Kernich v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth)

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

DEBELLE J

Social welfare - social security payments - offences - appellant received Social Security payments - payments in excess of amount to which the appellant was entitled - convicted of nine offences - sentenced to 3 months' imprisonment - ordered to repay $3,600.85 - whether the sentence of imprisonment should have been suspended - gross delay in institution of prosecution -appeal allowed - sentence of imprisonment suspended upon appellant entering a security in the sum of $750 to be of good behaviour for 3 years and to make reparation. Social Security Act, 1991s1347(b), referred to. House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; R v Todd (1982) 2 NSWLR 513, applied. R v Suckling (1983) 33 SASR 133, discussed. Laxton v Justice (1985) 38 SASR 376; R v Vasin (1985) 39 SASR 45; Reimann v Robinson (unreported decision of Matheson J delivered 25 November 1987); David v Marcelline (unreported decision of Duggan J 20 May 1991); Flavel v Venning (unreported decision of Olsson J Jdt No 3507, 16 July 1992), considered.

ADELAIDE, 21 January, 18 February 1997 (hearing), 18 February 1997 (decision)

#DATE 18:2:1997

Appellant:

Counsel: Mr P Humphries

Solicitors: Reilly Basheer Downs & Humphries

Respondent:

Counsel: Mr Bonnici

Solicitors: DPP (Cwlth)

Appeal allowed.

DEBELLE J

1. This is an appeal against sentence.

2. On 26 November 1996 the appellant was convicted, on his plea of guilty, of nine offences of knowingly obtaining payment of a Social Security payment in excess of the amount to which he was duly entitled, contrary to s.1347(b) of the Social Security Act 1991. The magistrate imposed one sentence in respect of all nine offences, a sentence of 3 months imprisonment. In addition the magistrate ordered the appellant to repay the sum of $3,600.85 illegally obtained by him. The magistrate declined to accede to a submission the sentence should be suspended. She ordered that the sentence be served forthwith.

3. The appellant has appealed on the ground that the sentence was manifestly excessive and on the ground that the magistrate should have ordered a suspended sentence. When the appeal came on for hearing, Mr Humphries, who appeared for the appellant, abandoned the ground that the sentence was manifestly excessive. That decision was very properly made. The penalty was well within the range for this kind of offending. It is sufficient for present purposes to refer to the decisions of this court in Laxton v Justice (1985) 38 SASR 376, R v Vasin (1985) 39 SASR 45, Reimann v Robinson (unreported decision of Matheson J delivered on 25 November 1987), David v Marcelline (unreported decision of Duggan J, 20 May 1991) and Flavel v Venning (unreported decision of Olsson J, Jdt No S3507, delivered on 16 July 1992). Nothing is to be gained by repeating all of the factors mentioned in those cases. Those factors apply with equal force to the circumstances of this case. It is sufficient to note…

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Details
Case
[1997] SASC 6050
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Supreme Court of South Australia, the appellant, Mr Leslie Kernich, appealed against his sentence for nine offences of obtaining social security payments in excess of the amount to which he was entitled, contrary to the Social Security Act 1991. The magistrate had sentenced him to three months imprisonment and ordered him to repay $3,600.85. The appellant argued that the sentence was manifestly excessive and that the sentence should have been suspended. The court needed to decide if the sentence was within the appropriate range for such offences and whether the magistrate should have suspended the sentence.

The court found that the penalty was well within the range for this kind of offending, citing previous cases. The court noted the prevalence of such offences, the difficulty in detecting them, and the need for penalties to reflect a concern for the protection of revenue. The court also noted that frauds of this kind must be viewed seriously and that a deterrent penalty is generally called for. However, the court found that the exceptional delay in instituting the prosecution, a considerable part of which is unexplained, justified interfering with the magistrate's discretion. The delay allowed the appellant to take steps towards his own rehabilitation, which would be jeopardized by imprisonment. The court concluded that fairness required that the appellant's prospects of rehabilitation not be jeopardized by the Departmental delay.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence of imprisonment was suspended, subject to the appellant entering into a bond to be of good behaviour for a period of three years, making reparation, and being subject to the supervision of a probation officer for two years. The respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs fixed at $150 and any disbursements reasonably incurred.

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