Khoury v The Public Trustee
[2010] NSWSC 475
•18 May 2010
CITATION: Khoury v The Public Trustee [2010] NSWSC 475 HEARING DATE(S): 15, 16 and 17 February 2010
JUDGMENT DATE :
18 May 2010JUDGMENT OF: McLaughlin AsJ DECISION: 1. I order that the time for the institution of these proceedings be extended up to and including the date of the filing of the summons herein.
2. I order that the Plaintiff receive from the estate of the late Martin James Haugh (“the Deceased”) a legacy in the sum of $150,000.
3. I order that the costs of the Plaintiff on the party and party basis and the costs of the Defendant on the indemnity basis be paid out of the estate of the Deceased.
4. I stand the matter over to a date to be fixed by arrangement with my Associate for the bringing in of short minutes, which will have the effect that the benefit of the foregoing legacy be limited to the Plaintiff personally, and that the manner of the payment of that legacy be retained under the control of the Defendant, for the benefit of the Plaintiff personally.
5. The exhibits may be returned.CATCHWORDS: SUCCESSION - family provision - intestacy - whether Plaintiff is an eligible person within paragraph (d) of definition - financial and material circumstances of Plaintiff - whether Plaintiff has been left without adequate provision for his proper maintenance - factors which warrant making of application - proceedings out of time - nature of provision to which Plaintiff is entitled. LEGISLATION CITED: Family Provision Act 1982 CATEGORY: Principal judgment CASES CITED: Re Fulop Deceased (1987) 8 NSWLR 679
Singer v Berghouse [1994] HCA 40; (1994) 181 CLR 201
Walker v Walker [1996] NSWSC 188
Vigolo v Bostin [2005] HCA 11; (2005) 221 CLR 19PARTIES: Tony Khoury (Plaintiff)
The Public Trustee (Defendant)FILE NUMBER(S): SC 2009/ 287765 COUNSEL: Mr R. Lovas (Plaintiff)
Mr M. Gorrick and Mr T. F. Edwards (Defendant)SOLICITORS: Slattery Thompson (Plaintiff)
L Rundle & Co (Defendant)
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
EQUITY DIVISION
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE McLAUGHLIN
Tuesday, 18 May 2010
2009/287765 TONY KHOURY –v- THE PUBLIC TRUSTEE
JUDGMENT
1 HIS HONOUR: These are proceedings under the Family Provision Act 1982.
2 By summons filed on 26 February 2009 Tony Khoury claims an order for provision for his maintenance and advancement in life out of the estate of the late Martin James Haugh (to whom I shall refer as “the Deceased”).
3 The Deceased died intestate on 11 January 2005, aged 67 years.
4 Letters of administration of the intestate estate of the Deceased were on 29 April 2005 granted to the Public Trustee (who is the Defendant to the present proceedings).
5 At the commencement of the hearing on 15 February 2010 the Plaintiff filed an amended summons. In addition to the foregoing substantive relief claimed in the summons, the plaintiff by that amended summons also sought an order for the extension of the prescribed period in which to commence the present proceedings.
6 The inventory of property discloses assets of the Deceased (including three unencumbered pieces of real estate) with values totalling $1,870,382. Those assets have now been liquidated, and the Defendant holds a credit balance of $1,927,254 on behalf of the estate of the Deceased.
7 In calculating the value of the estate available for distribution, the costs of the present proceedings must be taken into consideration, since the Plaintiff, if successful, will normally be entitled to an order that his costs be paid out of the estate of the Deceased, whilst the Defendant, irrespective of the outcome of the proceedings, will normally be entitled to an order that his costs be paid out of the estate.
8 It has been estimated on behalf of the Plaintiff that his costs will total $35,000, whilst it has been estimated on behalf of the Defendant that his costs will total about $27,400. It should be observed, however, in regard to costs, that the foregoing estimation of the Plaintiff’s costs is based upon a hearing occupying two days, whereas the hearing ultimately went into a third day. In addition to the foregoing amount of $35,000, the Plaintiff has a liability of $6,750 to former solicitors retained by him, Sharah & Associates (to whom further reference is made later in this judgment), which firm, however, did not act in the present proceedings. Further, in respect to the costs of the Defendant, it should be observed that those costs have been calculated upon a hearing occupying only one day, whilst (as I have already recorded) the hearing proceeded into a third day. Further, of the foregoing amount of about $27,400, the Defendant has already paid costs of almost $8,000. Accordingly, it is appropriate to proceed upon the basis that the distributable estate will be no more than about $1,850,000 (perhaps a somewhat lesser amount).
9 The Deceased, who had been born in Ireland, had apparently been raised in an orphanage, and it would appear that he had no knowledge of any kinsfolk. He never married or was in a de facto relationship. He had no children.
10 Although the Defendant has not yet completed his enquiries and investigations in attempting to locate any next of kin of the Deceased, it was stated by Counsel for the Defendant that it was unlikely that any further inquiries or investigations would be productive. It is probable, therefore, that the estate of the Deceased, upon his intestacy, will, pursuant to section 61B(7) of Probate and Administration Act 1898 pass to the Crown in the right of New South Wales, as bona vacentia.
11 The Plaintiff who was born in north Lebanon in 1965, is presently aged 44. He came to Australia as an infant, with his parents and two sisters. Other siblings were born in Australia.
12 The Plaintiff left school when aged 15 or 16. He worked for various employers. In 1985 the Plaintiff met the Deceased, who was the proprietor of a contract cleaning business. The Plaintiff then worked for the Deceased as a cleaner. A close friendship developed between the Plaintiff and the Deceased, who ultimately became in the habit of referring to the Plaintiff as his son and saying that the Plaintiff constituted the Deceased’s family.
13 According to the Plaintiff, that close relationship continued throughout a period of 20 years, from 1985 until the Deceased’s death in 2005.
14 The Plaintiff said that he relied upon the advice of the Deceased as to how to deal with a compensation payout in the sum of $50,000, which the Plaintiff received in 1988.
15 The Deceased resided in Rose Street, Ashfield, only a short distance from the family home of the Plaintiff and his parents, also in Ashfield. At various times the Plaintiff stayed in the Deceased’s residence. From 1988 for a period of about 10 years, the Plaintiff resided with the Deceased, spending every night at the latter’s home.
16 The Plaintiff went out socially with the Deceased, as well as being employed in his contract cleaning business (until the Deceased sold that business in 1998). The Plaintiff said that, if he needed money for food or other purposes, the Deceased would provide him with whatever money he required.
17 The Plaintiff suffers from health problems, both mental and physical. He said that the Deceased would purchase for him any necessary medication.
18 It was the Plaintiff’s evidence that the Deceased got on well with the Plaintiff’s parents and siblings, and would have meals with them at their home from time to time. Further, that the Deceased on a number of occasions, said to them words to the effect that the Plaintiff would never want for anything, as the Deceased would always provide for him; that the Deceased regarded the Plaintiff as his son, and as his only family; and that the Deceased would take care of him.
19 After the Plaintiff ceased to reside in the Deceased’s residence at the end of 1998, he said that he still continued to visit the Deceased frequently, almost daily.
20 It was the Plaintiff’s evidence that the Deceased deterred him from obtaining work with any other employer, the Deceased saying that he was looking after the Plaintiff.
21 The Plaintiff is unable to work, on account of the medical problems he suffers with his back.
22 The Plaintiff has been in receipt of a disability pension since about 2000. That pension is currently in an amount of about $745 a fortnight. He resides in rented premises at Summer Hill, for which he pays $300 a fortnight. His other fortnightly expenses include about $100 for food, about $20 for medicine, about $25 for mobile telephone, and about $30 to $48 for what were described as sundry items, as well as $200 for cigarettes. (In all, the fortnightly outgoings listed in his affidavit of 1 February 2010 total $727 - $745.)
23 The Plaintiff’s income is barely sufficient to meet his outgoings. He lives from one pension payment to another. His lifestyle is frugal in the extreme.
24 The Plaintiff has no assets, apart from his personal effects. He relies upon family, friends and charitable organisations when in need. He cannot even afford to acquire respectable clothing.
25 During the period while he was living with the Deceased the Plaintiff was not required to pay any rent or board, or to make any contribution towards household expenses, all of which were paid for by the Deceased.
26 The Plaintiff set forth details of his present needs, the most essential being security of accommodation. He said that he would like to purchase a modest two to three bedroom house in the Gladesville area. He provided evidence of the cost of such residences (the median price for such a house being $915,500).
27 The Plaintiff also provided evidence of the cost of various essential items of furniture and furnishings. He said that he would like to acquire a motorcar, at an estimated cost of $50,000.
28 The Plaintiff said that he did not become aware of the Deceased’s death until shortly after that event. However, he was in attendance at the Deceased’s funeral.
29 The Plaintiff offered an explanation for his delay in instituting the present proceedings (which it will be appreciated were instituted three and a half years after the expiry of the limitation period of 18 month from the death of the Deceased, provided by section 16 of the Family Provision Act).
30 In October 2006, the Plaintiff received a letter from the Public Trustee, addressed to the family home of the Plaintiff, stating that the Plaintiff’s name was on the Deceased’s personal computer.
31 The Plaintiff said that he did not know what to do with that letter. However, he said that he contacted a solicitor who had represented him in his earlier claim for worker’s compensation. He said that he did not hear anything further from that solicitor.
32 The Plaintiff said that ultimately he contacted his present solicitor in August 2008, and that, after a conference with Senior Counsel on 8 October 2008, the present proceedings were instituted in February 2009.
33 The Plaintiff asserts that he is an eligible person within paragraph (d) of the definition of that phrase contained in section 6(1) of the Family Provision Act, in that he was a member of the Deceased’s household for a period of ten years, and that, throughout that period and at other times, he was partly dependent upon the Deceased. The Plaintiff expressly disclaimed the status of an eligible person within paragraph (a) of that definition, rejecting the suggestion that he had been in a domestic relationship with the Deceased (in accordance with the definition of that phrase in section 5 of the Property (Relationship) Act 1984), as either a de facto partner of, or in a close personal relationship with, the Deceased.
34 It should at the outset be acknowledged that, as was frankly conceded by his Counsel, the Plaintiff was a poor historian. In many respects his evidence was quite unsatisfactory, especially as to such events in the past as the manner in which he expended each of the two worker’s compensation payouts he received, being $50,000 in about 1987 or 1988, and $40,000 about ten years later. (He referred to a holiday to Hawaii and America, a holiday to Tasmania, gifts (or loans) to family and friends, gambling on poker machines.)
35 It is in the light of the foregoing facts and circumstances that the Court must proceed to a consideration of the claim of the Plaintiff.
36 I have had the benefit of receiving a written outline of submissions from Counsel for the respective parties (as well as a chronology from Counsel for the Plaintiff). Those documents will be retained in the Court file.
37 Unless he can establish that he is an eligible person within one or more of the categories of the definition of that phrase contained within section 6(1) of the Family Provision Act the Plaintiff does not have the standing to bring the present proceedings.
38 I have already recorded that the plaintiff asserts that he is an eligible person within paragraph (d) of that definition.
39 The Defendant denies the status of the Plaintiff as an eligible person. The Defendant submits that the Plaintiff was no more than a friend of the Deceased.
40 There is no doubt that the Plaintiff was a member of the same household as the Deceased for a period of about ten years, from about 1988 to about 1998. It was submitted on behalf of the Defendant that throughout that period the Plaintiff received accommodation and board in return for working as a cleaner for the Deceased, and, to that extent, that the benefits which the Plaintiff received from the Deceased were in the nature of remuneration in kind, and did not constitute dependency. Nevertheless, for considerable periods during those ten years, the Plaintiff was formally employed by the Deceased, and received a regular and documented wage for that employment. The provision by the Deceased of accommodation and board for the Plaintiff for about ten years, constitutes in my conclusion dependency of the Plaintiff upon the Deceased.
41 I am satisfied, therefore, that the Plaintiff is an eligible person in relation to the Deceased within paragraph (d) of the foregoing definition. Accordingly, the Plaintiff has the standing to bring the present proceedings.
42 In carrying out the first stage in the two-stage process identified by the High Court of Australia in Singer v Berghouse [1994] HCA 40; (1994) 181 CLR 201 at 208 – 210 (the correctness of which test was affirmed by the High Court in Vigolo v Bostin [2005] HCA 11; (2005) 221 CLR 191) the Court must determine whether in consequence of the provisions of the will of a testator, or (as here) upon the intestacy of the Deceased, the applicant has been left without adequate provision for his or her proper maintenance.
43 The High Court in Singer v Berghouse (at 209–210) said that the determination of the first stage
- calls for an assessment of whether the provision (if any) made was inadequate for what, in all the circumstances, was the proper level of maintenance etc appropriate for the applicant having regard, amongst other things, to the applicant’s financial position, the size and nature of the deceased’s estate, the totality of the relationship between the applicant and the deceased, and the relationship between the deceased and other persons who have legitimate claims upon his or her bounty.
44 The Plaintiff is in extremely modest financial and material circumstances, and his lifestyle (as I have already recorded) is a very humble one. I satisfied that the Plaintiff has been left without adequate provision for his proper maintenance. That conclusion, however, is of itself not sufficient to entitle the Plaintiff to an order for provision out of the estate of the Deceased.
45 There are two further hurdles which must be overcome by the Plaintiff, before the substance of his claim can be considered. First, he has to explain why the proceedings were not brought within the limitation period of 18 months from the death of the Deceased, and he must satisfy the Court that it is appropriate that that limitation period be extended. Then he must establish, pursuant to section 9 (1) of the Act, that there are factors which warrant the making of the present application.
46 It is appropriate that I should deal with the substantive claim of the Plaintiff and with the question of whether there are factors which warrant the making of the claim, before I proceed to deal with the Plaintiff’s application of an extension of the prescribed period. It will be appreciated that if the Plaintiff cannot otherwise establish an entitlement to an order for provision out of the estate of the Deceased, then there is no purpose in considering whether or not the time for the institution of the present proceedings should be extended.
47 It was submitted on behalf of the Plaintiff that the relationship between himself and the Deceased was of a familial nature. There was evidence that the Deceased frequently referred to the Plaintiff as being in the nature of a son to him. Further, the Deceased on a number of occasions said to various persons (including the Plaintiff’s own parents, and members of his family) that the Plaintiff would never want for anything, and that he, the Deceased, would always look after the Plaintiff, and that the Plaintiff was like a son to him. However, it should be recognised that all those statements were made during the period of ten years, from 1988 to 1998, while the Plaintiff was a member of the Deceased’s household and was residing with the Deceased. It does not appear that the Deceased continued making such statements after the Plaintiff had departed from the Deceased’s household, and after the Deceased had given up his cleaning business, and the Plaintiff had left his employ.
48 It also falls to be decided whether there are factors which warrant the making of the present application. Such factors were described by McLelland J (as he then was) in Re Fulop Deceased (1987) 8 NSWLR 679 at 681 as being,
- factors which when added to facts which render the applicant an “eligible person” give him or her the status of a person who would be generally regarded as a natural object of testamentary recognition by a deceased.
49 In the instant case the Plaintiff submits that the following matters constitute such factors:
- The Closeness of the friendship
- Promises and assurances to provide for the Plaintiff
- Inducement to spend rather than save his compensation payment
- Inducement to cease gainful employ
- (i) increased the depth of the Plaintiff’ dependency on the Deceased;
- (ii) decreased the Plaintiff’s qualifications for future employment.
50 The suggestion that the Plaintiff’s $50,000 compensation payment was the only “nest egg” which the Plaintiff ever had is incorrect. It emerged in cross-examination that the Plaintiff subsequently received a further $40,000 compensation payment in about 1997 or 1998.
51 I am prepared to accept that the Plaintiff was a most unsatisfactory historian, and that the unsatisfactory nature of his evidence concerning the circumstances in which he received not one, but two, compensation payments, and his failure to give accurate evidence in this regard, was not due to a deliberate attempt on the Plaintiff’s part to mislead the Court.
52 It should be emphasised, however, that an applicant for provision has an obligation to place before the Court, as fully and as frankly as possible, all information concerning the applicant’s financial and material circumstances. In the instant case the Plaintiff failed to do so. I accept that the Plaintiff is an unsophisticated and innocent person, and is inexperienced in financial and business matters. He has had little education, and appears to be only of simple intelligence.
53 Eventually, a reasonably accurate picture of the Plaintiff’s present financial and material circumstances appears to have emerged during the course of the present proceedings.
54 I consider that the fact that for a period of ten years the Plaintiff resided with the Deceased, and was provided with accommodation and sustenance, as well as pocket money, by the Deceased throughout that period; also the fact that there appears to have been a close and affectionate relationship between the Plaintiff and the Deceased; as well as the various promises and representations made by the Deceased, at least during the period while he and the Plaintiff were residing together, all constitute factors which warrant the making of the present application.
55 The Plaintiff has made a claim that his needs are such that he should receive from the estate provision which would enable him to acquire a residence, in particular, a house property at Gladesville (costing in the vicinity of between $660,000 and about $795,000), as well as a medium size motorcar, costing about $50,000, and also various items of furniture and furnishings and electrical appliances, at a total cost of about $5,300. That is, the Plaintiff claims either that he should receive from the estate a legacy in an amount of no less than $850,000, or otherwise that he should receive the totality of the residuary estate of the Deceased.
56 In regard to the claim of the Plaintiff for that provision, it is appropriate that I should set forth the following salutary admonition of Young J (as he then was) in Walker v Walker [1996] NSWSC 188 (unreported, 17 May 1996), with which I respectfully agree,
- I reject the approach that all an applicant under this Act has to do is to prove that he or she is an eligible person and that he or she reasonably needs more financial assistance. The cases show that there must be a full investigation into all the facts and circumstances of the matter to see whether the community would expect that a person in the plight of this testator ought to have made provision or further provision for the applicant. Although it is not much mentioned in recent decisions, the older authorities often mention the fact that the Act did not intend to affect freedom of testation except in so far as that freedom had to be abridged in order to ensure that people made proper provision for those who were dependent on them financially or morally
57 As I have already recorded, the Plaintiff is in very modest financial circumstances, presently depending upon Centrelink benefits. He is unemployed, and has not worked for about the past ten years. Whilst I recognise that it is desirable that the Plaintiff might have more appropriate and more secure accommodation than is presently available to him, I do not disregard the fact that the Plaintiff has never owned his own residence, and has always lived either in rented accommodation, or in a shared household such as that of the Deceased. It is rare for even a son of a testator to be able to establish an entitlement for an unencumbered house property to be provided for him by the estate of his deceased parent.
58 In any event, there is no reason whatsoever why the Plaintiff should require as his residence a free-standing cottage or a house, rather than a home unit or a townhouse, or that any such residence should be at the expense of the estate of the Deceased, or should be located in a suburb such as Gladesville (which, according to the Plaintiff, is a far more salubrious area than those which he has previously experienced), rather than the inner western suburbs (for example Ashfield, where the Plaintiff has spent most of his life).
59 Similarly, there is no justification whatsoever why the Plaintiff should be looking to the estate of the Deceased for the purchase of a motorcar costing $50,000, when a motor vehicle adequate for the Plaintiff’s needs, could be purchased for less than half that amount.
60 Neither do I disregard the fact that the Plaintiff appears to have become somehow associated with or influenced by (the phrase “fallen into the clutches of” might not be too strong a description in the circumstances of this case) persons of criminal and disreputable background, who are clearly looking to benefit from any provision which the Plaintiff might receive from the estate of the Deceased. It would be quite inappropriate that an order for provision in favour of the Plaintiff should benefit anyone other than the Plaintiff himself.
61 The claim of the Plaintiff must be approached in the light of any competing claims upon the testamentary bounty of the Deceased. In the circumstances of the instant case, where the Deceased died intestate, and where it is almost certain that his estate will pass as bona vacentia to the Crown in the right of New South Wales, there has been no evidence placed before the Court concerning what would be done by the State of New South Wales with the benefit to which it would otherwise be entitled upon the intestacy of the Deceased.
62 Indeed, in this regard, Counsel for the Defendant, in his submissions, acknowledged that there were no competing claims upon the estate of the Deceased.
63 In the event that the Court ultimately finds that the Plaintiff has established an entitlement to an order for provision out of the estate of the Deceased, any such order for provision will not be diminished, let alone extinguished, by the competing claim of the State of New South Wales.
64 There remains to be considered the fact that the Plaintiff did not bring the present proceedings within the prescribed period of 18 months from the death of the Deceased, and that the proceedings were instituted about two years and seven months after the expiry of that prescribed period.
65 The Plaintiff was aware of the death of the Deceased at the time when it occurred, or very shortly thereafter (he was in attendance at the Deceased’s funeral). The Plaintiff, although made aware of the death of the Deceased, was inexperienced and unsophisticated in matters of estates of dead persons, and I am prepared to accept that he was unsure as to what he should do. Although he was aware that the Deceased owned various pieces of real estate, the Plaintiff appears not to have directed his mind to what was going to happen to them, or who had any responsibility in regard to them.
66 There is no suggestion that at that time the Plaintiff was aware of the existence of his eligibility to make a claim under the Family Provision Act, let alone that he was aware of any limitation period for the making of such a claim, or of the nature of that limitation period.
67 It emerged very clearly from the Plaintiff’s own evidence, especially in cross-examination, that he was shy about the nature of his relationship with the Deceased. Moreover, it would appear that throughout much, if not all, of the prescribed period he was grieving for the loss of the Deceased, whom he regarded as a good and close friend.
68 In October 2006, the Plaintiff received a letter from the Defendant in relation to the Deceased. He took that letter to a solicitor, and left it with the solicitor, but it was the Plaintiff’s evidence that he heard nothing from her. It was not until August 2008 that the Plaintiff followed a suggestion to see his present solicitor. Within six months of that suggestion, the present proceedings were instituted.
69 The first solicitor whom the Plaintiff saw, a Miss Joanne Sharah, had acted for him in at least one of his compensation claims. Although, according to the Plaintiff, he did not receive any further information from Ms Sharah after taking the Defendant’s letter to her in about October 2006, it emerged during the course of the present proceedings that Ms Sharah had certainly not done nothing in consequence of the Plaintiff’s contact with her. It would appear that she had even gone so far as to obtain the advice of Senior Counsel on the prospects of a claim by the Plaintiff.
70 However, there was no evidence placed before the Court from Ms Sharah herself. There is certainly nothing to suggest whether the Plaintiff was informed, first, of his entitlement to bring a claim against the estate of the Deceased, or, second, of the fact that there was a limitation period for the bringing of such a claim, let alone that the limitation period was a period of eighteen months from the death of the Deceased. Indeed, that period had already expired before the Plaintiff received the Defendant’s letter in October 2006.
71 The Defendant does not point to any prejudice, let alone any substantial prejudice, in consequence of the delay of the Plaintiff in bringing the present proceeding. It should not be overlooked that as late as June 2009 (that is, some four and a half years after the death of the Deceased, and some five months after the commencement of the present proceedings) the Defendant was “still continuing with searches to establish the next of kin in the estate”.
72 In all these circumstances I am satisfied that the Plaintiff has provided an adequate explanation for not instituting the proceedings within the period of 18 months from the death of the Deceased, and that it is appropriate that that prescribed period should be extended up to and including the date of the institution of the proceedings.
73 I am satisfied that the Plaintiff has established an entitlement to receive from the estate of the Deceased a legacy in a sum which will enable the Plaintiff to enhance his frugal and modest lifestyle, to acquire some necessary items of furniture and furnishings, as well as replenish his wardrobe, and to provide a fund to meet unexpected contingencies, as well as, if he so desires, to acquire a relatively inexpensive motor car.
74 I am satisfied that it is appropriate that the Plaintiff should receive from the estate of the Deceased a legacy in the sum of $150,000.
75 I am not in any way persuaded that the Plaintiff, being an eligible person in relation to the Deceased only within paragraph (d) of the definition of that phrase, should be able to look to the estate of the Deceased for the acquisition of an unencumbered residence, as well as an expensive motor vehicle.
76 It may be that the Plaintiff, motivated by misplaced considerations of delicacy as to the nature of his relationship with the Deceased, chose not to assert his eligibility as coming within paragraph (a) of the definition, as a close personal relationship or a de facto relationship. It is possible that his claim would have been far stronger, and any order in his favour would have been far greater, if he had brought himself within that paragraph of the definition. However, the Plaintiff expressly disclaimed that his relationship with the Deceased was other than as a member of the same household as and a person who was partly dependent upon the Deceased. The Court, in such circumstances cannot approach the claim of the Plaintiff in any other light.
77 I have already expressed concern regarding persons who might take improper advantage of the Plaintiff when he receives the foregoing legacy from the estate of the Deceased. I consider that the Plaintiff and the legacy which will be made in his favour, should be protected from any unscrupulous persons who might attempt to take advantage of the Plaintiff’s inexperienced and simple nature.
78 Accordingly, I make the following orders:
1. I order that the time for the institution of these proceedings be extended up to and including the date of the filing of the summons herein.
2. I order that the Plaintiff receive from the estate of the late Martin James Haugh (“the Deceased”) a legacy in the sum of $150,000.
3. I order that the costs of the Plaintiff on the party and party basis and the costs of the Defendant on the indemnity basis be paid out of the estate of the Deceased.
5. The exhibits may be returned.4. I stand the matter over to a date to be fixed by arrangement with my Associate for the bringing in of short minutes, which will have the effect that the benefit of the foregoing legacy be limited to the Plaintiff personally, and that the manner of the payment of that legacy be retained under the control of the Defendant, for the benefit of the Plaintiff personally.
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