Khalil and Tahir-Ahmadi (No 2)

[2011] FamCA 542

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

KHALIL & TAHIR-AHMADI (NO 2) [2011] FamCA 542

FAMILY LAW - ORDERS – oral application by counsel for a stay of the orders – where orders and judgment were delivered only moments earlier – where counsel made submissions about new issues which have arisen while judgment was reserved – where the Court was not satisfied of any reason for which a stay was necessary – application refused.

FAMILY LAW - PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – oral application for extension of time to appeal – where it was not appropriate to extend the time to seek leave to appeal – application dismissed.

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

APPLICANT: Mr Khalil

RESPONDENT: Ms Tahir-Ahmadi

FILE NUMBER: ADC 4408 of 2009

DATE DELIVERED: 7 July 2011

PLACE DELIVERED: Adelaide

PLACE HEARD: Adelaide

JUDGMENT OF: Dawe J

HEARING DATE: 7 July 2011

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: Mr Kent

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Legal Services Commission of SA

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: Ms Dibden

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: McDonald Steed McGrath Lawyers

COUNSEL FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Mr Pickhaver

SOLICITOR FOR THE INDEPNDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER:RESPONDENT: Barr Lawyers

ORDERS

1. No orders made.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Khalil & Tahir-Ahmadi (No 2) is approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT ADELAIDE

FILE NUMBER:  ADC 4408 f 2009

Mr Khalil

Applicant

And

Ms Tahir-Ahmadi

Respondent

EX-TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. This matter comes on before me this morning for the delivery of my judgment.  I have delivered my judgment.  Counsel have had an opportunity at best to have read the two pages of orders that I have made and not the reasons that are in support of that judgment.  The judgment itself refers to the difficulties in the relationship between the mother and the child..

2. The orders that I have made this morning are that the mother have sole parental responsibility for the child A, that A live with the mother and that on or before 14 July 2011, the father deliver the child A, and his personal belongings to his mother at a place to be agreed between the parties and failing agreement, the H Police Station.

3. I have heard submissions from the bar table this morning.  I have received no evidence as such but merely submissions from the bar table about matters which relate to the difficulties that have apparently been existing in the relationship between the mother and the child since I reserved my decision.  There is a dispute about the background to those difficulties.

4. These are very similar to the problems which existed at the time of the trial and have been in existence in this child’s life for approximately four or five years. 

5. I have not been given any information which makes it necessary for a stay to be granted on the oral submissions of counsel and I decline to do so.

6. The oral application to extend the time for leave to appeal my decision is made on the basis that counsel who were participating in the trial are not available until shortly before the time expires.  I am told that Mr Mellows will return on 28 July.  That will limit the time for the appeal to some seven days.  However, that may well be sufficient time for him to settle what would otherwise be the grounds of appeal prepared by other counsel or his instructing solicitors bearing in mind that I understand that counsel have not had an opportunity to read the 31 pages of my judgment to determine if in fact there are grounds for appeal.  The assumption that there will be an appeal is purely based on the fact that one of the parties does not like the outcome which is most usually the case in this type of proceedings otherwise there would not be trials.

7. I have noted, with the assistance of the Court Officer, that although there may be interpreters in Court there certainly has not been an interpretation carried out for the parties of anything that counsel have said or that I am now saying and that may also be an issue which needs to be followed up.

8. In relation to the general matters of the information that is to be given to the child, the orders which I have made provide for the Independent Children's Lawyer’s appointment to be discharged one month from today.  It would seem appropriate, but not necessary, for an order to be made for the mother who has sole parental responsibility to request the Independent Children’s Lawyer to explain or make arrangements for someone else to explain, the orders of the Court to A.

9. The mother having sole parental responsibility pursuant to my orders should be able to make the arrangements with the Independent Children’s Lawyer.  I trust that if it is necessary for the father to cooperate with those arrangements he will realise that the status of the mother having sole parental responsibility means that he is required to cooperate with those arrangements

10. I understand from the evidence before me that A is an intelligent child.  I have not made a specific order as to who should speak to A but obviously if there have been difficulties, as is now alleged, he needs to have the orders explained to him and made aware these are final orders.

11. I am not making any further orders, other than the orders that I made when I delivered my judgment some minutes ago.

I certify that the preceding eleven (11) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Dawe delivered on 7 July 2011.

Associate: 

Date:  13 July 2011