Keleher, Edward John v Sherrin Hire Pty Ltd (No 2)

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133/1998

PARTIES:  KELEHER, Edward John
  v
  SHERRIN HIRE PTY LTD (NO 2)

TITLE OF COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
JURISDICTION:  APPELLATE
FILE NO/S:  LCA 21/1998
DELIVERED:  30 October 1998
HEARING DATE/S:  16, 25 September, 23 October 1998
JUDGMENT OF:  Underwood J

CATCHWORDS:

Workers Compensation - Proceedings to obtain compensation - Determination of claims - Evidence and onus of proof - Evidence generally - Tribunal not bound by the rules of evidence - Tribunal entitled to regard a medical certificate as evidence of the truth of its contents - No breach of procedural fairness in so doing.

Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Tas), ss49(1) and 57(1).
Osmond v Kemp & Denning Ltd 44/1993; White v FAI Insurance 29/1991, Griffiths v Devonport Youth Accommodation Services Inc A39/1996, followed.
Casey v Repatriation Commission (1995) FCR 510, referred to.
Aust Dig Workers Compensation [148]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
             Appellant:  L K Mackey
             Respondent:  P L Jackson
Solicitors:
             Appellant:  Jennings Elliott
             Respondent:  Griffitts & Jackson

Judgment category classification:
Court Computer Code:  
Judgment ID Number:  133/1998
Number of pages:  4

Serial No 133/1998
File No LCA 21/1998

EDWARD JOHN KELEHER v SHERRIN HIRE PTY LTD (NO 2)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT  UNDERWOOD J

30 October 1998

Introduction

On 21 November 1996, the respondent's agent sent the appellant notice of intention to terminate weekly payments pursuant to the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 ("the Act"), s86(1)(c). Attached to that notice was a certificate from Edward M Schutz, MB, BS, FRACS, consultant surgeon. The certificate stated that it was Mr Schutz's opinion that the appellant had "wholly or substantially recovered from the effects of the injury that he suffered on 28th June 1996". The certificate set out the appellant's history and the grounds for the opinion. The appellant referred the matter to the Tribunal in accordance with the Act, s86(4).

On 1 December 1997, almost nine months after it was lodged, the referral came on for hearing before the Tribunal. Counsel for the appellant took a preliminary point that the notice did not comply with the provisions of the Act. At that hearing, the notice and Mr Schutz's certificate became exhibits. The learned Commissioner reserved his decision. Ten days later, he "determined the preliminary point in favour of the employer [respondent]" and adjourned the further hearing of the referral to a date to be fixed. Written reasons for the decision were published. From that determination there was an appeal to this Court. The appeal was dismissed. See Keleher v Sherrin Hire Pty Ltd 138/1997.

The hearing in the Tribunal resumed on 29 January 1998.  Again, the decision was reserved.  On 11 March 1998, the Tribunal determined that "at the relevant date the worker's condition was, as noted by Dr Schutz, as certified in the termination certificate and that he had wholly or substantially recovered from the effects of his work injury".  The referral was dismissed.  This appeal is against the order of dismissal.

Grounds of appeal

Upon the commencement of the hearing of this appeal, the notice of…

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Details
Case
[1998] TASSC 133
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Supreme Court of Tasmania heard an appeal brought by Edward John Keleher against Sherrin Hire Pty Ltd, concerning the termination of Keleher's workers' compensation payments. The central issue was whether the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Tribunal had erred in treating a medical certificate as evidence of the truth of its contents. The tribunal had determined that Keleher had substantially recovered from his injury, thereby justifying the termination of his compensation payments. Keleher contested the tribunal's decision, arguing that the certificate should not have been accepted as evidence without the doctor being cross-examined.

The court addressed the legal principles guiding the tribunal's consideration of evidence, emphasizing that the tribunal is not bound by the common law rules of evidence. Instead, it may consider any material that tends to prove a fact. The tribunal was thus within its rights to regard the medical certificate as evidence of the truth of its contents. The court further noted that the appellant's cross-examination largely affirmed the accuracy of the factual basis for the doctor's opinion, mitigating the impact of the doctor's absence. The appellant's opportunity to challenge the certificate was not prejudiced as he was offered, but declined, an adjournment to call the doctor as a witness.

In conclusion, the court upheld the tribunal's decision, dismissing the appeal. The tribunal did not breach any principles of natural justice by treating the medical certificate as evidence of the truth of its contents, and the appellant's failure to effectively challenge the certificate's contents led to the tribunal's decision being upheld. The appeal was thus dismissed, affirming the tribunal's ruling that Keleher had substantially recovered from his injury.

Background

Background to the litigation

On 21 November 1996, Sherrin Hire Pty Ltd provided Edward John Keleher with a notice of intention to terminate weekly payments for workers' compensation. The notice included a certificate from Dr. Edward M Schutz, a consultant surgeon, stating that Keleher had wholly or substantially recovered from his work-related injury sustained on 28 June 1996. Keleher referred the matter to the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Tribunal under the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988. The Tribunal initially heard a preliminary point on the compliance of the notice but later focused on whether Keleher had wholly or substantially recovered from his injury. The Tribunal heard evidence from Keleher, an orthopaedic specialist, and a general practitioner, but ultimately concluded that Keleher had recovered as stated in Dr Schutz's certificate.

The proceedings began on 1 December 1997, where the Tribunal first considered a preliminary point about the notice's compliance. This matter was later determined in favour of Sherrin Hire Pty Ltd, leading to an appeal that was dismissed. The substantive hearing resumed on 29 January 1998, where Keleher's counsel sought clarification on whether Dr Schutz's certificate would be treated as evidence of its contents. Despite objections, the Tribunal proceeded, treating the certificate as evidence. Keleher's counsel sought to cross-examine Dr Schutz but did not request an adjournment to do so. During the hearing, Keleher agreed, except for a minor detail, that the facts in Dr Schutz's certificate were accurate as of the examination date of 16 October 1996. Ultimately, the Tribunal dismissed Keleher's referral, finding that he had recovered as stated in the certificate. Keleher appealed this decision, arguing procedural errors and breaches of natural justice.

This case is an appeal against the decision of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Tribunal of Tasmania, which dismissed the appellant's referral. The appellant, Edward John Keleher, sought compensation from the respondent, Sherrin Hire Pty Ltd, following an injury sustained in the course of his employment. The matter initially came before the Tribunal when the appellant referred the decision of the respondent to terminate his weekly compensation payments to the Tribunal under section 86(4) of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988. The Tribunal determined the referral in the respondent's favour, finding that the appellant had wholly or substantially recovered from the effects of his injury. This determination was itself subject to an earlier appeal to the Supreme Court of Tasmania, which was dismissed. The current appeal concerns the Tribunal's handling of the medical certificate provided by Dr Schutz, a consultant surgeon, which formed the basis of the respondent's decision to terminate payments. Key procedural steps include the initial referral to the Tribunal, the preliminary hearing addressing the form of the notice, the main hearing where the Tribunal considered the merits of the referral, and the subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court. The appellant sought to amend the grounds of appeal during the hearing, arguing that the Tribunal's acceptance of the medical certificate as evidence without requiring the respondent to call Dr Schutz constituted a breach of procedural fairness. This appeal seeks to overturn the Tribunal's decision on several grounds, including the legal characterisation of the medical certificate as evidence and alleged procedural unfairness in how the certificate was treated.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the Tribunal was correct to regard the certificate of Dr Schutz as evidence of the truth of its contents, in light of the provisions of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Tas), s49(1).
2. Whether the Tribunal's treatment of the medical certificate without requiring the Respondent to call Dr Schutz to give evidence denied procedural fairness to the Appellant, in accordance with the principles of natural justice.
3. Whether the Tribunal's decision to dismiss the Appellant's referral to determine the claims for compensation was legally sound, considering the evidence presented and the applicable legal standards.

Held
1. The Tribunal was correct to regard the certificate of Dr Schutz as evidence of the truth of its contents, in light of the provisions of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Tas), s49(1). The court concluded that the Tribunal was not bound by the rules of evidence and could regard the certificate as evidence of the truth of its contents.
2. The Tribunal's treatment of the medical certificate without requiring the Respondent to call Dr Schutz to give evidence did not deny procedural fairness to the Appellant, in accordance with the principles of natural justice. The court concluded that the offer of an adjournment to call Dr Schutz as a witness dispelled any potential disadvantage, and the Appellant did not take up the offer.
3. The Tribunal's decision to dismiss the Appellant's referral to determine the claims for compensation was legally sound, considering the evidence presented and the applicable legal standards. The court concluded that the Appellant's evidence corroborated the contents of Dr Schutz's certificate, and the Appellant was unable to adduce evidence acceptable to the Tribunal to suggest that his condition was different from what was described in the certificate.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Supreme Court of Tasmania's judgment in Keleher v Sherrin Hire Pty Ltd (No 2) addresses several critical issues regarding the admissibility of evidence, procedural fairness, and the legal soundness of a tribunal's decision. The first issue concerns whether the Tribunal was correct to regard the certificate of Dr Schutz as evidence of the truth of its contents under the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Tas), s49(1). The court found that the Act expressly permits the Tribunal to consider the contents of a document as evidence of the truth of its statements. Section 49(1) allows the Tribunal to inform itself in any manner it deems fit, effectively excluding the common law of evidence and the provisions of the Evidence Act 1910. This principle was reinforced by Wright J in Connelly v P & O Resorts Pty Ltd, where it was held that the Tribunal could receive hearsay evidence as long as it satisfies the test of being evidence rather than mere supposition or hypothesis. In this case, the Tribunal's acceptance of the certificate as evidence was not only permissible but also supported by the appellant's cross-examination, where he affirmed the correctness of the facts upon which the certificate was based.

The second issue pertains to whether the Tribunal's treatment of the medical certificate without requiring Dr Schutz to testify denied procedural fairness to the appellant. The court examined this matter in the context of the principles of natural justice, as outlined in cases such as Osmond v Kemp & Denning Ltd, White v FAI Insurance, and Griffiths v Devonport Youth Accommodation Services Inc. The court noted that although the appellant's counsel sought to cross-examine Dr Schutz, an adjournment was offered to allow for this, which was declined. The court further compared this situation to Casey v Repatriation Commission, where the Federal Court held that the appellant could not complain about the lack of opportunity to deal with the material since he did not seek an adjournment or cross-examine the witnesses. Here, the appellant's failure to take advantage of the adjournment offer meant that there was no breach of procedural fairness.

The final issue is whether the Tribunal's decision to dismiss the appellant's referral to determine the claims for compensation was legally sound. The court considered the evidence presented and the applicable legal standards, concluding that the Tribunal's decision was sound. The Tribunal was entitled to give significant weight to the appellant's corroboration of the factual basis of the certificate, despite the absence of Dr Schutz's testimony. The court found that the appellant's own evidence and the expert evidence presented did not sufficiently contradict the certificate's findings to warrant a different outcome.

In summary, the ratio decidendi of this case is that under the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Tas), a tribunal is not bound by the common law of evidence and can regard a medical certificate as evidence of the truth of its contents, provided there is no breach of procedural fairness. The court also reinforced that procedural fairness was not compromised in this case as the appellant was given the opportunity to cross-examine the author of the certificate but declined to do so.