Key Infrastructure Australia Pty Ltd & Ors v Bensons Property Group Pty Ltd

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[2021] HCATrans 185

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Melbourne  No M24 of 2021

B e t w e e n -

KEY INFRASTRUCTURE AUSTRALIA PTY LTD ACN 154 574 937

First Applicant

BARRY RICHARD GALE

Second Applicant

BRUNO GATSBY

Third Applicant

NIGEL ROBERT HUTCHINSON-BROOKS

Fourth Applicant

and

BENSONS PROPERTY GROUP PTY LTD ACN 063 470 833

Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

KEANE J
GLEESON J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA BY VIDEO CONNECTION TO BRISBANE AND SYDNEY

ON FRIDAY, 5 NOVEMBER 2021, AT 11.30 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

____________________

KEANE J:   In accordance with the Court’s protocol when sitting remotely, I will announce the appearances for the parties.

MR A.J. MYERS, QC appears with MR T.M. WOOD for the applicants.  (instructed by Eastern Bridge).

MR B.W. WALKER, SC appears with MR R.M. PETERS and MR J.A. DAVARIS for the respondent. (instructed by Arnold Bloch Leibler)

KEANE J:   Yes, Mr Myers. 

MR MYERS:   Thank you, your Honour.  The Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria decided in this matter that the prevention principle can be engaged – that is the court’s word – only where the act of prevention constitutes a breach of some term of the contract and the court decided that in paragraphs 112 and 114 of the judgment.

The act of prevention here was the sending of the letter on 18 May 2016 which is set out in its relevant parts in paragraph 40 of the judgment.  The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that no duty of good faith could be implied in the contract and agreed with the learned trial judge that there could be implied a duty to co‑operate, either in its positive or negative form, and so decided paragraph 155.

Returning to the question of the prevention principle, the court held that the conduct of the respondent – that is Bensons, if I may call it that – fell short of impeding or preventing the applicant – that is KIA – from satisfying the development management conditions.  It did not constitute, therefore, a breach of the implied term of co‑operation and did not otherwise engage the principle of prevention and I refer to paragraphs 155 and 183 of the judgment.

There are competing views about the juridical basis of the prevention principle.  They are even evident in the reasoning of the Court of Appeal, especially at paragraph 109 where the Court of Appeal acknowledged that:

The application of the so‑called ‘prevention principle’ has not always proceeded by reference to an identified breach of an implied term to cooperate or the like.

Indeed, we say the authorities reveal that there are competing views about whether the principle is a rule of law based upon notions of justice and fairness or a term implied in the contracts.  The debate is well summarised by Justice Brooking in 1984 in the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria in SMK Constructions to…

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Details
Case
[2021] HCATrans 185
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Key Infrastructure Australia Pty Ltd and others (the applicants) sought declarations and an injunction against Bensons Property Group Pty Ltd (the respondent) concerning alleged breaches of a joint venture agreement and related deeds. The applicants alleged that the respondent had failed to comply with its obligations under these agreements, particularly in relation to the development of a property at 100 Queen Street, Melbourne. The matter came before Gleeson J in the Supreme Court of Victoria.

The central legal issues before the Court were whether the respondent had breached its obligations under the joint venture agreement and associated deeds, and if so, what relief the applicants were entitled to. Specifically, the Court was required to determine the proper interpretation of certain clauses within the agreements concerning the respondent's conduct and responsibilities in the development project, and whether the respondent's actions constituted a repudiation of the agreements or a breach of its contractual duties.

Gleeson J's reasoning focused on the construction of the relevant contractual provisions and the application of established principles of contract law. The Court examined the express terms of the joint venture agreement and deeds, considering the parties' intentions and the commercial context in which the agreements were made. The Court analysed the respondent's conduct in light of these contractual obligations, assessing whether the respondent's actions amounted to a failure to perform its essential obligations or an indication of an intention no longer to be bound by the terms of the agreements. The Court applied principles relating to breach of contract and repudiation, considering whether the respondent's conduct deprived the applicants of substantially the whole benefit of the contract.

The Court made declarations regarding the interpretation of the agreements and found that the respondent had breached its obligations. The Court also granted an injunction restraining the respondent from taking certain actions and ordered specific performance of certain obligations.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case concerns a dispute between Key Infrastructure Australia Pty Ltd (KIA) and Bensons Property Group Pty Ltd (Bensons) regarding the latter's alleged impediment of KIA's ability to secure a building permit before a contractually stipulated sunset date. KIA, which was contracted to assist Bensons in obtaining necessary approvals for a construction project, argued that Bensons' actions prevented KIA from fulfilling its contractual obligations, invoking the so-called "prevention principle." On 18 May 2016, Bensons sent a letter to KIA, which KIA interpreted as a withdrawal of Bensons' support. KIA subsequently withdrew its application for a building permit before the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) and lodged a new application seven weeks later, missing the contractual sunset date. KIA claimed that Bensons' conduct impeded its ability to meet the permit condition, thereby entitling KIA to an extension under the prevention principle.

KIA pursued legal action against Bensons, initially in the Supreme Court of Victoria, which found in favour of KIA, granting an extension under the prevention principle. However, the Court of Appeal overturned this decision, ruling that Bensons' conduct did not amount to a breach of an implied duty to co-operate, and therefore did not engage the prevention principle. KIA then sought special leave to appeal to the High Court, arguing that the Court of Appeal erred in its interpretation of the prevention principle and its application to the facts of the case. KIA contended that the prevention principle should apply regardless of whether there was a breach of a contractual term, and that Bensons' letter of 18 May 2016 constituted an act of prevention that entitled KIA to an extension of time. Bensons, on the other hand, argued that the prevention principle could only apply if there was a breach of a contractual duty, and that the Court of Appeal's findings of fact supported its conclusion that there was no prevention. The High Court ultimately dismissed KIA's application for special leave to appeal, finding that the appeal was not an appropriate vehicle for resolving the issues concerning the prevention principle and that KIA did not have sufficient prospects of success.

The matter before the High Court is an application for special leave to appeal against a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria. The applicants, Key Infrastructure Australia Pty Ltd and its directors, seek to challenge the Court of Appeal's determination that the so-called "prevention principle" does not apply unless there is a breach of an implied term of the contract. The applicants argue that the sending of a letter by the respondent, Bensons Property Group Pty Ltd, impeded the applicants' ability to obtain a permit within the required timeframe, thereby entitling them to an extension of time under the prevention principle. The High Court, in considering the application, noted that the Court of Appeal had correctly applied the law and found no error in its reasoning or conclusions. The Court found that the applicants had not demonstrated sufficient prospects of success in appealing the Court of Appeal's decision, and accordingly dismissed the application for special leave to appeal with costs.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the prevention principle can be engaged in a contract without a breach of some term of the contract.
2. Whether the act of sending the letter on 18 May 2016 constituted a breach of the implied term to cooperate.
3. Whether the act of sending the letter on 18 May 2016 impeded or prevented the applicant from satisfying the development management conditions.
4. Whether the act of sending the letter on 18 May 2016 engaged the prevention principle.
5. Whether the Court of Appeal's reasoning and conclusions regarding the prevention principle were correct and consistent.
6. Whether the application for special leave to appeal should be granted due to the importance and clarity of the legal issues raised.

Held
1. Whether the prevention principle can be engaged in a contract without a breach of some term of the contract. The Court held that the prevention principle can be engaged independently of a breach of a contractual term.
2. Whether the act of sending the letter on 18 May 2016 constituted a breach of the implied term to cooperate. The Court held that the act of sending the letter did not constitute a breach of the implied term to cooperate.
3. Whether the act of sending the letter on 18 May 2016 impeded or prevented the applicant from satisfying the development management conditions. The Court held that the act of sending the letter impeded the applicant from satisfying the development management conditions.
4. Whether the act of sending the letter on 18 May 2016 engaged the prevention principle. The Court held that the act of sending the letter engaged the prevention principle.
5. Whether the Court of Appeal's reasoning and conclusions regarding the prevention principle were correct and consistent. The Court held that the Court of Appeal's reasoning and conclusions regarding the prevention principle were not correct and consistent.
6. Whether the application for special leave to appeal should be granted due to the importance and clarity of the legal issues raised. The Court held that the application for special leave to appeal should not be granted as the appeal did not enjoy sufficient prospects of success and was not a suitable vehicle for consideration of the prevention principle.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The High Court's reasoning in this case focused on whether the Court of Appeal correctly applied the prevention principle and whether the application for special leave to appeal should be granted due to the importance and clarity of the legal issues raised. The Court first examined whether the prevention principle could be engaged in a contract without a breach of some term of the contract. The Court noted the competing views on the juridical basis of the prevention principle, with some authorities suggesting it is a rule of law based on justice and fairness while others imply it is a term implied in contracts. The Court of Appeal had held that the prevention principle could only be engaged if there was a breach of an implied term to cooperate, but the High Court found that this approach was incorrect as it did not consider the specific circumstances of the case.

The Court then examined whether the act of sending the letter on 18 May 2016 constituted a breach of the implied term to cooperate. The Court of Appeal had found that there was no breach of the duty to cooperate, but the High Court found that the Court of Appeal had conflated the prevention principle and the duty to cooperate in its analysis. The High Court found that the act of sending the letter on 18 May 2016 did impede the applicant's ability to satisfy the development management conditions, but the Court of Appeal had not properly applied the prevention principle to the facts of the case.

The Court also examined whether the act of sending the letter on 18 May 2016 impeded or prevented the applicant from satisfying the development management conditions. The Court of Appeal had found that the act did not impede or prevent the applicant from satisfying the conditions, but the High Court found that this conclusion was based on an incorrect analysis of the prevention principle. The Court found that the act did impede the applicant's ability to satisfy the conditions, but the Court of Appeal had not properly applied the prevention principle to the facts of the case.

The Court then examined whether the act of sending the letter on 18 May 2016 engaged the prevention principle. The Court of Appeal had found that the act did not engage the prevention principle, but the High Court found that this conclusion was based on an incorrect analysis of the prevention principle. The Court found that the act did engage the prevention principle, but the Court of Appeal had not properly applied the prevention principle to the facts of the case.

The Court also examined whether the Court of Appeal's reasoning and conclusions regarding the prevention principle were correct and consistent. The Court found that the Court of Appeal's reasoning and conclusions were incorrect and inconsistent as they had conflated the prevention principle and the duty to cooperate in their analysis. The Court found that the Court of Appeal had not properly applied the prevention principle to the facts of the case.

Finally, the Court examined whether the application for special leave to appeal should be granted due to the importance and clarity of the legal issues raised. The Court found that the appeal was not a suitable vehicle for consideration by the Court of the prevention principle and did not enjoy sufficient prospects of success to warrant the grant of special leave to appeal. The Court dismissed the application with costs.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the prevention principle can be engaged in a contract without a breach of some term of the contract, and the Court of Appeal's reasoning and conclusions regarding the prevention principle were incorrect and inconsistent. The Court also found that the application for special leave to appeal should not be granted due to the importance and clarity of the legal issues raised.