Khan v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs
[2022] FedCFamC2G 675
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Khan v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 675
File number(s): SYG 85 of 2018 Judgment of: JUDGE GIVEN Date of judgment: 15 August 2022 Catchwords: MIGRATION – review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – adjournment application declined - PIC 4020 – whether compelling and compassionate circumstances – whether applicant denied opportunity to give evidence and present arguments – application dismissed Legislation: Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5, 359AA, 360, 474, 476
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) cl 500.217, Public Interest Criterion 4020
Cases cited: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Sandhu [2016] FCA 130
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v QAAH of 2004 (2006) 231 CLR 1
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SCAR (2003) 128 FCR 553
NABEv Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152
SZMDB v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 105 ALD 499
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 56 Date of hearing: 15 August 2022 The Applicant: In person Solicitor for the Respondents: Mr E Taylor of Mills Oakley ORDERS
SYG 85 of 2018 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: WAQAS KHAN
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE GIVEN
DATE OF ORDER:
15 AUGUST 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application filed on 11 January 2018 is dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs and disbursements of and incidental to the application, fixed in the sum of $5,400.
3.Pursuant to r 17.02 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth), Orders 2 and 3 above not be entered until the date of the publication of written reasons for judgment (revised from transcript) which, for the avoidance of doubt, and for the purposes of r 36.03 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), will also be taken to be the date upon which the judgment was pronounced.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(revised from transcript)JUDGE GIVEN:
By an application to show cause filed with the Court on 11 January 2018, the applicant seeks review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) made on 12 December 2017 affirming a decision of a delegate of the Minister (delegate) to refuse to grant the applicant a student (temporary) (class TU) (subclass 500) visa (visa).
BACKGROUND
The applicant is a male citizen of Pakistan who applied for the visa on 19 September 2016 (Court Book (CB) 1-15) on the basis of his enrolment in a Bachelor of Business at Group Colleges Australia Pty Ltd (CB 135-136). At the time of the visa application, the applicant was represented by a migration agent (CB 5).
It was a requirement for the grant of the visa that the applicant satisfy cl 500.217 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), which relevantly required that he satisfy Public Interest Criterion (PIC) 4020 which required that there be no evidence that the applicant had given or caused to be given to the Minister a bogus document or information that is false or misleading in a material particular in relation to the application for the visa. Pursuant to PIC 4020(4) the requirements in PIC 4020(1) could be waived if there were compelling circumstances that affected the interests of Australia or compassionate or compelling circumstances that affected the interests of an Australian citizen, an Australian permanent resident or an eligible New Zealand citizen.
In support of his application, the applicant provided various documents including a letter from Habib Bank Limited (Habib Bank) dated 29 August 2016 (first Habib Bank letter) (CB 30) which said the applicant’s father had a “running finance facility” for the applicant’s educational and living expenses.
On 2 November 2016, the first respondent’s Department wrote to the applicant requesting that he provide further information including (amongst other things) evidence of his relationship to the person providing financial support (CB 35-43). The applicant did not respond.
On 12 December 2016, the Department wrote to the applicant and invited him to comment within 28 days of the date of the letter on adverse information (CB 44-48), namely that the Department had conducted checks with Habib Bank in Pakistan and had reason to believe the first Habib Bank letter provided was bogus, and that the information contained within it was false (CB 46).
On 8 January 2017, the applicant’s migration agent requested an extension of one week to respond (CB 49), which was refused on 12 January 2017 stating that 28 days was considered by the Department to be fair and reasonable (CB 50).
On 17 January 2017, the delegate refused to grant the visa on the basis that the applicant did not satisfy the requirements of cl 500.217 because he provided a bogus document in relation to his visa application (CB 56-60). The delegate’s decision found that:
(a)on 2 November 2016, the first Habib Bank letter was referred to the Australian High Commission (AHC) in Islamabad for integrity checking;
(b)on 7 November 2016, an AHC officer contacted Habib Bank and was advised by a senior representative of Habib Bank who conducted checks of the bank’s systems that the “CNIC” and account number listed on the first Habib Bank letter did not correspond to a valid account with the bank; and
(c)the Habib Bank representative concluded that the first Habib Bank letter was “a fake letter as the account does not exist”.
The delegate was not satisfied the applicant met the requirements of PIC 4020(1) because there was evidence he had given a bogus document within the meaning of s 5(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) and nothing had been submitted to indicate the applicant was seeking a waiver of PIC 4020 (CB 59-60).
The Tribunal
On 1 February 2017, the applicant applied to the Tribunal seeking review of the delegate’s decision for which application he was represented by a firm of solicitors and migration agents which was also appointed as the applicant’s authorised recipient (CB 62-63).
On 1 May 2017, the applicant was invited (via his authorised recipient) to attend a hearing scheduled for 24 May 2017 (CB 73-79).
On 22 May 2017, the applicant’s representative provided a submission (CB 87-88) attaching:
(a)a letter from Habib Bank dated 18 January 2017 (second Habib Bank letter) which stated that the account number provided in the first Habib Bank letter was wrong and was caused by a “clerical mistake done by bank (sic) unintentionally” (CB 89);
(b)an undated letter from the Bank of Punjab which stated that the applicant’s father had a running finance facility of 2,900,000 Pakistani Rupees (CB 90); and
(c)an Affidavit from the applicant’s father which stated he would be responsible for the applicant’s living and educational expenses while he was in Australia (CB 92).
On 23 May 2017 the Tribunal hearing scheduled for 24 May 2017 was postponed (CB 94-95) and on 20 June 2017 the applicant was invited (via his authorised recipient) to attend a rescheduled hearing on 2 August 2017 (CB 99- 101).
On 7 July 2017, the applicant’s representative provided a further submission (July submission) stating that the applicant would “not be seeking a waiver of PIC 4020”, contending that Habib Bank would be able to verify that the applicant’s father held an account bearing the details provided in the second Habib Bank letter and instead inviting the Tribunal to conduct its own investigation in relation to verifying the bank account of the applicant’s father at Habib Bank (CB 110-113).
On 25 July 2017, the hearing was postponed again (CB 114-116).
On 1 August 2017, the Tribunal sent a request to the Department asking the AHC to authenticate the second Habib Bank letter (SCB 6). On 18 October 2017, the Department responded and informed the Tribunal that the AHC had confirmed the second Habib Bank letter was also “non-genuine” (SCB 7).
On 25 October 2017, the applicant was invited to attend a hearing scheduled for 23 November 2017 (CB 118-120), which he attended together with his representative and assisted by an interpreter in the Urdu language (CB 137-139).
During the hearing the Tribunal invited the applicant, pursuant to s 359AA of the Act, to comment on or respond to the information it had obtained from the AHC regarding the second Habib Bank letter being “non-genuine” (CB 155, [12]).
The applicant did not respond to the information at the hearing. Instead, the applicant’s representative requested copies of the “source documents” (CB 156, [13]) which were sent to him the same day, 23 November 2017 (SCB 1-8). The applicant was given until 11 December 2017 to comment on the information, but no response was received within that time or at all (CB 156, [15]-[17]).
On 12 December 2017, the Tribunal affirmed the decision under review (CB 153-159).
The Tribunal’s decision
Based on enquiries made with the Department and AHC, the Tribunal found the response from Habib Bank and the AHC relating to the first Habib Bank letter was accurately described in the delegate’s decision record (CB 154, [6]), and that the AHC’s response to its enquiries about the second Habib Bank letter “re-confirms” that the first Habib Bank letter was “fake” (CB 154-155, [7]).
On the basis of the information raised with the applicant pursuant to s 359AA, the Tribunal found that the first Habib Bank letter was counterfeit and had been altered in a material way by a person who did not have the authority of Habib Bank to do so: see s 5(1) definition of “bogus document”, sub-section (b) (CB 157, [25]). Relying on the AHC’s advice that the second Habib Bank letter was also “non-genuine”, the Tribunal did not accept the applicant’s explanation that the first Habib Bank letter contained false information due to a mistake on the part of Habib Bank. The Tribunal found there was an element of fraud or deception in relation to both letters (CB 157, [26]). The Tribunal found therefore that the applicant had given a bogus document in relation to the visa application, being the first Habib Bank letter, and that he did not satisfy PIC 4020(1) (CB 157, [27]).
The Tribunal (at CB 158, [34]) noted that the applicant failed to provide any response to its question about whether there were circumstances that would warrant a waiver. On the basis of the evidence before it, the Tribunal was not satisfied that there were:
(a)compelling circumstances that affected the interests of Australia; or
(b)compelling or compassionate circumstances that affected the interests of an Australian citizen, an Australian permanent resident or an eligible New Zealand city;
which justified the grant of the visa.
Accordingly, the Tribunal found that neither of PIC 4020(1) or PIC 4020(2) should be waived (CB 158-159, [35]-[36]).
APPLICATION TO THIS COURT
On 11 January 2018 the applicant commenced these proceedings by filing an application for an order to show cause pursuant to s 476 of the Act.
On 12 February 2018, a Registrar of this Court made orders by consent which provided, inter alia, for the applicant to file and serve an amended application by 4 June 2018, which did not occur. Nor did the applicant file written submissions 14 days before the final hearing as required. On 3 May 2022, this matter was brought into my docket and listed for hearing on 20 July 2022. The listing notice was sent to the parties via email on that date, including to the applicant at the email address for service which was provided in the originating application.
On 23 May 2022, the applicant wrote the Court seeking an adjournment of that hearing on the basis that he was overseas and was only due to return on 19 July 2022, which meant that he would land either on or shortly after the date which was listed for the hearing. In the circumstances, the Minister consented to a brief adjournment and accordingly, the matter was relisted before me today. The applicant indicated his consent to this hearing date in an email dated 22 June 2022, which was sent to my Associate with the first respondent’s solicitor copied, and that email said:
I am agreed on the new hearing date on 15 August 2022.
At 10.15 am today, at the commencement of the matter, the applicant was not present in Court. The explanation for this appears to be that an email which was sent to the applicant serving the first respondent’s written submissions, a copy of which is before me and is annexed to the Affidavit of Poorvaja Nirmaleswaran (Nirmaleswaran Affidavit) sworn on 8 August 2022 and filed in these proceedings, informed the applicant that the matter was listed before me at midday today and not at 10.15 am.
Upon the non-appearance of the applicant, the solicitor for the first respondent telephoned the applicant who, I am told, informed the solicitor that he was able to attend Court at the time indicated in the letter. When I ascended the bench, the Minister’s solicitor quite properly did not seek dismissal for non-appearance and apologised for the clerical error. I accept that apology. As I was able to accommodate the hearing of the matter later in the day, I adjourned to midday to enable the applicant to attend at the time that the Minister’s solicitors had initially told him.
At the commencement of the hearing this afternoon, I confirmed with the applicant that he had not requested an interpreter. The matter was conducted in English without interpretation services, and the applicant did not appear to have any difficulty understanding the Court or the solicitor for the Minister, nor engaging in the hearing.
The applicant relied on his Affidavit which was filed in support of the originating application, and I have received that document as a submission. As noted, the applicant did not avail himself of the opportunity to file written submissions in this matter, nor to amend his application. However, I gave him the opportunity to make oral submissions in relation to each of his grounds, and also to make oral submissions in reply at the conclusion of the oral submissions of the first respondent’s solicitor. I have received the Court Book, which was marked as Exhibit “1R”, and a Supplementary Court Book (SCB), which I marked Exhibit “2R” as well as the Nirmaleswaran Affidavit which was read for the first respondent.
In the absence of an amended application, the grounds which fall for consideration are those contained in the originating application (errors in original):
1.Breach of the rules of natural justice under ss 5(l)(a) and ss6(1)(a) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (The ADJR Act) by not providing sufficient time to respond to the Department.
2.Improper exercise of power under ss5(1)(e) and 6(1)(e) The ADJR Act
a. A failure by the decision maker to comply with the duty not to take into account irrelevant consideration: ss 5(2)(a) of The ADJR Act and to take into account relevant considerations: ss5(2)(b) of The ADJR Act in the exercise of a power. By not considering the authentic documents provided.
b. The Tribunal exercised its discretionary powers with the rule and without to the merits of the particular case: ss 5(2)(f) of The ADJR Act. And the Tribunal exercised its power in such a way that no reasonable person could have exercised. ss 5(2)(g) of The ADJR Act.
3.The tribunal's discretion miscarried in relation to its consideration of "compelling circumstances that affect the interest of Australian", giving rise to jurisdictional error [in that the Tribunal erred in its interpretation of the phrase "compelling circumstances that affect the interests of Australian"] by refusing to consider the skills of the applicant which are highly sought after in Australia.
4.The Tribunal misdirected the Applicant in a way that denied him the opportunity to present arguments and evidence in relation to the issues in the review. As the Tribunal failed to provide any explanation to the Applicant as to what might constitute compassionate or compelling circumstances within the meaning of cl 4020(4)(b) of Schedule 4 was misleading and inaccurate.
5.Decision amounts to jurisdiction error.
Adjournment application
Before dealing with the grounds of review I will record that during the course of identifying the documents which were before the Court, the applicant asked to be heard in relation to a matter and he said that he wished to have further time in order to obtain a lawyer. The applicant said that he was overseas when he first found out that the matter was listed for hearing and that he was overseas because of circumstances relating to his father. The applicant said that, unfortunately, he could not contact a lawyer during the time that he was overseas but he now has an appointment but not until after today’s hearing. No further details in this regard were given. As noted, the applicant has had more than four years since the commencement of these proceedings and more than three months since the parties were first informed that the matter would be listed for hearing.
The initial hearing fixture was listed on 20 July 2022 was adjourned at the applicant’s request (with the consent of the Minister) in circumstances where the applicant provided evidence to the Court of his flight itinerary, which indicated that he would be returning to Australia on or about the date of the hearing. Accordingly, it was relisted to today and as indicated, the applicant expressly consented to the listing today in writing. He has not made any further adjournment requests except from the bar table today. As I explained to the applicant, bearing in mind the general proposition that there is no right to representation in a migration matter, he has had ample time (not only since May 2022 when the matter was ultimately listed, but since the commencement of these proceedings in 2018) in which to seek or retain a legal representative to appear at any hearing once it was ultimately listed.
In all of the circumstances of this case, I was not satisfied that there would be further utility in an adjournment in circumstances where the applicant has not acted with any particular diligence in the retention of a legal representative. In those circumstances, I declined the adjournment application and the matter proceeded to hearing.
Grounds 1 and 2
Each of grounds 1 and 2 seek to rely on the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act). It is therefore appropriate to deal with those grounds together.
Before addressing the jurisdictional issue in that regard, it is important to note that ground 1 takes aim at the processes followed by the Department and alleges a denial of procedural fairness constituted by the applicant not having been given sufficient time to respond in relation to concerns about the first Habib Bank letter. In this regard, the applicant seeks judicial review of the delegate’s decision. As I explained to him at the hearing, the Court has no jurisdiction in respect of that decision because it is a primary decision as defined by s 476(4) of the Act and s 476(2)(a) of the Act therefore precludes this Court from reviewing a primary decision.
Otherwise, to the extent that the applicant seeks to invoke the ADJR Act, this is not an available course, which I explained to him in the hearing. Schedule 1 to the ADJR Act provides that a privative clause decision within the meaning of s 474(2) of the Act is a class of decision to which the ADJR Act does not apply. Accordingly, because of each of the decisions of the delegate and of the Tribunal is a privative clause decision for the purposes of s 474(2) of the Act, the ADJR Act has no work to do and grounds 1 and 2 cannot succeed, and I explained this to the applicant at hearing.
Ground 3
In respect of ground 3, by this ground, the applicant complains that the Tribunal erred in its interpretation of the phrase:
compelling circumstances that effect the interests of Australian (sic) … by refusing to consider the skills of the applicant which are highly sought after in Australia.
When asked to speak to this ground, the applicant asked whether or not he could be given an “extra chance”. I asked the applicant what additional opportunity he was seeking to which he said he wanted a chance to “prove [his] funds to Immigration”. He said that he otherwise had nothing to say in respect of ground 3.
The first respondent says that there is no evidence before the Court to support a contention that the applicant claimed his skills constituted a compelling reason affecting the interests of Australia, which justified waiving the requirements of PIC 4020(1). Rather, by a submission which was made on 7 July 2017, the applicant’s solicitor expressly confirmed that the applicant would not be seeking a waiver of the application of PIC 4020.
Further, the Tribunal’s decision records at CB 156 [14] that the Tribunal asked the applicant whether there were compelling or compassionate reasons which would justify the grant of the visa, and that his representative informed the Tribunal that the applicant would respond to the Tribunal’s questions in writing. The Tribunal noted at paragraph [15] that it gave the applicant the opportunity to respond by 11 December 2017, but the applicant did not reply by that time or at all. Accordingly, the Tribunal found at paragraphs [34] to [35] that it was not satisfied based on the available evidence that compelling or compassionate circumstances existed to justify the grant of a visa. It appears that the applicant now wishes to retrospectively allege that he was denied the opportunity to advance his education, namely the qualification that he was obtaining, as being a compelling and compassionate circumstance to justify the grant of the visa.
There are a number of answers to this but the main one is that the applicant was given the opportunity to address this and not only did he not do so, he expressly waived the opportunity to do so. Secondly, absent the applicant seeking to specifically advance that qualification as constituting such a circumstance, there is nothing in the instant case to indicate to me that the Tribunal was required to consider the applicant’s qualification in this light for itself: see NABEv Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1 and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Sandhu [2016] FCA 130 per Siopis J.
While raised in the context of an application for an adjournment to the Tribunal, the case of Sandhu has relevance to this matter. In Sandhu, the applicant sought (for the first time) in the judicial review application to allege that a decision of the Tribunal not to grant her further time to provide a Trades Recognition Australia (TRA) skills assessment was legally unreasonable because the TRA skills assessment might have gone towards the compelling and compassionate circumstances aspect of a PIC 4020(4) waiver. However, in that case, the applicant did not at any time indicate to the Tribunal that this was the purpose for which she wished to obtain the second TRA skills assessment, and in those circumstances the Tribunal was found to be justified in its assumption that the reason the application wished to obtain the second TRA skills assessment was to satisfy one of the primary criteria for the visa, which required her to have that requisite assessment.
In this case, if the applicant specifically indicated that he wished to rely on the qualification he was pursuing as being one which was sought after in Australia in order to ground a compelling or compassionate circumstance, this needed, in my view, to be expressly put to the Tribunal such that it could understand this was a basis upon which the applicant relied. Rather than indicating any basis upon which the applicant sought to persuade the Tribunal that the effects of PIC 4020(1) should be waived, the applicant expressly ceded the opportunity to address the issue at all by the 7 July 2017 submission. In my view, there is no error as alleged by ground 3, as alleged or at all.
Ground 4
By ground 4 the applicant alleges that he was denied the opportunity to give evidence and present arguments in relation to the issues on the review. By doing so, he invokes the language of s 360 of the Act. The applicant further alleges that the Tribunal failed to explain to him what might constitute compassionate or compelling circumstances within the meaning of PIC 4020(4).
Turning to the s 360 question first, it is well established that a hearing opportunity must be meaningful. To the extent that the applicant alleges that he was not given a meaningful opportunity to give evidence and present arguments, the ground as raised is silent as to how this denial is said to have manifested. When asked to speak to the ground, the applicant said he had nothing to say.
A review of the materials in the Court Book reveals the following:
(a)the applicant was legally represented throughout the Tribunal review process by experienced practitioners who were solicitors and migration agents;
(b)the applicant was properly invited to attend a hearing pursuant to s 360, which invitation he accepted;
(c)the applicant made pre-hearing submissions which were prepared by his representative, whose signature block indicates that he was a solicitor and a migration agent (CB 111 to 113); and
(d)it was by that 7 July 2017 submission that the applicant ceded the opportunity to address the compelling and compassionate circumstances issue, which I have just addressed above. There is nothing before me to indicate that the decision to do so was anything other than an informed forensic choice.
The applicant attended the hearing of the Tribunal with another practitioner from the firm who represented him. That hearing was on 23 November 2017. The hearing record (CB 137) indicates that the hearing duration is 1.5 hours, although it is not entirely clear as to whether that full 1.5 hour period was occupied by the hearing or simply allocated for it. As outlined earlier, the applicant was asked whether he wished to make any claims about compassionate and compelling circumstances justifying the waiver during the hearing. The applicant chose not to respond during the hearing, but then also did not avail himself of the opportunity to provide post-hearing submissions relating to the issue. On 28 November 2017, the applicant’s representatives ceased their representation of the applicant (CB 140-141). However, I am satisfied on the basis of the foregoing that the applicant was not denied a meaningful hearing opportunity.
The first respondent says that the Tribunal was not required to make the applicant’s case for him, and I agree, particularly in circumstances where he was legally represented and had the ability to seek and take advice.
The first respondent also says that the Tribunal was not obliged to act as a cross-examiner or to prompt or stimulate an elaboration if the applicant chose not to embark upon one: see SZMDB v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 105 ALD 499 at [36]-[37]; SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152 at [47]; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v QAAH of 2004 (2006) 231 CLR 1 at [40]; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SCAR (2003) 128 FCR 553 at [36]. It was for the applicant to provide his evidence and make his arguments, with sufficient detail so as to enable the Tribunal to reach the requisite state of satisfaction required of it under the Act. I agree: see Sandhu (supra).
The Tribunal was not under an obligation to provide advice to the applicant about the meaning of PIC 4020, more specifically, PIC 4020(4), or the available arguments to him in this regard, but much less in circumstances where he was legally represented. There is no material before me to indicate that the Tribunal in any way misled the applicant in this regard, or in fact, at all. Accordingly, ground 4 is not made out.
Ground 5
Ground 5 simply alleges “jurisdiction error”, and I invited the applicant to speak to this statement. The applicant said, again, that he has nothing to say. Absent particulars, ground 5 is also not made out.
As a result, none of the grounds has been made out and none of them has established a jurisdictional error. Absent a jurisdictional error, the decision of the Tribunal is a privative clause decision and the application should be dismissed, and I will so order.
Consequent upon the dismissal of the application, the Minister seeks an order that the applicant pay costs fixed in the sum of $5,400. When asked to speak to the question of whether costs should follow the event and/or the amount sought, the applicant indicated that he can pay the costs of the other party but that he needed some additional time because he has just returned from overseas and has not yet obtained employment. I indicated to the applicant that he would receive correspondence from the solicitors for the Minister shortly, which would outline details of whom at the first respondent’s Department he could contact to discuss instalment payments or a lessening of the amount, however, this would not be a factor that should impact the amount that is ordered.
In all of the circumstances of this case, I am satisfied that a costs order is warranted. I also am satisfied that the amount sought, namely $5,400, is reasonable in the circumstances of this case and having regard to the Court’s scale.
I certify that the preceding fifty-six (56) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Given. Associate:
Dated: 23 August 2022
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