Kesic v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Kesic v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1270

MIGRATION – application for bridging visa – whether application a valid application – whether applicant an “eligible non-citizen” – whether applicant had not come to the notice of the Department of Immigration as an illegal entrant or an unlawful non-citizen within 45 days of entering Australia – dispute as to date of applicant’s arrival – whether no evidence to justify the decision of the Minister’s delegate that application not a valid application – whether Court can look beyond the material before the decision-maker in reviewing decision of delegate

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 46, 47, 72, 73, 475(1)(c), 476
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) regs 2.07, 2.20, Sch 1 item 1305

Curragh Queensland Mining Limited v Daniel (1992) 34 FCR 212 considered
Yilan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 854; 55 ALD 600 cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Indatissa [2001] FCA 181 applied

MILAN KESIC v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
N 620 of 2001

BRANSON J
SYDNEY
7 SEPTEMBER 2001

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 620 of 2001

BETWEEN:

MILAN KESIC
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

BRANSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

7 SEPTEMBER 2001

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

The application be dismissed.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 620 of 2001

BETWEEN:

MILAN KESIC
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

BRANSON J

DATE:

7 SEPTEMBER 2001

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. The applicant (“Mr Kesic”) is a Serbian citizen of Yugoslavia. He has applied under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) for review by this Court of a decision, made by a delegate of the respondent (“the delegate”) on 9 May 2001, that an application for a bridging visa made by Mr Kesic on 7 May 2001 was not a valid application. The respondent acknowledged that the decision of the delegate was a judicially-reviewable decision within the meaning of s 475 of the Act being a decision of the kind identified in par 475(1)(c).

  2. The only ground of review relied upon by Mr Kesic is that:

    “The Minister’s delegate’s decision was based on a particular fact, namely, that the applicant did not arrive in Australia more than 45 days before coming to the notice of Immigration, and that fact did not exist.  In fact, the applicant arrived in Australia on 23 October 1999, rather than on 13 December 1999 as found by the delegate.”

  3. Section 476 of the Act relevantly provides:

    “(1)… application may be made for review by the Federal Court of a judicially-reviewable decision on any one or more of the following grounds:

    …

    (g)that there was no evidence or other material to justify the making…

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Details
Case
[2001] FCA 1270
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Kesic v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs involved the applicant, Mr Kesic, challenging the decision of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs regarding his application for a protection visa. The dispute centred on the grounds for the refusal of the visa, particularly whether the decision was based on the existence of a particular fact that did not exist, as per section 476(4)(b) of the relevant Act. The Federal Court was tasked with determining whether the decision-maker had sufficient evidence to support the decision and whether the applicant was entitled to place evidence before the Court to establish that a particular fact did not exist.

The legal issues before the court included whether the court could consider evidence not before the decision-maker to determine if there was no evidence or material to justify the decision, and whether the applicant could rely on evidence provided in his statutory declaration and corroborative witnesses to challenge the decision. The court examined the argument that the decision was based on the absence of evidence or material that Mr Kesic had arrived in Australia more than 45 days before coming to the attention of the Department of Immigration, a fact which the applicant denied.

In its reasoning, the court held that while an applicant could place evidence before the Court to establish that a particular fact did not exist, they could not use it to demonstrate that the evidence before the decision-maker was insufficient to justify the decision. The court found that there was a complete absence of evidence or material to support the critical fact upon which the decision was based, but this did not extend to evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence before the decision-maker. Consequently, the court dismissed the application.

The court's final order was that the application be dismissed, thereby upholding the decision of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. The court's decision emphasized the limitations of judicial review in cases of administrative decisions, reaffirming the need for evidence to support the existence of facts upon which decisions are based.

Orders

Orders of the court

The application be dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

BRANSON J

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: BRANSON J

In oral argument it was contended by Mr Leeming that the particular fact upon which the delegate based his decision that did not exist, within the meaning of par 476(4)(b) of the Act, was either -(a)that Mr Kesic (as opposed to his acquaintance) did not mention in his application for the grant of a protection visa that he arrived in Australia on 4 December 1999; or(b)that Mr Kesic had provided no evidence in support of the statement to the effect that he arrived in Australia more than 45 days before he came to the attention of the Department of Immigration. Mr Kesic placed reliance on the detail surrounding his arrival in Australia provided by his statutory declaration and on the provision of the names, addresses and telephone numbers of persons said to be able to corroborate his story.Mr Kesic’s amended application, by contrast, identifies the relevant particular facts as “that the applicant did not arrive in Australia more than 45 days before coming to the notice of Immigration”.CONSIDERATION The argument advanced by Mr Leeming involved, as I understand the argument, the proposition that this Court, in determining whether there was “no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision” within the meaning of par 476(1)(g) of the Act, is entitled to look beyond the material before the decision-maker. In my view, on the present state of the authorities, it is plain that an applicant who can establish -(a)“that there was no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision”; and(b)that “the person who made the decision based the decision on the existence of a particular fact”,is entitled to place evidence before the Court to establish that the fact did not exist (Curragh Queensland Mining Limited v Daniel (1992) 34 FCR 212 (“Curragh”) per Black CJ, with whom Spender and Gummow JJ agreed, at 223- 224; Yilan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (FC) [1999] FCA 854 at [57]; 55 ALD 600 at 603). However, I do not consider that the authorities provide support for the view that evidence can be placed before the Court for the purpose of demonstrating that the evidence or other material before the decision-maker was insufficient to justify the making of the decision. In Curragh at 221-222 Black CJ, who was concerned with provisions in the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) comparable to the “no evidence” provisions of s 476 of the Act, said:“… to make out a ground under s 5(1)(h) there must be an absence of evidence or other material of a particular fact upon which the decision was based. It is not necessary in this case to explore the question whether, consistently with an intention that may be revealed, by s 5(3)(a), it will be enough to show, in a case in which s 5(3)(b) is relied upon, an absence of evidence or other material from which the decision-maker could reasonably be satisfied that the particular fact existed or whether, in relation to that fact, there must be a complete absence of any evidence or other material; in my view there was a complete absence of any evidence or other material from which the existence of the critical fact about Curragh’s capacity to have a later date for supply of coal could be established.”