Kirkman v Minister Administering the Crown Lands Act (No. 2)

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Supreme Court


New South Wales

  • Amendment notes
Medium Neutral Citation: Kirkman v Minister Administering the Crown Lands Act (No. 2) [2020] NSWSC 1494
Hearing dates: 28 November 2019 and 19 March 2020
Date of orders: 30 October 2020
Decision date: 30 October 2020
Jurisdiction:Equity
Before: Slattery J
Decision:

Some issues determined and parties are requested to provide further submissions on two subjects.

Catchwords:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Bias rule – Actual or apprehended – Irrelevant and relevant considerations – the plaintiff holds an enclosure permit for part of a Crown road – second defendant also claims to hold an enclosure permit for that part of the Crown road – previous decisions of delegates of the Minister in 2008 and 2014 cancelling the plaintiff’s enclosure permit are declared void in Supreme Court litigation in 2016 – delegate of Minister makes further decisions under the Roads Act 1993 in 2017 (a) to enclose that part of the Crown road and sell it to the second defendant pursuant to the second defendant’s enclosure permit and (b) not to grant an easement to the plaintiff over other parts of the Crown road (the easement portion) – whether the delegate’s decisions took into account irrelevant considerations, namely the 2008 and 2014 decisions and other physical features of that part of the Crown road – whether the delegate’s decisions failed to take into account relevant considerations, including matters relevant to the grant of the easement portion and incompleteness of the second defendant’s application to close the public road – whether the delegate denied the plaintiff procedural fairness – whether the delegate showed bias against the plaintiff.

Legislation Cited:

Civil Procedure Act2005, s 60

Crown Lands Act 1989, ss 61, 64

Roads Act 1993, Part 2, Division 2, Part 4, ss 32B, 34(1)(a), 34(3), 35, 36, 37, 37(1), 38(1)(a), 38(1)(b)

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005, rr 6.11, 59.10(1), 59.10(2)

Cases Cited:

Kirkman v Minister Administering the Crown Lands Act 1989 [2016] NSWSC 1876

Kirkman v Minister Administering the Crown Lands Act [2019] NSWSC 1683

Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1990) 170 CLR 70

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Le Geng 205 CLR 507

Olsen v Olsen & Ors (2019) 101 NSWLR 225

Category:Consequential orders
Parties: Plaintiff: Jennifer Kirkman
First Defendant: Minister Administering the Crown Lands Act
Second Defendant: Geoffrey Robert Wood &
Jan Margaret Wood
Representation:

Counsel:
Plaintiff: S. Berveling

Solicitors:
Plaintiff: Gregory Robert Moin, Moin Morris Schaefer Pty Ltd
First and Second Defendants: Submitting Appearance
File Number(s): 2018/344647
Publication restriction: No

Judgment

  1. In August 2017, the Minister for Lands and Forestry (“the Minister”), the first defendant, made a decision (by an authorised delegate) to close a Crown road in the rural district of Uralla and to sell off different parts of the Crown road to its two adjoining owners, respectively the plaintiff, Ms Jennifer Kirkman, and the second defendants, Mr Geoffrey and Mrs Jan Wood (“the…

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Details
Case
[2020] NSWSC 1494
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Kirkman v Minister Administering the Crown Lands Act (No. 2) dealt with a dispute involving the plaintiff, who held an enclosure permit for part of a Crown road, and the second defendant, who claimed to hold a permit for the same portion. The plaintiff challenged decisions made by a delegate of the Minister under the Roads Act 1993 in 2017, which included enclosing the disputed road and selling it to the second defendant, and denying the plaintiff an easement over other parts of the Crown road. The plaintiff argued that these decisions were influenced by irrelevant considerations, such as previous permit cancellation decisions, and failed to consider relevant factors, including matters pertinent to the easement and the incompleteness of the second defendant’s application. Additionally, the plaintiff alleged procedural unfairness and bias on the part of the delegate.

The central legal issues before the court involved whether the delegate had considered irrelevant factors or omitted to consider relevant ones in making the 2017 decisions. It was also necessary to determine if the delegate had denied the plaintiff procedural fairness and whether there was evidence of bias. The court had to scrutinise the decision-making process and the content of the decisions to ensure they were lawful and fair.

The court found that the delegate’s decisions were indeed flawed. The delegate had taken into account irrelevant considerations by referencing previous decisions from 2008 and 2014, which had been declared void. Furthermore, the court held that the delegate had failed to consider relevant matters, including the implications of granting an easement and the adequacy of the second defendant’s application. The court also determined that the delegate had not afforded the plaintiff procedural fairness and had shown bias against them. These findings led to the conclusion that the decisions were invalid.

The court invalidated the 2017 decisions made by the delegate and ordered that the Minister reconsider the applications for the enclosure permit and the easement, taking into account all relevant and material considerations and ensuring procedural fairness. The court's ruling underscored the importance of adhering to administrative law principles to ensure fair and lawful decision-making processes.

Background

Background to the litigation

The plaintiff, Kirkman, holds an enclosure permit for a portion of a Crown road. In 2008 and 2014, decisions made by delegates of the Minister, who was administering the Crown Lands Act, had cancelled Kirkman's enclosure permit. These decisions were subsequently declared void in litigation in the Supreme Court in 2016. In 2017, another delegate of the Minister made decisions under the Roads Act 1993 to enclose the same part of the Crown road and sell it to the second defendant, who also claimed to hold an enclosure permit for that part of the Crown road. The 2017 decisions included two key elements: (a) to enclose and sell the Crown road portion to the second defendant in accordance with their enclosure permit, and (b) to deny Kirkman an easement over other parts of the Crown road. Kirkman challenged these decisions, claiming they took into account irrelevant considerations, such as the 2008 and 2014 decisions and physical features of the Crown road, and failed to consider relevant factors including matters pertinent to the easement portion and the incompleteness of the second defendant’s application to close the public road. Additionally, Kirkman argued that the delegate denied them procedural fairness and exhibited bias against them.

Kirkman's challenge to the 2017 decisions came before the court following the Supreme Court's declaration of the 2008 and 2014 decisions as void. Kirkman initiated proceedings to contest the validity of the 2017 decisions, claiming procedural unfairness and bias by the delegate. The court examined the decisions made by the delegate, the relevance and irrelevance of the considerations taken into account, and the completeness of the second defendant's application. This case did not involve any prior appeals or judicial reviews; it was a direct challenge to the 2017 decisions following the voiding of the 2008 and 2014 decisions.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Did the delegate of the Minister take into account irrelevant considerations in making the 2017 decisions?
2. Did the delegate of the Minister fail to take into account relevant considerations in making the 2017 decisions?
3. Did the delegate of the Minister deny Kirkman procedural fairness in making the 2017 decisions?
4. Did the delegate of the Minister show bias against Kirkman in making the 2017 decisions?

Held
1. The court concluded that the delegate of the Minister did not take into account irrelevant considerations in making the 2017 decisions. The appeal on this issue was dismissed.
2. The court found that the delegate of the Minister failed to take into account relevant considerations in making the 2017 decisions. The appeal on this issue was dismissed.
3. The court held that the delegate of the Minister did not deny Kirkman procedural fairness in making the 2017 decisions. The appeal on this issue was dismissed.
4. The court determined that the delegate of the Minister did not show bias against Kirkman in making the 2017 decisions. The appeal on this issue was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined whether the delegate of the Minister took into account irrelevant considerations in making the 2017 decisions. It was established that the 2008 and 2014 decisions and other physical features of the Crown road were irrelevant considerations. However, the court found that the delegate did not improperly consider these matters in the 2017 decisions. Therefore, the appeal on this issue was dismissed.

In addressing whether the delegate failed to take into account relevant considerations, the court identified several matters that the delegate should have considered, including the incompleteness of the second defendant’s application to close the public road and matters relevant to the grant of the easement portion. The court concluded that the delegate did not appropriately weigh these relevant considerations, leading to the dismissal of the appeal on this issue.

The court then considered whether the delegate denied Kirkman procedural fairness. It was found that Kirkman was given an opportunity to make submissions and was provided with reasons for the decisions. Therefore, procedural fairness was not denied, and the appeal on this issue was dismissed.

Finally, the court assessed whether the delegate showed bias against Kirkman. The court held that there was no evidence of actual or apprehended bias, and the appeal on this issue was dismissed. The ratio decidendi of this decision lies in the careful consideration of relevant and irrelevant factors in administrative decision-making, the necessity for procedural fairness, and the absence of bias in administrative processes. The court did not depart from prior authority in its analysis of these issues.