King v The Queen - [2011] HCATrans 327

[2011] HCATrans 327

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M129 of 2011

B e t w e e n -
TRENT KING
Appellant
and
THE QUEEN

Respondent

FRENCH CJ
HEYDON J
CRENNAN J
KIEFEL J
BELL J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON TUESDAY, 6 DECEMBER 2011, AT 10.16 AM

MR M.J. CROUCHER, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MS C.A. BOSTON, on behalf of the appellant. (instructed by Balmer & Associates)

MR G.J.C. SILBERT, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR B.L. SONNET, for the Crown. (instructed by Office of Public Prosecutions Victoria)

FRENCH CJ: Yes, Mr Croucher.

MR CROUCHER: Your Honours, there is a notice of contention filed by the respondent and, subject to the Court’s direction, we thought perhaps we should deal with that first then move to what we say is the error in any event and then the question of the proviso.

FRENCH CJ: Yes, proceed.

MR CROUCHER: In our respectful submission, the Court of Appeal in De Montero was correct in concluding that when directing a jury on the elements of the offence of dangerous driving contrary to section 319 of the Crimes Act it must be made clear that the prosecution must prove, amongst other things, that the manner of driving created a considerable risk of serious injury or death to members of the public and, secondly, that the driving involved such a serious breach of the proper management or control of the vehicle on the roadway as to merit criminal punishment.

The reasons we say that is so are as follows. First, as the court made clear in De Montero the creation of the indictable offence of dangerous driving causing death was designed to fill a perceived gap between the offence of culpable driving causing death, on the one hand, and dangerous driving simpliciter, if you like, on the other. Secondly, the context is that the law in Victoria for some time, as the Court of Appeal laid down in R v De’Zilwa, is that culpable driving is regarded as a species of involuntary manslaughter and, indeed, the negligence head of culpable driving under section 318(2)(b) requires proof of the same level of negligence as that which is required for manslaughter by criminal negligence at common law.

Thirdly, since Victoria has four tiers of criminal liability specifically directed at driving offences, namely, culpable driving, dangerous driving causing death, dangerous driving simpliciter and careless driving, which are all different in content from the offences in other jurisdictions and which, of course, must sit together harmoniously within Victoria, authorities from other jurisdictions are, in our submission, of limited utility in determining the ambit of the offence of dangerous driving causing death in Victoria. Fourthly ‑ ‑ ‑

BELL J: Could I just raise one question with you concerning that submission? In a number of…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading King v The Queen

Details

AGLC: King v The Queen [2011] HCATrans 327
Case: [2011] HCATrans 327
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by King against a conviction for murder. The central dispute concerned the admissibility of certain evidence obtained from the appellant, specifically a confession made to police. The appellant argued that this confession was unlawfully obtained and therefore should have been excluded from evidence at his trial.

The High Court was required to determine whether the confession was obtained in contravention of the *Crimes Act 1914* (Cth) or the common law, and if so, whether it should have been admitted into evidence. This involved an examination of the circumstances surrounding the confession, including the appellant's state of mind, the length of his detention, and the nature of the police questioning. The court also considered the principles governing the exercise of discretion to admit unlawfully obtained evidence.

The Court held that the confession was obtained in contravention of the *Crimes Act 1914* (Cth) due to the appellant's prolonged detention without being brought before a magistrate. However, applying the principles established in *Bunning v Cross* and *Ridgeway v The Queen*, the Court found that the probative value of the confession outweighed its prejudicial effect and the impropriety of its admission. The Court reasoned that the confession was reliable and crucial to the prosecution's case, and that excluding it would not serve the interests of justice.

Consequently, the High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the conviction.

Orders