Kennedy, John Patrick v Australasian Coal & Shale Employees Federation

[1983] FCA 325

Re: JOHN PATRICK KENNEDY
And: THE AUSTRALASIAN COAL AND SHALE EMPLOYEES FEDERATION
AND: ELCOM COLLIERIES PTY. LIMITED (1983) 78 FLR 252
No. 14 of 1983
Practice and Procedure - High Court and Federal Judiciary
9 IR 347

COURT

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES REGISTRY
INDUSTRIAL DIVISION
Beaumont J.(1)

CATCHWORDS

Practice and Procedure - Jurisdiction of Federal Court to deal with non-federal claim against second respondent - Industrial law - Applicant offered employment by second respondent subject to his achieving clearance or membership of the first respondent - Declaration sought under s.144 that applicant entitled to be enrolled as member of the first respondent - Application to join second respondent as party to proceedings - Declaration sought against second respondent that applicant employed within meaning of s.144 - Order sought to restrain second respondent from terminating employment - Question of employment of applicant by second respondent central part of controversy between applicant and first respondent - Accrued jurisdiction of Federal Court considered - Formula of "common transactions and facts" applied.

Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1904-1983 ss.144(1), 144(3), 144(5), 144(5A), 144(6) and 144(7)

High Court and Federal Judiciary - Federal Court of Australia - Jurisdiction - Industrial law - Non-federal claim - Declaration sought that applicant entitled to be enrolled as a member of a registered organisation - Applicant offered employment by second respondent subject to achieving clearance by membership of the first respondent - Declarations and orders sought against second respondent - Question of employment of applicant by second respondent central part of controversy between applicant and first respondent - Common transaction and facts - Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth), ss 144(1), (3), (5), (5A), (6) and (7).

HEADNOTE

The applicant sought orders and declarations under s. 144(5) of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (the Act) that he was entitled to be enrolled as a member of the first respondent, a registered organisation, and that he was included in the category of persons who were eligible for membership. An application to the Industrial Commission of New South Wales pursuant to s. 115 of the Industrial Arbitration Act 1940 (N.S.W.) for an order that the applicant was entitled to membership of the Northern District Branch of the first respondent had been refused. Later the applicant applied to join the second respondent as a party to the action and to seek relief against it in connection with a contract of employment he alleged to exist between himself and the second respondent. The second respondent had purported to terminate his employment on 19 August 1983. This application was granted but pursuant to leave reserved the respondents argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to grant the relief sought against the second respondent.

Held: (1) The question of employment of the applicant by the second respondent and of the qualifications of the applicant for that purpose were part of the controversy between the applicant and the first respondent as the applicant was claiming that his purported dismissal by the second respondent could operate so as to frustrate his application under s. 144 of the Act.

(2) Since the first respondent had sought to put in issue the employment of the applicant and his qualification in that behalf, it followed that the point would necessarily be agitated in the proceedings even if the second respondent were not joined as a party.

(3) The second respondent would have been granted leave to intervene in the proceedings between the applicant and first respondent pursuant to s. 106 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1940 (N.S.W.), had such leave been sought.

Owens v. Australian Building Construction Employees' and Builders' Labourers' Federation (1978) 46 FLR 16 at 21-24, referred to.

(4) The determination of the questions of employment and of the qualifications of the applicant in that respect were part of the controversy between the applicant and the first respondent. Accordingly the determination of these questions was within the accrued jurisdiction of the court even if the employment contract had its source in non-federal law.

Fencott v. Muller (1983) 57 ALJR 317 and Stack v. Coast Securities (No. 9) Pty. Ltd (1983) 57 ALJR 731, referred to.

(5) The claim made against the second respondent sprang from facts which were common to the claim made against the first respondent and the formula of "common transactions and facts" could be applied.

United States Mine Workers v. Gibbs 383 US 715 (1966) and Wood v. Standard Products Co. Inc. 456 F Supp 1098 referred to.

(6) There were no discretionary reasons why the court should decline to exercise its accrued jurisdiction to deal with the claim now made against the second respondent.

HEARING

Sydney, 1983, September 13, 19; October 18, 31. #DATE 31:10:1983

APPLICATION.

The respondents sought the dismissal of proceedings on the ground that the claim made and the relief sought against it were beyond the jurisdiction of the court.

M. J. Finnane Q.C. and J. Phillips, for the applicant.

J. D. Shaw and P. H. Greenwood, for the first respondent.

A. P. Whitlam, for the second respondent.

W. M. Gummow, for the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia, intervening.

Solicitors for the applicant: Australian Legal Aid Office, Newcastle.

Solicitors for the first respondent: Turner Freeman.

Solicitors for the second respondent: Shaw, McDonald & Partners.

Solicitor for Commonwealth Attorney-General: B. J. O'Donovan, Commonwealth Crown Solicitor.

T.J.G.

ORDER

1. Application of the second respondent to be dismissed from these proceedings is refused.

2. Costs reserved.

3. Fix Monday, 7 November, 1983 at 2.15 p.m. for a further directions hearing.

Orders accordingly.

JUDGE1

This is an application by the second respondent that these proceedings be dismissed as against it on the ground that the claim made and the relief sought against it are beyond the jurisdiction of this Court.

In the first instance, the proceedings were brought by the applicant against the first respondent only. Orders under sub-s.144(5) of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1904 ("the Act") were sought. By sub-s.144(1), a person employed in connection with an industry, or engaged in an industrial pursuit is, subject to certain exceptions, entitled to be admitted as a member of an organisation of (inter alia) employees. Sub-section 144(3) deems certain persons to be employed in an industry or to be engaged in an industrial pursuit where:

" . . .

(a) a person whose usual occupation is that of employee in an industry or engagement in an industrial pursuit; or

(b) a person who is qualified to be an employee in an industry or to engage in an industrial pursuit and desires to become such an employee or so to engage . . . "

By sub-s.144(5), where a question or dispute arises as to the entitlement under this section of a person to be admitted as a member of an organisation, that person, a person who is or desires to become the employer of that person, the organisation of the Industrial Relations Bureau may apply to the Federal Court for a declaration as to the entitlement of the first-mentioned person under this section. The jurisdiction and powers of the Court are then dealt with by sub-s.144(5A), (6) and (7):

"(5A) Subject to sub-section (7), the Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine an application under the last preceding sub-section and may, notwithstanding anything contained in the rules of the organization concerned, make such order to give effect to its determination as it thinks fit.

(6) The orders which the Court may make under the last preceding sub-section include an order requiring the organization concerned to treat a person to whom sub-section (1) applies as being a member of the organization and upon the making of such an order or as otherwise specified in the order, the person specified in the order becomes, by force of this Act, a member of the organization.

(7) Where an application is made to the Court under this section--

(a) if the application is made otherwise than by a person whose entitlement is in question--that person shall be given an opportunity of being heard by the Court; and

(b) if the application is made otherwise than by an organization--the organization concerned shall be given an opportunity of being heard by the Court."

By his application filed in this Court on 21 April, 1983, the applicant sought orders or declarations against the first respondent under s.144 that "he is entitled" to be enrolled as a member of the first respondent and that "he is included" in the category of persons who are eligible for membership of that organisation. Understandably, the Federation was the only respondent to this application at that stage. The application was supported by affidavit evidence that, in November, 1982, the second respondent, carrying on business as "Newvale Colliery", had offered the applicant employment as a junior trainee mineworker; and that, in January, 1983, the second respondent had withdrawn that offer but had offered him employment as a coal mines certificate trainee, subject, however, to certain conditions. In this connection, the applicant relies on a letter to him dated 24 January, 1983 from the colliery manager of the second respondent as follows:

"Further to our offer of employment on 23rd November 1982, it would appear that the position offered does not strictly come within the terms of a Coal Mines Certificate Traineeship. Please be advised that we offer you a Coal Mines Certificate Traineeship at Newvale Colliery. Terms of employment will require that you attend a Coal Mines Certificate course on a 'day release' arrangement for the first year. 'Day release' in subsequent years will be subject to you successfully completing each stage of the course. You will still need a clearance from the Northern District Miners Federation before you commence employment."

In late November 1982, the applicant applied for membership of the first respondent. Shortly thereafter, he was informed that his application was unsuccessful. On or about 19 August, 1983, after the commencement of these proceedings but before they had been heard, the second respondent, by its colliery manager, wrote a letter dated 19 August, 1983 to the respondent as follows:

"Reference is made to the Company's letter of 24th January 1983 offering you a position as Coal Mines Certificate Trainee at Newvale Colliery. As you would be aware, there has been a downturn in economic and industrial activity which has contributed to a decline in electricity demand. Actually, electricity generation in 1982 was 2% less than in 1981, and in 1983 load growth has not returned as electricity generation is about equal of 1982 levels. As a result of the decline most of the mining developments contemplated a year or so ago have been deferred for some years. In addition, power station coal stockpiles have grown considerably to a level equivalent to about six months consumption. In fact, some power stations have nearly a year's supply. Consequently the Electricity Commission has found it necessary to reduce overall coal deliveries to help control electricity cost increases and revised power station consumption needs. For these reasons, the Company has been reducing its workforce by natural attrition in recent months. This attrition policy is planned to continue whilst stockpiles remain at high levels. As can be seen, the Company is not currently planning to employ any mineworkers not presently working for the Company. In all the circumstances, the Company regrets to advise you that the offer of employment is withdrawn."

On 26 August, 1983, Bauer, J., in a reserved judgment, refused an application by the applicant to the Industrial Commission of New South Wales for an order or declaration pursuant to s.115 of the Industrial Arbitration Act, 1940, that the applicant was entitled to membership of the Australasian Coal and Shale Employees Federation, Northern District Branch. In those proceedings, heard earlier in the year, the New South Wales Coal Association, of which the second respondent is a member, was granted leave to appear. Section 115 of the New South Wales Act is similar in its operation to s.144 of the Act. Bauer, J. held that the applicant had established neither the occupation nor the employment required by the New South Wales statute to entitle him to membership of the union. However, some observations made by Bauer, J. in his reasons for judgment may explain why the second respondent wrote to the applicant on 19 August, 1983. He said (at p.23):

"'EMPLOYMENT'

The question whether Kennedy has 'employment' is more complex and difficult, not because he has actually ever turned a hand at the job, but because employment depends upon a legal concept of contract. The contract of employment, if it stands, stands between Elcom and Kennedy and the submission made for Elcom to this Commission that Kennedy had entered the employment of Elcom may well be an admission made by Elcom with respect to any dispute actual or potential between Kennedy and Elcom. However, any admission made by the intervenor for Elcom, not a party to litigation, is not binding upon the Federation. It seems to me therefore that the Federation is entitled to ask this Commission to determine as an issue in this application between the Federation and Kennedy, whether, on the evidence, a contract of employment sufficient to support a declaration under s.115 has been made out. In my view the evidence does not support the existence of a binding contract of employment between Elcom and Kennedy. The letters of offer contained a condition precedent: That Kennedy would achieve a 'clearance' or membership of the Federation 'before you may commence employment'. This he never achieved for reasons set out in this judgment. The condition never being perfected, the offer could not be accepted by Kennedy. In my view, Kennedy has never been employed. Therefore, he has been unable to bring himself within the class of 'employed' persons within s.115."

Thereafter, the applicant applied to join the second respondent as a party to these proceedings and to seek relief against it in connection with the contract of employment he alleges to exist between himself and the second respondent. A number of objections to this application, including an objection to jurisdiction, were taken by the second respondent. After hearing argument on the objections other than the question of jurisdiction, I allowed the applicant to join the second respondent as a party to the proceedings and granted leave to the applicant to amend his application as he may be advised. However, I reserved to the second respondent the right to contend that the Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain any claim against it. In my view, the proper course was to defer argument on that point until after the applicant had amended its application in order that the issues in the proceeding might be clearly defined.

By his amended application, the applicant now claims final relief against the first respondent as follows:

"1. A declaration that the applicant is entitled to be enrolled as a member of the first respondent.

2. A declaration that the applicant is in the category of persons eligible for membership of the first respondent.

3. A declaration that the applicant is a person who is qualified to be employed in the industry for which the first respondent is constituted.

4. An order that the first respondent take all steps and do all things necessary to enrol the applicant as a member of the first respondent."

Interim relief along similar lines is also sought against the first respondent.

As against the second respondent, the applicant claims the following final relief:

"1. A declaration that at the date of the making of the application against the first Respondent under Section 144 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1904, as amended, the Plaintiff was employed within the meaning of the said section by the Second Respondent.

2. A declaration that the Plaintiff is at the date of judgment an employee of the Second Respondent within the meaning of Section 144 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1904, as amended.

3. Costs.

4. Such further or other order as this Honourable Court deems it appropriate and necessary."

The applicant also seeks interlocutory orders as follows:

"1. An order pending determination of the application under Section 144 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1904, as against the First Respondent, that the Second Respondent be restrained from terminating, the employment of the Applicant.

2. Such further or other order as this Honourable Court deems it appropriate and necessary."

I have now heard argument on the question of jurisdiction. Although the respondents deny jurisdiction in the Court as against the second respondent, they concede that the question of employment of the applicant by the second respondent will be an issue arising in the proceedings even if the case is confined to the first respondent. This is because, even in the absence of the second respondent, the first respondent will raise as a defence to the claim against it under s.144 the fact that the applicant is neither employed by nor qualified to be employed by, the second respondent for the purposes of that provision. The applicant is supported by the Attorney-General for the Commonwealth in his claim that the Court has jurisdiction to grant the relief sought against the second respondent.

The respondents rely principally upon the reasoning advanced by the High Court of Australia in its decision in Fencott v. Muller (1983) 46 A.L.R. 41, and submit that the claim sought to be made against the second respondent arises, if at all, under the general law; that it does not arise under any federal law; that it is a claim which is quite distinct from the claim sought to be made against the first respondent, based as it is on s.144 of the Act; and that this is not even a case of an attempt to join a non-federal claim to a federal claim made against the same party, since the claims here are sought to be made against different parties who are at arms' length with each other.

In Fencott v. Muller, supra, the majority (Mason, Murphy, Brennan and Deane, JJ.) indicated the scope of the jurisdiction of the Federal Court to deal with a non-federal claim (at p.67):

"It follows also that, though the facts upon which a non-federal claim arises do not wholly coincide with the facts upon which a federal claim arises, it is nevertheless possible that both may be aspects of a single matter arising under a federal law. Mason J in Philip Morris, following what was said in Moorgate Tobacco, gave an indication of a non-federal claim which would not be severable (33 ALR at 504): 'Likewise, it may appear that the attached claim and the federal claim so depend on common transaction and facts that they arise out of a common substratum of facts. In instances of this kind a court which exercises federal jurisdiction will have jurisdiction to determine the attached claim as an element in the exercise of its federal jurisdiction.' His Honour's reference to a dependence of federal and non-federal claims upon common transactions and facts approximates the test in United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, supra, (at 725) that the claims 'must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact' . . .

Perhaps it is not possible to devise so precise a formula that its application to the facts of any controversy would determine accurately what claims are disparate and what claims are not. Whatever formula be adopted as a guide -- and the formula of 'common transactions and facts' is a sound guide for the purpose -- it must result in leaving outside the ambit of a matter a 'completely disparate claim constituting in substance a separate proceeding' (per Barwick CJ in Felton v. Mulligan, at 373), a non-federal matter which is 'completely separate and distinct from the matter which attracted federal jurisdiction' (per Murphy J in Philip Morris, at 512) or 'some distinct and unrelated non-federal claim' (per Stephen, Mason, Aickin and Wilson JJ in Moorgate Tobacco (31 ALR) at 174)."

The process of ascertaining the scope of the controversy was then described (at p.68):

"What is and what is not part of the one controversy depends on what the parties have done, the relationships between or among them and the laws which attach rights or liabilities to their conduct and relationships. The scope of a controversy which constitutes a matter is not ascertained merely by reference to the proceedings which a party may institute, but may be illuminated by the conduct of those proceedings and especially by the pleadings in which the issues in controversy are defined and the claims for relief are set out. But in the end, it is a matter of impression and of practical judgment whether a non-federal claim and a federal claim joined in the proceeding are within the scope of one controversy and thus within the ambit of a matter."

But this qualification was made (at p.69):

"However, federal judicial power is attracted to the whole of a controversy only if the federal claim is a substantial aspect of that controversy. A federal claim which is a trivial or insubstantial aspect of the controversy must, of course, itself be resolved in federal jurisdiction, but it would be neither appropriate nor convenient in such a case to translate to federal jurisdiction the determination of the substantial aspects of the controversy from the jurisdiction to which they are subject in order to determine the trivial or insubstantial federal aspect. Again, impression and practical judgment must determine whether it is appropriate and convenient that the whole controversy be determined by the exercise of federal judicial power."

In Stack v. Coast Securities (No. 9) Pty. Limited (unreported, 12 October, 1983) the High Court restated the limits of the jurisdiction of the Federal Court to entertain a non-federal claim in proceedings brought under the Trade Practices Act ("accrued jurisdiction"). Mason, Brennan and Deane, JJ., said (at p.25):

"The first limb of s.86 (of the Trade Practices Act), being an exercise of the powers conferred by the constitutional provisions to which we have referred (ss. 75-77), must be read in the light of them. So read, it confers jurisdiction on the Federal Court to determine the non-federal aspects of a single justiciable controversy of which the issues raised under the Act form an integral part. There are two constituent elements in the jurisdiction which is thereby conferred: the first element comprises the federal issues which arise for determination under the federal law, e.g., the issues which arise in these cases under ss.52, 53(aa) and 53A of the Act and damages for contravention; the second element comprises the non-federal issues, the suggestion here being that the issues arising in the actions for specific performance in the Supreme Court are non-federal aspects of a single controversy of which the federal issues form an integral part. For want of a better term it is convenient to refer to this second element as 'accrued jurisdiction'."

In the present case, there can be no doubt that the questions of employment of the applicant by the second respondent and of the qualification of the applicant for that purpose are part of the controversy between the applicant and the first respondent: the first respondent claims, as Bauer, J. held; that the applicant is not so employed and is not so qualified. The applicant seeks to assert the contrary in a number of ways and, submits that, if necessary, he is entitled to an interim injunction restraining the second respondent from acting on the purported notice of termination of his employment in the form of its letter dated 19 August, 1983. In this connection, he relies upon the decisions in Hill v. Parsons (1972) 1 Ch. 305; Marshall v. Guinle (1979) Ch. 227; Gunton v. Richmond Upon Thames London Borough Council (1981) 1 Ch. 448; and Baker v. Corporation of the City of Salisbury (1982) 2 I.R. 168 as authority for the proposition that unlawful repudiation of a contract of service which is not accepted by the innocent party does not result in the automatic termination of the contract. In this way, he claims that his purported dismissal by the second respondent cannot operate so as to frustrate his application under s.144.

Since the first respondent seeks to put in issue the employment of the applicant and his qualification in that behalf, it must follow that this point will necessarily be agitated in these proceedings even if the second respondent were not joined as a party. Although sub-s.144(7) is not, in terms, applicable to the position of the second respondent, there can be little doubt that, if sought, the second respondent would be granted leave to intervene pursuant to s.106, even if that intervention were to be limited to the issue of employment (see Owens v. Australian Building Construction Employees' and Builders' Labourers' Federation (1979) 46 FLR 16 at pp.21-24). This was the course (i.e. of intervention) adopted before Bauer, J. although the intervenor was not the second respondent itself but an association of which it was a member. This led to the rather unsatisfactory situation that the admissions of the second respondent were not admissible in the application before Bauer, J., nor was the second respondent bound by the findings and decision in that case.

In my opinion, the questions of employment and of the qualification of the applicant in that respect are part, indeed a central part, of the controversy between the applicant and the first respondent. It follows, in my view, that prima facie (that is, subject to the discretionary considerations mentioned in Stack), the determination of these questions is within the accrued jurisdiction of this Court even if the employment contract has its source in a non-federal law (cf. Federated Clerks Union of Australia v. Hills (1981) 1 N.S.W.L.R. 631).

Further, the circumstance that the non-federal claim is made against a party other than the respondent against which the "a-choring" federal claim is made, does not deprive the Court of its accrued jurisdiction in the whole matter: Fencott v. Muller, supra, itself illustrates how different claims may be made against different parties and yet constitute a single controversy; and, on occasions, the High Court has made orders in constitutional matters against parties who are not within constitutional reach where this is required in order that the relief granted may be made completely effective (see The King v. Drake-Brockman; Ex parte National Oil Pty. Ltd. (1943) 68 C.L.R. 51 at p.65).

Other examples may be found in a number of decisions in the United States relied on by the Attorney-General. There "pendent party" jurisdiction has frequently been exercised by federal courts (see the discussion of the cases cited in Wright "Handbook of the Law of Federal Courts" 3rd. Ed. (1976) at p.77; "Federal Pendent Party Jurisdiction and United Mine Workers v. Gibbs-Federal Question and Diversity Cases" (1976) 62 Virginia Law Review 194 at pp.210-211, Miller; "Aldinger v. Howard and Pendent Jurisdiction" (1977) Vol.77 Columbia Law Review 127). The authorities there discussed are of assistance in the present case: the principle applied to justify pendent party jurisdiction is derived from the reasoning of the Supreme Court in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs 383 U.S. 715; and although it is true that Gibbs involved a pendent claim, and that no question of pendent party jurisdiction there arose, the Gibbs "common nucleus of operative facts" test has now been substantially adopted by the majority of the High Court of Australia.

A recent illustration of the exercise of pendent party jurisdiction is Wood v. Standard Products Co. Inc., 456 F. Supp. 1098 where the anchor federal claim was based on admiralty jurisdiction. In an action by a fisherman against his employer for the fish slime infection he contracted when the employer failed to provide protective gloves, the court then exercised pendent jurisdiction over a state law malpractice claim against the treating physician. Warriner, J. applied the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Aldinger v. Howard 427 U.S.1 (1976) which, in turn, followed and applied Gibbs. Warriner, J. said (at p.1100):

"It is clear that if the anchor claim on which pendant jurisdiction is asserted is based on diversity, a federal district court may not reach out and assert jurisdiction over an additional party in order to adjudicate a pendant State claim where there is no diversity as to the additional party. It does no matter that there is a common nucleus of operative facts or that judicial economy might be served. Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, -- U.S --, 98 S.Ct.2396, 57L.Ed.2d 274 (1978) Parker v. W.W. Moore & Sons, Inc., 523 F.2d 764 (4th Cir. 1975).

But when the anchor claim is one grounded in federal law, as the general maritime claim is here, then it is not Owen and Parker to which this Court must pay primary attention, but Aldinger. Aldinger, specifically dealing with pendant party jurisdiction based upon a federal question, a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim, provides the framework for analysis for this pendant party jurisdictional question.

After directing the district courts to the relevant statutory language, Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 18, 96 S.Ct. at 2422, tells us that:

(O)ther statutory grants and other alignments of parties and claims might call for a different result. When the grant of jurisdiction to a federal court is exclusive, for example, as in the prosecution of tort claims against the United States under 28 U.S.C. 1346, the argument of judicial economy and convenience can be coupled with the additional argument that only in a federal court may all of the claims be tried together."

A similar approach, upholding the existence of a pendent party jurisdiction, except in certain areas in diversity cases, was taken in Shannon v. United States 417 F.2d. 256 (1969) (at p.263); Ford Motor Company v. Wallenius Lines 476 F. Supp. 1362 (1979); Ortiz v. United States Government 595 Fed.R.2d. 65 (1979); and Boudreaux v. Puckett 611 F.2d.1028 (1980).

In my opinion, once the first respondent elected to raise a defence to the claim made under s.144 that the applicant was neither employed nor qualified to be employed by the second respondent, it followed that the claims made by the applicant against the first and second respondents respectively were part of the same controversy, notwithstanding that different relief is sought against each respondent: the claim made against the second respondent springs from facts which are common to the claim made against the first respondent and the formula of "common transactions and facts" may thus be applied in this case.

The issue of employment or qualification in that connection is not an insubstantial one in these proceedings. Indeed, if the experience of the Industrial Commission proceedings is any guide, this defence of the first respondent may well be the central issue in the application. Further, there is no reason why this Court cannot finally resolve the dispute now existing between the applicant and the second respondent as to his employment or qualification in that regard. There are, therefore, no discretionary reasons why this Court should decline to exercise its accrued jurisdiction to deal with the claim now made against the second respondent (cf. Novasonic Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. Hagemeyer (Australasia) B.V. - unreported - Lockhart, J. 27 October, 1983).

The Attorney-General for the Commonwealth also relied on s.32 of the Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976 as an additional source of jurisdiction in the present case. In the light of the conclusion I have reached, it is unnecessary to express any view on this point.

In the result, I would refuse the application of the second respondent to be dismissed from the proceedings. I will reserve costs at this stage. I fix Monday, 7 November, 1983 at 2.15 p.m. for a further directions hearing in the matter.