1 of the trial and consequences of that determination”; and, “Failure to take into account the fact of the funding referred to in ground 6 and improper attribution of the consequences of that to the appellant”
The case put by the appellant was that, although he was originally briefed for the cross-examination of the father, on the day of the hearing he became aware that the funding was only for the first day of hearing.
It has to be said, how this is relevant to the key finding that the appellant was not sufficiently prepared to cross-examine the father is beyond us. However, even so, the submission cannot succeed.
Whilst the material before the primary judge makes it clear that legal funding was available for the appellant for the entirety of the hearing, it may be accepted that the appellant’s instructing solicitor was confused about the funding. The following exchanges took place between the primary judge and the appellant’s instructor:
HER HONOUR: And as per the orders that I made at the original trial directions, this matter is listed for an eight-day hearing.
[MOTHER’S SOLICITOR]: Yes.
HER HONOUR: You’ve provided a costs estimate to the court that indicates that an estimate of costs for counsel of – I think it was 15 – approximately $15,000.
[MOTHER’S SOLICITOR]: That’s correct.
HER HONOUR: And that’s based on a calculation for an eight-day hearing.
[MOTHER’S SOLICITOR]: Yes, that’s correct.
HER HONOUR: And as far as you’re concerned, what were the terms of the brief upon which [Mr Kleid] was engaged?
[MOTHER’S SOLICITOR]: So we made inquiries from Victoria Legal Aid and also through the guidelines, and it has become really clear prior to booking counsel that the funding only covers the cross-examination of the father, not all other witnesses. We’ve communicated this to the barrister. We’ve also said to our barrister that if he ..... additional work, it would be pro bono, that Legal Aid would only cover him cross-examining the father.
(Emphasis added)
(Transcript 30 April 2024, p.15 lines 19–41)_
And:
HER HONOUR: That’s my – let me clarify – briefed to appear – you – he was briefed to appear at court in this matter yesterday.
[MOTHER’S SOLICITOR]: For eight days.
HER HONOUR: Yes.
[MOTHER’S SOLICITOR]: The brief was for eight-day hearing – final hearing.
HER HONOUR: And was the – was he provided with a backsheet that confirmed it was for an eight-day hearing?
[MOTHER’S SOLICITOR]: Yes, and a memo from myself, and also was booked with his clerk for eight days, so he was aware it was an eight-day-long trial.
HER HONOUR: All right. And the next question – to the best of your knowledge, was it your understanding that he retained briefs in other matters for yesterday, 29 April?
[MOTHER’S SOLICITOR]: He contacted my office – I think it was by email – about a week later, stating that he had a short mention here or there, and I said, “How is that possible? When we booked you with your clerk, you had no other hearings.” And he said he will discuss it with your Honour, and he assured me that it shouldn’t be a problem if he has to step out for a short while.
HER HONOUR: So you - - -
[MOTHER’S SOLICITOR]: And I said, “Look, I can’t get another barrister when I’m provided with cross-examination scheme funding a month before an eight-day hearing – final trial, and there was no other barristers available.” He assured me it shouldn’t be a problem, and we left it at that.
HER HONOUR: So from your perspective, did you provide consent to him to appear in another matter yesterday?
[MOTHER’S SOLICITOR]: No. No, I didn’t provide consent. He said he will sort it out with your Honour.
(Emphasis added)
(Transcript 30 April 2024, p.17 line 29 to p.18 line 18)
The appellant did not produce a letter of instruction, a backsheet or evidence from his clerk to challenge the statements of the solicitor that he was briefed for the entirety of the eight day trial. He did not seek to adduce such evidence on the appeal.
There can be no doubt, therefore, the appellant was briefed for eight days, for the whole trial, even though he might not be paid for each day, and that he had accepted the brief. It must follow that he accepted the limited payment.
Further, at a directions hearing on 16 April 2024, the appellant did not mention that there were any limitations on his appearance, as the following paragraphs from her Honour’s reasons of 31 May 2024 make clear (Schnur & Urbina [2024] FedCFamC1F 374):
8Later during Counsel’s submissions I sought to impress upon him the significance of the matter, and its importance to the parties in the proceedings and particularly the subject child of the proceedings. The following exchange occurred:-
HER HONOUR: Are you intending to appear at the trial?
[MR KLEID]: Well, I’m briefed for it and, as I should say, your Honour, that I was only briefed because there was no one else available despite the fact that I’m trying to work on a reduced workload. But I appreciate that [the mother’s] - - -
HER HONOUR: This is a significant matter. It involves the change of – a change of residence of a child who is eight years old. So I can’t think of any more significant matter that could be determined by this court. It’s a sliding door moment for a very young child.
9In order to reiterate to the mother’s Counsel the seriousness of the issues, the following exchange then occurred:-
HER HONOUR: Well, if you are to remain in the matter, my expectation is that you will be absolutely up to speed with how matters proceed in this court. This is a parenting matter. It is a serious parenting matter. There are legislative signposts as to how I approach the matter and will deal with it. The rules make specific provision for how these matters are to be conducted. And you need to familiarise yourself with all of that material before you get to first base, because it’s no excuse to say that, “I’ve only received the brief days or weeks ago.”
[MR KLEID]: As far as the hearing date is concerned, there’s ample time between now and then for myself to - - -
HER HONOUR: Well, you’ve got to get familiar not just with the material but with the court processes and how this matter runs…
10As a result of the submissions made by the mother’s Counsel at that mention hearing, it was understood that he was briefed to, and would appear, at the trial on behalf of his client. It was also confirmed by him during that mention hearing that he considered he had “ample time” to properly prepare the matter.
This makes the appellant’s submissions as to his retainer even more difficult accept. Further, the warnings from her Honour make the lack of preparedness even more inexcusable. It follows that there is no merit in these grounds whatsoever.
Ground 8 – “Perception of bias including the decision to refer the appellant to the Legal Services Commissioner without providing reasons at the time, inviting the barristers for the other parties to seek costs and improper conduct towards the [appellant] in particular with regards to the impact of such conduct on his recognised disability, more specifically autism spectrum disorder”
The appellant relies on matters that took place on 29 April 2024. He must fail at the first hurdle because he did not raise any objection with the primary judge at that time nor seek her disqualification (Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568).
We do not propose to deal with the balance of the submissions on this ground because they are factually inaccurate. The referral to the Legal Services Commissioner was made after the appellant had been heard and not before, there was extensive discussion about the appellant’s preparation before the primary judge found he was not ready, as opposed to little or none, and the question of costs was not raised at a premature stage.
The fact that the appellant felt he was unable to make certain submissions or provide medical evidence does not point to any perceived bias.
This ground fails.
Ground 9 – “Failure to adequately address written submissions of the appellant”
The submission is that her Honour only referred to the appellant’s submissions as to r 12.15. That is not so as [33], [34], [35] and [37] make clear.
Ground 10 – “Incorrect characterisation of the other commitment of the appellant on 29.4.24”
Her Honour found (at [34]):
Notwithstanding his own assertions that he was briefed to cross-examine the father, he had accepted a brief to appear in another Court on the first day of hearing…
Further, even if the appellant had been in a position properly to run the hearing, he was unavailable to appear for the whole day as he was holding a brief to appear in another court that afternoon.
The written submissions of the appellant were:
It is submitted that the it [sic] was not correct to state that I was unable to appear for the whole day as I was briefed in another matter. There was a mention listed on that day in the Melbourne Magistrates’ Court (MMC) for a matter that I had been involved in for some time. That listing came about prior to being briefed in this matter. I advised the solicitor for [the mother] of this at the time I was briefed for this matter. The mention was not due to take long. The MMC was advised of my commitment in this court and I advised that I would only be able to attend if I would be permitted to do so by this court. I advised this court on 29.4 of this hearing but was told that I would not be excused to attend the MMC. I was intending to send an email to the MMC to advise accordingly. However, the matter in this court was stood down for discussions to take place. This afforded me the opportunity and time to attend the MMC which I did and my attendance there only took 15 minutes and did not inconvenience this court.
(Appellant’s Summary of Argument filed 14 October 2024, p.4)
This merely confirms the finding as opposed to demonstrating error.
The appellant told her Honour at the hearing:
[MR KLEID]: Well, I have a client on bail. It has been stood down until 2 pm.
(Transcript 29 April 2024, p.14 line 31)
At the hearing of the appeal, the appellant variously told us:
[MR KLEID]: Advice the Melbourne Magistrates’ Court that I would be unable to attend, and the court would have dealt with that accordingly. It happens quite commonly that a practitioner in court is caught, so to speak, about – with regard to another matter, and - - -
ALDRIDGE J: Well, I mean, your experience may be different to mine, [Mr Kleid]. But as I understand it, when a barrister takes a brief, he is expected – he or she is expected to turn up.
[MR KLEID]: That’s correct..
ALDRIDGE J: That’s what they are briefed for.
[MR KLEID]: Well - - -
STRUM J: And it doesn’t matter whether it’s at the New South Wales Bar or at the Victorian Bar - - -
[MR KLEID]: Correct.
STRUM J: - - - or any other Bar in the Commonwealth of Australia or probably the Commonwealth.
[MR KLEID]: Well, this matter wasn’t a matter – it was a matter in which I was helping a client. It wasn’t a matter for which I was formally briefed. And it had been having ongoing - - -
STRUM J: So when you told the court that you had another brief, you didn’t have another brief.
[MR KLEID]: No. That was – I’m not sure if – I didn’t - - -
GILL J: Which is the case in which you were not briefed but you were just helping the client? Was that the case before - - -
[MR KLEID]: It was not a formal brief. No.
GILL J: This – but this court?
[MR KLEID]: No.
GILL J: Or a criminal court?
[MR KLEID]: The matter I had in the Melbourne Magistrates’ Court was a matter for which I was helping my client and - - -
GILL J: But you weren’t briefed.
[MR KLEID]: For which I was not formally briefed, but I was there to – I was assisting a client of mine. It was not a matter that was critical or that was critical – for which my attendance was critical. And so that’s why I was quite ready just to send an email to advise accordingly. I’ve had to do that in the past. And the Melbourne Magistrates’ Court has not had difficulty accommodating that. So I was acutely conscious that - - -
ALDRIDGE J: Well, didn’t you tell – didn’t you tell her Honour it was a bail application?
[MR KLEID]: No.
ALDRIDGE J: There’s something about bail?
[MR KLEID]: Not at all. It was a mention, your - - -
STRUM J: Well, [Mr Kleid], turn to page 28 of the appeal book, if you would.
…
[MR KLEID]: Yes. Well the – I – I’m not sure if the transcript covered that, but I did make clear that, if I weren’t to be excused, then I would have been – I would have advised the court accordingly. I – at no point was I - - -
ALDRIDGE J: Or why wouldn’t you just organise that on the Friday before, for someone else to go down and do it?
[MR KLEID]: Because there wouldn’t have been anyone else. This is a client I’ve been assisting for a long time who has significant mental health issues, and it would have been impossible to find someone, particularly someone who didn’t - - -
ALDRIDGE J: So it was preferable to leave this client you had been assisting for some time in the lurch, was it?
[MR KLEID]: Well, I wasn’t leaving it on the lurch because it was a – it was a mention. I was conscious that, if I didn’t appear, it wouldn’t have been an issue. I’ve asked the Melbourne Magistrates’ Court on the Friday of my - - -
ALDRIDGE J: Well, why did you tell Her Honour about it, then, if it wasn’t an issue?
[MR KLEID]: I – I only raised it to ascertain her view about whether or not I would be permitted to appear, and when she made clear that I wouldn’t be permitted to appear, I acknowledged that and - - -
…
GILL J: But, [Mr Kleid], you’ve told us you were not briefed. So about 20 minutes ago you told us you were not briefed in that matter in the Magistrates’ Court in Melbourne.
[MR KLEID]: That’s correct.
GILL J: That is completely at odds with what you presented to [the primary judge], is it not?
[MR KLEID]: If I’m – by using the word “briefed”?
GILL J: You told us you were not briefed. What you told [the primary judge] was effectively that you were briefed, you had a commitment to appear.
[MR KLEID]: Yes, and that was - - -
GILL J: On what you’ve said to us, that was wholly wrong.
[MR KLEID]: If by the use of the word “brief”, I’ve misled the court, then yes. All I can say is that I was in a highly agitated state.
…
[MR KLEID]: It was clumsy – clumsy use of language, your Honour.
STRUM J: Counsel are either briefed or they’re not briefed. If one appears at court, [Mr Kleid], as counsel, one appears because one is briefed to appear.
[MR KLEID]: Well, in my case, your Honour, because of the amount of pro bono work I do, I’m not formally briefed.
GILL J: Well, if you’re doing pro bono work, you’re still briefed to do it.
…
ALDRIDGE J: When you’re assisting clients, you’re briefed pro bono or briefed on a direct access basis. The word “briefed” appears in all three possibilities.
[MR KLEID]: Well, it does, your Honour, but I just find it – this perhaps reflects – my understanding is that I don’t see it formally as being briefed because I’m helping a client. Now, from a legal point of view, that might be characterised as being briefed by the client, but in fact it’s the initiative that’s come from myself where I have clients – vulnerable clients who really don’t know – understand the legal system and rely on people like myself to assist them, so.
(Transcript 19 November 2024, p.36 line 38 to p.43 line 13)
These passages not only do not demonstrate error on the part of the primary judge, they raise concerns as to the appellant’s frankness to the primary judge, his frankness to us, and his competence.
This ground also fails.
Ground 11 – “No factual basis to claim that costs of the respondent were in fact thrown away, in particular due to the course of the proceeding on 29.4.24 and the issues with the affidavit of the [father] as identified by the appellant”
The appellant said this in his Summary of Argument (p.4):
It is submitted that as discussions about resolving the matter commenced before there was any discussion about preliminary matters. Those discussion continued and were expected to resume on 30.4.24. I was in attendance on that day despite there being no funding for my appearance but the father would not participate and the matter was adjourned after that.
It is not clear what is intended by this paragraph but it does not demonstrate error. It is plain that the hearing date was vacated for the reasons identified by her Honour at [38]–[39].
Disposition
The appeal will be dismissed.
We have already noted with some concern that none of the submissions grappled with two key findings of the primary judge which were the appellant’s lack of standing and lack of preparedness. Each of these easily justified the order, so to repeat, the appeal as constituted was doomed to fail.
Further, accepting that the appellant was acting as a litigant in person and not as counsel at the appeal hearing, his appearance was marked by woeful preparation to a degree unacceptable for any litigant. Further we have significant concerns about the frankness and accuracy of some statements made to us by the appellant. We will direct the Principal Registrar to forward a copy of these reasons and the transcript to the Legal Services Commissioner.
I certify that the preceding fifty-six (56) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justices Aldridge, Gill & Strum. Associate:
Dated: 13 December 2024
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