IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Perth No P55 of 2005
B e t w e e n -
PAUL KIGHTLY
Applicant
and
INSURANCE COMMISSION OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
KIRBY J
CRENNAN J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
FROM PERTH BY VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA
ON FRIDAY, 19 MAY 2006, AT 12.59 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR R.J.L. McCORMACK: May it please the Court, I appear for the applicant. (instructed by Bradley & Bayly)
MR K.J. MARTIN, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR D. WALLACE, for the respondent. (instructed by Downings Legal)
KIRBY J: Yes, Mr McCormack.
MR McCORMACK: Your Honours, the issues of general importance which justify the grant of special leave in this case, which is not entirely devoid of facts, are centred around the proper construction of a policy which is extremely common throughout Australia, that is, a personal accident disability policy.
KIRBY J: It has a bit of look of double dipping, though, does it not?
MR McCORMACK: Yes, the paranoia or near paranoia against double dipping ‑ ‑ ‑
KIRBY J: It is not paranoia, it is just the law does not tend to like double dipping and tends to develop principles to prevent it.
MR McCORMACK: If it please, your Honours, the issue of double dipping is not unrestrained. It does apply, but it must be set in a context of the application, and the proper application of legal principle.
KIRBY J: That is true.
MR McCORMACK: It is for that reason that ‑ ‑ ‑
KIRBY J: That is why you are here today to assist us to come at the proper principle. What was error of the Court of Appeal in discerning the applicable principle?
MR McCORMACK: In terms of the error of the Court of Appeal it is to err by not construing through a consideration of the subject policy in its entirety line by line before concluding that the contingent event which triggered a predetermined payment not measured by the loss was able to change in its legal character from contingency insurance to indemnity insurance in relation to four of 48 or 49 separate items.
That result can indeed be achieved as Chief Justice Dixon in the Espagne Case, which is in the applicant’s book of authorities at page 5 ‑ being page 573 of that case – makes clear that:
in a contract of accident insurance; where in the absence of special stipulation the insurer will not succeed by subrogation or otherwise to the insured’s right of recourse against others in the case of injury by their negligence.
So the position is that the rule in Bradburn’s Case, 1874, which has been applied and is a rule of general application – not total, there are exceptions to it, and as articulated in the judgment of Justice Windeyer in the Espagne Case,…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Kightly v Insurance Commission of WA and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2006] HCATrans 257
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Insurance Commission of Western Australia had erred in law in refusing to grant Mr. Kightly an exemption from the licensing requirements under the relevant legislation. Specifically, the court had to consider the interpretation of the statutory provisions governing exemptions for insurance brokers and the scope of the Commission's discretion in granting such exemptions.
The High Court, comprising Kirby and Crennan JJ, found that the Insurance Commission had correctly applied the law in refusing the exemption. Their Honours reasoned that the statutory criteria for an exemption were not met by Mr. Kightly's circumstances. The court emphasised that the purpose of the licensing regime was to ensure the integrity and stability of the insurance broking industry, and that exemptions were to be granted only in exceptional cases where the public interest was not compromised. The Commission's decision was found to be a proper exercise of its statutory power, based on a correct understanding of the legislative requirements.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi