Keymer & Keymer - [2020] FamCAFC 70

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

KEYMER & KEYMER

[2020] FamCAFC 70

FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – INTERIM SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE ORDER –Where spousal maintenance order made in relation to spousal and child expenses – Impermissibly treated as indistinguishable – Error established – Leave granted to appeal – Appeal allowed in part – Spousal maintenance order set aside – Interim order made – Matter remitted for rehearing.

FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – INTERIM PARENTING ORDERS – Risk assessment – Risk of harm from exposure to family violence in the mother’s care – Where the father unsuccessfully applied for the child to live with him – Where the risk had been assessed by the appropriate authorities – Where child had lived with the mother for two years post separation – Competing factors – No appealable error established.

FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – COSTS – Where neither party incurred legal costs in the appeal and neither party sought an order for costs – father incurred costs in the way of disbursements and sought a costs certificate for the appeal – Both parties sought and were granted costs certificates for the rehearing.

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 72, 75(2)(d) and 75(2)(na)
Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) ss 6, 8 and 9

Eaby & Speelman (2015) FLC 93-654; [2015] FamCAFC 104
International Finance Trust Co Ltd v New South Wales Crimes Commission (2009) 240 CLR 319; [2009] HCA 49
Medlow & Medlow (2016) FLC 93-692; [2016] FamCAFC 34
Metwally v University of Wollongong (1985) 60 ALR 68; [1985] HCA 28
Redman and Redman (1987) FLC 91-805; [1987] FamCA 2
Royal Guardian Mortgage Management Pty Ltd v Nguyen (2016) 332 ALR 128; [2016] NSWCA 88
Salah& Salah (2016) FLC 93-713; [2016] FamCAFC 100
Saxena and Saxena (2006) FLC 93-268; [2006] FamCA 588
Stein v Stein (2000) FLC 93-004; [2000] FamCA 102

APPELLANT:

Mr Keymer

RESPONDENT:

Ms Keymer

FILE NUMBER:

BRC

976

2019

APPEAL NUMBER:

NOA

2019

DATE DELIVERED:

2 April 2020

PLACE DELIVERED:

Sydney

PLACE HEARD:

Brisbane

JUDGMENT OF:

Ryan (by videolink), Aldridge & Kent JJ

HEARING DATE:

19 March 2020

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:

Federal Circuit Court of Australia

LOWER COURT JUDGMENT DATE:

6 August 2019

LOWER COURT MNC:

[2019] FCCA 2166

REPRESENTATION

THE APPELLANT:

In person

THE RESPONDENT:

In person (via telephone)

Orders

The father be granted leave to appeal from Order 15 dated 6 August 2019.
The appeal be allowed in part.
Order 15 dated 6 August 2019 be set aside.
The mother’s application for interim spousal maintenance be remitted for rehearing in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia by a judge other than the primary judge.
Pending further order or determination of the remitted rehearing (whichever first occurs), the father shall pay interim spousal maintenance to the mother in the amount of $386.69 per week, the first payment to be made seven (7) days from the date of these orders and every seven (7) days thereafter. These payments to be made into the same account into which payments made pursuant to Order 15 dated 6 August 2019 were made.
The appeal be otherwise dismissed.
The Court grants to the father a costs certificate pursuant to s 9 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) being a certificate that, in the opinion of the Court, it would be appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise a payment under that Act to the father in respect of the costs incurred by the father in relation to the appeal.
The Court grants to the parties costs certificates pursuant to the s 8 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) being certificates that, in the opinion of the Court, it would be appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise payments under that Act to them in respect of the costs incurred in relation to the rehearing.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Keymer & Keymer has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).

THE FULL COURT OF THE FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE

Appeal Number: NOA 77 of 2019
File Number: BRC 976 of 2019

Mr Keymer

Appellant

And

Ms Keymer

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

By Amended Notice of Appeal filed on 25 October 2019, Mr Keymer (“the father”) seeks leave to appeal an interim order for spousal maintenance (Order 15) and to appeal various interim parenting orders (Orders 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5) made by a judge of the Federal Circuit Court on 6 August 2019. As is our usual practice, the application for leave to appeal the interim spousal maintenance order was heard simultaneously with the appeal.
Ms Keymer (“the mother”) is the respondent to the application for leave to appeal and the appeal. The mother seeks to uphold the decision of the primary judge. That said, the mother failed to comply with directions to file a Summary of Argument in support of her position. Although there was no reasonable basis for the mother’s non-compliance, the father did not oppose her being given permission to rely on her Summary of Argument presented on the eve of the appeal, which is what occurred.
The parenting orders relate to the parties’ only child, X, who was born in 2011 (“the child”). Following the parties’ separation in March 2017, the child resided with the mother, which the primary judge was satisfied should continue.
The father is employed by the Australian Defence Force and was posted from C Town in Victoria, where he, the mother and child had been living, to City A in January 2019. Although until then the father had been significantly involved in the child’s life, after he moved to City A, he was only able to have sporadic time with her. Knowing that the mother planned to move to Brisbane, the father obtained a position based in Brisbane which was to commence immediately after the hearing. Irrespective of whether the mother remained in C Town or moved to Brisbane, the father sought that the child live with him. A major plank of the father’s case is that the mother poses an unacceptable risk to the child from exposure to family violence and psychological abuse. However, that risk was not so high that it warranted supervision of the mother’s contact with the child, but was said to be sufficiently pervasive to justify a substantial change to the child’s living arrangements. Documents produced under subpoena by Victoria Police and the Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”) corroborated the father’s evidence that the mother has a history of domestic violence towards her partners (including him) and of psychologically abusive behaviour towards the child.
The mother acknowledged that the child had been exposed to violence between the parties and, albeit without providing detail, said that the father had physically assaulted her which he denied.
The primary judge was astute to the fact that the abridged nature of an interim hearing limited her ability to determine contentious issues [49]. Records produced by DHHS which concluded that the child had been “exposed to significant family violence perpetrated by her mother towards her father” [56] were given particular weight. The same records indicated that the mother had engaged well with DHHS and, mental health intervention had “been effectively administrated in an effort to mitigate the risk of exposing the child to any further harm” [58]. DHHS assessed that the mother did not pose an immediate risk to the child, a position which was consistent with the fact that despite the father’s allegations and evidence called against the mother, “the father ha[d] nevertheless allowed the child to reside with the mother for the past two years, and has never brought an application for the child to live with him” [59].

Procedural Fairness

Having filed an Amended Notice of Appeal that included amendments to his grounds of appeal, those amended grounds were further amended in the father’s Summary of Argument. The appeal was undertaken by reference to the later document.
By Ground 1, the father contends that he was denied procedural fairness by not being given an opportunity to make submissions regarding the risk that the mother posed to the child. As this ground goes directly to the integrity of the hearing, it should be considered first (Royal Guardian Mortgage Management Pty Ltd v Nguyen (2016) 332 ALR 128 at [9]).
The father correctly points out that procedural fairness requires that each of the parties is given the opportunity to advance their own case and answer the case put against them (International Finance Trust Co Ltd v New South Wales Crimes Commission (2009) 240 CLR 319 at [54]). As has already been mentioned, it was an important aspect of the father’s case that the mother posed an unacceptable risk to the child of psychological harm through exposure to family violence. Documents were produced under subpoena that were directly relevant to the assessment of that risk. It is the father’s contention that he was denied the opportunity to make submissions in relation to those documents and, that although the primary judge said she would read them it is not apparent that she did. According to the father it should be inferred that the primary judge did not read beyond page five of the hundreds of pages of documents produced by Victoria Police and DHHS. The significance of page five is that this document was expressly referenced in the reasons for judgment.
So as to provide context to this challenge, it needs to be understood that this was an interim hearing determined in a large duty list. Both parties filed affidavit evidence and the hearing was undertaken without cross‑examination. It commenced at 4.47 pm and concluded at 5.55 pm. The parties appeared without legal representation and as the transcript demonstrates, when the hearing started the primary judge already had an understanding of the issues in the case. No doubt this was enhanced by her prior involvement in the matter, in particular a hearing conducted on 25 February 2019 which resulted in an interim spousal maintenance order in favour of the mother and the parties and child being ordered to attend a Child Inclusive Conference with a Family Consultant.
The assertion that the father was not given the opportunity to present argument on the point does not survive examination of the hearing transcript. The hearing commenced with the applicant mother being given the opportunity to address her applications and the primary judge seeking to clarify various facts and aspects of the mother’s affidavit evidence. The mother then presented her case until page 12 of the transcript. The primary judge then called on the father and the same approach was adopted with him. The father made his submissions and addressed her Honour’s questions from hearing transcript page 12 until page 48. Shortly before 6.00 pm, the father sought to highlight documents which he said had not been considered by the Family Consultant and the following exchange took place:
HER HONOUR: I understand that. That’s in your document. Anything else?
MR KEYMER: So just with respect to parenting: can I draw your attention to some material in the subpoena that wasn’t considered by the family consultant?
HER HONOUR: Have you referred to it in any documents? I think you have, haven’t you?
MR KEYMER: I’ve referred to it in my affidavit but there are a couple of things in - - -
HER HONOUR: Okay. Can I do this? It’s now 6 o’clock, almost.
MR KEYMER: Yes, your Honour. Yes, your Honour.
HER HONOUR: I will do this before I make a decision. There are subpoena documents here that you’ve both had an opportunity to look at that are relevant to your daughter. I will look at them myself, okay.
MR KEYMER: Okay, your Honour.
HER HONOUR: All of them. I will look at all of them myself because I think if we now – you’re referring me to a document and you want me to take that from it. If I read all of them, then I will read everything that I need to read and take it all into account. So I’m sorry but we have to end there and I think I have enough information to make some decisions. All right. I can’t make that decision, though, for probably the next couple of weeks. It’s going to take me a while to do it. All right?
(Transcript 21 June 2019, p.47 lines 11–38)
At line 30, the father gave his explicit agreement to the suggested approach. The father is bound by the conduct of his case and having agreed to an approach below, it is not open to the father to complain about it on appeal (Metwally v University of Wollongong (1985) 60 ALR 68 at 71). It follows that there was no denial of procedural fairness. But even had the father resisted the approach suggested by the primary judge, there was no want of procedural fairness. It is abundantly clear that considerably more hearing time was devoted to the presentation of the father’s case than was taken by the mother and that he was given a proper opportunity to address issues that were important to him.
Furthermore, not every denial of procedural fairness will amount to appealable error and, it must be established that the want of procedural fairness went to a material issue. Hence, no doubt, the father’s submission that the primary judge did not read the documents produced under subpoena and thus by implication, failed to see the extent of the mother’s violent behaviour towards several of her partners. However, reference need only be made to paragraphs [55] and [56] of her Honour’s reasons to demonstrate that the primary judge did indeed consider the documents produced under subpoena. Merely because the primary judge did not mention other parts of the subpoenaed documents, does not establish the father’s contention that they were not read. Judicial method does not demand that a judge lists in the judge’s reasons for judgment every document considered in the case. Some judges do so, but so long as the documents under consideration are apparent from the trial record, there is no utility in a judge slavishly recording or summarising every piece of evidence that was placed before them. We see no proper basis for the inference for which the father contends. Indeed we would be slow to infer that a judge failed to read a document that the judge expressly committed to read.
Ground 1 has not been established.

Exposure to family violence

Grounds 2 and 3 concern family violence and the risk to the child of psychological harm of being exposed to it.
According to the father, the evidence established that the mother had engaged in family violence inflicted on a number of her partners and given there was no corroborated evidence that he had ever exposed the child to family violence, “[t]his alone should have been adequate for [h]er Honour to conclude that it was in the child’s best interests to reside with the father in lieu of the mother” (the father’s Summary of Argument filed 9 December 2019, paragraph 3.8).
An interim hearing is concerned with the immediate and proximate future whereas a trial will address a child’s long term needs. It needs to be understood that an assessment of risk undertaken in an interim hearing can be very different to that undertaken at trial (Eaby & Speelman (2015) FLC 93-654). More often than not, the evidence adduced at trial is more comprehensive than that adduced for an interim hearing and cases such as this one often have the benefit of expert opinion. Thus it is not uncommon to see a different outcome following a trial to the arrangements established after an interim hearing conducted on the papers.
The father is quite correct when he says there was evidence (including criminal convictions) against the mother which corroborated his evidence of her family violence and thus a risk to the child from being exposed to it. We were taken to no evidence which corroborates the mother’s evidence of family violence by the father.
However, as the father properly acknowledged to us, because the evidence was untested, it was not possible for the primary judge to make findings about disputed facts. Nonetheless, as the primary judge understood, that was not the end of the matter and she was required to undertake a risk assessment so as to determine the arrangements which would operate in the best interests of the child pending further order or a final hearing (Salah& Salah (2016) FLC 93-713). Context is always important and in this case, the risk assessment was undertaken in the context of the mother having had primary care of the child for the more than two years that had passed after the parties separated. The point being, as the primary judge well knew, it would be no small step to disrupt the child’s living arrangements, particularly where the child now had little contact with the father and she declined the Family Consultant’s invitation to meet with him.
Thus, from paragraphs [51] through to [59], the primary judge assessed the risks to the child. Particular attention was paid to a risk assessment undertaken by DHHS which took into account the mother’s history of family violence, threats of suicide and the child’s disrupted school attendance while in the mother’s care. The father is the source of much of the information given to DHHS and it is unsurprising that the assessment proceeded on the same basis as the father’s case to her Honour. In particular, that there was a history of significant family violence by the mother to which the child was exposed and that the mother had threatened to kill herself and the child.
In terms of the assessment of potential harm to the child, DHHS concluded that “it is likely [the mother] will not expose [the child] to further harm in the near future” [55]. This assessment was made having regard to the fact that:
·the parties had separated;
·the mother was motivated to disprove the allegations of ongoing family violence and abuse;
·the mother’s psychologist did not assess the mother as being a risk to the child; and
·the mother engaged cooperatively and well with DHHS.
The Family Consultant was of the opinion that this type of independent evidence and assessment was likely to be of assistance to the Court (Child Inclusive Conference Memorandum to Court, p.5). There can be no doubt that the primary judge was entitled to take this evidence into account and give it weight. Furthermore, in determining the magnitude of the risk, the primary judge was entitled to take into account, as she did, that the father did not commence proceedings to have the child removed from the situation. The inference being that he did not consider that the risks to the child from the mother were sufficiently high to justify prompt court action. This notion was reinforced by the father’s proposal that the child have unsupervised time with the mother.
Although the primary judge did not expressly say so, it is tolerably clear that immediate risks to the child were assessed as insufficient to justify wholesale changes to well entrenched arrangements. In reaching this conclusion the primary judge balanced the relevant facts and did not take into account irrelevant considerations. This was an undoubtedly difficult exercise and a quintessential exercise of discretion. The father’s submission that the decision is plainly unreasonable should be rejected.
These grounds have not been established.

Error of fact

The gravamen of Ground 4 is that the primary judge erred in deciding that the father’s failure to pay child support demonstrates that he does not act in the child’s best interests. It is the father’s contention that the finding as to these facts are wrong and, even if they are not, that his failure to pay child support is a secondary consideration to the risk to the child in the mother’s care through exposure to family violence.

Her Honour’s findings on this point are at [35] which is set out below:
35.The fact that the [father] has refused to pay child support, contribute to school uniforms, and is now in arrears in school fees only demonstrates to me that he does not act in the child’s best interests, but remains entrenched in a poor, if not non-existent, co-parenting relationship with the mother.
It was uncontentious, that between February 2017 and January 2019 the father voluntarily paid $725 per week by way of spousal maintenance and child support. The mother then successfully applied for an administrative assessment of child support. The father’s pay slips were in evidence and established that child support in the assessed amount was automatically deducted from his pay. The mother chose to cancel the child support assessment and the disruption which followed was a situation of her making.
As to the payment of the child’s school fees, the father had fallen into arrears. How or why that occurred was not explored during the hearing and her Honour’s conclusion on the point is unfair. As to her finding concerning the child’s school uniforms, the primary judge appears to have overlooked the mother’s evidence that there was an agreement between the parties that she would pay half the cost of school uniforms.
Thus we agree with the father that the findings at [35] are wrong. However, these are located under the heading “Interim Spousal Maintenance” and form part of the discussion of that issue. These sentiments are not repeated in her Honour’s consideration of the parenting issues and it is plain that the parenting issue was decided by reference to the issues discussed earlier. Because we are not satisfied that her Honour’s mistaken views concerning the father’s financial support of the child influenced her Honour’s determination concerning the parenting orders, appealable error has not been established.

Interim spousal maintenance

The father must satisfy the court that in all of the circumstances, the spousal maintenance decision is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant it be reconsidered by the Full Court and that substantial injustice would result if leave to appeal were refused (Medlow & Medlow (2016) FLC 93-692 at [57]).
Before we discuss this challenge any further, it is useful to now set out the order:
Spousal Maintenance
15.That the [father] pay to the applicant by way of scheduled electronic transfer to a bank account to be nominated by the applicant within forty‑eight (48) hours of the making of these orders the sum of $850 per week, the first such transfer to take place on or before 4:00pm on 13 August 2019.
There is no challenge to the primary judge’s statement of the principles which apply to an application for spousal maintenance. As the reasons demonstrate, such an application is made pursuant to s 72 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”). Section 72 of the Act provides:
(1)A party to a marriage is liable to maintain the other party, to the extent that the first‑mentioned party is reasonably able to do so, if, and only if, that other party is unable to support herself or himself adequately whether:
(a)by reason of having the care and control of a child of the marriage who has not attained the age of 18 years;
(b)by reason of age or physical or mental incapacity for appropriate gainful employment; or
(c)for any other adequate reason;
having regard to any relevant matter referred to in subsection 75(2).
(2)The liability under subsection (1) of a bankrupt party to a marriage to maintain the other party may be satisfied, in whole or in part, by way of the transfer of vested bankruptcy property in relation to the bankrupt party if the court makes an order under this Part for the transfer.
In Saxena and Saxena (2006) FLC 93-268, at 80,551, Coleman J explained that whether an order for spousal maintenance should be made requires a four step process as follows:
·can the applicant support himself or herself adequately?
·if not, what are the applicant’s reasonable needs?
·what capacity does the respondent have to meet those needs?
·what order is reasonable having regard to s 75(2)?
Thus, there can be no liability to pay spousal maintenance unless an applicant has first established that they are unable to support themselves because of the matters identified in s 72(1)(a)–(c).
By Ground 5 the father contends “that there was inadequate evidence adduced to support a conclusion that the [mother] was unable to provide [sic] herself” (the father’s Summary of Argument filed 9 December 2019, paragraph 1.4). In support of this ground, the father points to evidence that between 23 October 2012 and 26 March 2013, the mother was employed as a Consultant in City B for which she earned in excess of $80,000 in wages and sales commission. In addition, that the mother had worked as a Manager with various companies. These matters along with the paucity of evidence as to any attempts by the mother to secure paid employment, according to the father, were insufficient to discharge the onus of proof reposed in the mother.
It should be observed that the father gave evidence that the mother was sacked from her position as a Consultant and it was uncontroversial that thereafter and so as to advance the father’s career, the parties moved to the United States of America. Upon their return some years later, the mother was involved in the child’s day to day care and she commenced studies at university, so as to advance her career prospects. Those studies were well underway.
In relation to this threshold question, the primary judge accepted:
·the mother’s evidence that although she had tried to obtain employment, she had been mostly unsuccessful as corroborated by correspondence from a recruitment agency and the mother’s former boss [17];
·the mother is the primary carer of the child and is currently unemployed [4];
·the mother is unable to meet her daily living expenses for both her and the child (including the after school activities the child participates in) [9(a)];
·the mother has rental arrears, had obtained a personal loan and had no further borrowing capacity [9(b)]; and
·because the mother had been unable to afford it, her health insurance and car insurance had lapsed [9(c)].
It seems to us, that the primary judge considered the totality of the mother’s circumstances, including that she had primary responsibility for the day to day care of the child who, on the father’s case, was too young to be left alone outside of school hours. It is well settled, that on an application for interim spousal maintenance, the evidence need not be so extensive and the findings not as precise as would be required for final orders (Redman and Redman (1987) FLC 91-805 at 76,081). With those caveats in mind, there was sufficient evidence for the primary judge to be satisfied, as by implication she was, that at present the mother was unable to support herself adequately. It follows that in relation to Ground 5, the father has failed to establish that there is reason to doubt the correctness of the decision to award interim spousal maintenance.
By Ground 6, the father contends that the primary judge erred by failing to give consideration to his obligation to pay child support and meet his own commitments. In support of this challenge, the father relies on s 75(2)(d) as well as s 75(2)(na) of the Act which provide that in an application for spousal maintenance, the Court must consider:
…
(d)commitments of each of the parties that are necessary to enable the party to support:
(i)himself or herself; and
(ii)a child or another person that the party has a duty to maintain; and
…
(na)any child support under the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 that a party to the marriage has provided, is to provide, or might be liable to provide in the future, for a child of the marriage…
As we mentioned earlier it is uncontroversial that between February 2017 and January 2019, the father gave the mother $725 per week for living expenses. In addition, he paid the child’s private school fees, albeit term 3 2018 fees were outstanding. After the mother applied for an administrative assessment for child support, the father was assessed as liable to pay child support in the amount of $347.31 per week. The primary judge correctly noted the mother’s “curious” decision to then apply to the Child Support Agency to end the child support assessment [32]. Her application was accepted and the child support assessment ended as at 22 May 2019. It was on this basis, that the mother pursued her claim for spousal maintenance in the amount of $1,050. The point being, that that amount would include money for the child (Transcript 21 June 2019, p.7 lines 33–38).
The primary judge did not make findings as to the mother’s average weekly expenses, necessary expenses or the like. Rather, on the basis that the mother was unable to support herself adequately, the reasons for judgment focussed on the father’s capacity to pay. On the basis that some of the father’s “other weekly expenses set out in Part N [to his financial statement] could be… trimmed” he was found to have the capacity to pay $850 per week in spousal maintenance [34]. A comparison of the father’s Part N financial statement with that of the mother’s is illuminating and demonstrates that the mother claimed significantly greater expenses, item by item, than the father. For example, she claimed $230 per week for food, $100 for clothing and shoes and $200 for medical expenses. For comparable items, the father claimed $150, $30 and nil. His expenditure on entertainment, hobbies and holidays is also considerably less than that claimed by the mother.
As we have already explained, the finding that the father had “refused to pay child support” [35] is wrong and there is no doubt that the father has a substantial record of paying voluntary child support and that assessed child support only ceased because of actions taken by the mother.
It was not open to the primary judge to proceed as the mother contended and use a claim for spousal maintenance as a mechanism to achieve both spousal maintenance and child support (Stein v Stein (2000) FLC 93-004). Although in interim spousal maintenance determinations a broad brush approach will be tolerated, it cannot be so broad as to render a claim for spousal maintenance and child support indistinguishable. Furthermore, we agree with the submission by the father that the primary judge was obliged to consider the father’s expenses in relation to contact with the child and when she is with him.
In this case, it was incumbent on the primary judge to consider s 75(2)(d) and s 75(2)(na). That has not occurred.

Conclusion and Costs

It follows, that the father has established that the decision as to periodic maintenance is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered. The amount is not insignificant and, on balance, we are satisfied that a substantial injustice would result if leave to appeal were refused. Leave to appeal will thus be given and the appeal against Order 15 will be allowed and the order will thus be set aside.
In the event that the father failed to demonstrate error in relation to the mother’s need for spousal maintenance, at paragraph 7.6 of the father’s Summary of Argument filed 9 December 2019, he conceded that an order for interim spousal maintenance in the amount of $386.69 per week is appropriate. In light of that concession, it will be ordered that pending a remitted rehearing, the father pays interim spousal maintenance in that amount.
The parties were self‑represented throughout the appeal and neither party sought any order for costs against the other. The father sought a costs certificate for the appeal on account of having incurred costs for disbursements in relation to preparation of the appeal, including ordering the trial transcript. Both parties sought costs certificates for the rehearing. The requirements for certificates are met and orders to achieve that outcome will be made.

I certify that the preceding forty-seven (47) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Full Court (Ryan, Aldridge & Kent JJ) delivered on 2 April 2020.

Associate:

Date: 2 April 2020