FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| KIM & ANOR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2005] FMCA 1863 |
| MIGRATION – Review of Migration Review Tribunal decision – refusal of Educational (Temporary) (Class TH) visas – no reviewable error – application dismissed. |
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.357A, 375, 375A, 376, 379A, 379C, 483A, Division 8A
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s.39B
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Sch 2, sbcl 422.222(1)
Taylor v Taylor (1979) 143 CLR 1
Hoskins v Van Den-Braak (1998) 43 NSWLR 290
Clements v Independent Indigenous Advisory Committee (2003) 131 FCR 28
Cameron v Cole (1944) 68 CLR 571
O’Sullivan v Repatriation Commission (2003) 74 ALD 407
Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 113 CLR 475
Applicant NAHF of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 128 FCR 359
Moradian v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1590
WAJR v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] 204 ALR 624
NAQF v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 130 FCR 456
Xiao v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2000] FCA 1472
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v SCAR [2003] FCAFC 126
SZBDF v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1493
VXDC v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1388
Wu v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] 133 FCR 221
WAID v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 220
| Applicants: | YONG JA KIM & ANOR |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS |
| Second Respondent: | MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File No: | SYG3156 of 2004 |
| Delivered on: | 16 December 2005 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Hearing date: | 3 November 2005 |
| Judgment of: | Lloyd-Jones FM |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicants: | Mr B Zipser |
| Solicitors for the Applicants: | Davidson James & Associates |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Mr D Jordan |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Phillips Fox |
ORDERS
The application is dismissed.
The applicants are to pay the respondent’s costs and disbursements of and incidental to the application.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 3156 of 2004
| YONG JA KIM & ANOR |
Applicants
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS |
First Respondent
| MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The proceedings
These proceedings were commenced by an application under s.39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), invoking s.483A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”), filed in the Sydney Registry of the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia on 22 October 2004 for judicial review of the decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) made on 15 September 2004, affirming the decision of the delegate of the respondent (“the delegate”) made on 24 March 2003 to refuse to grant the primary visa applicant, Ms Yong Ja Kim, her spouse, Mr Il Soung Won, and her children, Dah Bin Won and Yoo Bin Won Educational (Temporary) (Class TH) visas. The applicants seek relief…
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- Case
- [2005] FMCA 1863
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues central to the case involved the interpretation of the statutory provisions and their scope in relation to the common law principles of natural justice. The Court needed to determine whether the statutory requirements fully addressed the need for procedural fairness in all circumstances, or whether there were additional obligations under the common law. The Court had to consider the extent to which the statutory provisions excluded the common law principles and whether there were specific circumstances where additional procedural safeguards were required.
In addressing the issues, the Court examined the relevant statutory provisions, including sections 424A and 57, and compared them with the common law principles of natural justice. The Court noted the differing judicial approaches in previous cases, such as those in Moradian, SZBDF, and NAQF, and evaluated how these decisions applied to the current case. The Court ultimately concluded that the statutory provisions did not entirely exclude the common law principles and that there were situations where additional procedural safeguards were necessary. The Court found that the applicants had not been provided with all relevant information, which affected their ability to adequately respond to the adverse information.
The Court dismissed the application and ordered that the applicants pay the respondent’s costs and disbursements of and incidental to the application.
Orders
Orders of the court
1.
The application is dismissed.
2.
The applicants are to pay the respondent’s costs and disbursements of and incidental to the application.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the decision of Moradian per Gray J the matter was whether or not the adverse information concerning the applicant being paid or acting on a voluntary basis needed to be provided to the applicant. The case turned upon a submission made by Counsel for the applicant which was accepted by Gray J at [28] of the decision. His Honour stated:“… These words do qualify the words that precede them. They make plain an intention that subdiv AB of Div 3 of Pt 2 of the Migration Act is not to be taken to be an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to every facet of that rule, but only in relation to the matters with which the provisions of subdiv AB deal. The question in the present case is how those matters are to be characterised? Counsel for Mr Moradian argued that, because of the exclusionary provision in s 57(3), the matter with which that section deals is the right to be notified, and to comment upon or to refute, relevant adverse information in relation to an application for a visa of a kind that can be granted when the applicant is in the migration zone. The matter of the right to be notified of, and to comment upon or to refute, relevant adverse information in relation to an application for a visa that cannot be granted when the applicant is in the migration zone is not dealt with.” (Emphasis added) Mr Jordan brought to the Court’s attention that s.57 is similar but not identical to s.424A in terms of the requirement to provide particulars of adverse information. The exception in subsection (3) is quite particular and does not have any equivalent in relation to the Tribunal’s power. Subsection (3) is:“This section does not apply in relation to any application for a visa unless the visa can be granted when the applicant is in the migration zone.” Mr Moradian’s visa was not one of those visas. Mr Moradian’s visa was the kind of visa that could not be granted when he was in the migration zone. In that case, it was certainly open and it was accepted by his Honour for it to be contended that there was no specific provision dealing with that particular matter. It was submitted that when Moradian is understood in that context it does not provide any assistance to the applicant in this case because unlike Moradian in this case there is a specific provision dealing with receipt of the relevant notice. Mr Jordan submitted that the approach in Moradian is the high water mark in terms of the narrow approach. In SZBDF, her Honour Branson J at [11]-[17] contrasts the diverging approaches. Her Honour summarises the approaches of French J in WAGR and Gray J in Moradian and then goes on to deal with the more general construction applied largely followed by Lindgren J in NAQF. Her Honour at [17] applies and prefers the more general construction by Lindgren and Hely J over the narrow approach of French J and Gray J. In VXDC his Honour Heerey J traces the history of the provisions relevant to this issue and then at [27]-[31] applies and accepts the approach of Lindgren J in NAQF. Lindgren J stated that it was inconceivable that the legislature meant the displacement of natural justice hearing rule to be co-extensive with and not go beyond a precise text and expressed protection of procedural fairness. His Honour Heerey J at [30] stated:“In the present case it is not easy to see how the drafters of the Explanatory Statement and the Minister could have made it any plainer that the intent of the 2002 amendments was to reverse the result of Miah and provide comprehensive procedural codes which made detailed provision for procedural fairness but excluded the common law natural justice hearing rule.”