KENNEDY v HILL & ORS
[1999] SASC 122
Civil: DOYLE CJ.
Introduction
The plaintiff is the executor of the will of Thelma Joyce Hill (“the deceased”).
The plaintiff has applied to the court for approval of a course of action that he proposes to take in performing his obligations as executor of the will of the deceased.
As will appear, I consider that the parties have not adequately distinguished between the different powers of the court that have been invoked. By this I mean the distinction between the power of the court to give advice and directions under s69 of the Administration and Probate Act 1919, and under s91 of the Trustee Act 1936 on the one hand, and the power to make a final determination of rights as between parties under r63.04 and r103.02 of the Supreme Court Rules: see generally In the estate of Hunter deceased [1957] SASR 194 and In the estate of Martin deceased [1958] SASR 365. However, all of the relevant parties are before me and there has been no suggestion that I should not decide the issue presented to me. Accordingly, I propose to do so.
The issue is whether an agreement entered into between the executor and Mrs Keast, a beneficiary under the will, has been repudiated by Mrs Keast, and whether the executor should now proceed on that basis, and carry out contracts with two other beneficiaries.
The agreement is for the sale to Mrs Keast of certain shares and an interest in land.
The parties have put before me correspondence that has passed between them. I heard brief oral evidence of a conversation between the executor’s solicitor and Mrs Keast’s solicitor. I will summarise that evidence shortly.
Legal Principles
To provide a background for what follows, I propose to say something first about the issue of law that arises.
A party to a contract is said to repudiate the contract if the party indicates, before the time for performance arrives, that the party will not be ready and willing to perform at the appointed time. If that occurs, the other party can accept that repudiation and terminate the contract without waiting for the time for performance to arrive. Such a repudiation, occurring before the time for performance has arrived, is called an anticipatory breach of the contract.
In the present case the issue is whether Mrs Keast, through her solicitor, has refused to perform obligations to which she agreed, or has attached conditions or qualifications to her agreement that amount, in substance, to a refusal to perform according to the tenor of the agreement.
The case is not one in which there is a refusal to perform, or an argument about, a particular condition. The executor’s case is that Mrs Keast has wholly repudiated her obligations.
In deciding whether there has been an anticipatory breach of the contract, the court must assess the conduct of the parties in its context, but must judge it objectively, or as a reasonable person…
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- Case
- [1999] SASC 122
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