Killman v CDK Stone Pty Ltd
[2022] NSWPICMP 348
•1 September 2022
| DETERMINATION OF APPEAL PANEL | |
| CITATION: | Killman v CDK Stone Pty Ltd [2022] NSWPICMP 348 |
| APPELLANT: | Torsten Lennart Killman |
| RESPONDENT: | CDK Stone Pty Ltd |
| Appeal Panel: | |
| MEMBER | Paul Sweeney |
| MEDICAL ASSESSOR | Henley Harrison |
| MEDICAL ASSESSOR | Paul Niall |
| DATE OF DECISION: | 1 September 2022 |
| CATCHWORDS: | wORKERS cOMPENSATION - Appeal by worker against a deduction made pursuant to section 323(2) of the Workplace injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 as a result of extraterritorial noise exposure in the Rhodesian Air Force in his late teens; Held – that the Medical Assessor erred in not addressing the history of noise in the appellant’s statement and in providing no description of the nature and extent of noise exposure in Rhodesia; Pereira v Siemens Ltd considered and applied; given the appellant’s 30 year plus history of exposure to industrial noise it was speculative to conclude that his impairment would have been less but for the exposure in Rhodesia; Medical Assessment Certificate revoked. |
BACKGROUND TO THE APPLICATION TO APPEAL
On 24 May 2022, Torsten Lennart Killman (the appellant) lodged an Application to Appeal Against the Decision of a Medical Assessor. The medical dispute was assessed by Dr Silvester Fernandes, a Medical Assessor (MA), who issued a Medical Assessment Certificate (MAC) on 11 May 2022.
The appellant relies on the following grounds of appeal under s 327(3) of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (1998 Act):
· the assessment was made on the basis of incorrect criteria,
· the MAC contains a demonstrable error.
The delegate is satisfied that, on the face of the application, at least one ground of appeal has been made out. The Appeal Panel has conducted a review of the original medical assessment but limited to the grounds of appeal on which the appeal is made.
The Personal Injury Commission Rules 2021 (the PIC Rules), and Procedural Direction PIC7 – Appeals, reviews, reconsiderations and correction of obvious errors in medical disputes set out the practice and procedure in relation to the medical appeal process under s 328 of the 1998 Act. An Appeal Panel determines its own procedures in accordance with the PIC Rules.
The assessment of permanent impairment is conducted in accordance with the NSW Workers Compensation Guidelines for the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 4th ed 1 April 2016 (the Guidelines) and the American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 5th ed (AMA 5).
RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The appellant is 66 years of age. At the age of 15 he obtained casual work at Luna Park, which exposed him to industrial noise. After leaving school he obtained a pilot’s licence and went to live in Rhodesia. He was in that country between 1976 and late 1978. During this period, he performed national service in the Rhodesian Air Force. He states:
“During those two years I was exposed to, and fired, a number of different rifles and machine guns, probably every few months in training courses. It was a requirement that ear plugs were worn during those exercises.”
After his return to Australia he was employed in several different occupations many of which were noisy. He was self-employed for, at least, one short period and worked for a company of which he was the proprietor for three years in noisy employment. For a period of nine years from 1980, he worked for the Lock and Safe Division of Chubb. He states:
“During this time I had a lot of exposure to building sites when I was supervising the installation of strong room doors and the like. My main role in this position involved liaising with builders and architects.”
From 1991, the appellant performed construction work building houses on the North Shore in Sydney. He states he was exposed to the normal construction sounds of power tools and machinery, and often wore protective gear, including headphones, which he states were then standard on construction sites.
The appellant says that from 1994 he performed odd jobs, including labouring and building work, for Simon Maxwell. He says that during this period he “mainly used tools such as a cordless drill”. He continues:
“Much of the time I was doing gyprock work or planting trees and carrying out various small maintenance jobs on his 5 acre property or boat.”
Then, between 1995 and 1996, the appellant performed fencing work. This “sometimes involved power tools such as angle grinders and chainsaws”. The appellant says that he wore hearing protection.
The appellant says that around 1995 he worked for a company known as Trackline Civil performing labouring work for a period of a year. He continues:
“This was usually on building sites and I always wore protective gear including headphones. There was often machinery such as 90-pound pneumatic hammers on site.”
According to the history in the MAC, the appellant was last employed by the CDK Stone Pty Ltd (the respondent), initially as a stone mason, then as a warehouse manager for a period of 21 years during which time he was also exposed to industrial noise.
Finally, in respect of his exposure to noise, the appellant says that he is a keen hunter who was exposed to firearms eight days each year in pursuing that activity. He states that he used “sound reactive headphones” while hunting.
The appellant saw Dr Peter Macarthur, an ear nose and throat surgeon, at the request of his solicitor on 16 August 2021. By a report dated 23 August 2021, Dr Macarthur recorded a history that the appellant had been employed by the respondent initially as a stone mason, but more recently as a warehouse manager. He recorded that in that work the appellant:
“was exposed to considerable noise particularly powered cutting implements for marble, Caesarstone and other benchtops, and generally power tools including vacuum cleaners to remove the dust.”
Dr Macarthur also recorded that the appellant had fired a number of different rifles, including a 303 rifle, when he was in school cadets and that he was engaged in rifle practice whilst in the Rhodesian Air Force for a period of two years.
Dr Macarthur concluded that the appellant’s employment with the respondent was such as to give rise to a real risk of industrial deafness. He accepted that the losses shown on audiogram at 2000 Hz and above were caused by noisy employment. After making an allowance for presbycusis, he found that the “adjusted total binaural hearing loss due to exposure to loud noise is 17%”. From that he deducted 10% pursuant to s 323(2) of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (1987 Act). He did so because he considered that the appellant’s two episodes of sole trading were periods during which he was exposed to considerable industrial noise. He assessed whole person impairment (WPI) as 8%. He expressed the opinion that hearing aids were reasonably necessary as a result of the hearing loss.
On 1 September 2021, Dr Scoppa, an ear nose and throat surgeon, provided a medico-legal report to the appellant’s solicitor. He did not examine the appellant and did not perform an audiogram. Thus, his opinion is based upon the history and audiogram of Dr Macarthur. He accepted that Dr Macarthur’s audiogram was a “true and accurate record” of the appellant’s hearing loss.
Contrary to the methodology adopted by Dr Macarthur, Dr Scoppa accepted that the losses in the left ear from 1500 to 4000 Hz and an equal amount of loss in the right ear should be accepted as due to industrial deafness.
Dr Scoppa said this:
“The test-retest reliability of an audiometric threshold for any test of frequency is accepted as being 5 dB, hence the finding of the same threshold at adjoining low tone frequencies does not indicate that in all matters the lower adjoining frequency is due to causes other than industrial deafness, and in my opinion each matter should be assessed on its own merits and facts, and after considering the nature and duration of occupational noise exposure as reported by Dr Macarthur I would assess the loss in the left ear from 1500 to 4000 Hz and an equal amount of loss in the right ear as being consistent with and due to industrial deafness in this matter based on Dr Macarthur’s audiogram.”
Based on these losses, Dr Scoppa found total binaural hearing loss due to industrial deafness of 22.5%. He made no deduction pursuant to s 323 for a pre-existing abnormality. He stated that Dr Macarthur’s occupational history made no reference to the appellant working as a sole trader and the nature of any occupational noise exposure in that work. He presented no evidence that such exposure caused noise induced hearing loss. He continued:
“My understanding is that unless there is evidence that occupational noise exposure that occurred during employment as a Sole Trader caused loss of hearing then a Section 323 deduction does not apply.”
On the basis of this reasoning, Dr Scoppa found 11% WPI.
While the respondent did not adduce medical evidence, the difference of opinion between Dr Macarthur and Dr Scoppa as to the degree of WPI resulting from industrial deafness gave rise to a medical dispute as that term is used in s 319 of the 1987 Act. Accordingly, a delegate of the President referred the medical dispute to Dr Fernandes for assessment. It is from his assessment that the appellant appeals.
PRELIMINARY REVIEW
The appeal panel conducted a preliminary review of the original medical assessment in the absence of the parties. As a result of that preliminary review, the appeal panel determined that it was unnecessary for the worker to undergo a medical examination by a member of the panel.
As the issue in dispute was whether the MA should have made a deduction pursuant to s 323 in respect of the appellant’s prior non work-related noise exposure, the panel concluded that a further medical examination would not illuminate that issue even if the panel found error in the MAC. The panel also noted that neither party sought a re-examination of the worker.
Fresh evidence
Section 328(3) of the 1998 Act provides that evidence which is fresh evidence or evidence in addition to or in substitution for the evidence received in relation to a medical assessment appealed against may not be given on an appeal by a party unless the evidence was not available to the party before the medical assessment and could not reasonably have been obtained by the party before that medical assessment.
Although it did not specifically enumerate this ground of appeal in its application, the appellant sought to admit as fresh evidence a supplementary report of Dr Scoppa dated 22 May 2022. The respondent opposed its admission arguing that it was prejudiced. The panel will address this issue further when giving its reasons below.
EVIDENCE
The appeal panel has before it all the documents which were sent to the MA for the original medical assessment and has taken them into account in making this determination.
Medical Assessment Certificate
The parts of the medical certificate given by the MA which are relevant to the appeal are set out in the body of this decision.
SUBMISSIONS
Both parties made written submissions. They are not repeated here in full but have been considered by the appeal panel. In summary, the appellant argued that the MA erred in making a deduction pursuant to s 323(2) in that he “did not have a proper basis for making a deduction” under the section.
The appellant alleged that the MA did not rely on audiogram evidence to conclude that there was a pre-existing condition caused by the appellant’s service in the Rhodesian Air Force for a period of two years and during a period of self-employment as a carpenter over some nine months. His conclusion was “mere conjecture”.
The appellant also relied on the reasoning of Garling J in the Supreme Court in Pereira v Siemens Limited [2015] NSWSC 113 (Pereira), which he asserted set out the “methodology to be adopted” in determining whether a deduction should be made pursuant to s 323. The appellant continued:
“It is submitted to the Appeal Panel that the facts upon which a pre-existing injury are to be found must be clearly identified and the injury itself identified including the time which the injury was sustained. The AMS did not make any fact finding effort to determine any pre-existing hearing loss with reference to the employment in Rhodesia or as a self-employed carpenter.”
Probably repetitively, the appellant then submitted that the MA had not “properly articulated the reasons” how the pre-existing loss could have contributed to the level of WPI. He referred to the case law that has arisen in respect of s 323 since its inception and also to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Matthew Hall Pty Ltd v Smart [2000] NSWCA 284.
On the basis that there should be no deduction pursuant to s 323 the appellant argued that the MAC should be revoked and the WPI resulting from industrial deafness certified at 11%.
The respondent submitted that in considering s 323 of the 1998 Act, Part 3 Division 4 of the 1987 Act had to be taken into account. It argued that there was evidence which provided a sound factual basis for a finding that the appellant had been exposed to noise in his service in the Rhodesian Air Force. Thus the facts in the case could be distinguished from those in Pereira where there was no evidence to establish the degree of noise to which the appellant was exposed in Pakistan. The respondent continues:
“In the current case the history recorded by the medical experts (IME reports attached to the ARD and Reply) and the appellant’s statement confirms the noise exposure over the Worker’s entire period of employment including the nature of his work in Rhodesia which was capable of causing industrial deafness. This is similar to the evidence obtained by the second medical appeal panel in Pereira in 2016.
The MA decision [sic] to make a deduction pursuant to Section 323 for extra-jurisdictional noise exposure to the appellant’s work in Rhodesia and his recreational activities and other non-work-related noise environment is justified and cannot be challenged based on the current evidence before the Commission.”
Finally, the appellant stated that it did not agree to the tender of an additional report from Dr Scoppa as there was no proper basis for its tender. It stated that should the appellant be granted leave to rely upon same, it should also be granted leave to obtain and rely upon a supplementary report from the respondent’s independent medical expert (IME).
LEGISLATION
In so far as it is relevant s 68B of the 1987 Act which deals with deductions for previous injuries and pre-existing conditions in cases where ss 15,16 and 17 of the Act prescribe a deemed or notional date of injury is as follows:
“When determining the compensation payable by an employer in a case in which section 17 applies (loss or further loss of hearing), section 323 of the 1998 Act applies to that compensation subject to the following -
(a) there is to be no deduction under section 323 of the 1998 Act for any proportion of the impairment that is due to the worker's employment in previous relevant employment (as defined in paragraph (b)) except any such proportion for which compensation under this Division (as in force at any time) or section 16 of the former Act has been paid or is payable,
(b) for the purposes of paragraph (a),
‘previous relevant employment’is employment to the nature of which the disease was due by a previous employer who is liable under section 17 to contribute in respect of the compensation being determined (or who would be so liable if the requirement to contribute were not limited to employers who employed the worker during a particular period).’”
REASONS and FINDINGS
Section 328(2) of the 1998 Act provides that an appeal is to be by way of review of the original medical assessment, but the review is limited to the grounds of appeal on which the appeal is made. This sub-section was considered by Davies J in New South Wales Police Force v Registrar of the Workers Compensation Commission of New South Wales [2013] SC 1792 (11 December 2013). Davies J considered that the form of the words used in s 328(2) of the 1998 Act ‘the grounds of appeal on which the appeal is made’ was intended to convey that the appeal is confined to those particular demonstrable errors identified by a party in its submissions. The Appeal Panel has only considered those grounds specifically raised by the appellant in her application.
In Campbelltown City Council v Vegan [2006] NSWCA 284 (Vegan), the Court of Appeal held that the Appeal Panel is obliged to give reasons. Where there are disputes of fact it may be necessary to refer to evidence or other material on which findings are based, but the extent to which this is necessary will vary from case to case. Where more than one conclusion is open, it will be necessary to explain why one conclusion is preferred. On the other hand, the reasons need not be extensive or provide a detailed explanation of the criteria applied by the medical professionals in reaching a professional judgement.
The role of the medical Appeal Panel was considered by the Court of Appeal in Siddik v WorkCover Authority of NSW [2008] NSWCA 116. An appeal by way of review may, depending upon the circumstances, involve either a hearing de novo or a rehearing. Such a flexible model assists the objectives of the legislation. However, in Versace vAustralia Best Tyres & Auto Pty Limited [2016] NSWSC 1540 (2 November 2016) Schmidt J, held that the 1998 Act did not permit the Appeal Panel to review the determination of the MA without first identifying error.
Though the power of review is far ranging it is nonetheless confined to the matters which can be the subject of appeal. Section 327(2) of the 1998 Act restricts those matters to the matters about which the MAC is binding. In considering the submissions of the appellant, it is necessary to bear in mind the nature of the statutory obligation of the MA to provide reasons. It is evident from reasoning of the High Court of Australia in Wingfoot Australia Partners PtyLtd v Kocak [2013] HCA 43 (Wingfoot) that it is only necessary for the MAC to explain the actual path of reasoning of the MA in sufficient detail to enable a court or an Appeal Panel to determine whether there is error in its findings. In Wingfoot it was said that:
“The function of a medical panel is neither arbitral nor adjudicative: it is neither to choose between competing arguments, nor to opine on the correctness of other opinions on that medical question. The function is in every case to form and give its own opinion on the medical question referred to it by applying its own medical experience and its own medical expertise.”
The reasoning in Wingfoot has been applied to medical assessments under the NSW Workers Compensation legislation: see, for example El Masri v Woolworths Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1344 (26 September 2014).
By the MAC, the MA recorded a that the appellant had a history of more than 30 years exposure to industrial noise. He also recorded that the appellant was exposed to noise in the Rhodesian Air Force for five hours a day over a period of two years.
On the basis of this history of exposure to noise, Dr Fernandes accepted that the appellant’s industrial deafness should be assessed by reference to his hearing loss at 1500 Hz and the frequencies above. He concluded thus:
“Hence after consideration of the nature and duration (immission levels) of occupational noise exposure and the nature and extent of all the hearing losses, including those at 0.5, 1 and 1.5 KHz, the hearing losses at 1.5, 2, 3 and 4 KHz are caused by his occupational noise exposure.”
The MA then turned to the question of a deduction “for extra-jurisdictional noise exposure”. He said this:
“Factually the rate of hearing loss due to chronic noise exposure is greatest in the initial years of exposure, and decreases as the hearing threshold increases. (See American College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine 2002). In other words, the earlier noise exposure are the most detrimental quantitatively. As his extra-territorial exposure occurred initially a 10% deduction is valid in the instant case.”
It is evident that the MA made a deduction pursuant to s 323(2) because he believed the deduction for “extra-jurisdictional” exposure was difficult to determine. The “extra jurisdictional” noise exposure can only relate to the appellant’s military service in Rhodesia as there is no other history of him being exposed to noise outside NSW.
After criticising aspects of Dr Scoppa’s report in respect of s 323, the MA returned to the question of what deduction should be made for the proportion of the impairment that was due to a previous injury or pre-existing condition. Relevantly, he said this:
“In my opinion the worker suffers from the following relevant previous injuries, pre-existing conditions or abnormalities:
‘1. An excess loss of uncertain origin (non-occupational) in the lower frequencies and
2.Age-related hearing loss and
3.An additional excess loss of unknown origin (non-noise-induced) on the right side.’”
The MA then states:
“In hearing loss cases the deduction is not for pre-existing conditions, but it is for hearing loss not due to noisy employment. It can usually be calculated exactly and the 10% deduction used in other compensation claims is not often needed.”
The MA then issued a MAC which contained the following calculations:
“Total % BHI: 37.1
Less pre-existing non-related loss (of 13.6): 23.5
Less presbycusis correction (of 2.9): 20.6
Add % of severe tinnitus (of 0.0): 20.6
Adjusted total % BHI: 20.6
Less s 323 Deduction (see above):
10% of 20.6 is 2.06
Deduct 2.06 from 20.6 = 18.54
Resultant total BHI of 18.5 = 10% whole person impairment (Table 9.1)”
The panel accepts that it was appropriate for the appellant to obtain a further medical report from Dr Scoppa for the purpose of formulating and refining its grounds of appeal. That, however, does not lead to a conclusion that the report should be received as fresh evidence. In the opinion of the panel there is nothing in the supplementary report that would assist in the determination of the issue in dispute. In considering the MAC, Dr Scoppa merely rehearses the arguments which he posited in his earlier report and reaches the same conclusion i.e. that there is no proper basis for a s 323 deduction. Further, the medical assessment process is not generally enhanced by further reports from IMEs criticizing the reasoning in the MAC. Accordingly, the panel rejects the tender of the report. It will, of course, consider the appellant’s argument that there was no proper basis for the s 323(2) deduction made by the MA.
The appellant submitted that in his assessment the MA had erroneously reduced the appellant’s hearing loss twice for presbycusis. A consideration of the calculations set out in the MAC make it quite clear that while the MA stated that deductions for non-occupational loss, age-related loss and excess loss of uncertain origin should be dealt with pursuant to s 323, he did not duplicate any of these deductions. Certainly, it is doubtful that the deductions are caught by s 323.The real basis of the deductions is that the losses have not been proven to result from employment injury namely the exposure to industrial noise. But that is immaterial in this case. The appellant has not established that the MA has duplicated a deduction for non work related hearing loss.
In his calculations in the MAC, the MA made distinct deductions for age-related and nonoccupational hearing loss. Plainly, the 1/10th deduction made pursuant to s 323 related to the appellant’s “extraterritorial exposure” that is his exposure to noise during his service in the Rhodesian Air Force.
The panel has little doubt that it was open to the MA to make a deduction for extraterritorial exposure pursuant to s 323 provided it occurred before the notional date of injury. If this were not the case, s 68B of the 1987 Act would be otiose. In Curran v Linfox Armaguard Pty Ltd [2021] NSWPICMP 76 (24 May 2021), the Medical Appeal Panel determined that s 17 of the 1987 Act did not permit an enquiry into what proportion of noise-induced hearing loss was caused by noisy employment after the notional date of injury. Plainly, s 323 only applies to exposure before the deemed date of injury as is the case here.
Conversely, the panel had considerable doubt whether it was appropriate to make a deduction pursuant to s 323 (2) in the factual circumstances of the case. It must be borne in mind that s 323 is a disentitling provision. While the issue of onus is rarely of importance in a medical appeal, the principles enunciated a very long time ago in Watts v Rake (1960) 108 CLR 158 and Purkess v Crittenden 114 CLR 164 have application to an evaluation under s 323. That these principles are relevant to the assessment of lump sum compensation under the Workers Compensation Act is also of ancient lineage: see Sadler v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1969) 123 CLR 216. It is necessary for a respondent to be able to point to appropriate evidence to support a deduction.
By his statement, the appellant states that during his service in the Rhodesian Air Force he fired a number of different guns “probably every two months in training courses”. Dr Macarthur records a similar history, namely that the appellant undertook “rifle practice” serving with the Rhodesian Air Force two years. It appears that the MA has taken a very different history of noise exposure during the appellant’s military service to that recorded in his statement. As recorded above, there is a suggestion in the table under the heading “Work History” that the appellant may have been exposed to noise five hours a day during this period.
Unfortunately, the MA does not record or describe the nature of the noise to which the appellant was exposed during his military service. Moreover, he does not address the obvious discrepancy between what he has recorded and what appears in the appellant’s statement and the occupational history of Dr Macarthur. It is, therefore, difficult to determine which account of the occupational exposure is correct.
The absence of a description of the noise to which the appellant was exposed in his military service also means that it is not possible for the panel to understand the actual path of the reasoning by which the MA made a deduction pursuant to s 323(2). That constitutes a failure to give sufficient reasons for a critical finding in accordance with the instruction of the High Court in Wingfoot. It is, therefore, necessary for the panel to re-assess the deduction pursuant to s 323 for a pre-existing condition namely the extraterritorial noise exposure during the appellant’s military service.
In reassessing the question of a deductible proportion, it is necessary to bear in mind the extensive case law which has entangled the seemingly simple words of s 323 in a legal thicket. Some of the important cases were brought together by Garling J in Pereira v Siemens Ltd [2015] NSWSC 1133 (21 August 2015), where he said at [81]:
“The assessment required by s 323 is one which must be based on fact, not assumptions or hypotheses: Elcheikh v Diamond Formwork (NSW) Pty Ltd (In Liq) [2013] NSWSC 365 at [89]; Matthew Hall Pty Ltd v Smart [2000] NSWCA 284 at [33]; Ryder v Sundance Bakehouse [2015] NSWSC 526 at [40].”
It is unnecessary to reiterate all that was said by the judge relevant to a s 323 in that case. It is more fully set out in the appellant’s submissions. But a fundamental principle which emerges from the case is that it must be proven that the pre-existing condition would alter the outcome of the assessment. In other words, it must be demonstrated that it would result in a lower assessment of permanent impairment.
The panel accepts that the exposure to firearms referred to in the appellant’s statement may have caused some sensorineural hearing loss. It also accepts the statement of the MA that noise exposure early in an occupational history may be more detrimental than subsequent exposure. However, the appellant had a 30 year plus history of exposure to noise at work. In the circumstances, the panel is of the opinion that it is not possible to reach a positive conclusion that, absent the exposure to noise during his military service described in his statement, his hearing loss would have been less. To reduce the appellant’s binaural hearing loss by1/10th for this exposure must involve a substantial element of speculation. As Pereira instructs that is not permissible.
Accordingly, the panel is of the opinion that it is inappropriate to make a deduction pursuant to s 323 for a pre-existing condition on the basis of the evidence in this case. The panel also notes that the appellant was self-employed in noisy employment for a period of nine months and that he operated firearms intermittently while hunting. However, the MA has not made a deduction in respect of these aspects of the appellant’s noise exposure. Indeed, the MA concludes that the appellant’s pastime of hunting provided only a de minimis risk of hearing loss.
The above findings lead to the conclusion of error in the MAC. For these reasons, the Appeal Panel has determined that the MAC issued on 11 May 2022 should be revoked, and a new MAC should be issued. The new certificate is attached to this statement of reasons.
PERSONAL INJURY COMMISSION
APPEAL PANEL
MEDICAL ASSESSMENT CERTIFICATE
Injuries received after 1 January 2002
Matter Number: | W5981/21 |
Applicant: | Torsten Lennart Killman |
Respondent: | CDK Stone Pty Ltd |
This Certificate is issued pursuant to s 328(5) of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act1998.
The Appeal Panel revokes the Medical Assessment Certificate of Dr Silvester Fernandes and issues this new Medical Assessment Certificate as to the matters set out in the Table below:
| Notional date of injury | Frequency Hz | Left dB HL Air Bone | Right dB HL Air Bone | Total % BHI | Occupational % BHI |
| 01/04/2021 (deemed) | 500 | 30 25 | 25 25 | 2.0 | 0.0 |
| 1000 | 45 40 | 45 40 | 10.2 | 0.0 | |
| 1500 | 40 40 | 45 45 | 6.8 | 6.4 | |
| 2000 | 40 40 | 50 45 | 5.3 | 4.8 | |
| 3000 | 60 60 | 70 65 | 6.5 | 6.3 | |
| 4000 | 60 55 | 80 70+ | 6.3 | 6.0 | |
| TOTAL % BHI: 37.1 | |||||
| Less Pre-existing non-related loss: 13.6 | |||||
| Less Presbyacusis correction: 2.9 | |||||
| Add % of severe tinnitus: 0.0 | |||||
| Adjusted total % BHI: 20.6 | |||||
| Resultant total BHI of 20.6 % = 11 % whole person impairment (Table 9.1) | |||||
The above assessment is made in accordance with the Guidelines for the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment for injuries received after 1 January 2002
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