Kelsey v Logan City Council and Another

Link copied
Case Copied 24 min read

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:  

Kelsey v Logan City Council and Another [2018] QIRC 009

PARTIES:  

Kelsey, Sharon
(Applicant)

v

Logan City Council
(First Respondent)

and

Smith, Timothy Luke
(Second Respondent)

CASE NO:

PID/2017/3

PROCEEDING:

Application for interim orders

DELIVERED ON:

1 February 2018

HEARING DATE: 

25 January 2018

MEMBER:

Industrial Commissioner Fisher

ORDERS:

1.        The application for an interim order against the First Respondent is refused.

2. Pursuant to s 51 of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 and s 314 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 the Second Respondent is take no part in any resolution by the First Respondent in respect of the Applicant's employment or have any involvement, direct or indirect, in the development or provision of information for any such resolution of the First Respondent, until the hearing and determination of this proceeding.

CATCHWORDS:

PUBLIC INTEREST DISCLOSURE - INTERIM ORDERS - INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTIONS - where applicant made a public interest disclosure - where allegations of misconduct by second respondent - where ongoing adverse interventions of second respondent in matters relating to applicant's employment - where potential termination of applicant's employment by first respondent at the instigation of second respondent - where allegations against one member of council and not any other councillors - whether prima facie case established - whether balance of convenience favours granting of the relief

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS - INTERIM ORDERS - INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTIONS - where applicant has exercised a workplace right - whether conduct breach of adverse action provisions

LEGISLATION:

CASES:

Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010, s 48, s 51
Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 285, s 314, s 473
Local Government Act 2009, s 12, s 176B

Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill [2006] 227 CLR 57
Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd [1968] HCA 1; (1968) 118 CLR 618

MIM Holdings Limited and The Australian Workers' Union of Employees, Queensland and Another (2000) 164 QGIG 296

APPEARANCES:

Mr C. Murdoch, QC instructed by Minter Ellison Lawyers for the Applicant.
Mr A. Herbert, Counsel instructed by King & Company Solicitors for the First Respondent.
Mr M. Trim, Counsel instructed by Gadens Lawyers for the Second Respondent.

Decision

  1. The Applicant seeks the following interim orders:

    "1. An interim order pursuant to section 51 of the PID Act and 314 of the IR Act that the First Respondent must not consider or vote upon any resolution in respect of the Applicant's employment (except in relation to a positive vote confirming her employment), whether pursuant to a probationary process or otherwise, until the hearing and determination of this proceeding.

1A. An interim order pursuant to section 51 of the PID Act and section 314 of the IR Act that the Second Respondent take no part in any resolution by the First Respondent in respect of the Applicant's employment or have any involvement, direct or indirect, in the development or provision of information for any such resolution of the First Respondent, until the hearing and determination of this proceeding."

  1. Section…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Kelsey v Logan City Council and Another and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2018] QIRC 9
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Applicant, Kelsey, filed an application against Logan City Council (the First Respondent) and a Councillor of that council (the Second Respondent) for interim orders, including interlocutory injunctions, following a public interest disclosure (PID) made by the Applicant on 12 October 2017. The Applicant alleged that the Second Respondent had engaged in misconduct and reprisal actions against the Applicant, including adverse interventions in the Applicant's employment matters. The Applicant also contended that the Second Respondent's conduct breached the adverse action provisions of the Industrial Relations Act 2016. The dispute required the court to decide whether the Applicant had established a prima facie case and whether the balance of convenience favoured granting the relief.

The court considered the legal principles required to grant an interim injunction, including that the Applicant must demonstrate a sufficient likelihood of success and that the balance of convenience favoured granting the relief. The court found that while the Applicant had made allegations of misconduct and reprisal actions by the Second Respondent, there was no evidence to suggest that other Councillors were engaged in or intended to engage in similar conduct. The court also noted that the Applicant's case against the First Respondent was based on the actions of the Second Respondent, who was acting on behalf of the First Respondent. However, the court found that the Applicant's concerns about the Second Respondent's continued involvement in the Applicant's probation process warranted an interim order.

The court ordered that the Second Respondent must not take part in any resolution by the First Respondent in respect of the Applicant's employment or have any involvement, direct or indirect, in the development or provision of information for any such resolution of the First Respondent, until the hearing and determination of the proceeding. The application for an interim order against the First Respondent was refused. The court's decision was based on the need to balance the Applicant's rights with the potential prejudice to the respondents if an interim order was granted.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for an interim order against the First Respondent is refused.

2. Pursuant to s 51 of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 and s 314 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 the Second Respondent is take no part in any resolution by the First Respondent in respect of the Applicant's employment or have any involvement, direct or indirect, in the development or provision of information for any such resolution of the First Respondent, until the hearing and determination of this proceeding.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Applicant also contends that the conduct is in breach of, and would amount to a breach of, the adverse action provisions of s 285 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (IR Act).Background The Applicant made a public interest disclosure (PID) on 12 October 2017 by providing correspondence to the Second Respondent and other Councillors of the First Respondent (the Council complaint) and to the Crime and Misconduct Commission (the CCC Referral). The Applicant also provided correspondence alleging misconduct under s 176B of the Local Government Act 2009 (LG Act) by the Second Respondent to the Director-General of the Department of Infrastructure, Local Government and Planning (the 176B Complaint). The s 176B complaint was referred to the CCC by the Director‑General. The Applicant understands the CCC is investigating the PID. The Applicant submits that each of the complaints and the referral are also an exercise of a workplace right for the purposes of the adverse action provisions of the IR Act as it was an exercise of a workplace right to make a complaint or inquiry about the Applicant's employment. The PID outlines the reasonable suspicion of corrupt conduct of, or maladministration by, the Second Respondent. The Applicant alleges that the conduct appears to have been engaged in by the Second Respondent for two purposes, one of which concerns the management of the Applicant's employment (including the probation review process), to cause detriment to the Applicant. Omitted by Decision of 27 February 2018. Because the PID was made, the First Respondent engaged an external consultant to undertake the Applicant's probationary review. The Applicant alleges that despite the First Respondent providing an assurance that the Second Respondent's involvement in the external review would be as an interviewee, the Second Respondent engaged in numerous and continuing acts that are both to the Applicant's detriment and adverse action. The Applicant contends that the conduct and the evidence support a conclusion that the detrimental conduct/adverse action is occurring because (or for reasons that include the fact that) the Applicant made a PID and in doing so exercised a workplace right. Given the Second Respondent's continued involvement in the Applicant's probation process, despite assurances to the contrary, the Applicant is concerned that detriment/adverse action in the form of termination of employment is threatened or may occur because:(i) the Applicant's probation ends on 30 January 2018 and has not been extended; and(ii) the respondents are in possession of the external consultant's probation review report, which, the Applicant contends, is overwhelmingly favourable to the Applicant. Despite this, there has been no indication that the Applicant's employment will be confirmed. Interim orders are sought to protect the Applicant's position pending the hearing and determination of the substantive application. At the hearing on 25 January, the parties agreed that the Applicant's probationary period would be extended to 9 February. This would allow time for the Commission to release its decision on this application this week as indicated, and, depending on the outcome, for a special meeting of the First Respondent to be held the following week.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Applicant noted that while she signed the Employment Agreement which includes the probation clause, no agreement was given to unlawful conduct being taken in respect of that clause.Consideration To grant an interim injunction the Commission must be satisfied that the Applicant has established a prima facie case and the balance of convenience favours the granting of the relief. Gummow and Hayne JJ described the meaning of the phrase, "prima facie case" in this way:"By using the phrase 'prima facie case', their Honours did not mean that the plaintiff must show that it is more probable than not that at trial the plaintiff will succeed; it is sufficient that the plaintiff show a sufficient likelihood of success to justify in the circumstances the preservation of the status quo pending the trial... With reference to the first inquiry, the Court continued…'How strong the probability needs to be depends, no doubt, upon the nature of the rights [the plaintiff] asserts and the practical consequences likely to flow from the order he seeks.' "[2][2] Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill [2006] 227 CLR 57, [65]. The Commission's traditional approach to interim orders was explained by Hall P who said in MIM Holdings Limited and The Australian Workers' Union of Employees, Queensland:"The Commission has traditionally, and should be, loath to make interim or interlocutory orders on the basis of part heard cases where no final view has been formed as to the facts or the law." [3][3] MIM Holdings Limited and The Australian Workers' Union of Employees, Queensland and Another (2000) 164 QGIG 296. The Commission is not required to make findings of fact in relation to the PID, the allegations or counter claims but there must be some evidentiary basis for the grant of the interim order. Because there are two respondents to this application with a separate order being sought against each of them, the case against each one is considered individually. Should an interim order be made against the First Respondent? The First Respondent submits that the whole of the Applicant's case is about the conduct of the Second Respondent. However, the Applicant contends that the actions of the Second Respondent have been taken in the Second Respondent's role in the First Respondent's employment and on behalf of the First Respondent. The First Respondent was thus knowingly concerned in the actions of the Second Respondent. In addition, the Applicant submits that there will be no work for any final order requiring the Second Respondent to be removed from involvement in any resolution considering the Applicant's employment on the grounds that the Second Respondent engaged in reprisal conduct if she has been dismissed in the interim because the interim order against the First Respondent was not made. For these reasons, the Applicant seeks interim orders against both respondents in order to protect the Applicant's position pending the hearing and determination of this matter. The difficulty for the Applicant is that there is nothing in the PID or the s 176B complaint that suggests that other Councillors have been engaged in or intend to engage in reprisal conduct. And, it is conduct about which s 51 of the PID Act is concerned. While the Applicant asserts the relevant conduct is the potential termination of the Applicant's employment by the First Respondent at the instigation of the Second Respondent, there is no foundation for that assertion. At its highest, the Applicant's evidence for this assertion is that the external consultant's reference to views expressed by "some Councillors" could only be derived from the Second Respondent.