Kiad v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Kiad v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FCA 703  

File number: NSD 1879 of 2024
Judgment of: BROMWICH J
Date of judgment: 27 June 2025
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – where the Minister decided under s 501(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to cancel the applicant’s visa on the basis that he failed the character test and cancellation was in the national interest – where aspects of national interest included prevention of terrorist acts in Australia – whether the Minister understood the law at that time to mean that a visa cancellation decision would have the result that the applicant would remain in immigration detention until removed as per Al-Kateb v Godwin [2004] HCA 37; 219 CLR 562 – whether that amounted to acting on an incorrect understanding of the law in view of NZYQ v Minister for Immigration [2023] HCA 37 – whether such an error was material to the decision – HELD: extension of time to seek judicial review of the Minister’s decision granted; decision set aside

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – whether decision made according to correct understanding of the law – legal error – whether jurisdictional error – materiality

Legislation:

Criminal Code (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 501, 501(3), 501(3)(b), 501(6), 501(6)(d)(v), 503A

Cases cited:

AJN23 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCAFC 103; 304 FCR 586

Al-Kateb v Godwin [2004] HCA 37; 219 CLR 562

Al-Kutobi v The King [2023] NSWCCA 155; 378 FLR 218

LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; 98 ALJR 610

NZYQ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 37; 415 ALR 254

YQLH v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 293

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 34
Date of hearing: 19 June 2025
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr A Bhasin
Solicitor for the Applicant: SBA Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr P Knowles SC and Mr B Kaplan
Solicitor for the Respondent: Clayton Utz

ORDERS

NSD 1879 of 2024
BETWEEN:

MOHAMMAD MUTLAG HANTOUSH KIAD

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

BROMWICH J

DATE OF ORDER:

27 JUNE 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The name of the respondent be changed to the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship.

2.An extension of time be granted until 23 June 2025 to bring an application for judicial review of the decision made by the respondent, on 16 February 2015, to cancel the Class BC Subclass 100 (Partner) visa held by the applicant (16 February 2015 visa cancellation decision).

3.The draft amended originating application for review of a migration decision filed on 23 June 2025 be treated as an originating application filed in the Court on that day in accordance with the extension of time granted by order 2.

4.The respondent’s 16 February 2015 visa cancellation decision be set…

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Details
Case
[2025] FCA 703
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Kiad v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship involved the applicant, Kiad, whose visa was cancelled by the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship under section 501(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The cancellation was based on the ground that Kiad had failed the character test and that cancelling his visa was in the national interest, including the prevention of terrorist acts in Australia. The key legal issues before the court were whether the Minister understood the law at the time of making the decision, specifically whether he comprehended that Kiad would remain in immigration detention until removed as per Al-Kateb v Godwin, and whether any error in this understanding was material to the decision.

The court determined that the Minister had acted on an incorrect understanding of the law, which was clarified in the subsequent case of NZYQ v Minister for Immigration. The error was found to be material as it affected the Minister's multifactorial evaluative decision-making process. The court held that the error could not be isolated to a single paragraph in the Minister's reasons but rather had implications for other parts of the decision. Consequently, the court was unable to affirmatively conclude that the outcome would have been the same had the error not been made.

The Federal Court granted an extension of time for Kiad to seek judicial review of the Minister's decision, set aside the decision, and ordered the Minister to pay Kiad's costs. The court's decision highlights the importance of understanding the law correctly when making decisions that significantly impact an individual's rights and freedoms. The extension of time and setting aside of the Minister's decision reflect the court's recognition of the materiality of the error and its impact on the fairness of the decision-making process.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The name of the respondent be changed to the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship.

2. An extension of time be granted until 23 June 2025 to bring an application for judicial review of the decision made by the respondent, on 16 February 2015, to cancel the Class BC Subclass 100 (Partner) visa held by the applicant (16 February 2015 visa cancellation decision).

3. The draft amended originating application for review of a migration decision filed on 23 June 2025 be treated as an originating application filed in the Court on that day in accordance with the extension of time granted by order 2.

4. The respondent’s 16 February 2015 visa cancellation decision be set aside.

5. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs as taxed or agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The evidence supporting the charges, including protected information which could not be disclosed to Mr Kiad pursuant to s 503A, forms the basis for the Minister’s conclusions that the statutory criteria for the exercise of the visa cancellation power under s 501(3)(b) had been met, and that exercise of the discretion was appropriate. Whether there is a material error in the Minister’s decision With the qualification that the Minister formally contends that AJN23 was wrongly decided, it is common ground that the statement at [32] of the Minister’s reasons, which appears in his discussion of the exercise of the discretion to cancel Mr Kiad’s visa, contains error based on a pre-NZYQ understanding of the law: Indefinite detention[32] I note that available information to the department indicates that Mr KIAD is stateless. I acknowledge, that as he is stateless, he will not be able to be removed from Australia and as a consequence of the statutory provisions may be liable to indefinite, or a long period, of immigration detention, if I decide to cancel his visa. The Minister contends that the decision’s error is confined to this paragraph, where it was plainly considered as a reason not to cancel Mr Kiad’s visa, evidently because of the harshness of extended or indefinite detention. Despite an argument that is advanced to the contrary by Mr Kiad, I accept that read properly and in context, the prospect of detention was being noted by the Minister at [32] as a reason not to exercise the discretion to cancel the visa. However, for the reasons that follow, I do not accept that the error can be readily, to adopt a helpful and evocative expression used by senior counsel for the Minister, “ring-fenced” from the rest of the reasons. In opposition to any such ring-fencing, Mr Kiad relies upon AJN23 at [51]:… A multifactorial evaluative decision such as that of the Minister cannot be analysed as a simple balancing exercise; “[a] task of that kind cannot be performed by fragmenting the consideration into an evaluation of individual considerations, attributing to each of them some form of individual abstract term purporting to be a measure of their significance, and then aggregating by some form of calculus each of those individual assessments”: CRNL v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 138 at [28] per Colvin, Stewart and Jackson JJ, and see also [27] and [34]-[35]. Once an important underpinning of the decision in relation to several elements is fundamentally altered, it is simply not possible to have confidence in what the outcome would have been; it cannot “be affirmatively concluded that the outcome would inevitably have been the same had the error not been made”: LPDT at [16]. It follows that the paragraphs in the Minister’s reasons relied upon by Mr Kiad require close consideration to determine whether the error expressly manifested in [32] infects all or any of them, implicitly or otherwise. That is, the question is whether any other paragraphs were affected by an error that, had it not been made, meant that there was a realistic possibility that the decision could have been different. Or to use the language in LPDT at [16] reproduced above, the question is whether it can be affirmatively concluded that the outcome would inevitably have been the same had the error not been made.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established