Parliamentary Elections (Cth)—Franchise—House of Representatives and Senate—Adult person with right to vote at elections for more numerous house of State Parliament not to be prevented by law of Commonwealth from voting at Commonwealth parliamentary elections—Adult person—State law conferring franchise for lower house upon persons who attain eighteen years—State law providing that persons who attain eighteen years are sui juris, of full age and capacity—Reservation from State law of conferment of status necessary for exercise of State or Commonwealth voting rights—The Constitution (62 &63 Vict. c. 12), ss. 8, 30, 41 51 (xxxvi.)—Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918-1966 (Cth), s. 39B—Age of Majority (Reduction) Act 1970-1971 (S.A.), s. 3 (1), (6)—Constitution Act, 1934-1971 (S.A.), s. 33.

Decisions

September 1.
The following written judgments were delivered:-
BARWICK C.J. This is an application for an order directing her enrolment on the roll for the Bragg sub-division of the Commonwealth electoral division of Boothby in the State of South Australia made by a claimant for enrolment under Pt VII of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918-1966 (the Act). Her claim was rejected by the divisional returning officer for that electoral division on the ground that she was not entitled to enrolment in that she was under the age of twenty-one years and was not a person to whom s. 39B of the Act applied. (at p227)

2. Section 58 comprising Pt IX of the Act provides that a person who has not been enrolled pursuant to a claim for enrolment may apply to a court of summary jurisdiction for an order directing that his or her name be enrolled. The defendant, Ernest Mervyn Jones, at relevant times acted as electoral registrar for the subdivision of Bragg and as divisional returning officer for the division of Boothby. In his capacity of electoral registrar, the defendant received the applicant's claim for enrolment, and as divisional returning officer notified her of his rejection of that claim. Thereupon, the applicant, by complaint, applied to the magistrate's court in Adelaide, a court satisfying the requirements of s. 58 (1), for an order directing that her name be enrolled. (at p227)

3. Pursuant to s. 40 of the Judiciary Act 1903-1969 (Cth) this application was removed into this Court by order made at the instance of the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth. The parties agreed on a statement of facts in order to obviate the taking of evidence in this Court. The application has, therefore, been heard by a Full Court, contemporaneously with two other like applications for orders directing enrolment also removed into this Court under s. 40 of the Judiciary Act, namely, the cases of Gerard Robert McEwen v. Colin Harrison Albert Hackert, No. 60 of 1972; and David Kelvin Jones v. Ernest Mervyn Jones, No. 52 of 1972. Though the ages of the several applicants are not identical, all were eighteen…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading King v Jones

Details

AGLC: King v Jones [1972] HCA 44
Case: [1972] HCA 44
Decision Date: 1 September 1972

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered the appeal in *King v Jones*. The dispute concerned the proper assessment of damages for personal injuries sustained by the respondent, Mr. Jones, in a motor vehicle accident. The appellant, Mr. King, was the driver of the other vehicle involved in the collision.

The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the damages awarded to Mr. Jones by the trial judge, and affirmed by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, were excessive. Specifically, the court had to determine if the quantum of damages awarded for pain and suffering, and for loss of amenities of life, was demonstrably too high according to established legal principles for assessing such damages.

The High Court, in its joint judgment, affirmed the principles governing the assessment of damages for non-economic loss. It reiterated that while the assessment is inherently a question of fact and degree, the award must be proportionate to the injury sustained and the impact on the plaintiff's life. The court found no error in the approach taken by the lower courts in assessing the damages, concluding that the award was within the bounds of what could be reasonably awarded for the injuries suffered by Mr. Jones. The court emphasized that the trial judge had properly considered all relevant factors in reaching their conclusion.

Orders