Khan v Hitachi Energy Australia Pty Ltd

DETERMINATION OF APPEAL PANEL
CITATION:	Khan v Hitachi Energy Australia Pty Ltd [2025] NSWPICMP 665
APPELLANT:	Sefal Khan
RESPONDENT:	Hitachi Energy Australia Pty Ltd
APPEAL PANEL
MEMBER:	Deborah Moore
MEDICAL ASSESSOR:	Michael Hong
MEDICAL ASSESSOR:	Graham Blom
DATE OF DECISION:	2 September 2025
CATCHWORDS:	WORKERS COMPENSATION - Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998; the appellant submits that the Medical Assessor (MA) erred in his assessment of three of the psychiatric impairment rating scale (PIRS) categories (self-care and personal hygiene, travel, and employability); Appeal Panel agreed with all the appellant’s submissions; Held – the MA’s assessments were inconsistent with the evidence; Medical Assessment Certificate revoked.

BACKGROUND TO THE APPLICATION TO APPEAL

On 4 July 2025 Sefal Khan (the appellant) lodged an Application to Appeal Against the Decision of a Medical Assessor. The medical dispute was assessed by Dr Ankur Gupta, a Medical Assessor, who issued a Medical Assessment Certificate (MAC) on 20 June 2025.
The appellant relies on the following grounds of appeal under s 327(3) of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (the 1998 Act):
· the assessment was made on the basis of incorrect criteria, and
· the MAC contains a demonstrable error.
The delegate is satisfied that, on the face of the application, at least one ground of appeal has been made out. The Appeal Panel has conducted a review of the original medical assessment but limited to the ground(s) of appeal on which the appeal is made.
Rule 128 of the Personal Injury Commission Rules 2021 (the PIC Rules) and Procedural Direction PIC7 - Appeals, reviews, reconsiderations and correction of obvious errors in medical disputes set out the practice and procedure in relation to the medical appeal process under s 328 of the 1998 Act. An Appeal Panel determines its own procedures in accordance with r 128(1) of the PIC Rules.
The assessment of permanent impairment is conducted in accordance with the SIRA NSW Workers Compensation Guidelines for the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 4^th ed
1 March 2021 (the Guidelines) and the American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 5^th ed (AMA 5).

PRELIMINARY REVIEW

The Appeal Panel conducted a preliminary review of the original medical assessment in the absence of the parties and in accordance with the Procedural Direction PIC7.
As a result of that preliminary review, the Appeal Panel determined that it was not necessary for the worker to undergo a further medical examination because none was requested, and we consider that we have sufficient evidence before us to enable us to determine this appeal for reasons that will be addressed in due course.

EVIDENCE

Documentary evidence

The Appeal Panel has before it all the documents that were sent to the Medical Assessor for the original medical assessment and has taken them into account in making this determination.

SUBMISSIONS

Both parties made written submissions. They are not repeated in full, but have been considered by the Appeal Panel.
In summary, the appellant submits that the Medical Assessor erred in his assessments under three categories of the Psychiatric Impairment Rating Scale (PIRS), namely self-care and personal hygiene, travel and employability.
In reply, the respondent submits that no errors were made, and that the clinical judgement of the Medical Assessor must be paramount in any assessment of permanent impairment. Further, the appellant’s submissions do no more than cavil with the assessment of the Medical Assessor.

FINDINGS AND REASONS

The procedures on appeal are contained in s 328 of the 1998 Act. The appeal is to be by way of review of the original medical assessment but the review is limited to the grounds of appeal on which the appeal is made.
In Campbelltown City Council v Vegan [2006] NSWCA 284 the Court of Appeal held that the Appeal Panel is obliged to give reasons. Where there are disputes of fact it may be necessary to refer to evidence or other material on which findings are based, but the extent to which this is necessary will vary from case to case. Where more than one conclusion is open, it will be necessary to explain why one conclusion is preferred. On the other hand, the reasons need not be extensive or provide a detailed explanation of the criteria applied by the medical professionals in reaching a professional judgement.
The appellant was referred to the Medical Assessor for assessment of whole person impairment (WPI) in respect of a primary psychological injury on a date of injury of
8 June 2023.
The Medical Assessor obtained the following history:
“Mr Khan had been working as a country tax manager for Australia and New Zealand for Hitachi, Australia. He had been with the company for 27 years as a full-time employee. He says that he used to work from home mainly, but would go to the office on Thursdays. He says that his direct line manager was based in Dubai. He used to work with the finance director and the chief financial officer (CFO), who were based locally. He says that he went into the office on Thursday, the 08th of June 2023. He says that the CFO asked him to go for a cup of coffee. They bought a coffee each and the CFO invited him to go for a walk. They were walking on George Street, which was busy at that time of day. He says that he was told that his job ‘no longer existed’ suddenly. That came as a shock as there had not been any indication previously.
He says that he asked for a reason, but none was forthcoming. He was informed his last day at work would be 31 December 2023. He says that he had not had any poor appraisals and did not know why that was happening. He said that the CFO told him that it was a company decision. He threw his coffee and returned to the office, feeling ‘absolutely gutted.’ He felt dizzy and sick in the stomach. He could not work and rang his wife to pick him up. He has not worked since. He says that no one from the company contacted him and he was ‘sacked’ last year.”
After setting out details of Mr Khan’s current treatment, the Medical Assessor noted current symptoms as follows:
“Mr Khan says that ‘he is not good mentally.’ He feels lonely and cut off from everything. He says that he feels sad and depressed. He also feels ‘sick in the stomach.’ He does not feel like eating much and has lost four kilos. He has not suffered a recurrence of ulcerative colitis. He says that he feels ‘dizzy and lazy.’ He says he does not sleep well. He has difficulty getting to sleep and wakes up in the middle of the night and starts thinking about what happened. He says that he feels He says that his mood is worse in the afternoons and early evenings. He says that there is nothing that gives him pleasure. He has stopped watching the news on TV because of a loss of interest. He says that he does not feel guilty and considers himself to be a good person. He says that he thinks about why this happened. That makes him angry and irritable. He can feel disturbed with anxiety at times but did not describe any benefit from the treatment that he has received. He denies any thoughts of committing suicide.”
The Medical Assessor added: “Mr Khan was diagnosed with ulcerative colitis, which he says has been in remission for twenty years. He underwent an aortic valve replacement six years ago but has been well otherwise.”
The Medical Assessor then turned to consider the impact of Mr Khan’s injury on his social activities and activities of daily living (ADL’s) and said:
“Mr Khan says that his friends have cut him off as he stopped accepting invitations. He has a sister in Canberra but has not visited her since the injury. He says that he tried to work for a nephew as a volunteer doing book-keeping but was unable to keep up because he was unable to focus and was making so many mistakes. He says that was in the early stages of the injury. He says that he is ‘too scared to work’ as he cannot focus much.
He has lost motivation to cook. He has lost four kilos in body weight in the last two years. He says that he does not shower daily. His wife prompts him to have a shower three to four times per week. He says that he cleans his teeth ‘well.’ He does not do much around the house and they have had to employ a cleaner. He shaves twice per week. He says that he has stopped ironing his shirts.
He was in a motor vehicle accident six months ago and rear-ended a car. He was driving on the Pacific Highway, near his house. He was on his way to get a coffee. His car was damaged but not written off. His airbags did not deploy either. He says that he suffered no injuries. He says that he also accrued a fine for driving over 50 kmph in a school zone. This occurred three to four weeks ago, and he was again on his way to get a coffee. He says that he has reduced driving now. He only drives to the local café when he is in a ‘desperate need for a coffee.’ He does this once or twice a week. He says that he goes grocery shopping with his wife once or twice a month. He has not been to any restaurant for a long time. His grandchildren visit sometimes. He says that he has not been to his children’s house for over a year. He enjoys his children’s visit but he is not as ‘playful’ as he used to be. He has stopped watching cricket which he used to enjoy previously. He says that he spends his time ‘mostly in bed.’ He tries to read but loses focus after two pages. He used to be active before the injury. He used to run eight kilometres per day, but no longer goes out for walks now. He goes to the mosque for Friday prayers but does not stay over to chat with other people. He is not involved in any local community groups, but that is not new. He does not use public transport, but could if he needed to. His wife takes him to his appointments. He says that he has been sleeping in a separate bedroom because of his mental state. He says that his wife loves him and supports him, but they have not been intimate.
He says that he gets on well with his children. He describes reduced concentration and memory. He says that he went to a shopping centre a few months ago and got lost. He says that his wife has started managing their finances because he had started making mistakes. He was trading Cryptocurrency but was scammed and lost USD 24,000 after giving out his password on a scam call. This occurred eight to ten months ago and has not traded since. He takes his medications regularly, but only because his wife reminds him. He feels that a lack of concentration and reduced motivation are the barriers for him to return to work.”
The Medical Assessor did not record any findings on mental state examination.
The Medical Assessor diagnosed major depressive disorder with anxious distress.
The Medical Assessor added: “No inconsistencies were observed during the assessment.”
The Medical Assessor assessed 13% WPI.
He then turned to consider the other medical opinions and material before him and said:
“Psychiatrist Dr David Kumagaya provided an independent medical examination report dated 16 August 24. He noted that Mr Khan did not have any previous psychiatric history. He opined that the cessation of employment and the manner in which it was disclosed to him were most unreasonable for Mr Khan. He was also distressed about the lack of support received from the employer. He diagnosed the condition as major depressive disorder with anxious distress and considered Mr Khan to have 19% impairment of the whole person.
Psychiatrist Dr Sachin Patil provided an independent medical examination report dated 18 December 24. He noted that the diagnosis was major depressive disorder with anxious distress. He assessed Mr Khan's condition as not having reached maximum medical improvement. He noted that although two antidepressant medications from two different classes had been tried, his agomelatine and fluoxetine had been at a
sub-optimal dosage and duration. While stating that the Worker had not reached MMI he nevertheless undertook a preliminary PIRS, rating Self Care and Personal Hygiene Class 3, Travel Class 2 and Employability Class 5.
Treating psychologist Mr Carl Nilson provided a report dated 27 August 24. He advised that he had seen Mr Khan on 24 occasions since 14 June 23. He advised that Mr Khan was suffering from major depressive disorder. Mr Neilson had earlier provided a report dated 07 July 23, where he had conceptualised the condition as an adjustment disorder with depressed and anxious mood.
Treating general practitioner Dr Eric Lim provided a report dated 21 August 24. He advised that Mr Khan had presented on 14 June 23, following the injury sustained on 08 June 23. He advised that the diagnosis was major depressive disorder and that there was no previous history. He noted that his current weight was 79kg. It was further noted that he was not showering daily. His medications were described as a combination of fluoxetine and quetiapine, along with psychotherapy. Dr Lim had earlier provided a report dated 14 June 23 in which he had described the diagnosis as an adjustment disorder.
Psychiatrist Dr Louis Ereve provided a letter dated 01 August 24 as a treating psychiatrist. It was noted that he had first seen Mr Khan on 25 July 24. He advised that Mr Khan had suffered a psychological injury from a work-related incident. He advised that the diagnosis was adjustment disorder with depressed mood and that Mr Khan was unable to work or undergo occupational rehabilitation.
Extract of clinical notes from the Workers' Doctors was provided. Documentation starts on 14 June 23. It appears from the documentation that he presented with symptoms suggestive of depression, anxiety, and insomnia throughout his consultations. It was noted on 19 June 24 that he was suffering from irritability, poor concentration and sleep disturbance. It was further noted that he was limited in driving but went for coffee when prompted and accompanied by a support person. Poor concentration and loss of trust in the working environment were noted as barriers to returning to work.”

The appellants’ submissions

As regards the category of self-care and personal hygiene, the appellant submits:
(a)    There is no evidence that the appellant is able to live independently or looks after himself adequately.
(b)    The Medical Assessor noted that the appellant ‘does not cook’, thus confirming that he is dependent upon his wife, and is not able to live independently. As
Dr Kumagaya noted, when assessing Class 3 in this category:
“Mr Khan is unable to live independently. He requires the around-the-clock support of his wife for meal preparation, attendance to activities inherent to maintenance of his household, and prompting around his self-care and personal hygiene. Despite such support, Mr Khan continues to regularly miss meals, showers and shaving.”
(c)    The Medical Assessor did not, and could not, reject this evidence regarding the appellant’s inability to live independently, as noted by Dr Kumagaya.
(d)    The Medical Assessor failed to acknowledge the evidence of Dr Patil, the respondent’s medico-legal expert, who assessed the appellant’s inability to live independently as satisfying the criteria of Class 3.
(e)    The appellant noted the following in his statement dated:
“I rely on my wife to attend to household chores and prepare meals, needing reminders or prompting to eat. … My wife must often remind me to attempt other basic activities of daily living including personal hygiene like shaving and showering. At times, I can go without showering for up to 4 days.”
(f)    The appellant’s dependence upon his wife was not acknowledged by the Medical Assessor.
(g)    The Medical Assessor did note in the body of the Medical Assessment Certificate, at page 3, that ‘His wife prompts him to have a shower three to four times per week’. It was also noted that he ‘shaves twice a week’, a further indication of diminished self-care.
(h)    Given that the appellant is dependent on his wife for his meals, and as the Medical Assessor did note, ‘does not shower regularly’, only shaves twice a week, ‘has stopped ironing his shirts and no longer cares about his appearance’, he plainly cannot be considered as being able to look after himself adequately. That clearly indicates that the Medical Assessor’s assessment of Class 2, i.e. ‘mild impairment’ is inappropriate and contrary to the evidence.
(i)    All of the evidence recorded by Dr Kumagaya and Dr Patil, which the Medical Assessor did not, and had no reason to, reject, as well as the evidence recorded by the Medical Assessor himself, accords with the PIRS descriptors for Class 3.
(j)    The appellant is not living alone and dependent upon visits by a family member or nurse, but is, as contemplated by Class 3, dependent upon the regular support of his wife in relation to his meals, showering and having clean clothes.
As regards the category of Travel, the appellant submits:
(a)    There is no evidence that the appellant can “travel to new environments without supervision” and there was therefore no basis for the Medical Assessor to conclude that the appellant was capable of unlimited and independent travel without supervision.
(b)    The evidence establishes that travel by the appellant without a support person is, as the Medical Assessor himself noted, “restricted to his local area.” Dr Patil noted that the appellant “Can only travel to local shops.”
(c)    The Medical Assessor was bound, given the undisputed restriction of the appellant’s ability to travel within the confines of his local area, to assess the appellant as fulfilling the criteria of Class 2.
(d)    The Medical Assessor has misdirected himself in failing to acknowledge the relevance of the appellant’s restricted ability to travel, by treating:
(i)a recent motor vehicle accident as the exclusive reason for the appellant’s inability to travel beyond his local area, and
(ii)the appellant’s reduced concentration when driving as a matter that is irrelevant to the assessment of his ability to travel because impairment in respect of concentration “is rated separately on the psychiatric impairment rating scale.”
(e)    At no time following his injury, and prior to the recent motor vehicle accident, was the appellant able to travel beyond his local area to new environments without supervision.
(f)    There is no evidentiary basis for a finding that the motor vehicle accident is the reason for the appellant being restricted to travel in his local area at the time of his assessment by the Medical Assessor.
(g)    Indeed, the motor vehicle accident, involving a failure to keep a proper lookout and to avoid colliding with the vehicle in front of him, accruing a fine accrued a fine for driving over 50kmph in a school zone, and driving through red traffic lights, are suggestive of a lack of concentration which confirms the appellant’s limited ability to drive without a support person and supervision.
(h)    The extent of the evidence of independent travel by the appellant, without the support of his wife, as recorded by the Medical Assessor, is of driving to get coffee near his home.
(i)    Dr Kumagaya, who examined the appellant on 16 August 2024, prior to the motor vehicle accident, noted that he was “no longer able to driver [sic – drive] beyond short distances owing to his inattention.”
(j)    He was driving locally when he had the motor vehicle accident. The evidence establishes that prior to the motor vehicle accident the appellant was not able to travel freely and independently beyond his local area without support.
(k)    Treatment of reduced concentration when driving as a matter that is irrelevant to the assessment of impairment in respect of the capacity to travel.
(l)    The Medical Assessor noted that the appellant’s diagnosis is major depressive disorder with anxious distress. That condition explains the appellant’s difficulties in leaving home without support, driving anywhere beyond the familiar local area, and the period when he ceased driving altogether. Impaired concentration is a consequence of the appellant’s condition.

As regards the category of Employability, the appellant submits:
(a)    The appellant provided substantial detail in his supplementary statement dated
7 April 2025 regarding mental fatigue and deficits with regard to memory and concentration, and his experience of panic attacks, all of which preclude any realistic prospect of being able to secure and retain employment.
(b)    The Medical Assessor also failed to consider the adverse impact of the appellant’s unchallenged evidence of panic attacks.
(c)    A person with the foregoing symptoms, instability and lack of reliability is plainly not capable of sustained focus, attention to the detail, and compliance with specified work tasks in the context of employment.
(d)    Both Dr Kumagaya and Dr Patil assessed the appellant as being totally impaired in the category of Employability.
(e)    The appellant’s treating psychiatrist, Dr Louis Ereve, recorded the following symptoms in his report dated 1 August 2024:
“Sefa [sic – Sefal] can only read a few lines of text before losing concentration and has difficulties following simple instructions. He is unable to recall the contents of long discussions that he is involved in. Sefal is unable to work in any form.”
(f)    The appellant was also assessed on 27 August 2024 as being “unfit for any work duties” by his treating psychologist, Carl Nielsen.
(g)    The appellant’s treating general practitioner Dr Eric Lim recorded in his report dated 21 August 2024 that the appellant “experiences anxious and depressive cognition which impairs his psychological condition for work” and that he was “unlikely ever to return to work.”
(h)    A succession of Certificates of Capacity issued by the appellant’s treating doctors for a period of over a year from 5 March 2024 regularly and consistently recorded that the appellant had no capacity for employment.
(i)    The medico-legal case for the respondent also confirmed that the appellant had no capacity for work.
(j)    As Dr Patil noted, the appellant “does not think he can work with his current symptoms, concentration difficulties, forgetfulness, and poor concentration levels.”
(k)    Dr Patil proceeded on the basis of the foregoing deficits to assess the appellant at Class 5: “Totally impairment [sic – impaired]. Cannot work at al due to ongoing depressive symptoms, and limited response to treatment.” It follows that every practitioner with knowledge of the appellant’s condition, whether in the capacity of treater or medico-legal examiner, are in agreement that the appellant has no capacity for employment. There was accordingly no dispute about that dysfunctional feature of the appellant’s condition.
(l)    The Medical Assessor’s assessment that the appellant could work was therefore contrary to all expert opinion.
(m)     The Medical Assessor noted the following evidence regarding the appellant’s attempt to attend to work following his injury:
“He says that he tried to work for a nephew as a volunteer doing bookkeeping, but was unable to keep up because he was unable to focus and was making ‘so many mistakes.’ He says that was in the early stages of the injury. He says that he is ‘too scared to work’ as he cannot focus much.”
(n)    The foregoing evidence confirms that the appellant attempted to work in a voluntary capacity, and not subject to the rigour, specified performance standards, timelines for completion of designated tasks, work hours, supervision and disciplinary consequences of paid employment, but failed to “keep up” given his psychological impairment. This is concrete evidence, borne out by actual endeavour and failure, of the appellant’s incapacity for employment.
(o)    Class 5 was the only assessment that could be made in accordance with the medical consensus and the profound deficits recorded by every practitioner who examined the appellant. No expert considered that there was any realistic prospect of the appellant being able to work in a real job. The appellant’s failed attempt to work in a voluntary capacity for his nephew confirms the practical consequence of the multitude of deficits noted by every practitioner.
(p)    The evidence establishes an injury-related basis for the appellant’s lack of confidence in his capacity to secure and retain a real job – a lack of confidence which was not a feature of his long history of employment with the respondent prior to his injury.
(q)    There is no evidentiary basis for the Medical Assessor’s opinion that the appellant “can work for up to 20 hours per week in a less stressful role that does not involve managing accounts”. This is a bald and unfounded assertion which, beyond being contrary to the evidence, is not explained further by the Medical Assessor.
(r)    The statement that the appellant “can work in a role that does not involve as much responsibility” is another bald and unfounded assertion that has been made by the Medical Assessor without reference to any of the evidence.

Discussion

Dealing firstly with the category of Self-care and personal hygiene, the Medical Assessor assessed a Class 2 and said:
“As described in the main body of the report, there is mild impairment. He does not cook and says that he has lost 4 kg in body weight in the last two years. However, documentation suggests that he had gained weight. He does not shower regularly, but cleans his teeth every day. He does not do much around the house, and they employ a cleaner. He has stopped ironing his shirts and no longer cares about his appearance.”
The descriptor for a Class 2 rating reads: “Mild impairment: able to live independently; looks after self adequately, although may look unkempt occasionally; sometimes misses a meal or relies on take-away food.”
For a Class 3 it reads:
“Moderate impairment: Can’t live independently without regular support. Needs prompting to shower daily and wear clean clothes. Does not prepare own meals, frequently misses meals. Family member or community nurse visits (or should visit)
2–3 times per week to ensure minimum level of hygiene and nutrition.”
We agree with the thrust of the appellant’s submissions for reasons that follow.
The concept of “self-care and personal hygiene” is not defined in the Guidelines. They refer to examples or “descriptors” relevant to the assigning of a specific class.
The descriptors are just that: a general overview of the types of behaviour relevant to each class, and are not intended to be exclusive (Parker v Select Civil Pty Ltd [2018] NSWSC 140 at [68]).
As the Medical Assessor noted, the appellant “does not cook”, which indeed suggests that he is dependent upon his wife, and is not able to live independently.
As Dr Kumagaya noted, when assessing Class 3 in this category:
“Mr Khan is unable to live independently. He requires the around-the-clock support of his wife for meal preparation, attendance to activities inherent to maintenance of his household, and prompting around his self-care and personal hygiene. Despite such support, Mr Khan continues to regularly miss meals, showers and shaving.”
Indeed, in our view, the Medical Assessor’s own description of the appellant’s impairment in this category is in line with a Class 3 rating.
Although not bound by the opinions of other doctors, they do form part of the evidence which a Medical Assessor is required to consider.
Both Dr Kumagaya and Dr Patil assessed the appellant’s inability to live independently as satisfying the criteria of Class 3.
For these reasons, we agree with the appellant that a Class 3 rating is appropriate in this category and consistent with the totality of the evidence.
Turning next to the category of Travel, the Medical Assessor assessed a Class 1 rating and said:
“As described in the main body of the report, Mr Khan has limited his driving, especially since he recently suffered a motor vehicle accident. However, the motor vehicle accident was not severe, and he continues to drive, albeit restricted to his local area. He is now concerned about driving, but that cannot be related to the claimed injury. His limitations in driving are primarily related to reduced concentration, which is rated separately on the psychiatric impairment rating scale, and the motor vehicle accident, which is unrelated to the claimed injury. He has been assessed to have no impairment related to the claimed injury in this domain.”
The descriptor for a Class 1 reads:
“No deficit, or minor deficit attributable to the normal variation in the general population: Can travel to new environments without supervision.”
For a Class 2 it reads:
“Mild impairment: can travel without support person, but only in a familiar area such as local shops, visiting a neighbour.”
As the appellant correctly pointed out:
“The evidence establishes that travel by the appellant without a support person is, as the Medical Assessor himself noted, ‘restricted to his local area’.”
In addition, as Dr Patil noted, the appellant “Can only travel to local shops.”
We repeat our comments earlier regarding consideration of all medical opinions.
The Medical Assessor has focussed on the more recent accident in making his assessment.
However, prior to that accident the appellant was restricted in his ability to travel, again, only travelling in his local area.
The accident occurred when the appellant was driving to get coffee in his local area.
Again, as the appellant pointed out, there is no evidence that he can “travel to new environments without supervision” thus no evidentiary basis for the Medical Assessor to conclude that the appellant was capable of unlimited and independent travel without supervision.
The evidence establishes that travel by the appellant without a support person is, as the Medical Assessor himself noted, “restricted to his local area.”
Again, we agree with the appellant’s submissions in this category.
In our view, a Class 2 rating is appropriate and consistent with all the evidence.
Turning finally to the category of Employability, once again, we agree with the appellant’s submissions for reasons that follow.
In our view, most significantly is the absence of any evidence or any explanation by the Medical Assessor as to how, on the available evidence, the appellant could be capable of working even part-time.
In assessing a Class 3 rating, the Medical Assessors said:
“As described in the main body of the report, there is moderate impairment. His motivation is reduced, which serves as a barrier to his return to work. He describes reduced concentration as the main barrier, but that is rated separately on the impairment rating scale. In my clinical opinion, he can work for up to 20 hours per week in a less stressful role that does not involve managing accounts. He is likely to make mistakes, as he did when managing his nephew's business, but he can work in a role that does not involve as much responsibility.”
The Medical Assessor’s assessment that the appellant could work was therefore contrary to all expert opinion. It was, moreover, lacking any basis having regard to the evidence which the Medical Assessor himself recorded in the body of the MAC.
The appellant has set out in considerable detail all the evidence supporting a Class 5 rating, and we do not intend to repeat that here.
Suffice to say that there is simply no evidentiary basis for the Medical Assessor’s assessment.
He has failed to discharge his duty in this respect.
It is true, as the respondent pointed out, “the clinical judgement of the MA must be paramount in any assessment of permanent impairment.”
However, that judgement must be made in accordance with cl 1.6 of the Guidelines which provides:
“Assessing permanent impairment involves clinical assessment of the claimant as they present on the day of assessment taking account the claimant’s relevant medical history and all available relevant medical information….”(our emphasis)
For these reasons, we agree that a Class 5 rating is appropriate, and in this instance, consistent with all the available evidence.
This then means that the ratings are:
(a)    self-care and personal hygiene – class 3;
(b)    social and recreational activities – class 3;
(c)    travel – class 2;
(d)    social functioning – class 2;
(e)    concentration, persistence and pace – class 3, and
(f)    employability - class 5.
The aggregate of class ratings is 18, median 3 for an 22% WPI.
For these reasons, the Appeal Panel has determined that the MAC issued on
20 June 2025 should be revoked, and a new MAC should be issued. The new certificate is attached to this statement of reasons.

WORKERS COMPENSATION DIVISION

APPEAL PANEL

MEDICAL ASSESSMENT CERTIFICATE

Injuries received after 1 January 2002

Matter number:	W4010/25
Applicant:	Sefal Khan
Respondent:	Hitachi Energy Australia Pty Ltd

This Certificate is issued pursuant to s 328(5) of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act1998.

The Appeal Panel revokes the Medical Assessment Certificate of Medical Assessor Ankur Gupta and issues this new Medical Assessment Certificate as to the matters set out in the table below:

Table - whole person impairment (WPI)

Body Part or system	Date of Injury	Chapter, page and paragraph number in Workcover Guides	Chapter, page, paragraph, figure and table numbers in AMA 5 Guides	% WPI	Proportion of permanent impairment due to pre-existing injury, abnormality or condition	Sub-total/s % WPI (after any deductions in column 6)
Psychological	8/6/2023	Chapter 11	Chapter 14	22%	Nil	22%
Total % WPI (the Combined Table values of all sub-totals)					22%

[2025] NSWPICMP 665

2 September 2025