INDUSTRIAL COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Kelsey v Logan City Council & Ors (No 3) [2022] ICQ 021
PARTIES:
SHARON RAE MARIE KELSEY
(appellant)
v
LOGAN CITY COUNCIL
(first respondent)
TIMOTHY LUKE SMITH
(second respondent)
CHERIE MARIE DALLEY
(third respondent)
RUSSELL BRUCE LUTTON
(fourth respondent)
STEPHEN FREDERICK SWENSON
(fifth respondent)
LAURENCE WILLIAM SMITH
(sixth respondent)
PHILIP WAYNE PIDGEON
(seventh respondent)
TREVINA DALE SCHWARZ
(eighth respondent)
JENNIFER RACHEL JULIE BREENE(ninth respondent)
FILE NO/S:
C/2021/8
PROCEEDING:
Appeal
DELIVERED ON:
14 July 2022
HEARING DATE:
Application for costs considered on written submissions
MEMBER:
Davis J, President
ORDER:
The appellant pay each of the first and third to ninth respondents’ costs of the appeal, including the costs of the application to amend the application to appeal, reserved costs and the costs of the written submissions on costs, all on the standard basis calculated on the scale of costs of the Supreme Court and District Court under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, Schedule 1.
CATCHWORDS:
INDUSTRIAL LAW - QUEENSLAND - APPEALS - APPEAL TO INDUSTRIAL COURT - COSTS - where the appellant made allegations against the second respondent - where the first respondent terminated the appellant’s employment - where the third to ninth respondents passed the resolution of the first respondent terminating the appellant’s employment with the first respondent - where the appellant alleged that the third to ninth respondents were motivated by reprisal for her complaint against the second respondent - where the appellant brought an application claiming relief for adverse action and reprisal for public interest disclosure - where the claim failed in the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission (QIRC) - where the QIRC found that the respondents were not improperly motivated when terminating the appellant’s employment - where the right of appeal is only on errors of law or jurisdiction - where an appellant can appeal on other grounds only by leave - where the appellant filed a notice of appeal which did not identify grounds of appeal - where the appellant made application to amend the notice of appeal - where that application failed - where it was held that there were no grounds of appeal with reasonable prospects identified - where it was held that even if a reasonably arguable ground was found, the discretion would be exercised against amendment - where the respondents sought their costs of the appeal against the appellant - where costs do not follow the event as a usual rule - whether the appeal was made vexatiously - whether the appeal was made without reasonable cause - whether it ought to have been reasonably apparent to the appellant that the appeal had no reasonable prospect of success - whether the discretion to award costs against the appellant has arisen - whether the discretion to award costs against the appellant ought to be exercised
Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 545, s 557, s 564, s 565
Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011, r 70
CASES:
Augusta Ventures Ltd v Mt Arthur Coal Pty Ltd (2020) 384 ALR…
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- Case
- [2022] ICQ 21
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was tasked with determining whether the appeal was frivolous, made without reasonable cause, and whether it was reasonably apparent to Ms Kelsey that her appeal had no reasonable prospect of success. Additionally, the court needed to decide if the discretion to award costs against Ms Kelsey had arisen and whether it should be exercised. Ms Kelsey's appeal was based on alleged errors of fact and law. However, the court found that an appeal grounded on factual errors required leave, which could only be granted if it was in the public interest. Ms Kelsey did not demonstrate a reasonable basis for such leave, and her grounds for appeal did not show a reasonable prospect of success.
The court reasoned that the appeal was frivolous as there were no reasonable prospects of success for Ms Kelsey. The court also noted that even if there was a basis for a reasonable prospect of success, Ms Kelsey's conduct would have warranted denying her leave to amend the notice of appeal. Section 545 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 provides a discretionary power to award costs if an application is vexatious or without reasonable cause, or if it was reasonably apparent that the application had no reasonable prospect of success. The court concluded that the discretion to award costs against Ms Kelsey had arisen and should be exercised.
The court ordered that Ms Kelsey pay the costs of the appeal, including the costs of the application to amend the application to appeal, reserved costs, and the costs of the written submissions on costs. These costs were to be paid on the standard basis calculated on the scale of costs of the Supreme Court and District Court under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, Schedule 1.
Orders
Orders of the court
The appellant pay each of the first and third to ninth respondents’ costs of the appeal, including the costs of the application to amend the application to appeal, reserved costs and the costs of the written submissions on costs, all on the standard basis calculated on the scale of costs of the Supreme Court and District Court under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, Schedule 1.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
An appeal based on an error of fact could only be mounted by leave.[16] By s 565 of the IR Act, leave may only be given if “it is in the public interest to do so”. In the grounds of appeal document, Ms Kelsey sought leave to mount her appeal on factual errors and described the public interest consideration as:“Public interest consideration28.Having regard to s 565 of the IR Act, it is in the public interest for the Court to grant the applicant leave to appeal on the grounds referred to at paragraphs 13 to 27 above because:(a)the relevant factual errors, if made out, manifest an injustice because they were, in combination, critical to the disposition of the proceeding; and(b)of the importance in upholding the protections from reprisals provided under the PID Act, and the IR Act, where such reprisals are demonstrated on the facts.”[16]Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 557(1) and (2). In the primary judgment, I found that there were no real prospects of Ms Kelsey obtaining leave to raise grounds of appeal based other than on errors of law.[17] Therefore, ground 6 had no prospects of success and grounds 2 and 4 became irrelevant.[18] I found that there were no real prospects of grounds 1, 3 and 5 being successful.[19] I concluded that even if there was a basis upon which a ground might have reasonable prospects of success, given Ms Kelsey’s conduct, I would exercise the discretion against allowing amendment.[20][17]Kelsey v Logan City Council & Ors (No 2) [2022] ICQ 13 at [67]-[83].[18]At [88] and [89]-[91].[19]At [94]-[97], [98]-[116] and [117]-[122].[20]At [126].Statutory provisions/principles Section 545 of the IR Act provides as follows:“545 General power to award costs(1)A person must bear the person’s own costs in relation to a proceeding before the court or commission.(2)However, the court or commission may, on application by a party to the proceeding, order— (a) a party to the proceeding to pay costs incurred by another party if the court or commission is satisfied—(i)the party made the application or responded to the application vexatiously or without reasonable cause; or(ii)it would have been reasonably apparent to the party that the application or response to the application had no reasonable prospect of success; or …” Section 545 of the IR Act displaces what might be described as the “usual rule” that costs follow the event.[21] As I observed in Kelsey v Logan City Council & Ors:[22][21]Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 per McHugh J at [97].[22][2021] ICQ 011.“[25] Section 545 and provisions like it have been the subject of analysis in various decisions. The following principles can be identified:(a)The starting point is that each party bears their own costs.[23](b)A discretion to depart from that point only arises, relevantly here, if one of the jurisdictional facts identified in s 545(2)(a)(i) or s 545(2)(a)(ii) are established.[24](c)The assessment of ‘reasonable cause’ in s 545(2)(a)(i) is:(i) an objective assessment;[25] and(ii) made considering the facts existing as at the time of the institution of the proceedings, here the appeal.[26](d)Section 545(2)(a)(ii) prescribes a separate and distinct jurisdictional fact giving rise to a discretion to award costs. In consideration of whether s 545(2)(a)(ii) is engaged, facts which arise after the commencement of the proceedings may be relevant.”[27][23]Section 545(1).[24]See the opening words of s 545(2).[25]Wanninayake v State of Queensland (Department of Natural Resources and Mines) [2015] ICQ 35 at [12]-[14] and MIM Holdings Ltd v Automotive, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Industrial Union of Employees, Queensland (2000) 164 QGIG 370.[26]Kanan v Australian Postal and Telecommunications Union [1992] FCA 539.[27]Maher v Isaac Regional Council [2020] QIRC 191 from [59].