Keysar Trad v Harbour Radio Pty Limited

[2014] HCASL 108

KEYSAR TRAD

v

HARBOUR RADIO PTY LIMITED

[2014] HCASL 108
S30/2014

1. The applicant brought proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales under the Defamation Act 1974 (NSW) ("the Act") in relation to statements made on a radio program broadcast by the respondent on 19 December 2005.

2. A jury found that the broadcast conveyed eight imputations defamatory of the applicant, but on 31 July 2009, the Supreme Court (McClellan CJ at CL) upheld the respondent's defences in relation to all of the imputations and dismissed the proceedings.  The applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales and was successful, in part.

3. The respondent appealed to this Court. On 5 October 2012, this Court held, by majority, that six of the imputations had been made on an occasion of qualified privilege. The majority concluded that it was necessary for the Court of Appeal to consider whether one or more of four identified imputations ("the identified imputations"), although themselves made on an occasion of qualified privilege, were substantially true (under s 15 of the Act), in order to determine whether the defence of contextual truth (under s 16 of the Act) applied to the two imputations that were not made on an occasion of qualified privilege ("the undetermined imputations"). This Court remitted the defences of substantial and contextual truth for consideration in the Court of Appeal.

4. On 23 December 2013, the Court of Appeal (Basten JA, with whom McColl and Tobias JJA agreed) dismissed the applicant's appeal.  Basten JA found that all of the identified imputations were substantially true and held that the defence of contextual truth was made out in relation to the undetermined imputations.

5. The applicant now seeks special leave to appeal to this Court.  He requires an extension of time to do so.  Many of the complaints articulated in the applicant's written case rise no higher than disagreement with the factual findings relied on by the Court of Appeal.  No question of law or principle falls for determination and the applicant enjoys insufficient prospects of success to warrant a grant of special leave.  Special leave should be refused.  That being so, there would be no utility in granting the applicant an extension of time.

6. Pursuant to r 41.10.5 we direct the Registrar to draw up, sign and seal an order dismissing the application.

S.M. Kiefel
19 June 2014 P.A. Keane