NOT SUITABLE FOR DISTRIBUTION
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ) 1 NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY ) NG 248 of 1992
)
GENERAL DIVISION 1
BETWEEN: KETTLE COOKED CHIP CO PTY LIMITED Applicant
AND : CCA SNACK FOODS PTP LIMITED Respondent
CORAM: Burchett J.
PLACE: Sydney
DATE : 8 September 1992
EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BURCHETT J.:
I have been asked to set aside a subpoena issued on behalf of the respondent CCA Snack Foods Pty Limited requiring the production of certain documents by West Coast Snacks Pty Limited. The subpoena is said to be oppressive and unduly burdensome and to require the production of large numbers of documents having no conceivable relevance to the proceeding.
available. So far as relevance is concerned, I am satisfied,
Confidentiality of much of this material is stressed.
So far as confidentiality is concerned, I see no problem about protecting the confidentiality of the documents produced by the usual sorts of confidentiality orders; and I note that counsel for the parties in the litigation do not appear to be at odds about the nature of the protection that could be made
having heard Mr Ellicott explain the way in which he seeks to use the information, that the subpoena should not be set aside on the footing that it is irrelevant.
So far as the burdensomeness of it is concerned, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 are rather wide, but I think there would be no difficulty in severing them in order to enforce them with respect to particular categories of documents falling within their terms. And Mr Ellicott has made it clear that, at any rate at this stage, he would accept documents of a secondary rather than a primary nature falling within the terms of those clauses. It does not appear, at this stage, to be actually necessary that large numbers of invoices should be produced. They must be summarised in appropriate financial statements and books and records and I find it inconceivable that these would not be capable of reduction to a reasonable compass since the business has, in fact, not been in operation for 12 months.
It was also suggested that the subpoena is too vague as regards the commencing time for the activities by reference to which the documents are to be identified. I do not accept that argument. It seems to me that the commencing time is plainly indicated, and that it is from the commencement of the activity of manufacture and sale of a product under the name which is identified in the schedule to the subpoena.
For these reasons, I will not set the subpoena aside. I
will not require, at this stage at any rate, that every original document which could fall within the terms of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 be produced. ~ u t if appropriate documents covering the areas identified in those clauses are not produced, I give Mr Ellicott leave to come back to insist upon further compliance; because I do not think that the width of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 is in itself a ground for setting them aside, in the absence of proof that it is unreasonably burdensome to comply with those paragraphs. I am not at the moment satisfied that that is necessarily so. I think it would be unreasonably burdensome to require more if all that Mr Ellicott reasonably needs can be obtained by way of more summary documents. So I reserve that question.
I order that the subpoena be complied with, that the documents be produced to the court, and that each of the parties to the litigation have access to them only by counsel and his instructing solicitor, and on the basis that they
the information obtained by having access to the documents, (i.e. counsel and his instructing solicitor) will not divulge and will be entitled to take only one copy for their own use of any documents they desire to copy. Any such copy is to be returned to the court at the conclusion of the case. I add as a condition that counsel for the respondent give to the party subpoenaed 48 hours notice of any tender that he proposes to make of any of the documents.
I will not order that a representative of the party subpoenaed be present when the documents are inspected; I do not think that is necessary when I have limited the access in this way. I will not attempt to bind the discretion either of myself or of another judge in regard to the use that may be made of the documents, as I have been requested to do, because the principles are well established; when documents are produced under subpoena, they are produced for the purposes of this litigation only, and any other way they can ever be used is very limited.
I certify that this and the preceding three (3) pages are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of his Honour M r Justice Burchett.
Associate: M- %-, ,L - Date: 8 September 1992
- AGLC
- Kettle Cooked Chip Co P/L CCA Snack Foods P/L [1992] FCA 780
- Case
- [1992] FCA 780
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Justice Burchett determined that the subpoena should not be set aside on the grounds of irrelevance, as the applicant's counsel had explained how he intended to use the information. The court found that the subpoena could be enforced with respect to particular categories of documents by severing the overly broad clauses. Regarding the burdensomeness, the court found that while the subpoena was wide, it was not unreasonably burdensome. The court noted that the business in question had not been operating for 12 months, which made it conceivable that the documents could be reduced to a reasonable compass. The court also rejected the argument that the subpoena was too vague regarding the time period, finding that the starting point was clearly indicated. Therefore, the court concluded that the subpoena should be complied with, subject to certain conditions to protect the confidentiality of the documents and limit their use to the litigation.
The final orders of the court were that the subpoena be complied with and the documents be produced to the court. The parties to the litigation were to have access to the documents only through their counsel and instructing solicitors, with strict conditions on the use and disclosure of the information obtained. The court also ordered that counsel for the respondent provide 48 hours' notice to the subpoenaed party before tendering any documents. The court did not require the presence of a representative from the subpoenaed party during the inspection of the documents, nor did it attempt to bind the discretion of itself or another judge in regard to the use of the documents beyond the scope of the litigation.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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