King v AG Australia Holdings Limited
[2003] FCA 652
•24 JUNE 2003
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
King v AG Australia Holdings Limited [2003] FCA 652
SHANE ROBERT KING v AG AUSTRALIA HOLDINGS LIMITED AND ORS
N 955 of 1999ALLSOP J
24 JUNE 2003
SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 955 of 1999
BETWEEN:
SHANE ROBERT KING
APPLICANTAND:
AG AUSTRALIA HOLDINGS LIMITED (ACN 054 573 401)
FIRST RESPONDENT
GRANT SAMUEL & ASSOCIATES PTY LIMITED (ACN 050 036 372)
SECOND RESPONDENT
DAVID MORTIMER
THIRD RESPONDENT
BRUCE HOGAN
FOURTH RESPONDENT
STEWART HONER STEFFEY
FIFTH RESPONDENT
RONALD ASHTON
SIXTH RESPONDENT
MARINA DARLING
SEVENTH RESPONDENT
ANDREW KALDOR
EIGHT RESPONDENT
LLOYD LANGE
NINTH RESPONDENT
DAVID O’HALLORAN
TENTH RESPONDENT
IAN POLLARD
ELEVENTH RESPONDENTJUDGE:
ALLSOP J
DATE OF ORDER:
24 JUNE 2003
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.the application for leave to appeal be dismissed.
2.the application for a stay of his Honour's orders be dismissed.
3.the third to eleventh respondents pay the applicant's costs of the motions.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 955 of 1999
BETWEEN:
SHANE ROBERT KING
APPLICANTAND:
AG AUSTRALIA HOLDINGS LIMITED (ACN 054 573 401)
FIRST RESPONDENT
GRANT SAMUEL & ASSOCIATES PTY LIMITED (ACN 050 036 372)
SECOND RESPONDENT
DAVID MORTIMER
THIRD RESPONDENT
BRUCE HOGAN
FOURTH RESPONDENT
STEWART HONER STEFFEY
FIFTH RESPONDENT
RONALD ASHTON
SIXTH RESPONDENT
MARINA DARLING
SEVENTH RESPONDENT
ANDREW KALDOR
EIGHT RESPONDENT
LLOYD LANGE
NINTH RESPONDENT
DAVID O’HALLORAN
TENTH RESPONDENT
IAN POLLARD
ELEVENTH RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
ALLSOP J
DATE:
24 JUNE 2003
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
In these proceedings I have before me a number of notices of motion dealing with interlocutory orders made by the docket judge in connection with the carriage of the pre-trial preparation of these proceedings. The motions were argued substantially by the fifth respondent who is counsel for Mr Steffey, who was the Chief Executive officer of GIO at the relevant time.
The motions in substance seek leave to appeal from orders made by the docket judge on 3 June 2003 denying the respondents’ claim for further and better particulars from the applicant to the proceedings and for leave to appeal from the docket judge's refusal to re-visit an order he made in March 2003 altering the order of giving evidence. This second notice of motion can otherwise be expressed as seeking leave to appeal from the order his Honour made in March and thereby, requiring an extension of time for the filing of that application.
I think the better way to analyse it however, in particular in the way in which matter was argued as an application for leave to appeal from his Honour's order refusing to re-visit those matters in the light of what had happened. The third and fourth and sixth to eleventh respondents, being the non-executive directors of the company, have similar applications. A further indulgence is required in their favour because they were out of time with their relevant motion. For reasons that will become apparent, I would grant an extension to the third and fourth and sixth to eleventh respondents so that the matter can be dealt with, with Mr Steffey's motion.
For clarity in these reasons, I should add that the notice of motion of Mr Steffey was filed on 10 June 2003 and the notice of motion of the non-executive directors was filed on 19 June 2003. There is also a motion which I heard in part last week filed on 13 June for expedition, which I granted last week, and for an order that various of the orders of his Honour in relation to the progress of the matter be stayed until the appeal requested is heard.
These reasons assume a familiarity with the history of this matter set out in the affidavits of Ms Carr, Mr Cameron and Mr Duffy filed in the application before me. The proceedings are set down for hearing next May to hear a limited group of matters, in substance those matters are all questions which do not raise causation and damages. In substance perhaps the better way of putting it is that the allegations that the Part B statement bore a misleading or deceptive character and all questions that underlie that are to be heard. The splitting of issues in that respect was made by order of his Honour earlier this year in respect of which no leave to appeal is brought.
I propose to deal with the question of his Honour's refusal to re-visit the order he made in March altering the order of evidence first. I refuse leave to appeal on that question. The substance of what his Honour ordered was that Mr Steffey and his former colleagues on the board file all their lay evidence, including their own, along with lay evidence to be filed by the applicant before any expert evidence is filed. His Honour did this after hearing argument and in order to most efficiently, in his view, bring forward the evidence to a hearing.
This was quintessentially the task and consideration of the docket judge in the case-managed system such as runs in this Court. The leave to appeal is not directed to an alleged error of principle of his Honour at the point of originally making the decision. It is said that his Honour anticipated the giving of particulars after he made that order. Those particulars have been given, two aspects of them are identified, that is, two aspects of the particulars are identified as being the reason why his Honour should, as a matter of principle, have re-visited the order he made for the changing of the order of the placement of statements.
Those two aspects of the particulars were as follows: first, there is the alleged inadequacy of the particulars as to the misleading or deceptive quality of the Part B statement to which I will come in due course. Secondly and more importantly, it is said that the particulars of the investigations which the directors are said to have been under an obligation to make, are so broad and so general that it would be wrong to have them attempt to deal with the case thus disclosed in chief while the real case, in the fullness of time, would be disclosed in expert evidence or in submissions closer to the trial.
Those matters were put to his Honour in June. They might, as a value judgment, be the best and most appropriate course to have undertaken. That is not a conclusion I draw but it is, at least logically, a possibility that is open. However, it does not disclose an arguable error or principle let alone one sufficient to warrant an appeal on a matter of practice and procedure in the conduct of a matter in the docket system.
It is said that his Honour erred in not dealing with this argument in his judgment of 3 June 2003. In par 28 of his judgment on 3 June 2003 his Honour said the following:
I do not accept that I should follow this course. First, it raises, in substance, an issue on which judgment has already been given. I do not suggest, however, that I will do anything other than endeavour to ensure that the preparation for trial and the trial itself will proceed on the footing that all parties have a fair opportunity to prepare and present their case. Nonetheless orderly case management would tend strongly against revisiting an earlier ruling unless circumstances had changed or I had failed to appreciate fully the implications of the course I had set the parties on by the ruling. Neither situation arises in relation to the matter now raised by the fifth respondent. It is true that subpars (a) to (bbb) of par 26 related to all respondents and not specifically the fifth respondent and that position has altered since judgment was given on 19 March 2003 but that is of no real relevance to the contention of the fifth respondent. I do not see why the fifth respondent should not be required to file his evidence in the sequence provided for in the timetable.
It was submitted that what his Honour was saying in that paragraph was that he simply refused to re-visit the issue. With respect, I cannot agree. His Honour said that orderly case management would tend strongly against visiting an earlier ruling unless circumstances had changed - and I emphasise "unless circumstances had changed" or that he had failed to appreciate fully the implications of the course on which he had set the parties by the ruling.
It is common ground that the argument before his Honour on 21 May 2003 was in substance to the effect that has been put to me, that is, that there was a fresh circumstance that had arisen or, at least two of them and that perhaps in that sense there was a lack of complete appreciation of the implications of the course that had been set because the respondents now were able to point to the vices in the particulars which they wished to identify.
His Honour did not go on to deal with the matter in the detail of expression that I've just identified but I think, in circumstances where that argument was placed before him and what his Honour said in par 28, what his Honour was doing was bringing to bear his experience and understanding of the case going by the arguments hitherto had and drawing a value judgment as to the lack of sufficient change in circumstances to warrant a change of course which he had ordered.
Again, whether or not I or any other Judge of the Court might have made the same decision is neither here nor there. I do not see in that course any error of principle let alone any error of apparent principle to warrant a Full Court hearing an appeal on that question.
I turn now to the first question in respect of which leave is sought by all the directors, that is, the complaint that his Honour failed to order further and better particulars of the misleading or deceptive character of the part B statement. The question before me, of course, is whether or not there is a sufficiently arguable question to warrant review on appeal by a Full Court of the course his Honour took for the reasons his Honour gave. It is said that, as a matter of principle, inadequate particulars have been given and that there is a sufficiently strong possibility of error in principle to warrant the matter going to a Full Court.
This case is about what is said to have been the misleading or deceptive character of the part B statement made by GIO to AMP’s takeover some years ago. The part B statement, which is in evidence before me, in unequivocal and emphatic terms, urged the shareholders of the GIO to reject "AMP’s inadequate bid". There were two booklets. One was a booklet which was under cover of a letter from the directors. The second was a detailed independent valuation report by the second respondent to the proceedings, Grant Samuel.
It is said, as I understand the pleadings by the applicant, because of the content including what was not in the part B statement as well as what was and the prominence given to the material urging rejection, that there was or were an implied representation or implied representations; that the shareholders had all relevant material that they needed to assess the bid by the AMP within the part B statement. That is perhaps an inadequate summary of the case made. The pleadings are detailed and I do not need to summarise them precisely for today's purposes.
There is no allegation that any particular express statement made in the part B statement was false; nor is it said, as I understand it, that any statement in the document could not of itself be said. What is alleged is that, because of the content, lack of content and form of the part B statement it did not adequately inform a relevant reader of the risks identified in the statement of claim called the risk factors which dealt with the strength of the GIO’s business including, but not limited to, the weakness of its inwards and outwards reinsurance programs.
Paragraph 25 of the seventh further amended statement of claim was in the following terms:
25.At no time during the relevant period did any of the Respondents adequately inform the Applicant and the group members that:
(a)the possible occurrence of risk factors particulars of which are given in the Schedule hereto (“the risk factors”) might substantially and adversely affect the financial forecasts and the valuation of the GIO shares contained in the Part B Statement;
(b)if the risk factors occurred, the value of GIO shares was likely to decline, perhaps significantly;
(c)the matters in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above should be taken into account by the Applicant and the group members because they were very relevant matters in any decision whether to accept the varied takeover offers.
[emphasis added]
Particulars were requested of par 25 under cover of letter from Corrs Chambers Westgarth dated 11 March 2003 which asked the following:
Paragraph 25
1.In respect of each of the matters identified in subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) separately, identify:
(a) the substance of each statement that the applicant alleges ought to have been included in the Part B statement and/or the Grant Samuel Report;
(b) in respect of each of the statements identified in answer to subparagraph (a), the location (by reference to a convenient description, for example, subject heading, page number, paragraph number) within either the Part B statement and/or the Grant Samuel Report where the applicant says the statement ought to have appeared;
(c) in respect of each of the statements identified in answer to subparagraph (a), the format or range of formats in which the statement ought to have been presented (for example, whether it should have been in bold, different colours from the balance of the text, different point size to the words on the same page, within a paragraph containing other information, in substitution for another statement contained in the documents);
(d) each of the statements that the applicant alleges ought to gave [sic] been excluded from the Part B statement and/or the Grant Samuel Report;
(e) in respect of each of the statements identified in answer to subparagraph (d), the location (by reference to a convenient description, for example, subject heading, page number, paragraph number) within either the Part B statement and/or the Grant Samuel Report where the applicant says the statement to be excluded actually appeared.
2.To the extent that the applicant alleges that each of the twelve risk factors ought to have been separately addressed in the Part B statement and/or Grant Samuel Report, answer the above request separately for each risk factor.
Answers were given in a document entitled, “Further and Better Particulars Provided by the Applicant to the Fifth Respondent” in the following terms:
Paragraph 25
5.The substance of the statements that should have been included in the Part B Statement is the substance of the information or warnings set out in the Risk Factors.
6.In respect of the requests that the Applicant identify in respect of each Risk Factor:
(a) where within the Part B Statement (by reference to a subject heading, page number, paragraph number) the statement should have appeared;
(b) the format or range of formats in which the statements ought to have been presented (by reference to whether it should be in bold, in different colours to the balance of the text, different point size to the words on the same page, within a paragraph containing other information, in substitution for another statement in the document);
(c) the statements that ought to have been excluded from the Part B Statement;
(d) where within the Part B Statement (by reference to a subject heading, page number, paragraph number) the statements that ought to have been excluded from the Part B Statement actually appeared; and
(e) what prominence that statement should have been given by reference to the content, position and size in the Part B Statement,
the Applicant says as follows:
7.The substance of the statements referred to in paragraph 5 hereof should have appeared in the Part B Statement with sufficient prominence in relation to content, position, size and format or range of formats:
(a) that it conveyed a warning about each Risk Factor to those shareholders to whom the Part B Statement was directed; and
(b) that it should (as particularised in paragraph 18 of the Consolidated Particulars) have been given as much prominence and detail as was given to the recommendation to reject AMP’s takeover offer.
8.The prominence and detail given to the statements should have been appropriate to all the circumstances including:
(a)the probability of each risk specified materialising;
(b)the potential impact on the value or price of shares in GIO if that risk materialised; and
(c)that the readers of the Part B Statement were predominantly retail investors lacking the sophistication of large corporate investors (as particularised in paragraph 19 of the Consolidated Particulars).
9.The prominence should have been sufficient for the reasonable retail investor to have been made aware of the risk factors and their significance having regard to:
(a)the amount of time that a reasonable retail investor might reasonably be expected to spend reading a Part B Statement;
(b)the likely level of knowledge of the reasonable retail investor of factors relevant to the GIO share price;
(c)the likely level of knowledge and education of the reasonable retail investor generally.
10.The bold type, large font coloured statements made in the Part B Statement should have been qualified, modified or not made at all, once the importance and significance of the Risk Factors had been taken into account, so that the overall impression of the Part B Statement would be fair and consistent with the potential significance of the Risk Factors to the GIO share price and to the decision of the investors to either retain their shares or accept the AMP offer.
11.There are numerous ways the Part B Statement could have been written and formatted which would have given adequate prominence to the substance of the Risk Factors so as to give fair and balanced information and advice to its recipients. The Applicant objects to any request for particulars which purports to call upon him to draft an alternative form or model Part B Statement.
It is conceded that pars 5 and 7 are adequate if existing on their own as particulars. Paragraph 5 alleges that what should have been included in the Part B statement is the substance of the warnings set out in the risk factors identified in the schedule to the statement of claim.
Paragraph 7, it is accepted, identifies a standard or criterion by reference to which contravention or non-contravention of s 52 can be judged, that is by reference to the prominence, content, position, size and format. There should have been a conveying of a warning about each risk factor of equivalent prominence and detail as was given to the recommendation to reject the takeover.
It is said that pars 8 through 11 so widen or loosen this clarity so as to make it unfair to allow the case to proceed and that there is a sufficiently clear possibility of error of principle to warrant leave being given.
His Honour dealt with this complaint in par 26 of his reasons when he said the following:
Two submissions were made by counsel for the fifth respondent. The first was that this request for particulars should be adequately answered. Counsel for the applicant responded by submitting that this request was tantamount to requiring the applicant to formulate how the Part B statement should have been framed or at least one version of it. She submitted the applicant cannot be required to do so. I agree. I am not aware of any authority which suggests that an applicant needs to demonstrate (and earlier particularise), as part of its case, how a representation (or a document containing a representation) should have been framed so as to result in it not being misleading (though I accept that in this matter, the applicant has done so up to a point when providing particulars). Ordinarily an applicant, in order to make good a case of misleading and deceptive conduct involving a representation, must demonstrate why the representation framed in a particular way was, against the factual background in which it was made, false or misleading. Conclusions might be drawn by the Court about how the representation could or might have been framed as part of assessing whether the making of it constituted misleading or deceptive conduct. But that, in my opinion, is not a matter that the applicant should be required to particularise. I see no difference, in principle, if one was considering not the representation simpliciter but the document said to contain the representation. Accordingly I do not accept the first submission made by counsel for the fifth respondent concerning the adequacy of the particulars provided by the applicant.
Emphasis is placed by the respondents on the following sentence in that paragraph:
I am not aware of any authority which suggests that an applicant needs to demonstrate (and earlier particularise), as part of its case, how a representation (or a document containing a representation) should have been framed so as to result in it not being misleading...
It is said that this sentence in particular displays an error of principle because it is inconsistent with what was said by the Full Court of this Court in Fraser v NRMA Holdings (1995) 55 FCR 452 at 467-468 where the Court said the following:
Where the contravention of s 52 alleged involves a failure to make a full and fair disclosure of information, the applicant carries the onus of establishing how or in what manner that which was said involved error or how that which was left unsaid had the potential to mislead or deceive. Errors and omissions to have that potential must be relevant to the topic about which it is said that the respondents’ conduct is likely to mislead or deceive. The need for an applicant to establish materiality is of particular importance in a case like the present one where the proposal is complex, and involves difficult questions of commercial judgment and matters of degree and conjecture as to the future about which there is room for a range of honestly and reasonably held opinions. If every possible formulation of the commercial objective of the proposal, and arguments for and against every theoretical possibility were set forth the total package of information to members would be likely to confuse rather than to illuminate the issue for decision, even for people having a familiarity with corporate law and commerce. The need to make full and air disclosure must be tempered by the need to present a document that is intelligible to reasonable members of the class to whom it is directed, and is likely to assist rather than to confuse: see Devereaux Holdings Pty Ltd v Pelsart Resources NL (No 2) (1985) 9 ACLR 956 at 959; Re Dorman Long & Co Ltd [1934] 1 Ch 635 at 665-666. In complex cases it may be necessary to be selective in the information provided, confining it to that which is realistically useful. Clearly the present case was one of this kind. However the proposal was formulated, and however the information to members was drafted, it is likely that some criticism could be levelled at it. For example, criticism is made that the prospectus incorporates notices of general meetings of members of the Association and Insurance and fails adequately to recognise them as separate entities – it is said that there should have been a separate explanatory memorandum for each meeting. Yet if three separate documents had been produced it is not difficult to imagine that criticism could be made that the documents were repetitious with the result that the length of the total package was too great, and the interrelationship of transactions separately discussed too difficult, to be understood by ordinary reasonable members.
His Honour did not say that the applicant did not need to particularise how a representation was misleading or how a misrepresentation would not have been misleading. The two are distinct, though in any given case not unrelated, to a degree dependent on the case in question. Here the question of the clarity of the case against the respondents is very much, it seems to me, connected with the nature, contents, strength or weakness of the case about the underlying business of GIO at the time giving rise to the risk factors.
Expert reports are to be filed by the applicant if he wishes to file them, on or before 30 September 2003. It would be surprising if matters dealing with the underlying strength or weakness of the business of GIO, including its inwards and outwards reinsurance programs, were not matters covered by those experts' reports.
When one looks at the structure of the Part B, that is the first booklet of the Part B, one sees that there are pages 1 to 18 which convey a clear and unequivocal message that the offer of the AMP was inadequate. Various methods are used to (perfectly properly in themselves) draw attention to various matters which it was thought important that the shareholders understand.
Pages 19 through to 45 contain a good deal of other information. There is additional statutory information required by the law. There is a section on appendix 1, being the 1999 forecast as well as the 1998 actual and 1997 actual audited results. Within that appendix 1 there is material clearly signposted by headings, Inwards Reinsurance and Corporate Insurance, a Sensitivity Analysis, a heading of Risk Factors, and Estimation of Claims Provisions, Volatility of Reinsurance Earnings, a paragraph on Catastrophes and another paragraph on Reinsurance.
But it is also fair to say that all that additional information was presented in a way with less attention to visual and artistic presentation so as to bring any particular part of it to the attention of the reader. Those are the two sections of the first book of the part B statement. The second book as I said is the Grant Samuel expert report which the parties did not really address in detail before me.
The applicant says that the part B did not adequately or fully and fairly bring forward the risk factors. The particulars provided used the word "adequately" or "inadequately". In argument today, the phrase "fully and fairly" was used. That phrase of course comes from and was used in the discourse today by reference to Fraser v NRMA from a passage I've earlier referred to.
What I am about to say should not be taken as personal criticism of the person who drafted the particulars but, like many particulars one reads, it is not entirely devoid of opacity. No doubt that is, to a degree, designed to ensure flexibility. These matters are not raised too critically but realistically in the recognition of the forensic task facing the person drafting the particulars.
However, that said I read paras 8 to 11 as putting a case that there should have been either equal prominence given as set out in par 7 or such other clear annunciation of the risks elsewhere identified as to fully and fairly or adequately (I see little real difference between the two) inform the type of reader identified in Campomar Sociedad Limitada v Nike International Limited (2000) 202 CLR 45, that is, the reasonable retail investor, of the significant risk attending the choice to decide to decline the offer by identifying the significant risks attending the business of the target company.
There may be a difference between "adequate" and "fully and fairly". I think, however, a discussion of that would descend too minutely into various categories such as those of indeterminate reference or others which I don't think as a matter of English language need arise from the phrase “adequate”. It is not my place to redraft particulars for any party in the proceedings but it is now a matter of public record and it can be resiled in the fullness of time if the applicant wishes that the applicant and his representatives see the phrase "adequate" as synonymous with "fully and fairly" as identified by the Full Court in Fraser v NRMA.
There may well have been a number of ways of making the hypothesised risks clear to the reader. I am unpersuaded that it is presently a useful task in requiring the applicant to identify one or more structures, formats or body of contents of the part B which would pass muster under a test of misleading or deceptive. I am unpersuaded that there is a sufficiently clear case that his Honour erred in a matter of principle in forming the view that he did that the particulars presently given to the request made were adequate.
His Honour may have been analysing the matter by reference to whether Mr Steffey’s solicitors were entitled to a fuller answer to their letter of 11 March 2003. I do not think they were so entitled to a fuller answer to that letter. Nor do I see any error or sufficiently clear error of principle in his Honour not concluding that the particulars taken as a whole were of themselves inadequate, leaving to one side the precise terms of clause letter.
It may be that with the pre-trial development of evidence and the service of expert reports, some unfairness to the respondents is exposed which should be remedied. At the moment I tend to agree with his Honour that the respondents have a sufficient grasp of what the complaints are about the alleged misleading or deceptive character of the Part B to allow a just, fair and orderly preparation of the case. It may be, though I am not persuaded as his Honour was not, that pars 8, 9 and 10 negate the accepted and acceptable clarity of standard provided by par 7.
If with the fullness of time, and in particular the clarification of the nature and direction of the evidence about the alleged weakness of the business of the GIO including its reinsurance brokers, it becomes apparent that some aspect of the claim as propounded is internally inconsistent or otherwise is such as to leave the respondents in a position of unfairness, no doubt the solicitors for the respondents will seek to have the docket judge remedy that position.
It should be noted that the hearing commencing in May 2004 will not involve the question of causation or damage to the applicant or individual members of the class. There will be no occasion or at least it will be unlikely that there would be an occasion to cross-examine either the applicant or members of the class on what he or each of them or any of them would have done faced with any particular form of Part B. To the extent there is an unfairness about that that arises from the severing of issues about which there's no application for leave.
In summary, having examined the first booklet of the Part B and the pleadings and particulars, I do not think that his Honour erred nor do I think that there is a sufficient prospect of concluding that his Honour erred in his reasoning in par 26 to warrant a Full Court looking at the matter. I do not think, looking at the first volume of the Part B and the pleadings and particulars, that at least at the present time there is any prejudice in the preparation of the case proceeding along the lines that his Honour ordered. For those reasons I would dismiss the application for leave to appeal in respect of that matter as well. In those circumstances I would also dismiss the application for a stay of his Honour's orders as a consequence of those conclusions.
The third to eleventh respondents will pay the applicant's costs of the motions which I identified earlier. It's enough for me to say for any taxing officer that those costs, it seems to me, ought be borne as if both motions were argued equally and at the same time as they were, notwithstanding the fact that one side bore the primary burden of propounding them.
I certify that the preceding forty-three (43) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Allsop. Associate:
Dated: 21 July 2003
Counsel for the Applicant: Dr K Hanscombe
Mr R B C WilsonSolicitor for the Applicant: Maurice Blackburn Cashman Solicitor for the first Respondent: Ebsworth & Ebsworth Solicitor for the second Respondent: Phillips Fox Counsel for the third, fourth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh respondents: Mr S Climpson Solicitor for the third, fourth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh respondents: Arnold Bloch Leibler Counsel for the fifth respondent: Mr N C Hutley SC
Mr M LeemingSolicitor for the fifth respondent: Corrs Chambers Westgarth Solicitor for the Price Waterhouse Coopers entities: Blake Dawson Waldron Solicitor for Macquarie Bank: Clayton Utz Date of Hearing: 24 June 2003 Date of Judgment: 24 June 2003
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