QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION
CITATION: | |
PARTIES: | Kelsey, Sharon v Logan City Council and Smith, Timothy Luke |
CASE NO: | PID/2017/3 |
PROCEEDING: | Application for interim orders |
DELIVERED ON: | 1 February 2018 |
HEARING DATE: | 25 January 2018 |
MEMBER: | Industrial Commissioner Fisher |
ORDERS: | 1. The application for an interim order against the First Respondent is refused. 2. Pursuant to s 51 of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 and s 314 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 the Second Respondent is take no part in any resolution by the First Respondent in respect of the Applicant's employment or have any involvement, direct or indirect, in the development or provision of information for any such resolution of the First Respondent, until the hearing and determination of this proceeding. |
| CATCHWORDS: | PUBLIC INTEREST DISCLOSURE - INTERIM ORDERS - INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTIONS - where applicant made a public interest disclosure - where allegations of misconduct by second respondent - where ongoing adverse interventions of second respondent in matters relating to applicant's employment - where potential termination of applicant's employment by first respondent at the instigation of second respondent - where allegations against one member of council and not any other councillors - whether prima facie case established - whether balance of convenience favours granting of the relief INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS - INTERIM ORDERS - INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTIONS - where applicant has exercised a workplace right - whether conduct breach of adverse action provisions |
LEGISLATION: CASES: | Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010, s 48, s 51 Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill [2006] 227 CLR 57 MIM Holdings Limited and The Australian Workers' Union of Employees, Queensland and Another (2000) 164 QGIG 296 |
| APPEARANCES: | Mr C. Murdoch, QC instructed by Minter Ellison Lawyers for the Applicant. |
Decision
The Applicant seeks the following interim orders:
"1. An interim order pursuant to section 51 of the PID Act and 314 of the IR Act that the First Respondent must not consider or vote upon any resolution in respect of the Applicant's employment (except in relation to a positive vote confirming her employment), whether pursuant to a probationary process or otherwise, until the hearing and determination of this proceeding.
1A. An interim order pursuant to section 51 of the PID Act and section 314 of the IR Act that the Second Respondent take no part in any resolution by the First Respondent in respect of the Applicant's employment or have any involvement, direct or indirect, in the development or provision of information for any such resolution of the First Respondent, until the hearing and determination of this proceeding."
Section…
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- Case
- [2018] QIRC 9
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the legal principles required to grant an interim injunction, including that the Applicant must demonstrate a sufficient likelihood of success and that the balance of convenience favoured granting the relief. The court found that while the Applicant had made allegations of misconduct and reprisal actions by the Second Respondent, there was no evidence to suggest that other Councillors were engaged in or intended to engage in similar conduct. The court also noted that the Applicant's case against the First Respondent was based on the actions of the Second Respondent, who was acting on behalf of the First Respondent. However, the court found that the Applicant's concerns about the Second Respondent's continued involvement in the Applicant's probation process warranted an interim order.
The court ordered that the Second Respondent must not take part in any resolution by the First Respondent in respect of the Applicant's employment or have any involvement, direct or indirect, in the development or provision of information for any such resolution of the First Respondent, until the hearing and determination of the proceeding. The application for an interim order against the First Respondent was refused. The court's decision was based on the need to balance the Applicant's rights with the potential prejudice to the respondents if an interim order was granted.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for an interim order against the First Respondent is refused.
2. Pursuant to s 51 of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 and s 314 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 the Second Respondent is take no part in any resolution by the First Respondent in respect of the Applicant's employment or have any involvement, direct or indirect, in the development or provision of information for any such resolution of the First Respondent, until the hearing and determination of this proceeding.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Applicant noted that while she signed the Employment Agreement which includes the probation clause, no agreement was given to unlawful conduct being taken in respect of that clause.Consideration To grant an interim injunction the Commission must be satisfied that the Applicant has established a prima facie case and the balance of convenience favours the granting of the relief. Gummow and Hayne JJ described the meaning of the phrase, "prima facie case" in this way:"By using the phrase 'prima facie case', their Honours did not mean that the plaintiff must show that it is more probable than not that at trial the plaintiff will succeed; it is sufficient that the plaintiff show a sufficient likelihood of success to justify in the circumstances the preservation of the status quo pending the trial... With reference to the first inquiry, the Court continued…'How strong the probability needs to be depends, no doubt, upon the nature of the rights [the plaintiff] asserts and the practical consequences likely to flow from the order he seeks.' "[2][2] Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill [2006] 227 CLR 57, [65]. The Commission's traditional approach to interim orders was explained by Hall P who said in MIM Holdings Limited and The Australian Workers' Union of Employees, Queensland:"The Commission has traditionally, and should be, loath to make interim or interlocutory orders on the basis of part heard cases where no final view has been formed as to the facts or the law." [3][3] MIM Holdings Limited and The Australian Workers' Union of Employees, Queensland and Another (2000) 164 QGIG 296. The Commission is not required to make findings of fact in relation to the PID, the allegations or counter claims but there must be some evidentiary basis for the grant of the interim order. Because there are two respondents to this application with a separate order being sought against each of them, the case against each one is considered individually. Should an interim order be made against the First Respondent? The First Respondent submits that the whole of the Applicant's case is about the conduct of the Second Respondent. However, the Applicant contends that the actions of the Second Respondent have been taken in the Second Respondent's role in the First Respondent's employment and on behalf of the First Respondent. The First Respondent was thus knowingly concerned in the actions of the Second Respondent. In addition, the Applicant submits that there will be no work for any final order requiring the Second Respondent to be removed from involvement in any resolution considering the Applicant's employment on the grounds that the Second Respondent engaged in reprisal conduct if she has been dismissed in the interim because the interim order against the First Respondent was not made. For these reasons, the Applicant seeks interim orders against both respondents in order to protect the Applicant's position pending the hearing and determination of this matter. The difficulty for the Applicant is that there is nothing in the PID or the s 176B complaint that suggests that other Councillors have been engaged in or intend to engage in reprisal conduct. And, it is conduct about which s 51 of the PID Act is concerned. While the Applicant asserts the relevant conduct is the potential termination of the Applicant's employment by the First Respondent at the instigation of the Second Respondent, there is no foundation for that assertion. At its highest, the Applicant's evidence for this assertion is that the external consultant's reference to views expressed by "some Councillors" could only be derived from the Second Respondent.