Kelly and Repatriation Commission (Veterans’ entitlements)

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Kelly and Repatriation Commission (Veterans’ entitlements) [2016] AATA 642 (26 August 2016)

Division

GENERAL DIVISION

File Number(s)

2014/5821

Re

Irene Kelly

APPLICANT

And

Repatriation Commission

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal

Ms A F Cunningham, Senior Member

Date 26 August 2016
Place Sydney

The decision under review is set aside and in substitution the Tribunal decides that the veteran’s death was war-caused. The date of effect of the decision to grant the Applicant a War Widows pension is 9 August 2013.

..............................[sgd]..........................................

Ms A F Cunningham, Senior Member

CATCHWORDS

VETERAN’S ENTITLEMENTS – claim for war widows pension – operational service – kind of death – Alzheimer-type dementia – post-traumatic stress disorder – whether war caused – reasonable hypothesis raised on the material – decision under review set aside.

LEGISLATION

Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth) ss 5E, 8, 11, 13, 14, 120A, 120B, 196B

CASES

East v Repatriation Commission (1987) 16 FCR 517

Forrester v Repatriation Commission [2013] FCA 898

Repatriation Commission v Deledio [1998] FCA 391

Repatriation Commission v Stares (1996) FCR 594

SECONDARY MATERIALS

DSM-IV

DSM-V

Statement of Principles concerning Alzheimer-type Dementia No. 22 of 2010

Statement of Principles concerning Posttraumatic Stress Disorder No. 5 of 2008

REASONS FOR DECISION

Ms A F Cunningham, Senior Member

26 August 2016

  1. The Applicant, Irene Kelly is the widow of the late veteran, Laurence Mills who served with the Australian Army during World War II. The Applicant’s claim for a pension based on the death of her husband, who died on 27 March 2013 at the age of 94 years, was refused by the Repatriation Commission. The Repatriation Commission’s decision was affirmed by the Veteran’s Review Board on 14 October 2014 and the Applicant now seeks a review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.

    Issues

  2. The issues for the Tribunal to determine are:

    (a)the “kind of death” suffered by the veteran within the meaning of ss 120A and 120B of the Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth) (“the Act”), and;

    (b)whether the death of the veteran was connected with his operational war service.

  3. The Applicant’s claim was made on 9 August 2013 and accordingly the date of effect of any decision to grant her application is effective from that date.

    Service

  4. The veteran enlisted in the Australian Army on 1 October 1939 and was discharged on 23 January 1946. His period of service between 1 to 29 October 1939 and between 21 January 1940 to 19 April 1940 is deemed eligible service. The period of service from 20 February 1942 to 23 January 1946 is deemed operational service under the provisions of the Act.

    Contentions

  5. The veteran’s death certificate lists the diseases or conditions directly leading to death as aspiration pneumonia and dementia. It is contended on behalf of the Applicant that the “kind of death” suffered by the veteran as provided under the Act was death from Alzheimer-type dementia and that the relevant Statement of Principles (SoP) is instrument No. 22 of 2010 regarding Alzheimer-type dementia.

  6. The Applicant contends that the veteran’s exposure to Category 1A…

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Details
Case
[2016] AATA 642
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application for a war widow's pension made by the applicant, the widow of a veteran, before the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The dispute centred on whether the veteran's death, attributed to Alzheimer-type dementia and post-traumatic stress disorder, was caused by his operational service.

The Tribunal was required to determine whether a reasonable hypothesis existed connecting the veteran's death with the circumstances of his service, in accordance with section 120A of the relevant legislation. This involved considering whether any such hypothesis was supported by a Statement of Principles (SoP) determined under section 196B of the Act.

The Tribunal applied the four-step process outlined in *Repatriation Commission v Deledio* [1998] FCA 391. This process requires the Tribunal to first identify if the material raises a hypothesis connecting the death to service. If so, it must then ascertain if a relevant SoP is in force. If a SoP exists, the Tribunal must determine if the hypothesis fits the SoP's "template." Finally, if the hypothesis fits, the Tribunal must consider whether it is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the death was not war-caused. In this instance, the Tribunal found that the medical evidence, particularly from Dr Synnott, suggested the veteran suffered grief and psychological distress rather than PTSD, and that his later conditions were connected to his deteriorating physical and cognitive health, not his service.

The Tribunal concluded that the material before it did not raise a reasonable hypothesis connecting the veteran's death with his operational service, as required by section 120A. Consequently, the decision under review was set aside.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Section 120A provides that with respect to claims made on or after 1 June 1994 relating to the operational service rendered by the veteran for the purposes of subsection 120(3), a hypothesis connecting the veteran’s death with the circumstances of any particular service is reasonable only if there is a SoP determined under ss 196B(2) or (11) that uphold the hypothesis.Evidence The Applicant gave oral evidence at the hearing and her written statement was tendered into evidence. Oral evidence and a written statement were also given on behalf of the Applicant by her daughter, Michelle Williams, the Applicant’s son Andrew Ottaway, and the Applicant’s daughter Kim Flick. A written statement of Giles Flick, the veteran’s grandson was tendered in evidence however Mr Flick did not give oral evidence before the Tribunal. Medical evidence was provided by Dr Anthony Dinnen, consultant psychiatrist, in the form of written reports dated 25 January 2016 and 19 April 2016 and oral evidence. The medical report from Alastair J Corbett, neurologist, dated 31 October 2014 was tendered into evidence. A written medical report dated 4 March 1996 was provided on behalf of the Respondent by Dr Peter J. Morse, consultant psychiatrist. Dr Inglis Howe Synnott, consultant psychiatrist, gave oral evidence and his medical report dated 9 October 2015 was tendered in evidence. The T-documents were tendered pursuant to s 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). The Applicant stated that she had first met the late veteran in 1990 after his retirement and they had married on 4 December 2005. She said that her husband infrequently discussed the war but there were events and particular occasions that would trigger his discussion and memories. Particular events such as Anzac Day, Christmas and other anniversaries generally caused a tearful and emotional response from her husband. The Applicant recalled her husband’s distress and anxiety when he spoke about his bomb disposal expeditions into the jungle where the bombs were not easily recognisable and difficult to identify. The Applicant said that her husband had a particular dislike of the jungle and its tropical and wet environment. She recalled a seaside holiday when her husband displayed a fear of entering the water which brought back unpleasant memories of his skin dermatitis from which he suffered during service. When recounting events, the Applicant described how her husband would “phase-out” and stare into space unwilling to continue any conversation. These episodes could last for quite some time and on occasions for the entire day. The Applicant said that her husband did not enjoy meeting new people and was really only socially comfortable with members of his own family. The Applicant considered that her husband may have been suffering from depression. She was aware of the symptoms because her first husband had suffered from depression and had received shock treatment for the condition. The Applicant’s mother had also been very depressed before she died from Alzheimer’s disease.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Dr Synnott explained that World War II veterans were on the whole welcomed home and encouraged to get on with their lives and whilst many had psychological distress, they did not develop psychiatric illnesses. In his opinion the veteran suffered grief and psychological distress upon the death of his first wife which should not be confused with post-traumatic stress disorder. The veteran’s psychological distress was evidenced by his symptoms of tearfulness, crying, night sweats and sleep disturbance. Dr Synnott considered that in later years the veteran suffered a depressive anxiety condition that was connected with the deterioration in his physical and cognitive health. Dr Synnott relied on the findings of Dr Morse who saw the veteran in 1996 and did not consider that he suffered from a psychiatric condition.Consideration The Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in Repatriation Commission v Deledio [1998] FCA 391 (Deledio) provided guidance in the form of four steps that the Tribunal should follow in determining the connection of the veteran’s death with his service in accordance with the above provisions of the Act. Those four steps are as follows:1)The Tribunal must consider all the material which is before it and determine whether that material points to a hypothesis connecting the injury, disease or death with the circumstances of the particular service rendered by the person. No question of fact finding arises at this stage. If no such hypothesis arises, the application must fail. 2)If the material does raise such a hypothesis, the Tribunal must then ascertain whether there is in force an SoP determined by the [Repatriation Medical Authority] under s 196B(2) or (11). If no such SoP is in force, the hypothesis will be taken not to be reasonable and, in consequence, the application must fail. 3)If a SoP is in force, the Tribunal must then form the opinion whether the hypothesis raised is a reasonable one. It will do so if the hypothesis fits, that is to say, is consistent with the "template" to be found in the SoP. The hypothesis raised before it must thus contain one or more of the factors which the Authority has determined to be the minimum which must exist, and be related to the person's service (as required by ss 196B(2)(d) and (e)). If the hypothesis does contain these factors, it could neither be said to be contrary to proved or known scientific facts, nor otherwise fanciful. If the hypothesis fails to fit within the template, it will be deemed not to be "reasonable" and the claim will fail. 4)The Tribunal must then proceed to consider under s 120(1) whether it is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the death was not war-caused, or in the case of a claim for incapacity, that the incapacity did not arise from a war-caused injury. If not so satisfied, the claim must succeed. If the Tribunal is so satisfied, the claim must fail. It is only at this stage of the process that the Tribunal will be required to find facts from the material before it. In so doing, no question of onus of proof or the application of any presumption will be involved.