Kim Hurst v Friendly Care Society t/as Friendly Care Pharmacy Burleigh Heads

[2015] FWC 2732

[2015] FWC 2732

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

REASONS FOR DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s 394 - Application for unfair dismissal remedy

Kim Hurst
v
Friendly Care Society t/as Friendly Care Pharmacy Burleigh Heads
(U2014/15630)

DEPUTY PRESIDENT SAMS SYDNEY, 27 APRIL 2015

Application for relief from unfair dismissal - application lodged out of time - ‘exceptional circumstances’ - alleged lodgement difficulties - no exceptional circumstances - application not devoid of merit - application dismissed.

[1] This decision arises from an application for an extension of time for the lodgement of an application for an unfair dismissal remedy, pursuant to s 394(3) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the ‘Act’). Ms Kim Hurst (the ‘applicant’) was dismissed from her employment with the Friendly Care Society t/as Friendly Care Pharmacy Burleigh Heads (the ‘respondent’) on 27 October 2014. The applicant lodged an application for an unfair dismissal remedy with the Fair Work Commission (the ‘Commission’) on 3 December 2014. The Act mandates a 21 day statutory time limit for the filing of an unfair dismissal application. Her application was therefore lodged 16 days outside the statutory time limit set out in s 394(2)(a) of the Act.

[2] On 3 December 2014, the Commission wrote to the applicant in the following terms:

‘The Fair Work Commission (the Commission) received an application from you on 3 December 2014 seeking an order for a remedy in relation to the termination of your employment by Friendly Care Society T/A Friendly Care Pharmacy Burleigh Heads.

An application for relief from unfair dismissal must be lodged within 21 days of the dismissal taking effect. Your application has been lodged outside of the legislated timeframe.

If you wish to continue with your application, the Commission is required to hold a conference/ hearing to determine whether to allow an extension of time for the lodgement of your application.

This process requires a Member of the Commission to consider and be satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, taking into account:

● the reason for the delay;
● whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect;
● any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal;
● prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay);
● the merits of the application; and
● fairness as between the person and other persons in a similar position.

You will shortly receive a notice of listing for the date of the conference/ hearing. To assist you in preparing for the conference/ hearing, please find attached a copy of your unfair dismissal application.

You can find more information about the Unfair Dismissal process on our website here:

Information about the timeframes for lodging applications with the Commission are available here:


Please contact the Commission on 1800 269 491 if you have trouble accessing the above information.

The Commission would also like to draw your attention to the Unfair Dismissal Bench Book at: The Bench Book has information to assist you in the preparation of materials for unfair dismissal matters before the Commission.

If at any time you and Friendly Care Society T/A Friendly Care Pharmacy Burleigh Headsresolve your application or you decide to discontinue your application, you must complete the attached Form F50, send an email or advise by telephone that you no longer wish to pursue your application. It is important to note that discontinuing an application means that the matter can no longer be pursued.

If you have any queries about this matter, please contact the Commission on 1800 269 491 or go to the Commission website at If you have any complaints or other feedback, please address these to the General Manager, Fair Work Commission.’

[3] The applicant had annexed a statutory declaration to her application, which set out the reasons for her late lodgement. These essentially related to technical difficulties in lodging her application. The Commission wrote to the applicant again on 16 January 2015 seeking further particulars. The applicant provided a response on 21 January 2015. The Commission wrote to the applicant again on 10 February 2015, seeking further particulars concerning the attempted lodgements of her application and contact with the Commission between 10 and 18 November 2014. She responded later that day. The Commission then wrote to the applicant on 23 February 2015, seeking a response to the respondent’s materials. Having considered this material, along with the originating Form F2 application and the Form F3 Employer’s Response, I issued an order refusing an extension of time and dismissed the application on 14 April 2015. What follows are my reasons for doing so.

RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES

[4] The relevant legislative framework, governing the exercise of the Commission’s discretion in relation to applications of this kind, is set out as follows:

‘394 Application for unfair dismissal remedy

...

(2) The application must be made:

(a) within 21 days after the dismissal took effect; or

(b) within such further period as the FWC allows under subsection (3).

(3) The FWC may allow a further period for the application to be made by a person under subsection (1) if the FWC is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, taking into account:

(a) the reason for the delay; and

(b) whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect; and

(c) any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal; and

(d) prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay); and

(e) the merits of the application; and

(f) fairness as between the person and other persons in a similar position.’

[5] The meaning of ‘exceptional circumstances’ was considered in Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd[2011] FWAFB 975 (‘Nulty’). While Nulty was decided under the General Protections provisions of the Act, the definition of ‘exceptional circumstances’ has been held to have the same meaning where it appears in other sections of the Act, most notably in s 394(3). In Nulty, the Full Bench of the Commission said:

‘[10] It is convenient to deal first with the meaning of the expression “exceptional circumstances” in s.366(2). In Cheval Properties Pty Ltd v Smithers a Full Bench of FWA considered the meaning of the expression “exceptional circumstances” in s.394(3) and held:

“[5] The word “exceptional” is relevantly defined in The Macquarie Dictionary as “forming an exception or unusual instance; unusual; extraordinary.” We can apprehend no reason for giving the word a meaning other than its ordinary meaning for the purposes of s.394(3) of the FW Act.”

[11] Given that s.366(2) is in relevantly identical terms to s.394(3), this statement of principle is equally applicable to s.366(2).

[12] The ordinary meaning of the expression “exceptional circumstances” was considered by Rares J in Ho v Professional Services Review Committee No 295 a case involving in s.106KA of the Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth). His Honour observed:

“23. I am of opinion that the expression ‘exceptional circumstances’ requires consideration of all the circumstances. In Griffiths v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 372 at 379 Brennan and Dawson JJ considered a statutory provision which entitled either a parole board or a court to specify a shorter non-parole period than that required under another section only if it determined that the circumstances justified that course. They said of the appellant’s circumstances:

‘Although no one of these factors was exceptional, in combination they may reasonably be regarded as amounting to exceptional circumstances.’

24. Brennan and Dawson JJ held that the failure in that case to evaluate the relevant circumstances in combination was a failure to consider matters which were relevant to the exercise of the discretion under the section (167 CLR at 379). Deane J, (with whom Gaudron and McHugh JJ expressed their concurrence on this point, albeit that they were dissenting) explained that the power under consideration allowed departure from the norm only in the exceptional or special case where the circumstances justified it (167 CLR at 383, 397).

25. And, in Baker v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 513 at 573 [173] Callinan J referred with approval to what Lord Bingham of Cornhill CJ had said in R v Kelly (Edward) [2000] QB 198 at 208, namely:

‘We must construe "exceptional" as an ordinary, familiar English adjective, and not as a term of art. It describes a circumstance which is such as to form an exception, which is out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon. To be exceptional a circumstance need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare; but it cannot be one that is regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered.’

26. Exceptional circumstances within the meaning of s 106KA(2) can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together are seen as exceptional. Thus, the sun and moon appear in the sky everyday and there is nothing exceptional about seeing them both simultaneously during day time. But an eclipse, whether lunar or solar, is exceptional, even though it can be predicted, because it is outside the usual course of events.

27. It is not correct to construe ‘exceptional circumstances’ as being only some unexpected occurrence, although frequently it will be. Nor is it correct to construe the plural ‘circumstances’ as if it were only a singular occurrence, even though it can be a one off situation. The ordinary and natural meaning of ‘exceptional circumstances’ in s 106KA(2) includes a combination of factors which, when viewed together, may reasonably be seen as producing a situation which is out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon. And, the section is directed to the circumstances of the actual practitioner, not a hypothetical being, when he or she initiates or renders the services.”

[13] In summary, the expression “exceptional circumstances” has its ordinary meaning and requires consideration of all the circumstances. To be exceptional, circumstances must be out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon but need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare. Circumstances will not be exceptional if they are regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered. Exceptional circumstances can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together are seen as exceptional. It is not correct to construe “exceptional circumstances” as being only some unexpected occurrence, although frequently it will be. Nor is it correct to construe the plural “circumstances” as if it were only a singular occurrence, even though it can be a one off situation. The ordinary and natural meaning of “exceptional circumstances” includes a combination of factors which, when viewed together, may reasonably be seen as producing a situation which is out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon.

[14] Mere ignorance of the statutory time limit in s.366(1)(a) is not an exceptional circumstance. Indeed, unfortunately, it would seem to be all too common for dismissed employees to be unaware of the time limits imposed in relation to making an application for an unfair dismissal remedy or a general protections FWA application. The parliament has chosen to condition the discretion to extend time for making such applications on the existence of “exceptional circumstances”. In doing so the parliament must be presumed to have proceeded on the basis that an employee who is aggrieved at being dismissed ordinarily ought be expected to seek out information on any remedy they may have in a timely fashion such that delay on account of ignorance of the statutory time limit is not, of itself, an exceptional circumstance.

[15] A finding that there are “exceptional circumstances”, taking into account the matters specified in paragraphs 366(2)(a) to (e), is necessary before the discretion to extend time is enlivened. That is, even when “exceptional circumstances” are established, there remains a discretion to grant or refuse an extension of time. That discretion should be exercised having regard to all the circumstances including, in particular, the matters specified in paragraphs 366(2)(a) to (e) and will come down to a consideration of whether, given the exceptional circumstances found, it is fair and equitable that time should be extended [Endnotes not reproduced].’

[6] It is plain from the above extract from Nulty that all of the factors outlined in s 394(3), must be considered when deciding whether or not ‘exceptional circumstances’ have been established. Even if ‘exceptional circumstances’ are established, this is merely the jurisdictional gateway for the exercise of the Commission’s discretion to extend the time for filing an unfair dismissal application. Put another way, ‘exceptional circumstances’ may be found to have existed, but the Commission may still refuse to exercise a discretion to accept the application out of time; See: Nulty at para [15]. A recent Full Bench of the Commission in Lombardo v Commonwealth of Australia[2014] FWCFB 2288 succinctly described the Commission’s decision making process under 394(3) of the Act as: ‘The test for granting an extension of time involves both a broad discretion and a high hurdle of ‘exceptional circumstances.’ I now turn to each of the criteria under s 394(3) of the Act.

CONSIDERATION

Reasons for the delay (s 394(3)(a))

[7] The applicant set out the reasons for the delay in filing her application in a statutory declaration attached to her application as follows:

‘I understand there was a 21 day time frame for lodgement. Unfortunately circumstances at the time didn’t allow for that to happen. I shall explain below.

Before I was dismissed, I joined the union as I had a feeling that something was going to happen. After I was dismissed, I spoke constantly with the union, who were quite sure I had a case but unfortunately because it was an issue before I joined, they were unable to help me. We were now into week 2 after my dismissal.

I tried lodging via e filing, I thought I have lodged correctly, but after phoning Fair Work, they had no record. So I tried again via email but again no success, ( I have attached copies of emails sent back to me with a failure to send notice). I had spoken with Laura from Fair Work numerous times and she was very helpful, I am unfortunately a 55 year old woman with very little computer skills so found this all very daunting and upsetting. My dismissal has caused me a lot of stress detrimental to my health. I have attached an email from my doctor who was unaware of what was happening for some time.

After I missed the 21 day time frame. I was so upset that I did not think it a good idea for me to continue. But I am unable to get out of my head what happened to me, so I am asking that you please reconsider my application and allow my lodgement to be heard.’

[8] Also attached to the applicant’s statutory declaration were an acknowledgement from the Commission’s servers that she had registered as an e-filing user, on 10 November 2014 and email failure notices dated 18 November 2015. These email failure notices reveal that the applicant was attempting to email her materials to [e-mail] rather than [e-mail]. There was also an email from the Commission’s Brisbane registry attaching a blank copy of the Form F2 application dated 18 November 2014. An attached doctor’s certificate disclosed that the applicant was being treated for major depression and that she had previously attended her general practitioner in April 2014 in a very distressed state.

[9] In an email dated 21 January 2015, the applicant wrote further:

‘After numerous attempts to email my application. I am aware now that I was putting in the incorrect email address, having failure notices come back one after the other, I thought, as I have stated in my covering letter, that I was so upset by the whole affair that maybe I should try to put it behind me and move on. I was/am unable to do this as I have definately [sic] been treated badly and unfairly dismissed by my former employer. This is why my lodgement was late. I have never been in a situation like this before in my working career. ‘

[10] In a further email dated 10 February 2015, the applicant said that she had not attempted to lodge her application between 10 and 18 November 2014, as she thought it had already been lodged by e-filing. After returning home from an interstate trip between 13 and 17 November 2014, she called the Commission on 18 November 2014 and realised her application had not been filed.

[11] In its Form F3 Employer’s Response, the respondent maintained its objection to the application. On 4 March 2015, it provided a response to the information and documents filed by the applicant, which simply submitted that none of the reasons set out by the applicant could constitute ‘exceptional circumstances’ within the meaning of s 394(3) of the Act.

[12] I am unable to conclude that the reasons, provided by the applicant, either individually or cumulatively, for the delay in filing her unfair dismissal application constitute ‘exceptional circumstances’ as contemplated by the Act. The Union’s decision not to assist or represent the applicant (the reason given for failing to act within the first two weeks after her dismissal) cannot be an ‘exceptional circumstance’. Legal or industrial assistance or representation is not required to file an application for a remedy for unfair dismissal. Parties frequently represent themselves in such matters before the Commission. The relevant application form, available from the Commission, is simple and straightforward. Without knowing the details, it would seem curious that in constant communication between the applicant and the Union (her words), the Union would not have advised her to simply lodge a claim.

[13] There is no evidence that the applicant lodged, or attempted to lodge her application on 10 November 2014. The documents filed by the applicant demonstrate only that she registered to use the Commission’s e-filing system on that day. She has presented no evidence that she lodged an application, in the required form, accompanied by the relevant fee on that date. The ‘failure to send’ emails referred to by the applicant were all dated 18 November 2014, one day outside the statutory time limit. These materials do not support a finding of an unsuccessful lodgement eight days earlier. I also observe that the internet is not the only method available for filing an unfair dismissal claim. The Commission provides a number of means by which an unfair dismissal application can be lodged. In addition to electronic lodgement, an unfair dismissal application may be filed in person at the Commission’s registry or by post. An unfair dismissal application can also be made by phone; See: Rule 9, Fair Work Commission Rules 2013. There is no evidence that the applicant unsuccessfully attempted to utilise any of these options.

[14] On the applicant’s own admission, she was aware of the statutory time limit. Even if I were to accept the applicant’s claim that she believed she had filed her application on 10 November 2014 and did not believe otherwise, until contacting the Commission on 18 November 2014, this demonstrates that she was on notice that her application had not been filed. At this point, she said that she was ‘so upset I did not think it a good idea to continue.’ While ignorance of the statutory time limit would not be an ‘exceptional circumstance’, I find it odd that the applicant was not more proactive in relation to her application at this point. It seems more likely that the applicant made a conscious decision not to pursue her application. The fact that she later changed her mind cannot be an ‘exceptional circumstance’.

[15] Finally, in relation to the applicant’s submission as to her mental health, I am unable to conclude that the symptoms reported by the applicant’s doctor positively demonstrate that she was incapable of lodging her application within the 21 day timeframe. In any event, the doctor’s certificate refers to an incident in April 2014 in which she had claimed bullying at work. This was six months before her dismissal. There was no evidence of the applicant being prescribed any medication or being otherwise unable to function normally on a day to day basis. Many employees suffer from elevated levels of stress and anxiety following termination of their employment. On one view, this is unexceptional, rather than exceptional. In Shaw v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited T/A ANZ Bank[2015] FWCFB 287, the Full Bench, by majority (Watson VP and Smith DP) said at para [15]:

‘[15] After taking into account the factors in s.366(2) the Deputy President needed to be satisfied that there were exceptional circumstances. The Deputy President noted, correctly in our view, that stress, shock and confusion, in and of themselves, are not exceptional. The loss of employment is a serious event in a person’s life, and such effects are unfortunately not unusual.’

[16] Accordingly, the reasons provided by the applicant cannot be said to constitute ‘exceptional circumstances’, within the meaning of s 394(3)(a) of the Act.

When the person first became aware of the dismissal (s 394(3)(b))

[17] In her Form F2 application, the applicant identified 27 October 2014 as the date on which she was notified of her dismissal, effective that day. She annexed a copy of the termination letter, dated 27 October 2014, to her Form F2 Application. The respondent also identified 27 October 2014 as the date of the applicant’s termination of employment. I find that the applicant was aware of her dismissal on 27 October 2014.

Any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal (s 394(3)(c))

[18] Neither party addressed this criterion, although I note the applicant was on notice that this would need to be taken into account; see para [2]. The applicant did not refer to any other attempts to dispute her dismissal, other than the filing of this application. This is a neutral factor in my consideration.

Prejudice to the employer (s 394(3)(d))

[19] The applicant did not specifically refer to this criterion, and the respondent was concerned as to the possibility it may incur costs. Given the delay in filing was sixteen days, this is a neutral factor in my consideration of whether to grant an extension of time.

The merits of the application (s 394(3)(e))

[20] The applicant attached her termination letter to her application. It was expressed as follows:

‘I am writing to your [sic] about the termination of your employment with UFS Friendly Society Ltd.

‘On the 28th April 2014 you met with Nathan Cruickshank and Greg Baker. In that meeting, you were advised of an inability to follow and complete instructions/requests fom supervising staff members, standard of dress and to wear the provided shirts and name badge, poor customer service and general attitude toward staff and customers. Also addressed was your wlaking [sic] out of the pharmacy before the end of your shift and without permission.
On the 15th October 2014 you met with Nathan Cruickshank and Kaylene Fairweather. In that meeting you were advised that inappropriate interaction with customers, inability to attend to tasks as assigned by your Pharmacy Manager and Supervisors, and conducting personal business during work hours, and a second and final warning letter was issued. This letter indicated that your employment may be terminated if your performance and behaviour did not improve immediately.
We consider that your performance and behaviour is still unsatisfactory and have decide [sic] terminate your employment for the following reasons.

● Failure to behave in a business like manor [sic] toward Pharmacy managers and also failure to conduct Specific Responsibilities as outlined in your Position Description; specifically relay information to patients under the direction of the pharmacist when handing out prescriptions.

Your employment will end immediately. Base [sic] on your length of service, your notice period is 2 weeks. In lieu of receiving that notice, you will be paid the sum of $684.88 net pay.
You will also be paid your accrued entitlements and outstanding remuneration, including superannuation, up to and including your last day of employment.’

[21] The applicant also attached a warning letter dated 28 April 2014, which referred to an ‘incident’ in the workplace on 22 April 2014. A further letter marked ‘Second and Final Warning Letter’ dated 20 October 2014, referred to a warning for breaches of the respondent’s policies on Staff Dress, Behaviour and Discipline. The following reasons were given:

‘1) Inappropriate interaction involving a customer which led to two local doctors being questioned in terms of why they hadn’t written an authority prescription for said customer who didn’t meet the eligibility criteria for that authority prescription.

2) As per position description- an inability to attend to any task assigned by your Pharmacy Manager or Supervisor; After the interaction with the customer, other staff and myself found it extremely difficult to approach you, and found it difficult to appoint any further tasks for the day.

3) Conducting business within the shop that doesn’t relate to Friendly Care Pharmacy or the day to day running of Friendly Care Pharmacy; i.e. the sale/pick up of items relating to your personal jewellery business.’

[22] The applicant provided extensive responses to both of these warning letters and two favourable references. She noted that she was a Grade 3 Dispensary Technician. She had expressed her dissatisfaction to both Mr Cruickshank and Ms Fairweather that a university student was being given more work and training than herself. On 22 April 2014, she had asked Mr Cruickshank if it would be possible to split the Tuesday shift so that she would work half the shift at the front counter and half in the dispensary. Mr Cruickshank had responded, ‘I don’t like ultimatums.’ Later that day, she and Ms Fairweather had a mild verbal altercation in relation to the younger employee, after which she claimed Ms Fairweather ignored her and spoke badly about her to other employees. She walked up to where Ms Fairweather was at the back counter. She said, ‘I have had enough, I was [sic] leaving the store.’ She believed that the issue would have escalated if she had not left. She had later unsuccessfully attempted to contact Mr Cruickshank. When she returned the next day, Ms Fairweather ignored her attempt to apologise and she was met ‘with a tirade of abuse’ from Mr Cruickshank. She was upset for the rest of the day. She did not believe that the underlying issues had been resolved in later meetings with the employer.

[23] The applicant provided a written statement dated 16 October 2014, which referred to an incident on 15 October 2014. An elderly customer had come into the pharmacy and had inquired as to why he was being charged $40 for an item he would usually get on a script. The applicant approached Mr Cruickshank to ask if he was aware of this customer receiving this item on a script. He replied ‘Of course he knew that, he knew a lot of things.’ She said that she would tell the customer to obtain an Authority script and denied having said this with ‘attitude or animosity’. Mr Cruickshank had said to her as she went out the front, ‘Don’t walk away from me.’ However, she was not walking away, she was going to tell the customer to ask his doctor for another prescription. The customer accepted this, said thank you and went to walk out. Mr Cruickshank approached the customer and after a number of computer inquiries and a phone call to the doctor, she was told that the doctor would not write an Authority script for the customer. There had been no need for Mr Cruickshank to do this and she denied having been ‘prickly’ with other staff after this incident. She had been emotional in the meeting following this incident and felt that it had been painted differently. She believed that Mr Cruickshank had a problem with her personality.

[24] As to the references, there was no evidence that the referees had been made aware of the reasons for the applicant’s dismissal or were witnesses to the alleged incidents. They must have limited relevance in this context and no relevance at all in respect to the reasons for the delay in filing the application.

[25] In its Form F3 Employer’s Response, it was said that the applicant had been dismissed on performance grounds. She had been given opportunities to improve her performance. The applicant’s performance had deteriorated from March/April 2014 in relation to instances of impoliteness and discourtesy. She had been issued with a written warning on 28 April 2014 for walking out of the workplace after a heated discussion with a senior colleague on 22 April 2014 and a follow up meeting was held on 14 May 2014. It was denied that the junior employee had been working on the back counter. A further meeting was held on 15 October 2014 related to an incident in which she exhibited ‘poor behaviour’. The applicant failed to engage in discussions. She continued to perform poorly, did not wear her allocated uniform and work badge, did not follow directions from managers and communicated inappropriately with customers. She was terminated in a meeting on 27 October 2014, with immediate effect. The applicant had not specified clear reasons why her dismissal was unfair.

[26] It is important for applicants to understand that a consideration of the merits of an application, at such an early stage in the proceedings and without the benefit of tested evidence, will only ever be on a prima facie basis. In Kornicki v Telstra Network Technology Group P3168, a Full Bench of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission said:

‘The merits of the substantive application. If the application has no merit then it would not be unfair to refuse to extend the time period for lodgment. However we wish to emphasise that a consideration of the merits of the substantive application for relief in the context of an extension of time application does not require a detailed analysis of the substantive merits. It would be sufficient for the applicant to establish that the substantive application was not without merit.’

[27] It seems clear that the applicant was dismissed for poor performance over a period of time. Even on her own evidence, her interaction with her managers was inappropriate. Her accounts of the two incidents in question serve to justify, rather than deny the conduct alleged. I note that the applicant did not address the respondent’s allegations in relation to the wearing of a uniform and the conduct of her own business in work time. I assess that the applicant’s prospects of success in this matter are not particularly strong. This weighs against an extension of time being granted.

Fairness as between the person and other persons in a similar situation (s 394(3)(f))

[28] Neither party substantively addressed this criterion. This is a neutral factor in my consideration.

CONCLUSION

[29] Having considered and balanced all of the matters the Commission is required to take into account under s 394(3) of the Act, I am not satisfied that there are ‘exceptional circumstances’ which would warrant my granting an exception to the statutory time limit for the lodgement of this unfair dismissal application. The circumstances, as disclosed by the material submitted by the applicant, are not ‘out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon’. The application for an unfair dismissal remedy must be dismissed. I confirm my order of 14 April 2015.

DEPUTY PRESIDENT

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