Kennedy Cleaning Services Pty Ltd v Petkoska

This case involved an appeal to the High Court of Australia concerning a claim for workers' compensation. The appellant, Kennedy Cleaning Services Pty Ltd, appealed a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia which had found in favour of the respondent, Mrs Vesela Petkoska. Mrs Petkoska, an employee, had suffered a stroke while cleaning rooms in the course of her employment. The central dispute was whether her incapacity resulting from the stroke constituted a "personal injury" under the relevant legislation.

The legal issues before the High Court were whether the respondent's stroke, which arose from a pre-existing heart condition (rheumatic mitral valve disease) and the formation and release of a blood clot, qualified as a "personal injury" under section 7(1) of the *Workers' Compensation Act 1951* (ACT). The court was required to consider whether this statutory regime for "personal injury" was mutually exclusive with the provisions relating to contracting or suffering an aggravation or acceleration of a disease under section 9(1) of the Act, and whether the Full Court had correctly applied the principles established in *Zickar v MGH Plastic Industries Pty Ltd*.

The High Court reasoned that the Full Court had correctly applied the majority decision in *Zickar v MGH Plastic Industries Pty Ltd*. The court noted that historical workers' compensation legislation often presented difficulties in compensating for diseases, particularly due to requirements for injury to arise "out of" and "in the course of" employment, and the need to prove "personal injury by accident". However, the legislation had evolved, with these requirements being modified or removed. The court emphasised the importance of applying the precise language of the applicable legislation to the facts of each case, rather than relying on generalities. In this instance, the court found that the respondent's stroke, precipitated by a paroxysm of atrial fibrillation in the context of her pre-existing mitral valve disease, constituted a "personal injury" within the meaning of section 7(1) of the Act, consistent with the reasoning in *Zickar*.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the appeal.