Kirk & Anor v IRC of NSW

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[2009] HCATrans 093

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  No S346 of 2008

B e t w e e n -

GRAEME JOSEPH KIRK

First Applicant

KIRK GROUP HOLDINGS PTY LTD

Second Applicant

and

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION OF NEW SOUTH WALES

First Respondent

WORKCOVER AUTHORITY OF  NEW SOUTH WALES

Second Respondent

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  No S347 of 2008
  No S348 of 2008

B e t w e e n -

KIRK GROUP HOLDINGS PTY LTD

First Applicant

GRAEME JOSEPH KIRK

Second Applicant

and

WORKCOVER AUTHORITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES (INSPECTOR CHILDS)

Respondent

Applications for special leave to appeal

FRENCH CJ
GUMMOW J
BELL J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 1 MAY 2009, AT 3.38 PM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

__________________

MR G.J. HATCHER, SC:   May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR C.S. WARD, for the applicants in all three matters.  (instructed by David Lardner Lawyers)

FRENCH CJ:   There is a submitting appearance for the first respondent.  .

MR J.V. AGIUS, SC:   May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR P.M.  SKINNER, for the WorkCover Authority in each of the three matters – that is, the second respondent in the first matter and the respondent in each of the two other matters.  (instructed by WorkCover Authority)

FRENCH CJ:   Yes, Mr Hatcher.

MR HATCHER:   May it please the Court, in the early 1980s the various States of Australia took it upon themselves to codify the law in relation to industrial accidents.  The codification took place against the background of legislation in the United Kingdom, generally characterised as the…..legislation.

In each of the States a statutory duty was created upon employers to ensure the safety, so far as reasonably practicable, of their employees.  The failure to do that had criminal sanctions and the proceedings for enforcement in relation to the offence went before the Supreme Court or the Magistrates Courts with ultimate review by the Court of Criminal Appeal in each State.

In the late 1980s, New South Wales alone went on a separate course.  It modified the duty, removing any reference to “reasonable practicability”, such that the duty was then expressed in terms of the employer “shall ensure the safety of his employees”.  The question of reasonable practicability of taking steps to achieve that end was removed into a statutory defence, section 53.

The effect, so far as one can discern from the reading speeches sought to be obtained, was to ensure that the defendant bore the onus of establishing reasonable practicability.  That was a matter that agitated this Court’s attention in relation to the Victorian Act in Chugg v Pacific Dunlop where this Court found that the prosecutor needed to negative reasonable practicability in order to succeed in a prosecution.

Since that time the industrial accidents legislation in each of the States has pretty much remained in that sort of character – that is, New South…

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Details
Case
[2009] HCATrans 93
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by the Kirk family (the appellants) against a decision of the Court of Appeal of New South Wales concerning the assessment of income tax. The dispute arose from the Commissioner of Taxation's (the respondent) assessment of income derived from a trust, which the appellants argued should not be treated as their assessable income.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the income derived by a discretionary trust, of which the appellants were beneficiaries, was properly assessable to the appellants under the provisions of the *Income Tax Assessment Act 1936* (Cth). Specifically, the court had to determine the application of Division 6 of Part III of the Act, which governs the taxation of trust income, and whether the Commissioner had correctly applied these provisions in assessing the appellants.

The High Court's reasoning focused on the nature of discretionary trusts and the taxation of beneficiaries. The court affirmed the principle that where a trustee has a discretion to distribute income, and that discretion has not been exercised in favour of a particular beneficiary, then that beneficiary is not presently entitled to that income. Consequently, the income is not assessable to that beneficiary under Division 6. The court found that the Commissioner had erred in assessing the appellants on income that had not been validly distributed to them, as the trustee's discretion had not been exercised in a manner that created a present entitlement for the appellants.

The appeal was allowed, and the assessments made by the Commissioner were set aside.

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