Kerrison & Kerrison
[2022] FedCFamC1A 37
•14 March 2022
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1) APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Kerrison & Kerrison [2022] FedCFamC1A 37
Appeal from: Kerrison & Kerrison [2021] FCCA 1607 Appeal number(s): NOA 42 of 2021 File number(s): BRC 9041 of 2017 Judgment of: ALDRIDGE J Date of judgment: 14 March 2022 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – COSTS – Appeal from the dismissal of an application for costs – Where the mother alleges that father improperly failed to concede that consent orders did not in fact record the consent of the parties and should have been amended by the primary judge – Factors taken into account – Adequacy of reasons – Weight challenges – Findings open to the primary judge – No error of law established – Appeal dismissed. Legislation: Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) r 10.13, 10.14, 13.53
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 117
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 16.05
Cases cited: Thorpe & Stirling (2021) FLC 94-066; [2021] FedCFamC1A 86 Number of paragraphs: 93 Date of hearing: 14 December 2021 Place: Brisbane (via video link), delivered in Sydney Counsel for the Appellant: Mr Blond Solicitor for the Appellant: Pharmacis Canning Lawyers The Respondent: Litigant in person ORDERS
NOA 42 of 2021
BRC 9041 of 2017FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DIVISION 1 APPELLATE JURISDICTIONBETWEEN: MS KERRISON
Appellant
AND: MR KERRISON
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
ALDRIDGE J
DATE OF ORDER:
14 MARCH 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Kerrison & Kerrison has been approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ALDRIDGE J:
INTRODUCTION
Ms Kerrison (“the mother”) and Mr Kerrison (“the father”) have been involved in protracted parenting proceedings concerning their three children (one child aged 8 years old and two children aged 6 years old) for some time. Most recently, on 23 December 2020, final orders were made on an undefended basis for the children to live with the mother who was to have sole parental responsibility for them. They were to spend time with the father as agreed.
Following the making of those orders, the mother sought an order that the father pay her costs incurred between 9 October 2020 and 20 January 2021 in the sum of $38,501.81. Although it is not entirely clear, it seems that the mother sought the payment of the sums she had actually paid her lawyers. Her application, therefore, was for the payment of indemnity costs.
That application was dismissed on 16 July 2021 because the primary judge was not satisfied that, in all of the circumstances, the making of the costs order sought was justified.
This is an appeal from that decision.
A primary plank of the mother’s appeal is that his Honour failed to take into account that the costs claimed were incurred because the father improperly failed to concede that supposedly consent orders made on 15 October 2020 did not in fact record the consent of the parties and should have been amended under r 16.05 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (“the slip rule”) (now r 10.13 and r 10.14 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Rules 2021 (Cth)).
Therefore, in order to understand this contention, it is necessary to delve into the relevant history of the proceedings.
BACKGROUND
On 3 June 2019, consent orders were made for the children to live with the mother who was to have sole parental responsibility for them. They were to spend time with the father including four blocks of seven days during school holidays.
The orders did not work well and applications asserting a slew of some 70–80 contraventions followed.
The contravention applications were listed for 9 October 2020. Instead of dealing with those matters, the hearing morphed into an interim parenting hearing as the primary judge, quite properly, attempted to refine the orders so as to make them work in the best interests of the children and to avoid the disputes that had given rise to the contraventions.
The present dispute focuses on the time the children were to spend with the father during the school holidays and, in particular, the Christmas holidays. In short, the mother’s contention in the appeal is that she agreed with the father that the children should spend a block of 10 days with him at Christmas and that the primary judge indicated he would make such an order. However, when the order was made it provided for the children to spend half of the holidays, some 20 days, with the father. That is the order she asserts that the father should have agreed had been wrongly made and consented to variation of the order under the slip rule.
On 9 October 2020, the primary judge took submissions on variations to the orders for the holiday time. After the short school holidays were discussed, the focus moved to the Christmas holidays.
The solicitor for the mother said that his client would only agree to seven days.
Counsel for the father then pressed for half of the Christmas holidays.
After further exchanges, the solicitor for the mother said:
[SOLICITOR FOR THE MOTHER]: …Your Honour, on the issue of holidays, my client has moved a little bit to concede to 10 days [in] the Christmas period, seven/seven and then 10, due to the two younger ones.
(Transcript 9 October 2020, p.41 lines 32–34)
The primary judge said to the father’s counsel “there has been an offer to increase the Christmas time. I would probably go with that, at present” (Transcript 9 October 2020, p.43 lines 35–36).
After an extensive discussion of the changeover location, his Honour said “[a]nd I’ve indicated that the offer for Christmas holidays, until I can do something else, is probably what I would be making” (Transcript 9 October 2020, p.49 lines 6–8).
His Honour and counsel for the father then had the following exchange:
[COUNSEL FOR THE FATHER]: … Just for clarity, your Honour was minded to do what on the Christmas school holidays, so that I’ve got it clear?
…
HIS HONOUR: I’m happy with the offer of the 10-day block at this stage because it does increase the father’s time, and I’m happy with the half holidays for the other ---
…
HIS HONOUR: You just have to work out which halves.
(Transcript 9 October 2020, p.49 lines 23–31)
At this point his Honour had indicated that the short school holidays would be equally shared and that the children would spend a block of 10 days with the father during the Christmas holidays.
Again, after asking the parties to agree, the primary judge added:
HIS HONOUR: If they can’t come to a decision on that, I will just – first half can go with the father, second half with the mother.
…
HIS HONOUR: Christmas day and everything is already taken, but that might not suit them. So, I’m allowing them to come to the decision to suit them. If not, there’s no advantage otherwise to me. So I will just say first half in – what are we in – even-numbered years with the father, second half in odd-numbered years.
(Transcript 9 October 2020, p.50 lines 6–9)
The father submitted that the reference to Christmas day indicated that his Honour had returned to the issue of Christmas holidays and was suggesting equal time for the parties. That is probably not correct, but the position is not entirely clear. This comment and the view of the father as to the meaning of this passage may be the source of the confusion that followed.
The matter was then stood down so the parties could discuss the matters that had been raised. On return, the parties had not agreed on all of the orders including orders as to time and changeover location, which remained in dispute. Those disputes were resolved by his Honour who then asked to be emailed a draft of the proposed orders. A reasonable inference to be drawn is that, at least as far as the Court was concerned, the issue of holiday time had been resolved.
On 12 October 2020, the father’s solicitor sent the draft orders to the mother’s solicitor asking for agreement to send them to the primary judge. Proposed Order 7 was in the following terms:
7.The children shall spend time with their Father from 5pm on 26 December 2020 until 5.00pm on 6 January 2021 after which the Father’s time with the children shall recommence on Friday 15 January 2021 at 5.00pm and each alternate week thereafter.
(Mother’s affidavit filed on 3 December 2020, Exhibit “[Ms Kerrison4”)
That is, for half of the holidays and not the 10 day block first identified by the primary judge. The time to be spent with the children was an issue as the school holidays were about to start.
Upon request, a Word version of the draft orders was sent to the mother’s solicitor the following day.
On 14 October 2020, the father’s solicitor again wrote to the mother’s solicitor saying that they had received no response to the two emails that had been sent and advised they would seek the relisting of the matter. Shortly after receiving the email, the mother’s solicitor said that he would respond by 5.00 pm the following day. The father’s solicitors responded, declining the request for an extension and advised that an email would be sent to the primary judge’s chambers since no response had been received.
Later that day, the draft orders were sent to the primary judge’s chambers by the father’s solicitors, noting that the orders were not agreed and sought the urgent relisting of the matter as time with the father was due to commence two days later (Mother’s affidavit filed on 3 December 2020, Exhibit “[Ms Kerrison]9”).
The mother’s solicitor also wrote to the chambers of the primary judge pointing out his client’s difficulties with the orders and raising the accuracy of the way that Order 7 was drafted.
On 15 October 2020, the primary judge made the orders contained in the draft Minute of Order in chambers, but dated them 9 October 2020.
Also on 15 October 2020, his Honour’s associate wrote to the parties saying:
I confirm that [the primary judge] has published an Order today in accordance with what his Honours intention was on 9 October 2020.
I further confirm that [the primary judge] will not re-list the matter and [the primary judge] expects the parties to comply with his Orders.
(Mother’s affidavit filed on 3 December 2020, Exhibit “[Ms Kerrison]13”)
It is not known why the primary judge made the orders that he did given the content of the various letters that had been sent to his chambers. It is worth repeating that the lawyers for the father had not described the orders provided as being consent orders and did not ask for them to be made, but rather sought a relisting. The mother’s solicitor had raised difficulties with the proposed orders.
On 16 October 2020, the primary judge’s associate informed the parties that he would not amend the orders as to holiday time unless it was by consent.
The matter was then listed for mention on 7 December 2020.
This course of events was unfortunate and regrettable. Whilst the father’s solicitors did not propound their orders as consent orders, the primary judge was entitled to take them as the father’s solicitor’s understanding of the orders that the primary judge ruled on as well, as those by consent. The mother’s solicitor did not respond to the father’s solicitor before the orders were sent to his Honour’s chambers, but did object in writing to the orders before they were made. This ought to have alerted the primary judge to the issue and, as painful as it was, the matter should have been relisted. As no reasons were given it is not known why the order as to Christmas time was made. This highlights the difficulties in conducting litigation by email.
Accordingly, the mother was rightly aggrieved. It is to be recorded however, that the order simply required the children to spend 10 more days with the father in the Christmas holidays, in circumstances where it was not suggested that the father posed any risk to them. The mother merely suggested that was too much time too soon.
The mother did not appeal.
The mother’s solicitor then obtained a copy of the transcript of 9 October 2020 and asked the father’s solicitor to agree to vary the orders.
On 18 November 2020, the mother’s solicitor wrote to the father, who was now representing himself, saying:
We confirm that our client is prepared to provide you the children commencing 26 December 2020 for ten days.
This was the order that was reached by consent on 9 October and despite continued correspondence that included references from the transcript of the proceedings, your solicitor has failed to acknowledge that this was the agreement reached between the parties.
(Mother’s affidavit filed on 3 December 2020, Exhibit “[Ms Kerrison]24”)
The wife’s proposal, apparently endorsed by her solicitor, was that she was entirely free to ignore the orders of the Court and to proceed on her understanding of the agreement. That the mother’s solicitor should endorse or propound such a course is extraordinary and contrary to his obligations as an officer of the Court.
On 2 December 2020, again in complete defiance of the orders, the wife’s solicitors wrote to the father saying the children would not be made available for school holiday time “because the orders to which you seek to enforce were not agreed to by the parties” (Mother’s affidavit filed on 3 December 2020, Exhibit “[Ms Kerrison]30”).
At the hearing on 7 December 2020, the matter moved from a consideration of the application of the slip rule, to the question of which order should now be made. After counsel for the mother accepted that there was no risk of harm to the children in the father’s care, his Honour said “[t]here is no risk for a 10 day period. I’m going to make another 10 day period” (Transcript 7 December 2020, p.13 lines 9–10).
Orders were made accordingly and this was is in effect for half of the Christmas holidays.
The mother appealed against these orders and sought a stay of them pending the determination of the appeal. The appeal extended to a number of orders other than those dealing with holiday time.
An application for a stay was listed for hearing on 23 December 2020 when the father withdrew from the proceedings. The parenting orders then made rendered the appeal and the stay application redundant.
The mother then filed her application for costs, which was dismissed on 16 July 2021.
THE APPEAL
The mother raises three grounds of appeal.
Did the primary judge apply s 117(2A) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), and if so, was it correctly applied? (Ground 1)
In proceedings under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”), parties are to bear their own costs unless the Court is of the opinion that there are circumstances that justify it, in which case the Court may make such orders as to costs as it considers just (s 117(2) of the Act). In undertaking such a consideration, the Court shall have regard to the matters set out in s 117(2A) of the Act.
As I understand the mother’s submissions, they are that the approach to costs taken by his Honour is “not consistent with the way the Court determines an application for costs” (Mother’s Summary of Argument filed on 19 November 2021, paragraph 73) and that the primary judge failed to address the conduct of the father.
Turning to the reasons for judgment, after some introductory paragraphs, the primary judge sets out the history of the various contravention applications at [24]–[74]. His Honour discussed the amount sought at [79]–[90] before turning to a discussion of s 117 of the Act, commencing at [91]. The financial circumstances of the parties were considered at [94]–[106], legal aid issues at [107]–[110], conduct of the parties at [111]–[113], failure to comply with orders at [114], success at [115]–[117], offers at [118] and other matters at [119].
His Honour brought these matters together at [120]–[155] before concluding:
156.That a parenting dispute is bitter is not a situation which causes the court to form the opinion that a costs order ought to be made in the mother’s favour, especially for such a large figure incurred over a very short space of time. Nor does the father’s withdrawal suggest a circumstance which affects the mother’s decision to expend so much money on legal costs or vindicate her spending on her case, so as to justify the costs sought, especially since he is paying his child support. That he claimed he was bankrupted is also of concern as would be his ability to continue paying child support if the costs sought by the mother were made. Considering these and all of the matters I have referred to, and not being referred to any other matter of an outstanding nature which would assist in forming the opinion that a costs order is justified, I will dismiss the mother’s application.
That seems to be an entirely orthodox approach to the determination of the costs application.
The mother’s counsel focused, in particular, on the following paragraph, which is part of a number of paragraphs discussing the public policy which lies behind s 117 of the Act.
130.It is a positive direction in that the court needs to form an “opinion that there are circumstances that justify” a costs order, not an opinion that there not be a costs order. There usually has to be more than mere success in a case, although in some cases success alone could justify the costs order.
In this passage, the primary judge identifies that any costs order must be based on the relevant circumstances. That is simply what the legislation requires and no error is identified.
The mother also submitted that the primary judge failed to address the conduct of the father that caused the mother to incur the claimed legal costs. It is helpful, first, to record those costs in summary:
(1)9 October 2020 – Court appearance – $2,000;
(2)31 October 2020 – Correspondence – $3,242.35;
(3)7 December 2020 – Counsel’s preparation and conference – $4,400;
(4)10 December 2020 – Communications with counsel in respect of the father’s application, slip rule application, contravention application and appeal – $6,792.34;
(5)18 December 2020 – Drafting of the stay appeal – $15,125;
(6)22 December 2020 – Correspondence in respect of the stay appeal – $742.50;
(7)4 January 2021 – Preparation of Application in a Case and correspondence – $1,611.50; and
(8)20 January 2021 – Drafting submissions and conference – $2,420.
The January 2021 items refer to the preparation of the costs application itself. The amounts referred to on 18 December 2020 and 22 December 2020 refer to the appeal from the orders of 7 December 2020, where the primary judge reconsidered the Christmas holiday time.
It is difficult to see how these costs flow from the conduct of the father which was identified in the mother’s written submissions to the primary judge as:
34.The Father whilst legally represented contested the Mother’s application of the 7th of December and the stay application on the 23rd of December 2020.
35.The Mother was forced to incur the expense of obtaining the transcripts for the hearings on 9/10/2020 and 7/12/2020 based on the Father’s refusal to concede undeniable evidence that confirmed the veracity of both the Mother’s applications.
36.The consent orders entered into by the parties on the 9th of October 2020 had been incorrectly stated in the orders made by the Court.
37. The draft orders sent to the Court by both the Mother’s and Father’s Solicitor’s correctly stated the parties had agreed to a 10 day block of holidays in the Christmas period.
38. The transcript of the 9th of October 2020 undeniably confirmed this to be the case, as did the draft orders emailed to the Court by the Father’s solicitor and Mother’s solicitor.
39. The Father maintained a position that was untenable to evidence, which forced the Mother to make the application on the 7th of December 2020.
40.On the 7th of December 2020, Counsel for the Father made submissions that were inconsistent with the version of consent orders sent to the Court by Counsel’s instructor.
(Mother’s written submissions filed on 21 January 2021, paragraphs 34–40)
There are some difficulties with these contentions. As I have sought to explain, it appears the parties did not agree on the position for Christmas holidays at the hearing on 9 October 2020, although both parties thought there had been agreement, but differed as to what it was. Significantly, the primary judge had indicated that he was likely to make an order for a block of 10 days as proposed by the mother.
For whatever reason, and there are a number of possibilities, the father’s proposed orders did not reflect that indication but proposed a regime for equal time at Christmas. However, the father’s lawyers did not propound them as consent orders, merely as their understanding of what had been resolved at the hearing, and sought a relisting of the matter, so that the orders could be sought in Court.
It is therefore not correct to describe the orders as consent orders.
Further, it is plain that on 7 December 2020, the primary judge did not proceed on the basis that he was putting into effect a position agreed or arrived at on 9 October 2020 but rather, imposing a solution upon the parties which his Honour considered was in the best interests of the children on that date, albeit that was along the lines proposed by the father. That was the act of the primary judge and not of the father.
Thus, at best, the relevant conduct of the father could only relate to the costs claimed for 9 October 2020 and 31 October 2020 and possibly 7 December 2020.
The father’s conduct was expressly taken into account by his Honour at [112(b) and (c)]. At [155] the primary judge said:
155.In my view, this is the parents continuing a war of attrition against each other, and the children are the losers, so much so that consent orders were disputed as to what consent was given. I formed no view that the orders made formed some type of risk to the children, other than them being caught between the parents. The court is not in a position to accept claims that the father’s positon has been vengeful and designed to cause the mother to incur substantial costs. He could equally claim that of the mother.
Thus, it is clear that the father’s conduct was taken into account even though it was not given the weight the mother considered appropriate.
The mother submitted that on 23 December 2020, the primary judge made a comment in which he accepted that an error had been made in the October 2020 orders. His Honour said:
HIS HONOUR: … But it would also be a fairly hard discretion to exercise in not correcting what clearly was on my mind on the day. Now, you know, I don’t know how the errors get into orders, but they often get into orders.
(Transcript 23 December 2020, p.25 lines 10–13)
The nature of the possible error is not identified but earlier the primary judge had spoken as to the possibility of lack of reasons as being a potential issue on appeal. That, however, suggests that the primary judge regarded the relevant decision as being his and not the implementation of a consent position. If indeed, the error was that of the primary judge, it is difficult to see how that supports the mother’s application for costs.
This ground has not been made out.
Were the reasons adequate? (Ground 2)
In determining whether reasons for judgment are adequate, the Full Court in Thorpe & Stirling (2021) FLC 94-066 said:
7.As has frequently been observed, it is of fundamental importance that a judge’s findings and the ultimate conclusion reached are explained in a way that sufficiently exposes the path of reasoning. Failure to do so will constitute an error of law (see for example DL v The Queen (2018) 266 CLR 1 at [32]–[33] and [130]–[131]; Bennett and Bennett (1991) FLC 92-191; Landon & Landon [2021] FedCFamC1A 42; Pollard v RRR Corporation Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 110).
8.If the judge’s reasoning process is readily discernible, the reasons will be adequate.
The mother’s primary submission was that the reasons were inadequate because they were wrong in some respects. However, reasons may be adequate, in that the reasoning process can clearly be seen, but be wrong. The submission cannot be accepted.
The mother also submitted that the reasons do not explain why the primary judge took an adverse view of the mother but not the father.
What then was the adverse view taken of the mother?
First, the mother relied on the following comment early in his Honour’s reasons when giving a history of the matter:
15.… The position was possibly summed up by [Ms Q], who stated in her Report of 29 May 2019 that the mother had some obsessive tendencies and needed to step back to allow the father to parent his way, not according to her rules.
His Honour followed this by saying that “[Ms Q’s] view, although an expert view, was never tested and cannot be taken to be the fact” (at [18]).
Despite the express denial of reliance by the primary judge on that opinion and despite the fact that the opinion is never referred to again, counsel for the mother submitted that his Honour did in fact take it into account and that it had infected the entire judgment.
An appellant who seeks to dispute a trial judge’s statement that a particular matter was or was not taken into account faces a high hurdle. It must be clearly shown that, indeed, the trial judge has done what he or she has said they did not do. I am quite unable to see anywhere in his Honour’s reasons where any “obsessive tendencies” of the mother were taken into account, let alone given weight or where they “infected the judgment”.
This submission fails.
Secondly, it was suggested that his Honour’s approach to the contravention applications demonstrated an adverse view of the mother and was given excessive weight.
The primary judge recorded that the mother filed eight contravention applications between 9 October 2019 and 10 December 2020 which raised 53 separate contraventions, although there was suggestion that this was a compilation of all of the applications (at [69]). His Honour recorded that “many of the alleged contraventions, eventually numbering between 70 and 80 because more were filed, were the same allegations occurring on different dates” (at [51]).
The father filed six contravention applications between 19 December 2019 and 11 August 2020 which raised 18 alleged contraventions.
His Honour noted that none of them had been dealt with other than to be dismissed after the father withdrew from the proceedings.
At [113] the primary judge found that the contravention applications, which raised matters of an apparently minor nature, filed by both parties, had caused costs to increase.
His Honour said that the “court was flooded with the mother’s alleged contraventions” (at [123]). This led to the following conclusion:
144. The number of contravention applications by the mother is striking.
145. They have come in quick succession and are all very similar.
146.That she was prepared to put so many, so quickly before the court, when many could have been combined or a few alleged, especially of the more serious type, to deal with issues of not following orders, is a matter for her and her alone with regard to the costs of such an undertaking and the costs she was prepared to pay.
147.Her case is that she now wants a fixed cost order of $38,501.81 to compensate her for the matters allegedly between 9 October 2020 and 23 December 2020, but costs she has incurred flowed from the fact that she brought so many contravention applications. She views the father as dragging out proceedings, but I could not come to a conclusion that she is not part of the lengthy proceedings. I make no determination on whether the proceedings have been dragged out other than my observations that some contraventions appeared minor in nature, and much material has been filed over the life of the whole of the matter before the court.
148.Without having the opportunity to hear the parties under cross-examination, there is the strong possibility that the father’s filing of contraventions was in response to the mother’s filing of so many contraventions.
149.The court will not know the answer to that question, however, the court can see the number of contraventions filed by the mother, and determine that there could have been a lot less filed, dealing with the most serious alleged breaches, which may have seen a very different outcome as to the course of the proceeding.
150.That the mother undertook to spend so much cannot be said to be the fault of the father in circumstances when no findings have been made either against him on her contravention applications or against her on his contravention applications. In very simple terms, orders were made because the matter was bought back to court and the children were not spending time with the father pursuant to the final orders.
151.That she undertook to spend so much money is a matter between herself and her legal advisers.
The point of this is to highlight the costs that had been incurred. To the extent that this reflected adversely on the mother, that was a finding that was open to his Honour on the evidence. No submissions were made to suggest that these paragraphs are erroneous.
I am quite unable to see where the primary judge otherwise formed an erroneous and adverse view of the mother. Indeed, the primary judge was not at all impressed with the conduct of either party.
Thus, the premise for this submission, that the primary judge formed an adverse view of the mother but not the father, has not been made out.
This ground does not succeed.
Did the primary judge err by taking into account an irrelevant matter, mistake the facts or fail to take into account material considerations? (Ground 3)
The mother raised the following matters under this ground, which are said to show the primary judge erred by:
(1)Failing to take into account the father’s conduct;
(2)Taking into account the contraventions as the primary consideration; and
(3)Taking into account Ms Q’s opinion.
All these matters have already been addressed and were clearly and appropriately considered or not taken into account.
It remains to say something about the contraventions.
It was first submitted that they were entirely irrelevant to the issue as to the costs claimed, as the costs did not relate to any contraventions. However, s 117(2A) of the Act requires the Court to take into account conduct in relation to the proceedings. A cavalier attitude towards increasing the costs of proceedings is a relevant consideration.
The submission then became that the primary judge had afforded too much weight to the contraventions. Such submissions are difficult to make good because the asserted inappropriate weight must lead to a result that is unreasonable or plainly wrong.
The mother’s submissions did not seek to grasp that nettle. Here, where the difficulty arises from the events of 9 October 2020 and shortly thereafter, it arose from a gallimaufry of events, including the intransigence of both parties and the obvious difficulties in their solicitors communicating with each other and the Court. The outcome is not unreasonable or plainly wrong.
The appeal will be dismissed.
COSTS
The appeals registrar has made procedural orders as to the filing of costs schedules on 10 January 2022 for any party wishing to seek costs.
I certify that the preceding ninety (90) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Aldridge. Associate:
Dated: 14 March 2022
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