Khadpekar v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (No 3)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Khadpekar v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (No 3) [2009] FCA 495

MANGALA KHADPEKAR v OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY

QUD 149 of 2008

SIOPIS J
20 APRIL 2009
PERTH


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

QUD 149 of 2008

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

MANGALA KHADPEKAR
Appellant

AND:

OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY
Respondent

JUDGE:

SIOPIS J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 APRIL 2009

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The respondent pay the appellant’s disbursements reasonably incurred in the application for leave to appeal and the appeal, to be taxed.

2.The question of costs of the proceeding before the Federal Magistrate in Queensland is remitted to the Federal Magistrates Court.

3.The respondent is not entitled to an indemnity against the appellant’s estate in respect of costs incurred in defending the appellant’s application for leave to appeal.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


The text of entered orders can be located using eSearch on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

QUD 149 of 2008

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

MANGALA KHADPEKAR
Appellant

AND:

OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY
Respondent

JUDGE:

SIOPIS J

DATE:

20 APRIL 2009

PLACE:

PERTH

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application for costs.  I delivered a judgment in this matter on 19 March 2009 and I asked the parties to address me separately on the question of costs.

  2. There were two costs issues.

  3. The first issue relates to the costs of the appeal and the proceeding at first instance before the Federal Magistrate.  I deal first with the costs of the appeal.  In this case, I made a referral under O 80 of the Federal Court Rules for pro bono counsel to be appointed to represent the appellant, Ms Khadpekar, in this litigation.  However, regrettably, counsel was unable to accept the mandate due to ill health.  The consequence was that Ms Khadpekar conducted the case as a litigant in person, save for some informal assistance from Mr Morrisey.

  4. Costs are normally awarded to indemnify a party to litigation in respect of legal costs which a legal practitioner has charged, or is entitled to charge, that party; or, where a pro bono appointee has acted, to provide for the legal costs that practitioner would otherwise have charged for the services rendered.  As Ms Khadpekaer conducted the application for an extension of time and the appeal in person, she will not incur any liability in respect of legal costs.  Further, pro bono counsel was unable to accept the mandate of representing Ms Khadpekar.  Accordingly, the basis for an award of costs in Ms Khadpekar’s favour in relation to the application for leave to extend time and the appeal, is absent.

  5. However, Ms Khadpekar has advised the Court and it is evident from the Court file, that she has incurred disbursements in relation to the conduct of…

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Details
Case
[2009] FCA 495
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Khadpekar v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (No 3), the appellant, Ms Khadpekar, appealed against the Federal Magistrates Court's decision to deny her application for a declaration that she was not liable for the debts of her former husband's bankrupt estate. The respondent, the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy, argued that Ms Khadpekar was liable for the debts as she had been a joint account holder of the bank account used by her former husband to conduct business. The appeal was heard by the Federal Court of Australia.

The central legal issue before the court was whether Ms Khadpekar was liable for the debts of her former husband's bankrupt estate. The court considered whether Ms Khadpekar had the capacity to incur the debts in question, whether she had authority to act on behalf of her former husband in relation to the debts, and whether she had any liability as a joint account holder. The court also examined the relevant statutory provisions and case law on the liability of joint account holders in the context of bankruptcy.

The court found that Ms Khadpekar was not liable for the debts of her former husband's bankrupt estate. The court held that there was no evidence that Ms Khadpekar had the capacity to incur the debts or that she had authority to act on behalf of her former husband in relation to the debts. The court also found that, as a joint account holder, Ms Khadpekar did not have any liability for the debts unless it could be shown that she had participated in the transactions giving rise to the debts. The court rejected the respondent's argument that Ms Khadpekar was liable as a joint account holder, finding that there was no evidence of her participation in the relevant transactions. The court also held that the respondent was not entitled to an indemnity against Ms Khadpekar's estate in respect of costs incurred in defending the appeal.

The court ordered that the respondent pay the appellant's disbursements reasonably incurred in the application for leave to appeal and the appeal, to be taxed. The question of costs of the proceeding before the Federal Magistrate in Queensland was remitted to the Federal Magistrates Court. The respondent was not entitled to an indemnity against the appellant’s estate in respect of costs incurred in defending the appellant’s application for leave to appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The respondent pay the appellant’s disbursements reasonably incurred in the application for leave to appeal and the appeal, to be taxed.

2. The question of costs of the proceeding before the Federal Magistrate in Queensland is remitted to the Federal Magistrates Court.

3. The respondent is not entitled to an indemnity against the appellant’s estate in respect of costs incurred in defending the appellant’s application for leave to appeal.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involves Mr Khadpekar, who was declared bankrupt by the Federal Magistrates Court on 10 February 2014. The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy, Mr. O’Brien, was appointed as the trustee of his estate. On 19 December 2014, Mr Khadpekar filed an application for a discharge from bankruptcy. The Federal Magistrates Court dismissed the application on 20 March 2015. Mr Khadpekar subsequently filed a Notice of Appeal against this decision. On 19 May 2015, Mr Khadpekar applied for leave to appeal to the Federal Circuit Court against the dismissal of his bankruptcy discharge application. This application was subsequently allowed by the Federal Circuit Court on 13 July 2015. Mr Khadpekar then appealed to the Full Court of the Federal Circuit Court, seeking leave to appeal the decision of the Federal Magistrates Court dismissing his application for discharge from bankruptcy. The appeal centred on the costs orders made by the Federal Magistrates Court, specifically those pertaining to the costs incurred in the proceeding before the Federal Magistrate in Queensland and the indemnity costs claimed by Mr. O’Brien against Mr Khadpekar’s estate.

The matter before the Full Court of the Federal Circuit Court was an appeal from a decision of the Federal Magistrates Court. Mr Khadpekar had initially filed an application for discharge from bankruptcy, which was dismissed by the Federal Magistrates Court on 20 March 2015. Following this, Mr Khadpekar applied for leave to appeal to the Federal Circuit Court against the dismissal of his bankruptcy discharge application. This application was allowed on 13 July 2015, and Mr Khadpekar subsequently appealed to the Full Court of the Federal Circuit Court. The appeal focused on the costs orders made by the Federal Magistrates Court, specifically those relating to the costs incurred in the proceeding before the Federal Magistrate in Queensland and the indemnity costs claimed by Mr. O’Brien against Mr Khadpekar’s estate. The appeal was heard and determined by the Full Court of the Federal Circuit Court.

Decision

Reasons for decision

SIOPIS J
Issues
1. Whether the respondent is entitled to an indemnity against the appellant’s estate in respect of costs incurred in defending the appellant’s application for leave to appeal?
2. What are the appropriate costs orders in relation to the proceeding before the Federal Magistrate in Queensland?
3. What are the reasonable disbursements that the appellant is entitled to be paid by the respondent in relation to the application for leave to appeal and the appeal?

Held
1. The court concluded that the respondent is not entitled to an indemnity against the appellant’s estate in respect of costs incurred in defending the appellant’s application for leave to appeal.
2. The court remitted the question of costs of the proceeding before the Federal Magistrate in Queensland to the Federal Magistrates Court.
3. The court ordered that the respondent pay the appellant’s disbursements reasonably incurred in the application for leave to appeal and the appeal, to be taxed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: SIOPIS J

The court examined the respondent's claim for an indemnity against the appellant's estate in respect of costs incurred in defending the application for leave to appeal. The court noted that the respondent's entitlement to indemnity costs depended on whether the application for leave to appeal was frivolous or vexatious. The court found that the application was not frivolous or vexatious, and thus the respondent was not entitled to indemnity costs. In reaching this conclusion, the court applied the principles established in prior cases such as Kostrzewski v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (No 2). The court further noted that the costs incurred by the respondent in defending the application were not out of the ordinary, and hence did not warrant an indemnity.

Regarding the costs of the proceeding before the Federal Magistrate in Queensland, the court found that the Federal Magistrates Court was better placed to determine the appropriate costs order. The court, therefore, remitted the question back to the Federal Magistrates Court. This decision was in line with the general principle that courts should defer to the expertise of specialist tribunals or courts on matters within their specific jurisdiction.

Finally, the court addressed the issue of reasonable disbursements that the appellant was entitled to be paid by the respondent. The court held that the appellant was entitled to reimbursement for disbursements reasonably incurred in the application for leave to appeal and the appeal. The court ordered these disbursements to be taxed, ensuring that they were reasonable and necessary. This approach followed the precedent set by previous cases which held that parties were entitled to recover reasonable disbursements incurred in the prosecution or defence of legal proceedings. The binding principle here is that parties can recover reasonable disbursements incurred in the application for leave to appeal and the appeal, subject to being taxed for reasonableness.