Kelsey v Logan City Council (No 3)

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INDUSTRIAL COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Kelsey v Logan City Council & Ors (No 3) [2022] ICQ 021

PARTIES:

SHARON RAE MARIE KELSEY

(appellant)

v
LOGAN CITY COUNCIL
(first respondent)
TIMOTHY LUKE SMITH
(second respondent)
CHERIE MARIE DALLEY
(third respondent)
RUSSELL BRUCE LUTTON
(fourth respondent)
STEPHEN FREDERICK SWENSON
(fifth respondent)
LAURENCE WILLIAM SMITH
(sixth respondent)
PHILIP WAYNE PIDGEON
(seventh respondent)
TREVINA DALE SCHWARZ
(eighth respondent)
JENNIFER RACHEL JULIE BREENE

(ninth respondent)

FILE NO/S:

C/2021/8

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

DELIVERED ON:

14 July 2022

HEARING DATE:

Application for costs considered on written submissions

MEMBER:

Davis J, President

ORDER:

The appellant pay each of the first and third to ninth respondents’ costs of the appeal, including the costs of the application to amend the application to appeal, reserved costs and the costs of the written submissions on costs, all on the standard basis calculated on the scale of costs of the Supreme Court and District Court under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, Schedule 1.

CATCHWORDS:

INDUSTRIAL LAW - QUEENSLAND - APPEALS - APPEAL TO INDUSTRIAL COURT - COSTS - where the appellant made allegations against the second respondent - where the first respondent terminated the appellant’s employment - where the third to ninth respondents passed the resolution of the first respondent terminating the appellant’s employment with the first respondent - where the appellant alleged that the third to ninth respondents were motivated by reprisal for her complaint against the second respondent - where the appellant brought an application claiming relief for adverse action and reprisal for public interest disclosure - where the claim failed in the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission (QIRC) - where the QIRC found that the respondents were not improperly motivated when terminating the appellant’s employment - where the right of appeal is only on errors of law or jurisdiction - where an appellant can appeal on other grounds only by leave - where the appellant filed a notice of appeal which did not identify grounds of appeal - where the appellant made application to amend the notice of appeal - where that application failed - where it was held that there were no grounds of appeal with reasonable prospects identified - where it was held that even if a reasonably arguable ground was found, the discretion would be exercised against amendment - where the respondents sought their costs of the appeal against the appellant - where costs do not follow the event as a usual rule - whether the appeal was made vexatiously - whether the appeal was made without reasonable cause - whether it ought to have been reasonably apparent to the appellant that the appeal had no reasonable prospect of success - whether the discretion to award costs against the appellant has arisen - whether the discretion to award costs against the appellant ought to be exercised

Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 545, s 557, s 564, s 565
Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011, r 70

CASES:

Augusta Ventures Ltd v Mt Arthur Coal Pty Ltd (2020) 384 ALR…

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Details
Case
[2022] ICQ 21
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Kelsey v Logan City Council (No 3), the Industrial Court addressed an appeal against a decision by the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission (QIRC) dismissing all claims brought by Ms Kelsey against the Logan City Council and others. Ms Kelsey, the former Chief Executive Officer of the Council, alleged that her termination of employment was motivated by reprisal for her complaints against the Mayor. The QIRC found against Ms Kelsey, concluding that her claims were not substantiated.

The court was tasked with determining whether the appeal was frivolous, made without reasonable cause, and whether it was reasonably apparent to Ms Kelsey that her appeal had no reasonable prospect of success. Additionally, the court needed to decide if the discretion to award costs against Ms Kelsey had arisen and whether it should be exercised. Ms Kelsey's appeal was based on alleged errors of fact and law. However, the court found that an appeal grounded on factual errors required leave, which could only be granted if it was in the public interest. Ms Kelsey did not demonstrate a reasonable basis for such leave, and her grounds for appeal did not show a reasonable prospect of success.

The court reasoned that the appeal was frivolous as there were no reasonable prospects of success for Ms Kelsey. The court also noted that even if there was a basis for a reasonable prospect of success, Ms Kelsey's conduct would have warranted denying her leave to amend the notice of appeal. Section 545 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 provides a discretionary power to award costs if an application is vexatious or without reasonable cause, or if it was reasonably apparent that the application had no reasonable prospect of success. The court concluded that the discretion to award costs against Ms Kelsey had arisen and should be exercised.

The court ordered that Ms Kelsey pay the costs of the appeal, including the costs of the application to amend the application to appeal, reserved costs, and the costs of the written submissions on costs. These costs were to be paid on the standard basis calculated on the scale of costs of the Supreme Court and District Court under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, Schedule 1.

Orders

Orders of the court

The appellant pay each of the first and third to ninth respondents’ costs of the appeal, including the costs of the application to amend the application to appeal, reserved costs and the costs of the written submissions on costs, all on the standard basis calculated on the scale of costs of the Supreme Court and District Court under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, Schedule 1.

Background

Background to the litigation

The primary decision effectively disposed of the appeal. The parties’ submissions address not only the costs of the application to amend the application to appeal, but also the costs of the appeal generally. These orders dispose of all costs issues.Background The facts giving rise to Ms Kelsey’s claims against the various respondents are examined in detail in the primary judgment[4] and in the judgment in the QIRC[5] and there is no need to repeat that detailed analysis.[4]Kelsey v Logan City Council & Ors (No 2) [2022] ICQ 013.[5]Kelsey v Logan City Council & Ors (No 8) [2021] QIRC 114. In short, Ms Kelsey was employed in 2017 as the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the first respondent, the Logan City Council (the Council). A condition of Ms Kelsey’s employment was that she was placed on a probationary period. Before the probationary period expired, she met with the third respondent (Cr Dalley) and the eighth respondent (Cr Schwarz) representing the Council. Councillors Dalley and Schwarz expressed concerns about Ms Kelsey’s performance as CEO. Two days after the meeting, Ms Kelsey made allegations against the second respondent, Mayor Smith. A vote on whether Ms Kelsey’s employment should continue was had by the Council on 7 February 2018, although by that stage Mayor Smith had been enjoined against voting on any resolution concerning Ms Kelsey’s employment.[6][6]Kelsey v Logan City Council & Anor [2018] QIRC 009. The third to ninth respondents all voted in favour of terminating Ms Kelsey’s employment and those votes were sufficient to carry a resolution dismissing her. Ms Kelsey then commenced proceedings against the Council, Mayor Smith and the third to ninth respondents, being those who voted in favour of her dismissal. It is unnecessary to examine Ms Kelsey’s claims. That is done in the other judgments. Broadly speaking, she alleged that her sacking was procured by Mayor Smith and actioned by the third to ninth respondents as an act of reprisal against her complaints made about Mayor Smith. A 23 day trial in the QIRC resulted in the dismissal of all Ms Kelsey’s claims against all the respondents. That judgment was delivered on 1 April 2021.[7][7]Kelsey v Logan City Council & Ors (No 8) [2021] QIRC 114. Central to Ms Kelsey’s claims was an allegation that the third to ninth respondents were actuated by a prohibited reason, namely reprisal for the complaints against Mayor Smith. Whatever legal subtleties there were to her case, Ms Kelsey could only succeed against any particular respondent if she proved that motivation against that respondent. At the trial in the QIRC, the appellant gave evidence as did each of the second to ninth respondents, and other witnesses. The respondents gave evidence that they were not motivated by any prohibited reason to cause the termination of Ms Kelsey’s employment. They said that they were motivated by performance issues which had arisen. The QIRC:1.found Ms Kelsey an unimpressive witness and rejected her evidence;2.found the respondents credible and accepted their evidence;3.did not accept Ms Kelsey’s case that her employment was terminated for a prohibited reason.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Ms Kelsey, by her application to amend, produced a document which contained “grounds of appeal” which, over 27 paragraphs, identified six grounds of appeal. Those grounds were:“Evidence relevant to assessing reasons actuating dismissal vote[10][10]Ground 1.1.Erred in finding that, when assessing whether the lawful reasons that the third to ninth respondents alleged actuated their decision to vote for the termination of the applicant’s employment, the reasonableness, fairness or justification of those reasons was irrelevant (paragraphs 803 to 804 of the reasons).Accessorial liability[11][11]Ground 2.2.Erred in finding that it was an essential element of establishing involvement by the third to ninth respondents in the first respondent’s contravening conduct that each of those individual respondents knew how the other respondents were going to vote on the motion to terminate the applicant’s employment (paragraphs 294 and 760 to763 of the reasons).Inadequacy of reasons[12][12]Ground 3.3.[Paragraphs 3-10 alleged various failures to give adequate reasons.]Meaning of ‘industrial law’[13]11.Erred in finding that the PID Act, or relevant sections of it, including 13, 17 and 48, was not an industrial law for the purposes of the IR Act (paragraphs 35, 44 to 63 and 747 of the reasons).Browne v Dunn[14]12.Erred in the application of the rule in Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67, HL in that each of the third to ninth respondents were challenged in respect of their asserted reasons for termination of the applicant’s employment (cf. 819 of the reasons).Errors of mixed law and fact[15]To the extent that they relate to alleged errors of fact, the applicant seeks leave, under s 557(2) of the IR Act, to appeal the decision below on the bases that the Vice President [made various factual errors set out in paragraphs 13-27].”[13]Ground 4.[14]Ground 5.[15]Ground 6. An appeal based on an error of fact could only be mounted by leave.[16] By s 565 of the IR Act, leave may only be given if “it is in the public interest to do so”. In the grounds of appeal document, Ms Kelsey sought leave to mount her appeal on factual errors and described the public interest consideration as:“Public interest consideration28.Having regard to s 565 of the IR Act, it is in the public interest for the Court to grant the applicant leave to appeal on the grounds referred to at paragraphs 13 to 27 above because:(a)the relevant factual errors, if made out, manifest an injustice because they were, in combination, critical to the disposition of the proceeding; and(b)of the importance in upholding the protections from reprisals provided under the PID Act, and the IR Act, where such reprisals are demonstrated on the facts.”[16]Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 557(1) and (2). In the primary judgment, I found that there were no real prospects of Ms Kelsey obtaining leave to raise grounds of appeal based other than on errors of law.[17] Therefore, ground 6 had no prospects of success and grounds 2 and 4 became irrelevant.[18] I found that there were no real prospects of grounds 1, 3 and 5 being successful.[19] I concluded that even if there was a basis upon which a ground might have reasonable prospects of success, given Ms Kelsey’s conduct, I would exercise the discretion against allowing amendment.[20][17]Kelsey v Logan City Council & Ors (No 2) [2022] ICQ 13 at [67]-[83].[18]At [88] and [89]-[91].[19]At [94]-[97], [98]-[116] and [117]-[122].[20]At [126].Statutory provisions/principles

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

An appeal based on an error of fact could only be mounted by leave.[16] By s 565 of the IR Act, leave may only be given if “it is in the public interest to do so”. In the grounds of appeal document, Ms Kelsey sought leave to mount her appeal on factual errors and described the public interest consideration as:“Public interest consideration28.Having regard to s 565 of the IR Act, it is in the public interest for the Court to grant the applicant leave to appeal on the grounds referred to at paragraphs 13 to 27 above because:(a)the relevant factual errors, if made out, manifest an injustice because they were, in combination, critical to the disposition of the proceeding; and(b)of the importance in upholding the protections from reprisals provided under the PID Act, and the IR Act, where such reprisals are demonstrated on the facts.”[16]Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 557(1) and (2). In the primary judgment, I found that there were no real prospects of Ms Kelsey obtaining leave to raise grounds of appeal based other than on errors of law.[17] Therefore, ground 6 had no prospects of success and grounds 2 and 4 became irrelevant.[18] I found that there were no real prospects of grounds 1, 3 and 5 being successful.[19] I concluded that even if there was a basis upon which a ground might have reasonable prospects of success, given Ms Kelsey’s conduct, I would exercise the discretion against allowing amendment.[20][17]Kelsey v Logan City Council & Ors (No 2) [2022] ICQ 13 at [67]-[83].[18]At [88] and [89]-[91].[19]At [94]-[97], [98]-[116] and [117]-[122].[20]At [126].Statutory provisions/principles Section 545 of the IR Act provides as follows:“545 General power to award costs(1)A person must bear the person’s own costs in relation to a proceeding before the court or commission.(2)However, the court or commission may, on application by a party to the proceeding, order— (a) a party to the proceeding to pay costs incurred by another party if the court or commission is satisfied—(i)the party made the application or responded to the application vexatiously or without reasonable cause; or(ii)it would have been reasonably apparent to the party that the application or response to the application had no reasonable prospect of success; or …” Section 545 of the IR Act displaces what might be described as the “usual rule” that costs follow the event.[21] As I observed in Kelsey v Logan City Council & Ors:[22][21]Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 per McHugh J at [97].[22][2021] ICQ 011.“[25] Section 545 and provisions like it have been the subject of analysis in various decisions. The following principles can be identified:(a)The starting point is that each party bears their own costs.[23](b)A discretion to depart from that point only arises, relevantly here, if one of the jurisdictional facts identified in s 545(2)(a)(i) or s 545(2)(a)(ii) are established.[24](c)The assessment of ‘reasonable cause’ in s 545(2)(a)(i) is:(i) an objective assessment;[25] and(ii) made considering the facts existing as at the time of the institution of the proceedings, here the appeal.[26](d)Section 545(2)(a)(ii) prescribes a separate and distinct jurisdictional fact giving rise to a discretion to award costs. In consideration of whether s 545(2)(a)(ii) is engaged, facts which arise after the commencement of the proceedings may be relevant.”[27][23]Section 545(1).[24]See the opening words of s 545(2).[25]Wanninayake v State of Queensland (Department of Natural Resources and Mines) [2015] ICQ 35 at [12]-[14] and MIM Holdings Ltd v Automotive, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Industrial Union of Employees, Queensland (2000) 164 QGIG 370.[26]Kanan v Australian Postal and Telecommunications Union [1992] FCA 539.[27]Maher v Isaac Regional Council [2020] QIRC 191 from [59].