Kilmaley Investments Pty Ltd v City of Wanneroo [No 3] - [2020] WASC 165

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   KILMALEY INVESTMENTS PTY LTD -v- CITY OF WANNEROO [No 3] [2020] WASC 165
CORAM:   TOTTLE J
HEARD:   12 NOVEMBER 2019, 24 JANUARY 2020
DELIVERED          :   20 MAY 2020
FILE NO/S:   CIV 1516 of 2012
BETWEEN:   KILMALEY INVESTMENTS PTY LTD
First Plaintiff
SHEAN PTY LTD
Second Plaintiff
AND
CITY OF WANNEROO
Defendant

Catchwords:

Agency - Powers of attorney - Where power of attorney granted to conduct litigation in name of principal - Where application made by attorney in attorney's name - Whether application void or merely an irregularity - Leave given to amend irregularity

Resumption and acquisition of land - Compensation under s 241 of the Land Administration Act 1997 (WA) - Where right or title of plaintiff's to receive compensation doubtful - Where moneys paid into court by defendant - Where compensation determined in favour of plaintiff who had discontinued claim - Where s 249 of the Land Administration Act 1997 (WA) applies - Where moneys to be distributed as the Court thinks just and equitable

Legislation:

Land Administration Act 1997 (WA), s 241, s 249
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA)

Result:

Application dismissed in part
Leave given to amend application

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

First Plaintiff	:	Ms L E Rowley
Second Plaintiff	:	Ms L E Rowley
Defendant	:	Mr K M Pettit SC & Mr D W McLeod

Solicitors:

First Plaintiff	:	Rowely Legal
Second Plaintiff	:	Rowley Legal
Defendant	:	McLeods Barristers & Solicitors

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Alexander Ward & Co Ltd v Samyang Navigation Co Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 673
Bertram v Metters [1921] SASR 172
Campbell v Pye (1954) 54 SR (NSW) 308
Growden v Wiltshire [1935] HCA 27; (1935) 52 CLR 286
Kilmaley Investments Pty Ltd v City of Wanneroo [2019] WASCA 156
Kilmaley Investments Pty Ltd v City of Wanneroo [No 2] [2017] WASC 307
Re Manias; Ex parte Edsill Pty Ltd (1986) 15 FCR 1

TOTTLE J:

Introduction

On 26 October 2017 I handed down my primary decision in this matter determining the compensation payable under s 202 of the Land Administration Act 1997 (WA) (the Act) for the taking of a parcel of land in the northern Perth suburb of Wangara.[1] In January 2018 the defendant (the City) paid the sum of $462,361 into court pending an appeal against the orders made as a consequence of the primary decision. These reasons concern who is entitled to have those moneys paid out of court.
[1] Kilmaley Investments Pty Ltd v City of Wanneroo [No 2] [2017] WASC 307 (Kilmaley Primary Decision).
The background to this issue is found in the primary decision and in the judgment of the Court of Appeal dismissing the plaintiffs' appeal.[2]
[2] Kilmaley Primary Decision [32] - [35]; Kilmaley Investments Pty Ltd v City of Wanneroo [2019] WASCA 156 [120] - [164].

The present applications

The competing claimants are: the plaintiffs (Shean and Kilmaley), the City, and Mannor Holdings Pty Ltd (Mannor). Mannor was originally a plaintiff in the action.
When the Court of Appeal delivered judgment on 11 October 2019 senior counsel for the City foreshadowed an application by the City for the payment of the money in court to it and counsel for the plaintiffs foreshadowed that an application would be made by Mannor in respect of the money. In the face of the competing claims the Court of Appeal made orders that:
(a)the City's application for the moneys paid into court be referred to me, as the primary judge; and,
(b)any application by Mannor be made to me by 25 October 2019.
On 23 October 2019 the plaintiffs' solicitors filed a chamber summons making alternative applications. The first application was an application by Shean for payment to it of the money in court and accrued interest. The alternative application was expressed to be made by Kilmaley and Shean, 'as attorneys for Mannor Investments (sic) Pty Ltd' for payment of the money to them in their attorney capacity. The application was supported by an affidavit sworn on 23 October 2019 by Mr Michael Frawley, a director of both Kilmaley and Shean. Mr Frawley attached to his affidavit, among other documents, a deed made on 14 October 2019 entitled 'Power of Attorney and Deed of Assignment' (the October 2019 Deed) which recorded that Mannor had appointed Kilmaley and Shean as its attorneys. I refer to the terms of the October 2019 Deed in more detail later in these reasons.
On 7 November 2019 the City filed a notice of motion seeking an order that the money in court be paid out to it.
The circumstances in which Mannor ceased to be a plaintiff in the action and Shean was joined as a plaintiff are set out in the primary decision as follows:[3]
On 11 February 2015 a registrar of the court made an order that had the effect of removing Mannor as a plaintiff and permitting a minute of amended statement of claim filed on 11 February 2015 to stand as Kilmaley's amended statement of claim.
Kilmaley pleaded in [29] of the amended statement of claim that Mannor had assigned to it the benefit of an entitlement to the claim for compensation that had been lodged by it and Kilmaley. As is apparent from my earlier reference to the April 2013 deed, Mannor purported to assign its interest in the claim for compensation to Shean, not Kilmaley.
In its amended defence filed and served on 27 February 2015 the defendant admitted the plea that Mannor's interest in the claim for compensation had been assigned to Kilmaley. In the course of preparing for the trial the defendant's solicitors realised the error and sought leave to file a further amended defence withdrawing the admission.
This prompted an application by Kilmaley to amend the writ of summons to join Shean as the second plaintiff and to amend [29] of the amended statement of claim to plead that Mannor had assigned its interest in the compensation claim to Shean. I granted leave to Kilmaley to join Shean and to amend the amended statement of claim in the manner described above. The defendant was given leave to withdraw its earlier admission of [29] of the amended statement of claim. My reasons for granting leave were three-fold: first, to ensure that the parties whom Kilmaley contended were the correct parties to the action were joined; second, there was no discernible prejudice to the defendant; and, third, although the defendant maintained its contention that the assignment by Mannor to Shean was ineffective to transfer Mannor's interest in the claim to Shean, it was inappropriate to resolve that issue summarily as a pleading issue.
[3] Kilmaley Primary Decision [32] - [35].
The pleading applications referred to in the extract of the primary decision set out above were heard on the day before the trial was due to commence. In the course of argument senior counsel for the City was at pains to emphasise that by pursuing the issue of which party was entitled to compensation the City was not 'trying to get out of paying compensation'.[4] Rather, senior counsel stated 'it's just we want to make certain [the compensation] goes to the right party and we're not held to account'.[5] Counsel submitted that 'the problem would all be solved if [Mannor] were reinstated as plaintiff'.[6]
[4] ts 7 June 2016, 33.
[5] ts 7 June 2016, 33.
[6] ts 7 June 2016, 33.
At trial the City's position was that Kilmaley and Mannor were the parties entitled to the compensation and that the purported assignment by Mannor to Shean of its share of the compensation was ineffective at law. That was not only the basis upon which the trial was conducted but it was the context in which (having held that Mannor's assignment of its entitlement to compensation was ineffective) I stated in the primary decision that:[7]
Subject to hearing from the parties when they have had the opportunity of considering these reasons, I will give consideration to whether I should adopt the course proposed by the plaintiffs of ordering that Mannor's share of the compensation be paid into court.
[7] Kilmaley Primary Decision [539].
Following the delivery of the primary decision the parties remained in dispute about to how to deal with the compensation in respect of the interest in land owned by Mannor. Correspondence was exchanged between the solicitors for the parties. In the course of that correspondence one possibility canvassed by the solicitor for Kilmaley and Shean was that consideration be given to the City paying the compensation to the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs indemnifying the City,[8] (the City's solicitors having sought such an indemnity from Kilmaley in July 2015).[9] The City's solicitors responded to this suggestion by revisiting the possibility of an assignment by Mannor and stated:[10]
What is required by way of assignment is an assignment by Mannor of the money or its interest in the money represented by the compensation award. The previous assignment purported to assign Mannor's interest in the litigation.
If you want to pursue that, the best course might be to forward to me as soon as possible a draft of any further assignment you propose to put to Mannor.
[8] Affidavit of Michael Frawley sworn 14 December 2017, 64.
[9] Affidavit of Denis William McLeod sworn 7 June 2016, 28.
[10] Affidavit of Michael Frawley sworn 14 December 2017, 68.
It was against this background that I made an order on 18 December 2017 that the amount in question be paid into court pursuant to s 249 of the Act pending either an appeal by the plaintiffs or an application for disbursement of the money, such application to be made by no later than 28 February 2018 in the event that no appeal was lodged. Although the order made on 18 December 2017 was not made by consent the terms of the order were agreed between the parties and proposed to the court in the terms agreed.[11]
[11] ts 18 December 2017.
Relevantly, s 249 of the Act provides that if any doubt or dispute arises as to the right or title of any person to receive any compensation, the compensation may be paid into court and the court, on the application of any person interested, is to make such orders for the distribution of the money as it thinks just and equitable.

Shean's claim

Shean advanced its claim on the basis that at the time of the taking, Mannor's interest in the land taken, was subject to a mortgage in its favour and under s 251 of the Act it was entitled to be paid the money in court in reduction of the mortgage debt which remained outstanding.
There are a number of difficulties with Shean's claim. The first difficulty is that its application does not fall within the ambit of the Court of Appeal's orders - Shean was not given leave to make the application.
The second difficulty is that Shean's application is, in effect, an attempt by it to run a new claim for the compensation that was the subject of its unsuccessful claim relying on a different legal basis. Shean's unsuccessful claim was founded on the (ineffective) assignment of Mannor's rights to it. Shean did not advance a claim as a mortgagee.[12] It is not now open to Shean to advance a new basis for a claim to the same compensation following the primary decision and an unsuccessful appeal.
[12] Kilmaley Primary Decision [511].
The third difficulty is that the evidence supports the conclusion that Shean's mortgage was discharged on completion of the sale of Mannor's interest in the land to Kilmaley as contemplated by the April 2013 deed, the terms of which are set out in the primary decision at [506]. At [507] of the primary decision I recorded that:
I infer, however, from the text of cl 2 read in conjunction with Mr Frawley's evidence that Kilmaley acquired Mannor's interest in lot 703, that the condition precedent to Mannor's assignment of its entitlement to compensation to Shean was satisfied, and that this assignment satisfied Mannor's indebtedness to Shean.
It is appropriate to add that cl 2 of the April 2013 deed provided that on completion of the sale contract between Mannor and Kilmaley, Shean would release Mannor from liability in respect of all monies advanced prior to 15 March 2013 and all claims arising from the mortgages. Further, the finding recorded at [507] of the primary decision was not challenged on appeal. No evidence has been adduced by Shean that suggests that the finding was incorrect. To the contrary, Mr Frawley attached to his affidavit sworn on 23 October 2019 a copy of a deed entitled 'Deed of Affirmation' executed by Shean, Kilmaley and Mannor on 17 August 2016 in which it was recited that:
EMannor Holdings was, prior to 2nd April 2013, indebted to Kilmaley Investments and Shean.
Shean's counsel contended that the recital was not intended to convey that Mannor was not indebted to Shean or Kilmaley after 2 April 2013. Objectively, however, what is conveyed by the recital is that any indebtedness on the part of Mannor to Kilmaley and Shean created prior to 2 April 2013 had been discharged, a position which accords with the finding recorded at [507] of the primary decision.

Mannor's claim

The City contended that Mannor had abandoned its claim. The contention was not supported by reference to any legal principle other than a generalised reference to the principles of estoppel.[13]
[13] ts 24 January 2020, 166.
The City did not dispute Mannor's title to its interest in the taken land. On the taking that interest was converted from an interest in land to a statutory entitlement to compensation, a chose in action, a form of personalty. The purpose of the action was to determine the quantum of compensation payable. The existence of Mannor's interest was not contingent upon it remaining a party to the action and nor did the City treat it as being so contingent.
Notwithstanding that Mannor had ceased to be a plaintiff in the action in February 2015, the City regarded Mannor's interest as one that continued in existence. On 8 July 2015 the City's solicitor sent a letter to Kilmaley's solicitor expressing reservations about the effectiveness of the assignment of Mannor's entitlement to compensation and stated:[14]
The Defendant has not raised, and does not now raise, any objection to the withdrawal of Mannor Holdings Pty Ltd, but the matter could become a live issue at the time any further payment is required to be made for compensation etc. The payment of the full amount to the continuing plaintiff may leave Mannor Holdings Pty Ltd with a claim against the City.
The matter could be simply dealt with by Kilmaley giving an indemnity to the City, or Mannor giving a release, or preferably both.
[14] Affidavit of Denis William McLeod sworn 7 June 2016, 28.
As may be inferred from the statements made by the City's senior counsel to which I have referred at [8] above, at the commencement of trial the City accepted that Mannor's entitlement to compensation continued to exist, and that was the City's position when it was corresponding with the plaintiffs' solicitors in December 2017.
There is no foundation in legal principle for the contention that Mannor abandoned its statutory entitlement to compensation and that its personal property right has been extinguished. And there is no factual foundation that might support the operation of any form of estoppel.
In my view, Mannor is the party entitled to payment of the money in court. It is just and equitable that the moneys in court be paid to Mannor or at its direction. Parenthetically, this appears to reflect the City's view of who was entitled to the compensation in respect of Mannor's interest in the land up to the delivery by the Court of Appeal of its judgment.
The City contended that it was not open for Mannor - as a stranger to the litigation - to make an application for orders in its favour absent some exceptional circumstances. As a general proposition it is correct to say that a stranger may not intervene in litigation to which it is not a party but in this case the Court of Appeal's order constituted, in effect, leave to Mannor, as a person whose interests were directly affected, to intervene by bringing the application.
The City contended that the alternative application brought by the plaintiffs as attorneys should have been brought in Mannor's name and that thus no application had been brought within the time prescribed by the Court of Appeal's order. In response to this contention the plaintiffs argued that the City's contention was not supported by authority and that there was no provision in the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) which suggested that their approach was incorrect.
The City did not contest the validity of the power of attorney granted by Mannor to Kilmaley and Shean but argued that the power only authorised Kilmaley and Shean to bring an application in Mannor's name and not in their names.
Kilmaley and Shean were appointed as Mannor's attorneys under a power contained in the October 2019 Deed. The power of attorney was contained in cl 2 which provided:
2Appointment
Pursuant to s 124 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), Mannor irrevocably appoints Kilmaley and Shean to jointly and severally exercise and perform in perpetuity in its name the following powers and duties:
2.1institute and conduct in its name any court proceedings which Kilmaley and/or Shean consider necessary and appropriate to carry into effect the agreements between the parties contained in the settlement Deed and this deed including, without prejudice to the generality, the institution and conduct of legal proceedings to the fullest extent necessary and including any appeal in its name at the cost of Kilmaley and Shean;
2.2receive and retain without requirement to pay or repay to Mannor any monies paid or awarded by the Court and/or the City of Wanneroo as a consequence of the taking of part of the Original Land, the making of the Claim or for any other reason;
2.3sign or execute in its name any documents reasonably required to carry into effect the tasks set out in 2.1 and 2.2 hereof; and
2.4any other things which may be required to put into effect the intentions of the parties set out in the recitals hereof.
Relevant also is recital P of the October 2019 Deed which provided:
In reflection of the obligations and agreements between the parties, Mannor has agreed to execute this deed:
i.appointing Shean and Kilmaley jointly and severally as its attorney to take all actions which they consider necessary or appropriate on behalf of Mannor and in the name of Mannor to carry into effect the agreements between the parties including, without prejudice to the generality, the institution and conduct of legal proceedings in its name; and
ii.confirming the assignment to and entitlement of Shean and Kilmaley of all and any rights it may have had to be paid the compensation arising out of the taking of part of the Original Land which is or may be awarded to it or to which it is entitled whether:
a.by the Decision or
b.by any orders made by the Court or
c.payable as a consequence of the making of the Claim or
d.for any other reason; and
iii.directing the Court and/or the City of Wanneroo that any monies to which it is or may become entitled as a consequence of the taking of part of the Original Land and/or the making of the Claim should be paid to Shean as mortgagee in respect of the debt not satisfied by the transfer of the Land to Kilmaley or Kilmaley as owner of the Original Land or to either as a consequence of the obligations contained in the Settlement Deed and/or this deed.
Clause 3 of the October 2019 Deed provided:
3 Assignment
Mannor hereby irrevocably assigns to Shean and Kilmaley, in whatever portions or manner as they see fit, all and any rights it may have to be paid any monies or compensation arising out of the taking of part of the Original Land which is or may be awarded to it or to which it is entitled whether:
a)by the Decision; or
b)by any orders made by the Court; or
c)payable as a consequence of the making of the Claim; or
d)for any other reason.

It is a well-established principle that an attorney cannot apply to the court for relief on behalf of the principal in the attorney's own name.[15]
[15] See Bertram v Metters [1921] SASR 172 (Murray CJ & Angas Parsons J) and the authorities cited there; Campbell v Pye (1954) 54 SR (NSW) 308 (McLelland J).
The 'alternative application' brought by Kilmaley and Shean should have been brought by them in Mannor's name. The application was said to be brought by Kilmaley and Shean as attorneys for Mannor seeking that 'the money be paid out to the First and Second Plaintiffs as attorneys for Mannor Investments Pty Ltd'. Plainly, this was an attempt by Kilmaley and Shean to seek relief on behalf of Mannor in their names.
The wording of the application is materially indistinguishable from the claim before the South Australian Supreme Court in Bertram v Metters,[16] where the plaintiff was expressed to be 'Hamilton Adam Bertram as attorney for and on behalf of the Palatine Insurance Company Limited'. Murray CJ and Angas Parsons J stated:[17]
Forms of words or the absence of words indicative of agency, or the undisclosed fact of agency, have no bearing upon this case, which is governed by the rule that the agent cannot sue in his own name on behalf of the principal. This, it seems to us, is precisely what the agent has done in this case. He has sued in his own name as attorney for and on behalf of the Palatine Insurance Company Limited, that is to say, the action is brought on behalf of the company by its agent in the name of the agent. Substitute the word 'agent' for 'attorney', and it is, if anything, plainer that the action is brought by Bertram in his capacity as agent of the company. There is no necessity or right to introduce the name of the agent in the action, and the fact of its introduction shows that the agent is the plaintiff.
[16] Bertram v Metters [1921] SASR 172.
[17] Bertram v Metter, 175.
In my view, however, the commencement of the application by Shean and Kilmaley in their own names should be viewed as an irregularity rather than as a defect that rendered the application invalid. There is no possible prejudice to the City. As noted, the City's declared interest has been to ensure that the compensation is paid to the correct person and that it is not held to account. Further, there is authority for taking the approach that the application should be treated as an irregularity.
In Re Manias; Ex parte Edsill Pty Ltd,[18] a creditor's petition for sequestration orders referred to a judgment debt due to Edsill Pty Ltd but was commenced in the name of a director of Edsill. The petition commenced with the words 'I, Robert Hine, Company Director of Edsill Pty Ltd … petition the Court for a sequestration order against the estate of Nick Manias …'.[19] Mr Hines did not have the authority of Edsill to commence the petition, (although authority was subsequently ratified). Jackson J concluded that where an officer of a company, stating his position as such, has purported to present a petition on behalf of the company but has used his own name, it was appropriate to give leave to amend the petition to correct that error by substituting the correct petitioner.[20] Jackson J, after referring to the principle that the making of the petition could later be ratified by the company,[21] observed:[22]
The petition remains defective in form, however, because the opening words of it refer to Mr Hine as the petitioning creditor. In Growden v Wiltshire, the High Court rejected an argument that a petition was invalid because it was brought in the name of a liquidator rather than in the name of a company in liquidation, a matter which it regarded as an irregularity. It directed the judge of the Court in Bankruptcy to amend the petition by substituting the name of the company for that of the liquidator and to make any consequential amendments.
I am satisfied that I should adopt a similar view when dealing with the present case where an officer of the company, stating his position as such, has purported to present a petition on behalf of the company but has used his own name. (citations omitted)
[18] Re Manias; Ex parte Edsill Pty Ltd (1986) 15 FCR 1.
[19] Ex parte Edsill, 2.
[20] Ex parte Edsill, 3.
[21] Citing the decision of the House of Lords in Alexander Ward & Co Ltd v Samyang Navigation Co Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 673.
[22] Ex parte Edsill, 3.
In Growden v Wiltshire,[23] Wiltshire, the liquidator of a company Coo‑ee Pictures, had applied to the Court in Bankruptcy for a bankruptcy notice following Growden's failure to pay on a judgment debt in favour of Coo-ee. In that application Wiltshire was described as the 'official liquidator of Coo-ee Pictures Ltd' and the notice issued by the Court similarly described Wiltshire. Growden sought to have the bankruptcy notice set aside on the basis that it was not issued 'in the name of and on behalf of' Coo-ee. That application was dismissed and Growden appealed to the High Court. Rich J in delivering the leading judgment stated:[24]
We think that the petition ought not to have been presented in the official liquidator's name, but that the irregularity should be met by amendment. The bankruptcy notice operated to found an act of bankruptcy. The matter should be remitted to the Bankruptcy Court for the purposes of amending the petition by substituting the name of the company for that of the official liquidator, and of making all consequential amendments.
[23] Growden v Wiltshire [1935] HCA 27; (1935) 52 CLR 286.
[24] Growden v Wiltshire, 289.
Dixon J, as his Honour then was, concluded that the issuing of the notice in the name of the official liquidator was 'an irregularity which could not have caused any substantial injustice, and ought not to invalidate the bankruptcy notice'.[25]
[25] Growden v Wiltshire, 290.
In this case the irregularity should be cured by filing an amended chamber summons incorporating an application in Mannor's name for an order that the money paid into court be paid out to it.
The plaintiffs' counsel, Ms Rowley, urged me to join Mannor as a party to the action. Counsel contended that Mannor should be joined as a plaintiff. A difficulty with this course is that Ms Rowley, who is also the plaintiffs' solicitor, has told the court that she is unable to represent Mannor. Ordinarily all plaintiffs must be represented by the same solicitor. It is appropriate for Mannor to be before the court before orders are made finally disposing of the money in court. Given the stage that these proceedings have reached and the limited role to be played by Mannor, it was my intention that Mannor would be permitted to be separately represented in the event that Ms Rowley remains unable to represent Mannor. However, after delivery of an advance copy of these reasons and before publication of them, senior counsel for the City drew my attention to O 18 r 6(2) of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) that provides, among other things, that a person may not be added as a plaintiff to an action ‘without his consent signified in writing or such other manner as may be authorised’. There was some debate between the parties as to the application of this rule in the light of the power of attorney granted by Mannor to Kilmaley and Shean. Rather than perpetuate controversy between the parties I determined that Mannor should be joined as the second defendant.

The City's claim

The City's claim was advanced on the basis that it was 'the last person standing', that is, in the absence of any other legitimate claim the money should be paid out to it. As I have determined that Mannor is entitled to the money in court the City's claim falls away.

Orders

I consider that orders to the following effect should be made:
(a)Shean's application for payment of moneys out of court pursuant to s 151 of the Land Administration Act 1997 (WA) be dismissed;
(b)The City's notice of motion be dismissed;
(c)Mannor Holdings Pty Ltd be joined as the second defendant;
(d)The chamber summons filed 23 October 2019 be amended by:
(i)deleting from paragraph 2 of the chapeau the words 'by the First and Second Plaintiffs as attorneys for Mannor Investments Pty Ltd pursuant to s 149 of the Land Administration Act 1997' and inserting the words 'by Mannor Holdings Pty Ltd pursuant to s 249 of the Land Administration Act 1997 (WA)'; and
(ii)deleting from paragraph 2 of the orders sought the words 'to the First and Second Plaintiffs as attorneys for Mannor Investments Pty Ltd pursuant to s 149 of the Land Administration Act 1997' and inserting the words 'to or at the direction of Mannor Holdings Pty Ltd pursuant to s 249 of the Land Administration Act 1997 (WA)';
such amended summons to stand as an application for payment of moneys out of court by Mannor Holdings Pty Ltd made 23 October 2019.

Payment of money out of court

The resolution of the issue as to who is entitled to the money in court has been long and unnecessarily complicated. I express the hope that once Mannor is joined as second defendant and solicitors are instructed on its behalf the steps required to make the payment out of court can be dealt without the need for further contention and disputation.
I will hear the parties as to costs.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
AS
Associate to the Honourable Justice Tottle
20 MAY 2020