KINNEY & KINNEY
[2019] FCCA 862
•10 April 2019
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| KINNEY & KINNEY | [2019] FCCA 862 |
| Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – Property Settlement – short marriage – asset-by-asset approach. |
| Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss.75(2),79 (1), (2), (4) |
| Cases cited: Hickey & Hickey & Attorney-General for the Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 30 FamLR 355 |
| Applicant: | MS KINNEY |
| Respondent: | MR KINNEY |
| File Number: | LNC 544 of 2018 |
| Judgment of: | Judge McGuire |
| Hearing date: | 14 March 2019 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 14 March 2019 |
| Delivered at: | Burnie |
| Delivered on: | 10 April 2019 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mrs K Mooney |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | McVeity & Associates |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Ms C Gibson |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Charmaine Gibson |
ORDERS
That each party retain to the exclusion of the other all assets, liabilities, financial resources including the benefits of any superannuation fund or entitlement currently in the possession or control of that party.
That each party indemnify the other in respect of:
(a)Any and all liabilities incurred by that party since separation in either joint names or that party’s name alone;
(b)Any and all liabilities attaching to any asset retained by that party pursuant to these Orders.
That pursuant to Section 81 of the Family Law Act1975 these orders shall as far as practicable finally determine the financial relationship between them and avoid further proceedings between them.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Kinney & Kinney is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BURNIE |
LNC 544 of 2018
| MS KINNEY |
Applicant
And
| MR KINNEY |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Applications
These are competing applications for alteration of property interests between the parties to a marriage of the just over five years’ duration.
The applicant wife is 56 years of age. She is a retired public servant. The husband is 60 years old. He is also retired and has crystallised his superannuation interests into an income stream.
The husband is an undischarged bankrupt. His trustee in bankruptcy does not participate in these proceedings although indicates that any payment or tangible assets received by the husband pursuant to my orders should properly vest in the trustee.
The husband essentially seeks one order only being that there be a superannuation split in respect of the wife's policy and with a base amount of $300,000 in his favour. Notably, such an order, if made, would comprise 'exempt property' for the purposes of the husband's bankruptcy. In all other respects the husband proposes that each of the parties keep all items of property and superannuation currently in his or her possession or control.
The wife seeks a single order whereby the husband paid her a sum of $117,952 being essentially a 'repayment' for what the wife claims were direct contributions by her to the husband's superannuation entitlement. The fundamental premise to the wife's argument and the crux of the dispute now before me is that the wife says that the parties maintained separate finances during the course of their short relationship and hence it is proper for the Court to conduct its consideration on an asset-by-asset approach rather than the more common global approach. Thus, she says that the $117,952 is directly identifiable and traceable in respect of her contribution to the husband's superannuation.
The husband's Counsel argues that the Court should follow the inglobo approach and that the parties’ finances were generally mixed throughout their relationship and hence the various contributions by them should not be seen as targeted towards particular assets or resources.
The wife's Counsel argues that the circumstances prevailing for these parties are such that there should be no adjustment under the s.75(2) considerations. The husband argues for an adjustment in his favour on account of s.75(2) considerations.
The Background Facts
The husband receives an income stream of approximately $48,000 per annum from his superannuation entitlement with a current corpus of the approximately $317,000.
The wife is a retired public servant currently on Centrelink benefits given that that she has not reached an age where she is able to crystallise her superannuation entitlements.
In … 2007 the husband purchased an investment property in Town A, Western Australia for $800,000. His initial equity was $150,000 with a $650,000 mortgage. That property was rented out during the Western Australian mining boom and was initially positively geared providing the husband with an income source.
The parties met in the 2012 and commenced cohabitation in … of that year.
The parties married on … 2014.
On … 2015 the wife received the benefits from a property settlement with her further husband including a superannuation split of $91,000 and a cash adjustment of $541,428 together with sundry assets.
On … 2015 the wife received an inheritance of $333,742.
In … 2015 the wife deposited $540,000 into a fixed term deposit account in her name and $340,000 into her superannuation account.
On 5 April 2016 the parties each signed statutory declarations in the same terms purporting to each relinquish 'any claim to any monies, shares, property or chattels (including vehicles and household goods) that did not belong to me before knowing (the other) or that I did not pay for during our relationship. This includes any money that has been deposited into bank accounts or superannuation accounts, plus any accrued interest since June 2012'.
Neither party argues that the statutory declarations comprise a form of binding financial agreement or could be rectified to be such a binding financial agreement.
In … 2016 the husband received an inheritance of $27,252.
In September 2016 the husband became bankrupt with debts of approximately $600,000 referenced, on his evidence in Court, only to the mortgage liability on the Property B property. It is the husband's evidence that the value of the property and the benefit of rental income were both substantially diminished due to a downturn in the mining industry. The husband's evidence is that he made a conscious decision to cease paying the mortgage at a time when the mortgage was not, in fact, in arrears and thereby to effectively cause a debt leading to an act of bankruptcy.
Our 4 November 2016. The husband converted his superannuation entitlement of $335,000 into a Super Income Stream pension.
At or by the end of 2016 both of the parties had effectively retired but with only the husband's superannuation having crystallised.
In … 2017 the wife purchased a home at Property C, Tasmania for $380,000. The home was purchased in her name alone. It was purchased with funds from her term deposit. There is no mortgage. At the same time she purchased a motor vehicle also from term deposit funds.
On 26 October 2017 the husband's trustee in bankruptcy sold the Property B property for $445,500 which, of course, did not satisfy his debt to the bank.
The parties lived in the wife's Property C home for about nine months until they separated on 1 January 2018.
The Issues
There is a fundamental dispute between the parties as to whether the Court adopts the global approach or the asset-by asset approach to the consideration of contributions pursuant to s.79(4) of the Act.
The parties dispute as to whether or not they essentially agreed to and did maintain separate finances during the course of their marriage or whether there was no such agreement and hence that their finances were mixed.
Whether there should be any adjustment, in any event, in respect of the s.75(2) considerations.
The Evidence
The parties were the only witnesses. They were both represented. Both gave evidence and were cross-examined. I generally found each of the wife and the husband to be good, honest and candid witnesses. They both, of course, tended to emphasise their responses pointedly at their respective arguments being, on the wife's part, that the finances were kept separate and, from the husband's perspective, that there was a mixing of the finances.
I observed the wife to be more assertive, detailed and with a greater historical recollection than was the husband who candidly volunteered that his recollections were poor and that the wife primarily controlled financial matters during the course of their relationship.
Specifically, the parties have different recollections as to the motivation for the above-mentioned statutory declarations. The wife says that the initiative for the declarations was to record their agreement to maintain separate finances and for these purposes it was she who instructed solicitors in the months leading up to the signing of the declarations. The husband maintained that the motivation for the statutory declarations was solely a joint desire to protect the wife from his forthcoming bankruptcy.
Relevant Law
Section 79(1) of the Family Law Act provides:
In property settlement proceedings, the Court may make such order as it considers appropriate:
(a)in the case of proceedings with respect to the property of the parties to the marriage or either of them – altering the interests of the parties to the marriage and the property; or
(b)in the case of proceedings with respect to the vested bankruptcy property in relation to a bankrupt party to the marriage – altering the interests of the bankruptcy trustee in the vested bankruptcy property.
Section 79(2) states:
The Court shall not make an order under this section unless it is satisfied that, in all the circumstances, it is just and equitable to make the order.
Section 79(4) provides:
In considering what order (if any) should be made under this section in property settlement proceedings, the Court shall take into account:
(a)the financial contribution made directly or indirectly by or on behalf of a party to the marriage or a child of the marriage to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of any of the property of the parties to the marriage or either of them, or otherwise in relation to any of that last – mentioned property, whether or not that last – mentioned property has, since the making of the contribution, ceased to be the property of the parties to the marriage or either of them; and
(b)the contribution (other than a financial contribution) made directly or indirectly by or behalf of a party to the marriage or a child of the marriage to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of any of the property of the parties to the marriage or either of them, or otherwise in relation to any of that last – mentioned property, whether or not that last – mentioned property has, since the making of the contribution, ceased to be the property of the parties to the marriage or either of them; and
(c)the contribution made by a party to the marriage to the welfare of the family constituted by the parties to the marriage and any children of the marriage, including any contribution made in the capacity of homemaker or parent; and
(d) the effect of any proposed order upon the earning capacity of either party to the marriage; and
(e)the matters referred to in subsection 75(2) so far as they are relevant…
Whereas there was previously general agreement as to a preferred four- step process to be taken by trial judges in making property alteration orders pursuant to s.79 and consistent with the well-known decision in Hickey & Hickey & Attorney-General for the Commonwealth of Australia[1], the High Court in Stanford v Stanford[2] focused on a preliminary question or determination for the Courts in respect of s.79(2) and whether it be 'just and equitable' to make any orders without specific reference to the four-step process. Although the High Court in Stanford did not adopt a four-step process, it did not specifically exclude that formulaic approach. There followed an attempt by the Full Court in Bevan v Bevan (No.2)[3] to harmonise any uncertainty between Hickey and Stanford where the Court noted at [18]-[19]:
Senior counsel for the husband structured his submissions by reference to the 'four-step' approach to property settlement applications discussed in our earlier reasons. By way of explanation for doing so, senior counsel said:
the adoption of the above (four-step) approach is not intended to presuppose a positive answer to the question posed [by] section 79 (2), nor to suggest that it is an approach appropriate in all proceedings. Rather, and provided that the fundamental propositions outlined by the High Court in Stanford [2012] HCA 52; (2012) 293 ALR 70… are not obscured, such approaches intended to and does no more than provide a principled, disciplined and structured means by which all of the matters arising for consideration pursuant to section 79 can be conveniently and properly identified and assessed. (Further, and whilst not said critically nor in a manner which seeks to cavil with the decision in this appeal, no other approach to the determination emerges readily from either Stanford nor the decision in this appeal. It is respectfully submitted that provided that the 'fundamental propositions' articulated in Stanford are not obscured, and whilst not universally so as has always been recognised, the approach set out above continues to provide a proper, transparent, certain and structured approach to the presentation and determination of applications pursuant to section 79.
(We have no issue with what senior counsel is said about the utility of the four-step process, and we accept provides a convenient way to structure both submissions and judgements, provided the caveat mentioned is not overlooked).
[1] (2003) 30 FamLR 355
[2] (2012) 247 CLR 108
[3] (2014) 51 FamLR 363
Consequently, I am comfortably satisfied that what evolves from Hickey, Stanford and Bevan (No.2) is a judicial recognition of a four-step approach to guide trial judges in determining property alteration orders and as follows but provided the s.79(2) question is engaged:
i)to identify the property of the party including assets, liabilities and financial resources and for these purposes superannuation entitlements are to be 'treated as property' and then to attribute value to the items and hence to the property pool;
ii)to identify the various financial and non-financial contributions by or on behalf of each of the parties to the property pool with specific reference to s.79(4) (a), (b) and (c) and to attribute weight to the parties’ contributions accordingly;
iii)to then assess whether any further adjustments are proper, just and equitable with reference to the matters in s.75(2) of the Act;
iv)to then 'step back' and consider whether the proposed orders do justice and equity to the parties[4].
[4] Russell v Russell (1976) 134 CLR 495
Global approach or Asset-by Asset approach
It is long and well-established that it is permissible for trial judges to consider the parties’ entitlements under s.79 of the Act by consideration on either a global or an asset-by-asset approach[5].
[5] Norbis & Norbis (1986) FLC 91-712
A global approach looks at the contributions of various types but without a focus to distinct assets, liabilities or resources. The asset-by-asset approach, to the contrary, does focus particular contributions to distinct or individual items in the property pool. As I observed in Hemiro & Ramos & Ors[6]:
Although experience suggests that most matters are more commonly and conveniently dealt with by the global approach, it seems that the alternative may be appropriate in circumstances where the marriage is of short duration and/or where the parties have maintained relatively separate finances and/or where a particular contribution might be directed to particular asset. Further it is open to the Court to consider separately two ‘pools’ (or more) dependent upon the status of an asset or pool of assets.
[6] [2018]FCCA 1425
The marriage here is of short duration being just over five years. There are no children of the relationship or dependent children of either of the parties in the relationship. The assets and liabilities of the parties at the date of cohabitation seem to be readily identifiable and agreed. The introduction of the benefit from the wife's previous property settlement in June 2015 ($541,428.80) together with the wife's inheritance in … 2015 ($333,742) and the husband's inheritance in … 2016 ($27,252.38) are agreed, identifiable and traceable. The parties’ relevant employment records and taxable incomes are agreed as are their taxable incomes for the relevant years. The parties maintained separate bank accounts during the course of their relationship although also created and utilised joint but identifiable bank accounts for a period. The husband's Property B property remained in his own name as did the mortgage liability. The wife purchased a property at Property C in her own name. There were no jointly purchased assets of any significant value. Prima Facie, the statutory declarations evidence an intent to maintain separate finances although I accept that to there are different views as to the motivation of that document.
On reflection, I am of the view that the above factors lean towards me adopting an asset-by-asset approach to the consideration of the parties’ contributions and entitlements under s.79 of the Act.
Property Pool
The parties essentially agree the property pool in the sense of the assets of each of them with only minor discrepancies as to valuation estimates. I am able to find the relevant pool for the purposes of these reasons as follows: –
Wife’s property at Property C, Tasmania
$450,000
Wife’s Motor Vehicle D
$ 24,000
Wife’s ANZ account balance
$ 70,000
Husband’s Motor Vehicle E
$ 500
TOTAL
$544,500
The parties have the following superannuation entitlements:
Wife’s Super Fund F accumulation fund
$645,000
Husband’s Super Fund G accumulation fund
$ 21,176.42
Husband’s Super Income Stream
$317,392.87
TOTAL - Superannuation
$983,569.29
TOTAL - Property
$1,528,069.29
The wife claims a credit card liability of $5,543.
The husband's superannuation Income Stream is effectively an annuity bringing him currently approximately $48,000 per annum.
I am required pursuant to s.79(2) to determine whether it is just and equitable to alter the property interests of the parties. Although I consider it proper to proceed on an asset-by-asset approach, it is clear that each party claims contributions towards the assets in the hands of the others. Specifically, the wife claims contributions to the husband's superannuation entitlement. The husband claims contributions in and inglobo sense to the property pool generally. Whilst careful not to conflate the considerations in s.79(4) with those in s.79(2), I am of the view that justice and equity requires me to consider an alteration of the parties interests in the property pool.
Contributions
At the commencement of cohabitation the husband owned the property at Property B. I have no valuation in admissible form as to its value at the relevant date. I am aware that the husband purchased the property for $800,000 in 2007 being some five years prior to cohabitation. He says his equity at that time was just $150,000. I am aware that property values in the Town A were volatile through the relevant period and accept that they may have initially risen sharply but similarly declined dramatically to the stage that the mortgagee sale brought only $445,000.
This property was purchased by the husband as an investment. It was at all times in his name. The mortgage was in his name alone. There is no indication of any direct or even indirect contribution by the wife towards this property in the short duration of this marriage and, indeed, she claims no such contribution.
The husband also had a term deposit of $31,000 – $35,000. He owned two motor vehicles and a caravan. Again, I have no evidence in admissible form as to their valuation. In any event, the total values are no more than approximately $30,000 at their highest estimate and, again, the wife claims no contribution.
The wife owned a motor vehicle with an agreed value of $20,000 and says that she had cash reserves of $49,000.
The parties agree that the husband's superannuation entitlements totalled $51,039 and the wife's entitlements stood at approximately $90,000 as at the date of the commencement of cohabitation.
The wife worked as a public servant until the end of 2016. The husband initially lived from the profits of the positively geared property at Property B. His taxable income for the 2012/13 year was $11,643. He then returned to his occupation as a tradesman. His taxable income for the following three years were $70,582, $21,101 and $70,114. He also retired at the end of 2016.
I am satisfied generally on the evidence, and without any specific argument to the contrary, that each of the parties contributed to normal living expenses from their incomes.
In March 2017 the wife purchased a property at Property C in Tasmania for $378,000. The property was purchased with her own monies from her term deposit account which in turn come from traceable advancements to her. There was no mortgage. The property was bought and registered in her sole name. The parties lived in that property for approximately nine months. The husband claims some contributions by way of maintenance and improvements. There is no valuation evidence in respect of the value-added by those improvements. He did, of course, have the benefit of living 'rent-free' in the property for the nine-month period. On balance, therefore, I am not satisfied that the husband made any contributions to that property such that should exercise my consideration in this matter.
During the course of the relationship each of the parties received inheritances. The husband received $27,252 in … 2016. The wife received $333,742 in … 2015.
Whilst the parties opened at least one joint account with NAB whilst living in Queensland, they also quite clearly retained and created their own personal bank accounts.
The wife received the benefit of a property settlement with her previous husband in … 2015 of $541,428. These monies were combined with the wife's inheritance and initially deposited into a joint account but shortly thereafter preserved by the wife in a fixed term deposit account of $540,000 together with a $340,000 lump sum injection into her own superannuation. I assume therefore no long term intention to “mingle” those monies. There can be no argument that the husband contributed directly to these monies since preserved in superannuation, term deposit accounts, and eventually the wife's Property C property. Similarly, the wife claims no direct contribution to the husband's inheritance.
The wife says that she made a direct financial contribution of $117,000 to the husband's superannuation. Specifically she says that in or about 2012 she contributed her savings of $24,000 into the husband's superannuation account. She says that from mid April 2013 until late November 2014 she made further identified payments of $93,000 which went to the husband's superannuation account which were identifiable direct financial contributions towards a lump sum to the husband’s superannuation account on 24 November 2014. This, therefore, is the operative period being between April 2013 and November 2014 after which the wife identifies other contributions by her but she concedes were for ambiguous purposes or moved between various accounts. She makes no claim in respect of these smaller sums.
The wife says, and there is some general agreement from the husband, that from the start of their relationship the parties agreed that they would both retire at a relatively early age. She says that they agreed that the husband's superannuation entitlements would be firstly maximised given that he is slightly older and would be able to crystallise his superannuation earlier.
Whilst the husband in his candid evidence in Court gave some credence to the wife's claims, he was not unequivocal in accepting that there was a specific agreement in the terms of the wife's evidence set out above. Nevertheless, on the balance of probabilities, I prefer the wife's evidence in this respect. Firstly, she was clearly a better historian than was the husband. He readily admitted his difficulties with recollections. The wife's evidence was confident, clear and withstood cross-examination. Further, I am satisfied that the parties agreed to and, in fact, did both retire at the end of 2016 and before the wife's own statutory retirement age. Still further, and notably, the wife agrees that she made further payments to the husband or joint accounts which may or may not have ended up in his superannuation account after November 2014 but she does not claim these as a direct contribution with the same specific intent as she does those particular payments between April 2013 and November 2014. Specifically, the wife’s Counsel put to the husband in cross-examination specific dates and amounts which she said were deposited into his superannuation account. These assertions were date specific and supported by bank statements. The husband agreed, albeit reluctantly, with the assertions put to him. Consequently, I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the wife contributed the sum of $117,000 to the husband's superannuation entitlement. The wife's Counsel, in her final address, admitted some mathematical calculation amendments from the application and affidavit and the wife now seeks a final order whereby she receives the sum of $117,000 being that asserted contribution to the husband's superannuation entitlement.
The wife now has her own superannuation entitlement of $645,618. I am satisfied that the husband made no direct contribution to this entitlement. The wife brought into the relationship superannuation with an agreed value of approximately $90,000. She is able to point to her own direct contributions to her superannuation in the intervening years and specifically from large cash injections from her property settlement and her inheritance.
Conclusions – Contributions
This was a short marriage. Both of the parties were mature entrants into the relationship. I am satisfied that the statutory declaration evidenced a joint intent to each maintain a form of 'ownership' of their own assets. Any joint account or mingling of finances was relatively minimal and did not concern the major individual assets of the parties. The one exception to this was the wife’s identifiable cash injections into the husband's superannuation account. I am satisfied that this was pursuant to a specific agreement to maximise the husband's entitlement with a view to early retirement. The parties otherwise maintained their own assets and liquid funds separately from the other actually or by title consistent with their intent and agreement evidenced by the statutory declaration. Consequently, the relevant contribution for my consideration is that of the wife's injection of $117,000 into the husband's superannuation fund. She effectively seeks a return of this contribution to her to achieve consistency in respect of the separation of the parties’ assets.
Section 75(2) consideration
These parties are actually and potentially in very different financial situations as they move into their retirement. The husband has lost his Property B property, or his equity in it, to the bank’s mortgagee sale. He has no other assets of any substantial value save and except his superannuation which gives an income stream of currently about $48,000 per annum and with a corpus of approximately $317,000. This will, of course, consistently and gradually reduce both in income and corpus. He does not own real property. He also as a second superannuation entitlement of $21,176. He lives in a rental property.
The wife, on the other hand, is relatively wealthy. She owns her Property C property unencumbered and the parties agree that it has a value of $450,000. The wife also has superannuation entitlements of $645,618. There is no evidence as to how the wife intends to utilise her superannuation which will crystallise in a short period. However, and only by way of comparison, should the wife choose to convert her entitlement into an annuity on the same terms and conditions as has the husband then she could reasonably expect an income twice that of Mr Kinney. She also retains cash savings of some $70,000.
Whilst the Court must careful not to utilise the s.75(2) factors as a form of 'social engineering' in order to somehow equalise parties positions as they leave relationships, it remains that the Court is able to adjust entitlements, after consideration of contributions, on the basis of those factors set out in s.75(2) of the Act. This is a situation in which two mature people entered into a relationship when in their 50’s. They agreed a plan towards their joint retirement which would ultimately give them both a relatively comfortable income. Factors have intervened including the loss of the Property B property and the parties’ separation. These circumstances have settled with the wife being in a clearly superior financial position. She seeks an order whereby she be effectively 'reimbursed' her $117,000 contribution into the husband's superannuation entitlement. Such an order would, on pure mathematical calculations, reduce the husband’s superannuation corpus to approximately $200,000 (he retains an accumulation account of $21,176) and his income probably to around $32,000 per annum. Conversely, such an order would benefit the wife's superannuation to a corpus of some $763,000 and any potential income from the conversion into an annuity accordingly. Again, the husband's savings are effectively limited to the $21,176 in his accumulation account whereas the wife has an unencumbered property plus $70,000 in savings.
Conversely, the husband seeks an order whereby he receive $300,000 from the wife's superannuation. This would, again on simple mathematics, increase his superannuation corpus to approximately $617,000 and potentially double his income to near $100,000 per annum. The effect on the wife's superannuation, however, would be to reduce it to $345,000 and hence giving her a potential income from any annuity similar to the husband's current $48,000 per annum. Such an order could not, in my view, be just and equitable on either a consideration of the contributions or the s.75(2) factors or both particularly where the wife's contributions (if taken on an inglobo basis) were overwhelming as they currently sit even given the husband's introduction of the Property B property which, of course, is now valueless.
Conclusion
Having considered the parties’ contributions on an asset-by-asset approach where I find a particular contribution by the wife to the one “asset” namely the husband's superannuation entitlement but to where it is appropriate to make an adjustment to the husband in respect of the s.75(2) factors, I am of the view that I should make no orders for alteration of the parties property interests. That is, each of the parties will retain those assets and superannuation entitlements currently in his or her name, possession or control.
If I am then to move to the ‘fourth step’ and stand back and consider whether such orders do justice and equity to these parties then it might be opportune to view such a result if I had taken an inglobo approach and where, in reality, each such approach should lead to a similar result. This was a short marriage of five years duration. The wife made significant and identifiable contributions of an initial sum of $24,000, her initial superannuation entitlement of $90,000, her property settlement of $541,428 and an inheritance of $333,742 being a direct financial contribution of $989,179 and the husband a direct financial contribution of $216,000 (if I allocated an equity of $150,000 to the Property B property).
The husband's major contribution was the Property B property. It is now valueless. The husband's own evidence was that he effectively caused an act of bankruptcy in refusing or neglecting to meet mortgage payments. The husband's income over the duration of the marriage was both less than and less consistent than that of the wife. The husband had the benefit of living in the wife's Property C property for approximately nine months prior to separation but also completed some maintenance and/or improvements to the property.
The parties agree a current asset pool inclusive of superannuation of approximately $1,528,069. The husband retains approximately $340,000 of value. Such an adjustment would be approximately 22.25% of the pool to the husband and 77.75% to the wife. Such a distribution would, in my view, give due weight and recognition to the wife's overwhelmingly superior contributions in a short marriage and which remain identifiable but also with some consideration of the relevant s.75(2) factors which would be adjusted in the husband’s favour.
I am satisfied that orders which see each of these parties retaining those items of property and all superannuation entitlements currently in his or her possession or control is just and equitable.
I certify that the preceding sixty nine (69) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge McGuire
Date: 10 April 2019
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
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Family Law
Legal Concepts
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Remedies
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Procedural Fairness
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