King, A v Bridge Auto Sales & Service Pty Ltd

Case

[1987] FCA 375

9 Jul 1987

No judgment structure available for this case.

.

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

ONLY

NORTHERN

- -

- - - - -

__

TERRITORY

- -

- - __ -

DISTRICT

REGISTRY

-

- __ - -

)

No. NTG 4 of 1986.

)

BETWEEN:

ARTHUR

KING

- - - - -

-

Appllcant

AND:

BRIDGE

AUTO

SALES

AND

~ E ~ v i C ~ P ~ ~ ~ ~ f i . ~ a & ~

as

- -

BRIDGE

-

-

AUTOS

-

-

- -

TOYOTA

- - - - -

Responden t

JUDGE

MAKING

ORDER

:

BEAUMONT J.

DATE OF ORDER

9 July 19117

WHERE MADE

Darwln

MINUTE OF ORDER

THE COURT ORDERS

:

1.

The

app l l ca t lon

IS

dlsmlssed.

2.

The

app l l can t

to pay

respondent 's

costs.

No te : Se t t l emen t and en t ry

of

o r d e r s

IS

dea l t w l th

In

Orde r

36

of

theFede ra l Cour t Ru les .

IN THE FEDERAL COURT

OF

AUSTRALIA

)

)

NORTHERN TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY _ _

)

No.

NTG

4 of 19x6.

)

GENERAL DIVISION

)

BETWEEN:

ARTHUR

KING

A p p h c a n t

AND:

BRIDGE

AUTO

SALES

AND

t. PT

Y. LTD.

tradlng

as

BRIDGE

AUTOS

TOYOTA

Respondent

CORAM:

BEAUMONT J.

DATED :

9 July 1987

REASONS

FOR

JUDGMENT

In

August

1983,

the appl lcant purchased

a

motor vehlc le f rorn the

respondent . He now sues the respondent for damages pursuant

to

s.82

of

t h e

T r a d e P r a c t l c e s A c t -

1974

("the Act") clalrnlng

to h a v e s u f f e r e d

loss o r d a m a g e

by reason

of

the respondent ' s rn l s leadlng conduct

In

lnduclng hlm

to e n t e r I n t o

t h e t r a n s a c t l o n

(see s.52

of

the Act ) .

In

e s s e n c e , h l s c l a m

IS t h a t

I t was

r e p r e s e n t e d to h l m t h a t t h e v e h i c l e ,

a

T o y o t a C o r o n a

CS sedan , was

a

"new"

vehlcle whereas ,

In

fact, I t was not

"new".

A l t h o u g h t h e c l a m

IS a

relatively

s m a l l o n e , t h e m a t t e r h a s

a

co rnp l l ca t ed h l s to ry and the pa r t l e s a re

at

ISSUC

on mos t

of

the Impor t an t ques t lons

of

fact whlch arlse.

On Sa tu rday

13

August

19x3,

t h e s p p l l c a n t w m t

to the r e sponden t ' s

p remlses

at

Darwm. The respondent

IS a

m o t o r d e a l e r d e a h n g

In

both new and

used ca r s , bu t t he app l l can t p roceeded

to

t h a t p a r t

of

the respondent ' s p remlser

o n w h l c h n e w c a r s w e r e o f f e r e d f o r s a l e . T h e a p p l ~ c a n t l n q u l r e d a b o u t

the

2.

posslble purchase of a new car and lndlcated that he would wlsh to trade-ln

a used Ford utlllty owned by hlm.

Although a transactlon

was ultlrnately entered

Into, the respectlve

verslons of the

dlscusslons at the tlme dlffer slgnlflcantly.

Accordlng to the appllcant's

evldence, the appllcant Informed the

respondent's representatlves that he wanted a

new car.

He rnentloned that hc

had seen an

advertlsement on televlslon offerlng a rebate of

$500.00 cash of f

the retall prlce of

any Toyota vehlcle purchased before 30 August.

He sald

that Mr. Frankenfeld suggested a "new" Corona CS to hlm.

The appllcant

Inspected the vehlcle but dld not drlve

It.

It appeared to hlrn to be new.

Prlces,

the value of the trade-ln

and the appllcant's

need to obtain flndncc wcre

dlscussed. A prlce of $12,500.00 and a trade-ln value of $6,500.00 were agreed.

Some documents were slgned, lncludlng an appllcatlon for flnance. It was

agreed that when the appllcant returned

home - he hved at Borroloola

about

1,000 kms. from Darwln - he would rernlt $500.00 In cash to the respondent

on

account of the purchase prlce. He then took

possesslon

of the vehlcle

and

drove It to Borroloola.

At the

tlme, he did not notlce that the

odorneter

lndlcated (as was

the fact) that the vehlcle

had then travelled more than

16,000 kms. Thls,

he sald, was

polnted out

to hlm

by a frlend In Rorroloola

on the following day.

Mr. Frankenfeld,

who was lnvolved In the flnanclal

and

admlnlstratlve aspects of the respondent's buslness, gave

a very dffferent

verslon

of

the events. He

sald

that the appllcant

was

Interested In acqulrlng

a four wheel drlve vehlcle but, because of the applicant's llrnlted

resources

and

modest Income, he explalned

to the appllcant that

he

could not afford

3.

a vehlcle of that klnd.

Mr. Frankenfeld sald that he suggested to thc

appllcant that he conslder purchaslng a CS Corona vehlcle owned by thc

respondent used as a "demonstrator" and also used by Mr. Frankenfeld as

hls personal car.

Accordmg to Mr. Frankenfeld,

the appllcant was tahen

on a

test drlve of the car

by Mr. Matham, one

of the

respondent's

sales

representatlves.

A number of posslble ways of flnancmg a sale of the car

were explored byMr. Frankenfeld wlth the

appllcant.

Inltlally, Mr. Frankenfeld

offered a prlce of $11,300.00,

made up of $9,620.00

as the retall 1Ist prlcc

of a new vehlcle, together wlth exfras of $1,680.00 as

follows:

$808.00

Alr-condltlonlng

120.00

Seat covers

260.00

Pre-dellvery

185.00

Reglstratlon

122.00

Xntlng wmdows

--

122.00

Stamp duty on transfer

$1,680.00

A t thls stage, Mr.

Frankenfeld proposed to offer $5,000.00

by way

of

allowance for the trade-ln of the utlhty.

It appears that thc

value,

In the trade,

of thls vehlcle

was only $2,500.00 but the

appllcanr

was offered a further sum of $2,500.00

as a "dlscount" off the retall prlcc

of the

car.

Later, Mr. Frankenfeld proposed that both the

purchase prlce

and the amount allowed on the trade-ln be

Increased by $l,ZOO.OO, J.C. to

$12,500.00 and $6,200.00 respectlvely.

4.

It w ~ l l

be necessary,

later, to deal wlth the confllcts In the evldcncc

of the appllcant

on the one hand and

Mr.

Frankenfeld on the othcr. Beforc

attemptlng thls, I should refer to the documentatlon which

was generated by the

transactlon.

The flrst document IS a prlnted form headed “Offer to Purchase”.

It

contalns detalls of the transactlon

and was executed by the appllcant

on 13 August.

It was as

follows (I set out the front

page only. The second

page,

also executed

by the appllcant, contamed prmted terms

and condltlons none of whlch appear to

be relevant for our purposes).

1 .

CUSTOMER'SNAME

4a-a

EL

r r ~

\ A

OCCUpATlON

s u n w c

IHu.mmh.r

ca l ld Ih Cullom.rl

C H R l S l U N

N M E S

PRIVATEADDRESS

? h L Q

wRa-h

PHONE No

BUSINESSADDRESS

PHONE No

MAKE 6-

BODY M P €

6zIpd

ENGlNENo M*+-$

MODEL

TRANS '5

e

BODYCOLOUR % REGNO 246- to

I hereby offer to purchase from the Company the motor vehocle descrlbed hereunder subject to the

overleaf

I cenlfy that I em l 8 years of age or older

l

PURCHASE

'

4 t r

s w r t ~ d Q <

PRICE

CASH

OF UNIT

e

/25"QA

R.go Stamp Duty

$

R e ~ o

Transfer Fee

$

Duty S

Stamp

Fsnance

Flnance

Guarantor

Duty

Stamp

$

Name

Address

DateP/O apphesto

Acc No

ICM No

Date

l

W/B T/I

S

NIL

~

1

TO AOREE WITH TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE $

TRADE IN

FINANCE TRANSACTION

NameofCmpany

DateApproved

Flnance Company

Perwnnal

Extras

.I declare that

the Motor

Vehlcle belng

traded-In IS

my

property solely and free from

debt byvlrfue of Hlre Purchase

Agreement or Mongage or any other

Date \3- c -vs

ACCEPTANCE BY THE COMPANY

A ,

6 .

There were also executed by the appllcant two

documents addressed

to the fmance company, Esanda

Llmlted. Flrst

was a credlt request and offer of

chattel mortgage showmg a "cash prlce" of $12,500.00,

a "dealcr's trade-In

allowance" of $6,200.00

and $5,898.00

as the amount of the loan requlred.

Next was a chattel mortgage dated

16 August slgned by the appllcsnt In whlch

a detalled descrlptlon

of the vehlcle

appeared.

Under the prmted

headlng "new or

used" appeared.m

handwrltmg, the words:

"Demo

New"

The appllcant's llablhty to

Esanda was

guaranteed by Mr.

A.T. Shaw,

a dlrector

and shareholder

of the respondent. Mr.

Shaw had had

a

prevlous

sportlng contact wlth the appllcant.

Mr. Shaw was

present durlng

some of

the dlscusslons on 13 August.

It appears that Toyota dld not

pay the appllcant the advertlsed

rebate of $500.00.

Nor dld the appllcant

pay the respondent the sum of

$500.0C he owed.

In January 1984, Mr. Shaw wrote to the appllcant:

7.

THE BRIDGE AUTO GROUP

18th January, 1984

I

Mr. Arthur Xlng,

Dulu Camp,

B0RROU)OI.A N.T.

Dear Arthur

,

When purchaslng the Toyota Corona Sedan, Reglstratlon

No. 246-103, the

net purchase prlce was

$9,398.00.

Payment of thls amount was to be

provlded by:

res urces

own

you

from

Cash

$ 500.00

Cash from Toyota Bonus

500.00

Esanda Flnance

5.898.00

Trade-In Value

2,500.00

$9,398.00

You were

aware at the t m e of purchase, the vehlcle was a demonstratlon

model and you promlsed to pay the $500.00 from your own resources

together wrth the ToyOta rebate cheque. Unfortunately, because

of the

tlme delay, TOyOta have not lssued the rebate cheque, and in

vlew of

our promlse thrs would be avarlable, we have deducted thls amount

fr m

your account.

The balance of $500.00 1s now overdue

and as you can see from a copy of

the pdgement attached, you must pay thls amount mmedlately, as

we

have already requested actlon vla the Sherlff.

Yours farthfully,

A.T. SHAW

DIRECTOR

Encl.

I

i ,

Y . , Mobil

1

COMMERCIAL

PASSENGER

X.

The apphcan t d ld no t r e spond

to

th ls le t te r . Subsequent ly , the

r e s p o n d e n t s u e d t h e a p p h c a n t f o r t h e d e b t

of

$500 .00

a n d o b t a m e d d c f a u l t

~ u d g m e n t . T h e a p p h c a n t p a i d t h e ~ u d g m c n t d e b t .

In

Aprll

1984,

t h e a p p h c a n t s u e d t h e r e s p o n d e n t

In

t h e L o c a l

C o u r t c l a l m l n g d a m a g e s f o r b r e a c h

of

c o n t r a c t . H e a l l e g e d t h a t

I t

w a s

a

t e r m

of

t h e c o n t r a c t t h a t t h e c a r b e

a

"new" vehlcle.

In

an a f f ldav l t sworn

In

these proceedlngs ,

Mr.

S h a w d e n l e d h a b l l l t y b u t a d m l t t e d t h a t t h e v a l u c

of

the t rade- In was $6 ,200 .00 . The proceedlngs were d lscontmued because ,

I

was to ld , t he fo rum was though t

to

be "not approprlate".

In

hls

s t a t e m e n t of

c l a lm

m

t h l s a c t l o n , t h e a p p l l c a n t a l l e g c s

b r e a c h e s

of

ss.52

a n d 53 of

t h e A c t

as follows:

"13.

The r e sponden t was

In

b reach of

5.52

of

t h e T r a d e P r a c t l c c s

Act by engaglng

m

conduc t t ha t was mls l ead lng and decep t lve .

-

Par t l cu la r s

( a ) Represen tmg

to

t h e a p p h c a n t

t h a t

t h e T o y o t a C o r o n a

w a s a

new motor vehlcle .

(b) Represent lng

to

t h e a p p h c a n t t h a t t h e T o y o t a C o r o n a

w a s a

cur ren t model .

( c ) R e p r e s e n t l n g t h a t t h e p r o p e r p r l c e

of

a

new Toyota Corona

w a s $12,500.00.

(d ) Represen tmg tha t

I t was a l lowlng

a

trade-In value

of

$6 ,20C.00 .

( e ) R e p r e s e n t m g t o E s a n d a L l m l t e d t h a t t h e T o y o t a C o r o n a

was wor th $12 ,500 .00 .

14.

A l t e r n a t l v e l y t h e r e s p o n d e n t w a s

m

b r e a c h

of

5.53

of

t h c s a l d

A c t b y

-

(a ) Fa lse ly represent lng tha t the Toyota Corona was new.

(b ) Fa l se ly r ep resen t lng tha t t he Toyo ta Corona was the

cur ren t model .

9.

(c)

Maklng

a

false

or mlsleadlng statement

In relatlon to

the proper prlce of the Toyota

Corona.

(d)

Falsely advertlslng

that

the rebate

of

$500.00 applled

to new cars only."

On behalf of the appllcant crltlclsm

was levelled at the

respondent's

conduct, and

that of

Mr. Frankenfeld In partlcular, In several

respects. Much was

sought to be made of the process of lnflatlon of the prlce of the car and of the

allowance offered

on the trade-ln of the utlllty.

I thlnk there

IS some force In these

CrltlcIsms. The objective facts, as we

now know them, are as follows:

(I) The car was manufactured In Australia In December 1981, although

It was s t d l the current

"model" In August 1983.

( 2 )

I t was acquired by the respondent from the dlstrlbutor In Aprd

1982

and was flrst registered In May of that year.

(3)

Unti l I t s sale to the appllcant, the vehlcle

was used

by the

respondent both as a demonstratlon model and as a car available

to Mr. Frankenfeld for hls personal use.

(4)

By 13 August 1983, the vehlcle had been drlven approxlmately

16,500

kms.

(5) At that date, It "owed" the respondent approxmately $8,689.00 -

belng $7,444.00

paid as purchase prlce to the dlstrlbutor,

sales tax, extras and reglstratlon.

The respondent wanted to sell

the vehlcle and Mr.

Frankenfeld declded that If a prlce of

$8,800.00

were achleved, I.e. a nommal "proflt",

no questlons would be

asked

by senlor management.

The appllcant's ut l l l ty was worth only

$2,500.00 so that the dlfference

or, In Mr. Frankenfeld's terms,

the "changeover"

flgure,

was $6,300.00.

Whllst It would have been

theoretlcally posslble to express the transactlon In

these flgures.

the appllcant would not

have obtalned flnance on such a deal

10.

because flnance companles usually requlred thc prospectlve

purchaser to

contribute In cash, or Its equlvalent, one-half

of the purchase prlce. Hence

the declslon to Inflate both the prlce

and the allowance for the

trade-m.

The

fmance company was glven the Impression, flrst, that the appllcant

was

purchaslng a car of the

retall value of

$12,500.00,

whereas, In fact, the

respondent was

prepared to sell It for $8,XO0.00; and secondly that the

appllcant was tradlng-ln a utlllty of the

value of

$6,200.00.

I t s true value

was $2,500.00,

or, as Mr. Shaw put It, the utl l l ty was "overtraded" by

$3,700.00.

In

the

result,

Esanda

was

prepared to lend; the

respondmt

acqulred the utlhty (whlch

I t later

sold

for

$2,500.00); and the rcspondcnt

was to recelve $6,300.00

together wlth the three addltlonal Items

mentloned In the offer to purchase ($11.00 (stamp duty);

$347.00 (Insurance

premlum); $240.00 (personal accldent premlum)).

Esanda may have been mlsled by the respondent's actlons.

But

It does not follow that the appllcant

was mlsled or decelved or Ilhely to be so.

I t IS accepted on hls behalf,

correctly I thlnk, that

he can succeed here only I f

he can establlsh that the respondent, through Mr. Frankenfeld, represented to

hlm that lt was offermg hlm a "new" car.

The course

of authorlty deallng wlth the lnterpretatlon

and appllcatlon

of s.52 In the present type

of case tells us that, In lnqulrlng

whether a contraventlon

of the statute

has occurred, the respondent's conduct must

be looked a t a5 a

whole.

In the end, the questlon here

15 one of fact:

has the respondent by 11s

actlons, VIZ.

the words of Mr. Frankenfeld,

made a false representatlon to the

appllcant that the

CS sedan was

a "new" veh1cle7

11.

At the outset, the

case for the appllcant

must face thc dlfflculty

that the

meanlng of the adlectlve

"new" IS Itself somewhat uncertaln.

The

problem, In the present type

of case, was

dlscussed by Frank1 J. In Annand jc

Thompson W. Ltd. V. ___

TrdPractlces Commlsslon

(1979) 25 A.L.R.

91 at pp.94-95:

"The meanlng of the word

'new', partlcularly In relatlon to motor

vehlcles, has been consldered several tlmes In the

courts.

It

seems there are at least flve

posslble meanlngs whlch the word

may bear

when used

to descrlbe a

vehlcle.

They are:-

(I) That the vehlcle

has not been prevlously sold by retall,

that It IS not a second-hand vehlcle.

(2)

That the vehlcle

IS a current and not a superseded model.

(3)

That the vehlcle

lhas not suffered slgnlflcant deterloratlon

or been used

to any slgnlflcant extent.

(4)

That the vehlcle

IS of recent orlgln.

(5)

That the vehlcle

IS one whlch has suffered a measure of

damage but thls damage has been qulte effectlvely repalred, or any damaged part replaced, and the vehlcle IS otherwise new In every respect.

Conslderatlon has been glven to the meanmg of

'new" In relatlon to a

motor vehlcle In at least the followlng

cases:-

(a)

Marcus Clark (VIC)

L td v. Brown (1928) 4 0 CLR 5 4 0 where, at

549, reference was made

to the difference between

new and

second-hand cars and also to the posslblllty of a car not

belng

second-hand but belng used, by,

for example, the motor dealer

Itself:

see also h r r l s Motors.-

v. u e y (1959) I WLR 1184;

(1959) 3 A l l ER 737;

Morris Motors

__

L td v.

Phelan (1960) RPC

209;

(1960) 2 All ER 20811, and Standard Motor C o - a v.

Grantchester Garage L g

(1960) RPC 211."

In Marcus C lark supra, Knox CJ., Isaacs and Powers JJ. sald

(at p.549):

"'Secondhand' may mean slmply

used so as to destroy I t s character

as new - used, that IS, not slmply for experrment or demonstratlon

for selllng purposes, but for what

may tecalled the consumer's

purpose,

that for whlch the artlcle

was made."

In John McGrath

.-

Motors (Canberra) Pty. Lti. v. Agplebee

(1964)

110 C.L.R. 656,

Kltto, Taylor and Owen JJ. sald (at p.659):

12.

"It IS unnecessary to express a concluded oplnlon

on the

meanlng to be glven to the words 'new car' In the context In whlch they were used, but there IS much to be sald for

the vlew that the partles

understood It to mean 'not second-

hand'."

In the present case, the vehlcle was the current model.

It had

not suffered slgnlflcant deterloratlon.

On the other

hand,

It had been used

to a slgnlflcant extent

as a demonstrator

and as Mr. Frankenfeld's personal car.

It follows, In my oplnlon, that If I were to accept the appllcant's

evldence, a

contraventlon of

s.52 would be

made out.

That IS to say, I f Mr. Frankenfeld

slmply represented

to the appllcant that the vehlcle

was "new" wlthout any other

explanatlon,

the apphcant would

have been

mlsled:

he

could not

reasonably

have been expected to appreclate that the car

had been used

to a slgnlf~cant

extent as a demonstrator and as the personal car of a

member of the respondent's

staff.

On the other

hand, I f Mr. Frankenfeld's verslon of the dlscus~on

IS accepted, an entlrely dlfferent plcture

emerges.

It w ~ l l

be

remembered that,

accordlng to Mr. Frankenfeld,

It was explalned to the appllcant that the vehlcle

was

a demonstrator

and had

been used by

Mr. Frankenfeld.

If thls explanatlon

was glven, the apphcant's clalm

must fall.

The respectlve verslons of the conversatlon are contradlctory.

There 1s no lntermedlate posltlon and no way that one verslon can be accommodated

or reconclled wlth the other.

It becomes a questlon of the

credlbhty of edch

verslon.

In my oplnlon, It IS Inherently Improbable that the

dlscusslon took

the form alleged

by the apphcant.

For one thlng, It 15 unllkely that d motor

dealer would even

attempt such a clumsy

fraud.: no

attempt wd5 made t ~ ,

W I I , ~

13.

b a c k t h e o d o m e t e r o r

to

concea l

I t f r o m t h e a p p l l c a n t . O n t h e c o n t r a r y ,

Mr.

F rankenfe ld mus t have r ea l l s ed tha t

I t

was h lghly l lke ly tha t the appl lcant

wou ld s lgh t t he r ead lng on the odomete r

as

soon

as

h e sat

In

t h e d r l v e r ' s

scat.

A n y a t t e m p t

to

m l s r e p r e s e n t t h e c a r

as

slmply

a

"new"

car would be lmmedmte ly

exposed . More

Impor tan t ,

the conduct

of

the app l l can t when , acco rd lng

to

hls

ev ldence ,

I t

w a s f l r s t p o m t e d o u t

to

h lm tha t t he veh lc l e had been d r lven some

17 ,000 kms.,

IS t e l l i ng . On the app l l can t ' s

case, the re was po ln ted ou t

to h lm on

I4

Augus

a

fact

w h l c h c o u l d o n l y m e a n t h a t h e h a d b e e n c h e a t e d a n d d e f r a u d e d t h e

prevlous day.

As

a

r e su l t

of

tha t " f raud" , he had under takcn

a

c o m m l t m e n t

to

Esanda In

excess

of

$6,000.00.

As

has been sa ld , t he app l i can t had v l r tua l ly

no assets and only

a

modest Income. Exposure

to a c o m m i t m e n t of

w c h a

re l a t lve ly l a rge amoun t mus t have been

of

c o n s l d e r a b l e s ~ g n ~ f ~ c a n c e

to hlrn.

I f ,

In

fact,

t h e a p p l l c a n t h a d n o t u n t l l t h a t p o l n t

of

t l m e a p p r e c m t e d t h a t t h c

vehlc le had t rave l led such

a

substant la l dls tance, one would have expected 5ome

reac t lon f rom h lm. One wou ld have though t t ha t he wou ld have

a t

l e a s t m a d e

s o m e a t t e m p t

to

c o n t a c t t h e r e s p o n d e n t a n d a s s e r t ,

as

he now does , t ha t he

had been

seriously mlsled.

Instead,

the

apphcant

dld nothing.

In

my

vlew,

hls

l ack

of

reac t lon when, on h ls ev ldence ,

I t w a s f l r s t p o m t e d o u t

to

h l m t h a t t h e

vehlcle had been s lgnlf lcant ly used,

IS slgnlf lcant .

I t

means, In my

VICW,

t h a t

t h e r e a r e r e a l d l f f l c u l t l e s

In

accept lng h ls vers lon

of

t h e e v e n t s

as

plausible.

Whl ls t the appl lcant ' s fa l lure

to

respond

to

t h e l n f o r m a t l o n t h a t t h e v e h l c l e

had been dr lven subs tan t la l d i s tances

IS

lnconsls tent wlth hls own verslon

of

w h a t

was sald, hls lack

of

r e a c t l o n

IS

consistent

wl th

Mr.

F r a n k e n f e l d ' s r c c i h l

of

the l r

dea

lmg

.

On

t he

who

le

,

t he

ve r s lon

g

lven

by

Mr.

Frankenfcld 15, I th lnh,

t he more I lke ly .

I

mus t p re fe r h l s ev ldence

to

t h a t

of

the app l l can t .

I

r e j e c t

t he app l l can t ' s ve r s lon

as

Inherently Improbable.

14.

In my opmon,

no contraventlon of

s.52 has been made

out.

It

must follow that no breach of s.53 has occurred.

The appllcant has also sued m fraud and neglrgence undcr the

general law.

It IS accepted, correctly, by the appllcant that,

unless he

can

make out a mlsrepresentatlon

of the krnd requlred to demonstrate a contravcntlon

of s.52, he must fal l here also.

The appl~catron

IS dlsmlssed wlth costs.

1 hereby certlfy that thls

and the

precedlng 13 pages are a true

copy

of the ~udgment of hls Honour

,

w~

~

Assoclate to Beaumont J.

Dated:

9 July 1987

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