SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Kelsall & Anor v State of Queensland & Anor [2012] QCA 369
PARTIES:
PAUL ANTHONY KELSALL
(first appellant)
EUNICE YING TENG KELSALL
(second appellant)
v
STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(first respondent)
BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL
(second respondent)FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 10572 of 2011
SC No 5762 of 2011DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
General Civil Appeal
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at BrisbaneDELIVERED ON:
21 December 2012
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
16 August 2012
JUDGES:
White and Gotterson JJA and North J
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the order madeORDER:
Appeal dismissed with costs.
CATCHWORDS:
REAL PROPERTY – COMPULSORY ACQUISITION OF LAND – POWERS OF ACQUISITION – PURPOSE OF ACQUISITION – where appellants owned Lots 70 and 71 as described – where both lots acquired by second respondent “as constructing authority” for “a purpose incidental to the purpose of an approved Tollway Project” – where appellants made a claim for compensation under s 19 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1967 (Qld) (“the ALA”) – where appellants sought to have the land revested in them under s 17 of the ALA – where the lots were then declared to be required for an additional transport purpose of the first respondent – where the appellants contend that this interfered with their entitlements under ss 17 and 41 of the ALA – where the trial judge concluded that the Minister was empowered by s 26A of the Transport Planning and Coordination Act 1994 (Qld) (“the TPC Act”) to change the purpose for which the land had been acquired – where the appellants contend that the trial judge erred in particular to the construction of “transport purpose” and “transport land” in s 3 of the TPC Act and the construction of the power to make a declaration under s 26A of the TPC Act that “land is required for another stated transport purpose” – whether “transport purpose” and “transport land” are limited to purposes of and land acquired by the first respondent, and the power in s 26A thereby limited to the first respondent – whether s 26A extends to permit a declaration where the “other stated transport purpose” is not one for which the acquiring entity was authorised to acquire the land – whether s 26A permits a declaration to be made in relation to additional purpose, as opposed to a declaration in relation to a different or an alternative purpose – whether the land the subject of the declaration (Lots 70 and 71) was not “transport land”
Acquisition of Land Act 1967 (Qld), s 5, s 17, s 19, s 41
Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 23(1)
Transport Infrastructure Act 1994 (Qld), s 2, s 5(1), s 92, s 93
Transport Planning and Coordination Act 1994 (Qld), s 2, s 3, s 4, s 6, s 8A, s 22, s 23, s 24, s 25, s 26, s 26A, s 27, Pt 4B
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- Case
- [2012] QCA 369
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were the interpretation of the terms "transport purpose" and "transport land" within the context of the Transport Planning and Coordination Act 1994 (Qld), and the extent of the power conferred by section 26A of that Act to declare that land is required for another stated transport purpose. The appellants contended that the trial judge erred in their construction of these terms and in their application of section 26A. Specifically, the appellants questioned whether "transport purpose" and "transport land" were limited to purposes and land acquired by the first respondent, and whether section 26A extended to permit a declaration for an additional purpose not originally authorized for the acquisition of the land.
The court found that the trial judge correctly interpreted the relevant statutory provisions. The court held that "transport purpose" and "transport land" were not limited to the purposes and land of the first respondent, and that section 26A permitted a declaration for an additional transport purpose, even if it was not the original purpose for which the land was acquired. The court also determined that the land in question was indeed "transport land" for the purposes of the TPC Act. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal with costs.
The final orders of the court were to dismiss the appeal with costs, affirming the decision of the trial judge and the subsequent declaration by the first respondent regarding the additional transport purpose for Lots 70 and 71.
Orders
Orders of the court
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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