Kennedy & McDermott
[2007] FMCAfam 524
•26 July 2007
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| KENNEDY & McDERMOTT | [2007] FMCAfam 524 |
| CHILD SUPPORT – Departure order – administrative assessment. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Discovery – meaning of full and frank disclosure – full and frank disclosure not provided. |
| Child Support (Assessment) Act, 1989 (Cth), s.117 Federal Magistrates Act, 1999 (Cth), s.45(1) Federal Magistrates Court Rules, 2001 (Cth) rr. 24.02(1)(a), 24.03, 25A.03, 25A.08 |
| Black v Kellner (1992) FLC 92-287 Genovese v BGC Construction Pty Ltd [2006] FMCA 1507 |
| Applicant: | PAUL ANTHONY KENNEDY |
| Respondent: | GAYLE MCDERMOTT |
| File Number: | MLC 1038 of 2007 |
| Judgment of: | Lucev FM |
| Hearing date: | 22 June 2007 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 22 June 2007 |
| Delivered at: | Brisbane (by telephone to Melbourne) |
| Delivered on: | 26 July 2007 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Baker |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | LG Yves Michel & Co. |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr Hoult |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Hardys |
THE COURT ORDERS:
All extant applications be adjourned to 10.00 am on 30 August 2007 for hearing of two (2) days before FM Lucev.
Within 21 days the Applicant produce to the Respondent the documents requested in the letter from the Respondent’s Solicitors on 27 April 2007.
Within 21 days the Applicant provide to the Respondent copies of documents in accordance with Schedule A attached hereto, unless copies have already been provided subsequent to production in accordance with Order 2 herein.
The Applicant serve a copy of these orders on the Child Support Registrar.
Costs reserved.
AND THE COURT DECLARES under s.45 of the Federal Magistrate Act, 1999 (Cth) that it is appropriate in the interests of the administration of justice to allow discovery in this matter.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE |
MLC 1038 of 2007
| PAUL ANTHONY KENNEDY |
Applicant
And
| GAYLE MCDERMOTT |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Interim Orders made for Discovery
The Court made interim orders for discovery in this matter in Melbourne on 22 June 2007, and indicated that it would deliver written reasons for judgment at a later date. These are those written reasons for judgment.
Application
The Applicant Father’s application for a child support departure order was filed on 23 March 2007 (“the Application”).
Grounds for Departure and Order sought
The grounds for departure under s.117 of the Child Support (Assessment) Act, 1989 (Cth) are set out in the Application as follows:
That, in the special circumstances of the case, application in relation to the child of provisions of this Act relation to administrative assessment of child support would result in an unjust and inequitable determination of the level of financial support to be provided by the liable parent for the child:
(i) because of the income, earning capacity, property and financial resources of either parent or the child; or
(ii) because of any payments, and any transfer or settlement of property, made or to be made (whether under this Act, the Family Law Act 1975 or otherwise) by the liable parent to the child, to the carer entitled to child support or to any other person for the benefit of the child; or
(iii) because an amount (the additional amount) of a liable parent’s child support income amount was earned, derived or received by the liable parent for the benefit of a resident child or resident children of the liable parent; or
(iv) because an amount (the additional amount) of an entitles carer’s child support income amount was earned, derived or received by the entitles carer for the benefit of a resident child or resident children of the entitled carer.
(Transcribed from original without amendment)
The Applicant seeks an order that the Court deems just and equitable.
The Applicant Father filed a financial statement on 23 March 2007 (“Applicant’s Financial Statement”). The Applicant Father says that he is an unemployed manager.[1]
[1] Applicant’s Financial Statement, Questions 3 and 4.
Discovery
Discovery is not the norm in this Court. Discovery is not allowed unless the Court declares that it is appropriate, in the interests of the administration of justice, to allow discovery.[2]
[2] Federal Magistrates Act, 1999 (Cth), s.45(1) (“FM Act”).
In Genovese v BGC Construction Pty Ltd[3] this Court set out what was meant by “the interests of the administration of justice” in the following terms:
In BHP Billiton Ltd v Schultz (2004) 221 CLR 400, [2004] HCA 61, (“Schultz”) the High Court considered the nature of the “interests of justice”: Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Heydon JJ CLR at p.421, HCA at par [15] said:
The interests of justice are not the same as the interests of one party, and there may be interests wider than those of either party to be considered. Even so, the interests of the respective parties, which might in some respects be common (as, for example, cost and efficiency), and in other respects conflicting, will arise for consideration. The justice referred to in s.5 is not disembodied, or divorced from practical reality.
Gummow J observed that the interests of justice “are even-handed”; CLR at p.445, HCA at par [100] while Callinan J referred to the requirement to “do equal justice”: CLR at p.492, HCA at par [258].
Some of the factors ordinarily considered when assessing the interests of justice are factors which it is mandatory for this Court to take into account under the Federal Magistrates Court Act and Federal Magistrates Court Rules: for example, costs and convenience of hearing and determination, earlier hearing of proceedings, availability of particular proceedings and pending proceedings in another court (in this case the Federal Court).
In considering the above issues I have had due regard to the factors cited in the dicta from Schultz.
In assessing the “interests of the administration of justice” similar considerations to those in Schultz apply, with the qualification related to “administration of justice”. Administration means “management”: Concise Oxford Dictionary, 7th Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) at p.13. Thus, s.39(3)(d) of the Federal Magistrates Court Act is directed to a consideration of the interests of the management of justice, which must mean management by the Court of the proceedings pending before the Court.[4]
[3] [2006] FMCA 1507 (“Genovese”).
[4] Genovese, at paras. 24-28 per Lucev FM.
In child support matters the Federal Magistrates Court Rules, 2001 (Cth) (“FMC Rules”)[5] make specific provision for certain documents to be produced and to be brought to Court.
[5] The FMC Rules referred to in this decision are the FMC Rules as at 22 June 2007, that is, the date of the Orders made by the Court, and prior to any relevant amendments under the Federal Magistrates Court Amendment Rules 2007 (No 1) (Cth).
Chapter 2 of the FMC Rules relates to family law and child support proceedings, within which there are certain rules relevant to the discovery and disclosure in child support proceedings.
Rule 24.02(1)(a) provides that the Applicant must file a financial statement.
Rule 24.03 of the FMC Rules provides that:
24.03 Full and frank disclosure
(1) A party required under this Part to file a financial statement or affidavit of financial circumstances must make in the statement or affidavit a full and frank disclosure of his or her financial circumstances, including details of:
(a) any vested or contingent interest in property (including real or personal property, superannuation and legal and equitable interests); and
(b) income from all sources, including any benefit received in relation to, or in connection with, the party’s employment or business interests; and
(c) the party’s other financial resources; and
(d) any trust:
(i) of which the party is, or has been since the separation of the parties, the appointor or trustee; or
(ii) of which the party, or the party’s child, spouse or de facto spouse is, or has been since the separation of the parties, an eligible beneficiary as to capital or income; or
(iii) of which a corporation is an eligible beneficiary as to capital or income if the party, or the party’s child, spouse or de facto spouse is, or has been since the separation of the parties, a shareholder or director of the corporation; or
(iv) over which the party has, or has had since the separation of the parties, any direct or indirect power or control; or
(v) of which the party has, or has had since the separation of the parties, the direct or indirect power to remove or appoint a trustee; or
(vi) of which the party has, or has had since the separation of the parties, the power (whether subject to the concurrence of another person or not) to amend the terms; or
(vii) of which the party has, or has had since the separation of the parties, the power to disapprove a proposed amendment of the terms or the appointment or removal of a trustee; or
(viii) over which a corporation has, or has had since the separation of the parties, a power mentioned in subparagraphs (iv) to (vii), if the party is a director or shareholder of the corporation; and
(e) any gift or other disposition of property made by the party since the separation of the parties; and
(f) if there is a partnership, trust or company (except a public company) in which the party has an interest, copies of the 3 most recent financial statements and the last 4 business activity statements lodged by the partnership, trust or company.
Father’s Financial Statement - Full and frank disclosure
The Father’s Financial Statement is in the usual form, and therefore contains the following provision:
“(a)I have read Rule 24.03 and I am aware that by law I have an obligation to make a full and frank disclosure of my financial circumstances to the Court and each other party In particular, I have disclosed in this document or in an affidavit filed by me or on my behalf under Rule 24.02(1)(b), all matters I am required to disclose under Rule 24.03.
…
(c)I have no income, property or financial resources other than as set out in this document or any affidavit filed by me under Rule 24.02(1)(b).”
In Black v Kellner[6] the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia discussed the fundamental nature of the obligation of full and frank disclosure and the Full Court’s observations are apposite here. Put succinctly, as it often is by Counsel, the obligation is to “show and tell” not “hide and seek.”
[6] (1992) FLC 92-287.
Discovery Application
The Respondent seeks discovery of a variety of documents. Those are reflected in the scope of the orders made by the Court on 22 June 2007. The Respondent made the application for discovery on the basis that the Applicant had failed to make full and frank disclosure. Whether this is so requires an examination of the evidence.
Father’s expenditure and assets – the evidence
The Applicant Father summarised his financial position as follows:
A Your total average weekly income $189.90
B Your total personal expenditure $2313.68
C Total value of property owned by you $245,000.00
D Total gross value of your superannuation $ NIL
E Total of your liabilities $301,000.00
F Total of your financial resources $ NIL[7]
[7] Applicant’s Financial Statement, Question 2.
The Applicant Father says his only income is from a government parenting benefit of $189.90 a week.[8]
[8] Applicant’s Financial Statement, Question 12.
The Applicant Father’s total weekly personal expenditure is said to be $2313.68 a week.[9] However, an examination of the items of personal expenditure listed, which are:
a)$500.00 a week to Greenmount Nominees Pty Ltd for mortgage payments/rent;[10]
b)a $100.00 a week minimum credit card payment to Citibank Visa;[11] and
c)$1963.68 a week maintenance payments/child support,[12]
actually amount to $2563.68 a week (assuming the figures are correct for present purposes).
[9] Applicant’s Financial Statement, Questions 2B and 33.
[10] Applicant’s Financial Statement, Question 21.
[11] Applicant’s Financial Statement, Question 30.
[12] Applicant’s Financial Statement, Question 31.
The Father’s Financial Statement says that the “Total of all other expenditure” is “$nil”.[13] However, the Father’s Financial Statement indicates average weekly expenses of $410.00, made up of estimates of $200.00 for food; $5.00 for household supplies, $25.00 for gas, $25 for electricity, $15 for telephone, $50.00 for petrol and $90.00 for child minding.[14]
[13] Father’s Financial Statement, question 32.
[14] Father’s Financial Statement, question 60.
With average weekly expenses added to his personal expenditure the Applicant’s outgoings are approximately $2973.68 a week.
The disparity between outgoings/expenditure and income is marked. Even allowing for the fact that:
a)the $500.00 a week mortgage is allegedly paid by the Applicant’s present wife, Michelle Kennedy (“Applicant’s Present Wife”);[15] and
b)the Child Support maintenance payments of $1963 a week are seemingly not being paid,
the total of the Applicant’s outgoings/expenditure are still $510.00 a week, or more than two and one half times his weekly income. Even allowing for the putting of outgoings/expenditure on the single credit card disclosed, a Citibank Visa, with a balance of $15,000.00 debt,[16] the disparity between outgoings/expenditure and income is so marked as to beg the question whether there has been full and frank disclosure.
The Applicant might point to the fact, adverted to above, that the Applicant’s Present Wife pays some outgoings. The Applicant asserts that Applicant’s Present Wife pays:
a) the $500.00 a week mortgage; and
b) two car lease payments totalling a further $500 a week.[17]
[15] Father’s Financial Statement, question 18.
[16] Applicant’s Financial Statement, question 51.
[17]Applicant’s Financial Statement, question 18.
The total is $1,000.00 a week allegedly paid for by the Applicant’s Present Wife. The Applicant asserts that Applicant’s Present Wife does this on an income of “$950.00” a week.[18] Elsewhere , the Applicant says that Applicant’s Present Wife “has worked all through our relationship and marriage and has been earning approximately $50,000.00 a year.”[19]
[18] Applicant’s Financial Statement, question 17. This is approximately $49,557.70 a year using a multiplier of 52.166 to convert weekly income to yearly income.
[19] Applicant’s Affidavit, para. 6.
Michelle Joanne Kennedy, the Applicant’s Present Wife, filed an affidavit on 23 March 2007 (“Applicant’s Present Wife’s Affidavit”) in which she says:
“1.I have lived with Paul Anthony Kennedy from September 2004.
2. I married Paul in September 2005.
3.During all the time of my relationship with Paul, I have worked and earned money as a Teacher – approximately $50,000 per year.
4. All my earnings have been spent to maintain the family.”[20]
[20] Applicant’s Present Wife’s Affidavit, paras. 1-4.
It is relevant to note at this stage that the Applicant has three children, all girls, one aged 19 and twins aged 13, by his marriage to the Respondent, and one child, a girl, aged 1, by his marriage to Applicant’s Present Wife.[21] Applicant’s Present Wife appears to have one child, a girl, presently aged 10, by a previous relationship.[22]
[21] Applicant’s Affidavit, para. 1.
[22] Applicant’s Financial Statement, question 17.
The meaning of “earnings … spent to maintain the family”[23] is ambiguous without further exploration, which might be required at final hearing. What is clear is that:
a)on the Applicant’s evidence the Applicant’s Present Wife’s total pre-tax income is insufficient to meet the payments the Applicant says she is making for the mortgage and two cars;
b)the Applicant’s evidence may not be consistent with the Applicant’s Present Wife’s evidence, in relation to the expenditure of the respective incomes, the Applicant saying it is spent on the mortgage and cars, the Applicant’s Present Wife saying it is spent to maintain the family; and
c)in any event, it is arguable that the excess of expenditure over income evident on the evidence requires further explanation,
and, in those circumstances the question is again begged as to whether there has been full and frank disclosure.
[23] Applicant’s Present Wife’s Affidavit, para. 4.
The position with the mortgage appears to be that the mortgage is payable to Greenmount Nominees Pty Ltd (“Greenmount Nominees”), which appears to be the registered owner of 4/214 Nepean Highway, Seaford, Victoria (“Seaford Property”), probably as trustee for the Kennedy Family Trust.[24] The Applicant says that the Applicant’s Present Wife “pays disbursements to the mortgage repayment”.[25]
[24] Applicant’s Affidavit, paras. 11 and 12, Applicant’s Financial Statement, questions 21 and 35.
[25] Applicant’s Affidavit, para. 11(d). Precisely what is meant by the quoted phrase is unclear.
The Applicant says that Greenmount Nominees “is a company owned by myself and my wife” (i.e. Applicant and Applicant’s Present Wife),[26] which is presumably why the Applicant says in Applicant’s Financial Statement he has a fifty per cent share of the Seaford Property and the mortgage on the Seaford Property.[27] Apart from the otherwise unsupported statement about the co-ownership of Greenmount Nominees, there is no direct disclosure as to the actual ownership of the other fifty per cent of the Seaford Property. However, the Applicant says that he “hold[s] 100% of the shares [in Greenmount Nominees]” and that the Applicant’s Present Wife is a “Co-Director”.[28] That statement is not necessarily consistent with the Applicant and the Applicant’s Present Wife being co-owners of Greenmount Nominees, nor with the Applicant only having a fifty per cent share in the Seaford Property.
[26] Applicants Affidavit, para. 11.
[27] Applicant’s Financial Statement, item 35.
[28] Applicant’s Affidavit, para. 11(b).
Alternatively, it may be consistent with the Applicant being the sole shareholder and owner of Greenmount Nominees, with Greenmount Nominees owning a fifty per cent share in the Seaford Property, and some undisclosed person owning the remainder.
Furthermore, there is no disclosure as to:
a)arrangements by reason of which the Applicant’s Present Wife, as a natural person, is paying the mortgage obligations of a corporate entity, of which she is a director, but in which she holds no shares; and
b)the distribution, if any, of income accruing to Greenmount Nominees from the payment of the mortgage obligation by the Applicant’s Present Wife, which payment appears, on the basis of the Applicant’s Financial Statement to be paid direct to Greenmount Nominees, as lender.[29]
[29] Applicant’s Financial Statement, question 21.
The position is not assisted by the Applicant’s Affidavit which refers to Greenmount Nominees as having “no named nominated beneficiaries”.[30]
[30] Applicant’s Affidavit, para. 11(c).
It appears that Greenmount Nominees is a trustee with respect to the Seaford Property, as the Applicant’s Financial Statement refers to “Greenmount Nominees Pty Ltd as Trustees”[31]. But Trustees for whom? The Applicant does not say directly – although he does disclose that the Kennedy Family Trust holds “one property” – the Seaford Property,[32] but the nature of the holding is not disclosed. There is no disclosure of the trustee or trustees, the terms of the trust, or the beneficiary or beneficiaries. The position is not assisted by the Applicant’s Affidavit which refers to the Kennedy Family Trust as “never [having] been a trading company”.[33]
[31] Applicant’s Financial Statement, question 35.
[32] Applicant’s Affidavit, para. 12(b).
[33] Applicant’s Affidavit, para. 12(a).
Once again, the nature of the Applicant’s disclosure begs more questions than are answered as to:
a)the ownership of the Seaford Property;
b)the nature, ownership and structure of the entities having an interest in the Seaford Property; and
c)the payment of the mortgage on, and income earned from, the Seaford Property;
such that it seems that full and frank disclosure may not have been made by the Applicant.
The Applicant’s Present Wife is also said to be paying lease payments on two vehicles.[34] Which two vehicles they are is not disclosed by the Applicant, and the Applicant’s Present Wife’s Affidavit does not mention the two vehicles. The Applicant includes in property owned by him two vehicles:
a) a 2005 Holden Astra; and
b) a 2005 Lexus,
valued at $25,000.00 and $50,000.00 respectively, asserting his share as one hundred percent.[35] However, the Applicant also says that the “owner” and “registered owner” of the two vehicles is PAK Logistics Pty Ltd[36] (“PAK Logistics”) a business of which the Applicant says he has a one hundred per cent share and is sole director.[37] There is no evidence that the Applicant’s Present Wife has any interest in PAK Logistics.
[34] Applicant’s Financial Statement, para. 18.
[35] Applicant’s Financial Statement, para. 40.
[36] Applicant’s Affidavit, para. 8(e); Applicant’s Financial Statement, para. 40.
[37] Applicant’s Financial Statement, paras. 41 and 52.
There is no direct evidence of any liability arising from PAK Logistics “ownership” of the Holden Astra and the Lexus. There are two hire purchase/lease agreements referred to by the Applicant: the lender is AGC and the persons named in the hire purchase or lease agreement are: “PAK Logistics Pty Ltd (Sole Director Paul Anthony Kennedy)” for amounts of $30,000.00 and $75,000.00 of which the Applicant claims his share of the liability as one hundred percent.[38]
[38] Applicant’s Financial Statement, questions 51 and 52.
Therefore, the position might be that the Applicant’s Present Wife is paying lease payments for two vehicles other than the Holden Astra and Lexus. Alternatively, the Applicant’s Present Wife is paying lease payments on vehicles leased by PAK Logistics, a company in which she has no interest. If she is doing this, why, and the nature of the arrangements under which it is being done, are not disclosed.
The Applicant says that he has “not personally made any money or revenue directly or indirectly from PAK Logistics Pty Ltd”.[39] Apart from being directly inconsistent with the Applicant’s evidence that he was paid wages of $20,000.00 a year by PAK Logistics,[40] this evidence ignores the fact that the Applicant seemingly treats the two vehicles as his property, presumably with the benefits of use that thereby accrue, and seemingly without either the Applicant or PAK Logistics (of which he is a sole director, but about the shareholding in which he provides no information) having to make the required lease payments, these payments being made by a third party seemingly unrelated to the lessee (the Applicant’s Present Wife) PAK Logistics Pty Ltd.
[39] Applicant’s Affidavit, para. 8(f), (underlining in original).
[40] Applicants Affidavit, para. 8(c).
A further possibility was volunteered by the Applicant’s Counsel in his opening submission:
“After Timeslot Logistics Pty Ltd he went into a company, Timeslot Pty Ltd. He left that company in 2006. He received a payout from the company of $50,000. Through the companies he had purchased two motor cars.”[41]
[41] Transcript, p. 2.
At the time this submission was made PAK Logistics had not been mentioned. Although not evidence, the submission (presumably made on instructions) gives rise to the possibility that the two vehicles were purchased or leased by another company or companies in which the Applicant has an interest, other than PAK Logistics.[42] The further possibility is of course that there are a further two vehicles in the “possession” of the Applicant which have not been disclosed.
[42] Applicant’s Affidavit, paras. 7(b) and (c), 9 and 10.
The Applicant’s disclosure with respect to vehicles is such that it again seems that full and frank disclosure may not have been made by the Applicant.
The Applicant discloses interests in three trading entities: PAK Logistics, Timeslot Pty Ltd (“Timeslot”) and Timeslot Logistics Pty Ltd (“Timeslot Logistics”).[43]
[43] Applicant’s Affidavit, para. 7.
PAK Logistics is said to be a management company existing for the purpose of providing logistic consulting services.[44] In the twenty-one months from 31 March 2005 to 31 December 2006, PAK Logistics’ “income net of GST was $145,252.00”[45], or just shy of $7,000.00 a month. But from 1 January 2007 PAK Logistics “has had no income so to speak of”.[46] The phrase “so to speak of” is vague. If there is income it has seemingly not been disclosed. Otherwise, it is curious that as of January 2007 PAK Logistics income net of GST drops from an average of $7,000.00 a month to “no income”. No explanation is proffered for this dramatic diminution.
[44] Applicant’s Affidavit, para. 8.
[45] Applicant’s Affidavit, para. 8(a).
[46] Applicant’s Affidavit, para. 8(d).
Timeslot is said by the Applicant to be “a trading company and does the business of logistics”.[47] The Applicant then says as follows:
“I was a Share Holder and hold 50% of shares with Graham Clarke whom holds the remaining 50% in shares. Until December 2006.”[48]
[47] Applicant’s Affidavit, para. 9.
[48] Applicant’s Affidavit, para. 9(a).
The first sentence is contradictory: it seems to say both that the Applicant “was” and “is” a shareholder; unless it is intended to convey that the Applicant now holds the shares for someone else (but if so, who, and under what type of arrangement?).
The second sentence read alone is meaningless. Even read with the first sentence it is difficult to understand what it means, or is meant to mean. If it is intended to convey that the Applicant’s shareholding was held until December 2006, that is inconsistent with the Applicant’s earlier evidence that says he presently has an interest in Timeslot.[49]
[49] Applicant’s Affidavit para. 7(b).
Of Timeslot the Applicant goes on to say:
“Timeslot was incorporated in December 2005. It took over from Timeslot Logistics. He sold his.”[50]
[50] Applicant’s Affidavit, para. 9(b).
The third sentence is incomplete. Furthermore, who “He” is not apparent. Nor is what “He” sold – the floating “his” at the end of the sentence having nothing to which it relates.
The second sentence does not say what it is that Timeslot “took over” from Timeslot Logistics. That is particularly confusing when the Applicant later says that “Timeslot Logistics never made any money and went into liquidation in December 2005 with significant debt.”[51]
[51] Applicant’s Affidavit, para. 10(d).
Of Timeslot Logistics, the Applicant says that it came into “operation to be the company that carries the business following the merger of PAK Logistics … with Fargo-Clarke Logistics”[52], that it was formed in September 2004 and commenced trading on 1 September 2004.[53] As indicated above it went into liquidation in December 2005 with significant debt. One of the co-directors is said to have “disappeared” shortly before the liquidation.[54] The significance of the co-directors disappearance is not explained. Whether the liquidation was voluntary or involuntary is not revealed. What occurred in the liquidation, and whether the liquidation is complete, and, if so, what the final outcome was, is not revealed. Likewise the nature of the “merger” is not discussed, and how PAK Logistics has emerged from its merger into a company which went into liquidation is not even hinted at by the Applicant.
[52] Applicant’s Affidavit, para. 10(a).
[53] Applicant’s Affidavit, para. 10 and 10(c).
[54] Applicant’s Affidavit, para. 10(e).
The disclosure concerning the corporate legal entities with which the Applicant is involved is, suffice to say, variously vague, incomplete, confused and inadequate. Again, it indicates that there may not have been full and frank disclosure.
Conclusion
At this stage of the matter the views expressed above are interim views arising from an interim application made in the case. However, it is evident that the Applicant may not have provided full and frank disclosure in respect of relevant matters, the major matters being dealt with above. Hence, the Court made orders on 22 June 2007, taking the view that in this case it is in the interest of the administration or management of justice, and consistent with the terms of the FMC Rules relating to document provision in child support matters, for discovery to be ordered to the extent of the orders made, and Court so declared.
I certify that the preceding forty-nine (49) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Lucev FM
Deputy Associate: J. Semler
Date: 26 July 2007
3
2
3